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Abstract
This PhD thesis explores how bioethics has reconfigured the way we think about, discuss and 
govern the scientific and medical use of the human body in the UK and Singapore. The thesis 
starts by analysing the language, knowledge, institutions and mechanisms that allowed people 
to render intelligible and organise the medical use of the human body before the emergence of 
bioethics. Then, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, Ian Hacking and Nikolas Rose, the 
thesis examines and compares the conceptual, material and political conditions that made it 
possible, in both the UK and Singapore, to identify the medical use of human tissue as a 
‘problem of ethics’ needing to be assessed and regulated. The thesis furthermore discusses a 
key component of bioethics — the procedure of informed consent -  and analyzes how its use is 
reconfiguring subjectivities and contemporary notions of citizenship in both countries.
O n the basis of a systematic content analysis of key bioethics’ journals from 1960 to the 
present and over twenty in-depth interviews with key experts in the field, the thesis makes two 
important findings. First, it explains how, in the UK, bioethical governance was developed to 
protect human beings from the dangers o f modern science, while in Singapore it was 
introduced as part o f the country’s drive to be a modern and developed nation. Second, it 
argues that bioethical governance has brought into being, through its language, categories, 
procedures and experts, a new figure of the subject and citizen: the human being capable of 
reflecting and deciding on his or her own existence. These findings make an original 
contribution to (1) the sociological study o f bioethics and the bioethical governance o f the life 
sciences and (2) the literature on govem-mentality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis suggests that, over the last twenty years, a new logic of government or style of 
thinking has progressively reconfigured the way the scientific and medical use of the human 
body and parts thereof is problematised and administered. It terms this new mentality of rule: 
‘ethics governance’ or ‘bioethical governance.’1
Among the different concepts, expertise, problems, institutional forms and procedures that 
compose ethics governance, three elements are particularly characteristic o f this new style of 
thought. The first is the belief that the collection and use o f the human body in medical 
research are fraught with potential dangers for the lives and dignity o f human beings. 
According to this logic o f government, these dangers constitute ‘ethical issues’ that should be 
solved by re-organising the collection and use o f the human body in biomedical research in 
ways that are respectful and protective o f human beings. The second element characteristic of 
this new style o f thought is the bioethical committee. Staffed with experts from philosophy, 
law, theology, social science and medicine, these committees are mandated to identify', analyse 
and recommend solutions to the ethical issues that the scientific and medical use of human 
tissue are thought to generate. The third element characteristic o f bioethical logic is the notion 
o f ‘ethical framework:’ an assemblage o f ethical codes, practical instructions and guidance, 
formal procedures and monitoring institutions that aims to put in place a way to collect and 
use the human body for medical research that respects and protects human beings, their lives 
and their dignity.
This new way o f thinking and governing the collection and use o f the human body in medical 
research has become increasingly widespread and influential o f late. This style o f thought was 
initially developed in scholarly texts written by experts on bioethics working for research 
centres at universities, in official reports published by national ethics commissions and at
1 This thesis uses the terms government and governance interchangeably to refer to an assemblage of rationalities, 
institutions and technologies. It does not subscribe to the distinction drawn by some authors between 
government as a form of rule characterised by a single source of power, hierarchy and command and governance 
as a form of rule characterised by a multiplicity of sources of power, partnerships and dialogue (e.g. Rosenau, J.N. 
and E.-O. Czempiel, Governance without Government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Rhodes, 
R.A.W., Understanding Governance, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1997).
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conferences organised by organisations promoting bioethics such as the International 
Association o f Bioethics. Today, ethics governance can be found at work in a much larger 
number o f documents, institutions and procedures: declarations and reports published by 
international organisations like UNESCO, the W HO or the OECD; ethical guidelines adopted 
by funding agencies and professional medical associations; corporate social responsibility 
programmes developed by pharmaceutical companies; formal procedures and research ethics 
committees put in place by laboratories and tissues banks in universities and hospitals; and 
information leaflets produced and distributed by patients advocacy groups. At the same time, 
the influence o f ethics governance has also expanded geographically. Initially developed in 
N orth America and Europe, it has since been adopted in an ever increasing number of 
countries, most notably in South America and Asia (cf. Morioka 1995; Diniz, Guilhem et al. 
1999; Fox and Swazey 2008:Chapter 8).
Taking a genealogical approach (Foucault 1991a; Foucault 2004a; Foucault 2004b), this thesis 
explores the transformations in the ways we think about, problematise and organise the 
medical use o f the human body brought about by the emergence o f bioethical governance. 
First, it locates and charts the development o f the rationalities and practices that make the 
identification o f the collection and use of the human body as an ethical issue possible today. 
Second, the thesis analyses how the new ways o f thinking and governing that make up ethics 
governance have reconfigured the way we understand ourselves as subjects and citizens. To 
explore these two questions, the thesis focuses on both the United Kingdom, one of the 
countries in the West where ethics governance was first developed, and Singapore, an Asian 
country and former British colony where bioethical logic was only recently introduced. It first 
compares the conceptual, material and political conditions that make it possible for ethics 
governance to emerge and exist in the two countries. It then examines how a key component 
o f ethics governance — the procedure of informed consent — has transformed contemporary 
subjectivities and notions o f citizenship in both the UK and Singapore.
The thesis hopes to make an original contribution to two different bodies of literature. The 
first one is the sociology o f bioethics and the ethical governance o f the biomedical sciences 
(e.g. Hoffmaster 2001a; Corrigan 2003; Jasanoff 2005; Waldby and Mitchell 2006; Salter 2007; 
Sunder Rajan 2007). Although the thesis shares the same thematic interest in the ethical 
regulation of the biomedical sciences as the sociology o f bioethics, it takes a markedly different 
approach to the topic. The sociology o f bioethics is primarily concerned with highlighting the 
‘failures’ of bioethical governance (e.g.: its ‘bureaucratisation;’ its incapacity to account for the 
‘socio-cultural context;’ its complicity with the ‘medico-industrial complex’) and deploring the
shortcomings o f its understanding of the subject (e.g.: too Western; too abstract; too 
individualistic). In contrast, this thesis aims to locate the rationalities and practices that make 
ethics governance possible in the first place and aims to determine the concept o f the subject 
brought into being by ethics governance.
The second body o f work to which this thesis aims to contribute is the literature on 
governmentality (e.g. Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991; Barry, Osborne et al. 1996; Dean 1999; 
Rose 1999a; Foucault 2004a; Foucault 2004b; Miller and Rose 2008). In this case, the thesis 
and governmentality studies share the same conceptual approach (genealogy) but apply it to a 
different empirical field. The literature on governmentality has primarily used the genealogical 
approach to examine the way liberalism and neo-liberalism have reconfigured modern 
mentalities o f rule. In contrast, this thesis uses the same approach to explore how one 
particular contemporary language o f virtue -  bioethics — has transformed the way we govern 
today. In doing so, it contributes to a burgeoning literature which has sought to apply a 
genealogical approach to the modem ethical discourses — the ethics o f war; environmental 
ethics; corporate ethics; bioethics; etc. — that seek to infuse human activities like war, trade or 
science with a renewed sense o f morality (e.g. Osborne 2003; Barry 2004; Power 2007).
Organisation of the Thesis
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the theoretical concepts used in the thesis, situates the 
thesis in relation to two bodies of literature to which it aims to contribute and offers an 
overview o f the methodology pursued. It starts by discussing a series o f key theoretical 
concepts that figure prominendy in the thesis and which are drawn from the work o f Michel 
Foucault in particular. These concepts include: genealogy, problematisation, rationalities, 
technologies, govern-mentalities, modes of subjectification and citizenship projects. The 
chapter then locates the thesis in relation to sociological and anthropological studies of the 
ethical governance o f the life sciences, explaining how the thesis relates to these two bodies of 
work. Finally, the chapter discusses some methodological considerations, most notably the 
research methods used to access and reconstruct the ways o f thinking and acting that make up 
bioethical governance and the reasons for choosing to contrast the United Kingdom and 
Singapore.
Chapter 3 does not address ethics governance itself. Instead, it explores the rationalities, 
institutions and procedures that allowed people to problematise and administer the collection
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and use o f the medical body in research before the emergence o f ethics governance in the 
1990s. More specifically, it examines the logics that dominated the ways o f governing the 
movement o f the human body in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Given that the most 
influential logics at the time were developed in the UK rather than in Singapore and given the 
paucity o f the historical scholarship on this issue in Singapore, the chapter focuses essentially 
on the UK. It argues that, during this two hundred year period, there were two principal logics 
o f rule that dominated, in succession, the way of problematising and administering the medical 
use of the human body. The chapter then describes the knowledge, institutional forms and 
forms o f subjectivities that made up each of these two mentalities o f rule which it terms 
‘m odem  anatomical’ and ‘haemato-social governance’ respectively. This description offers an 
interesting contrast to bioethical governance and provides an overview of the context in which 
the rationalities and practices that make up ethics governance were progressively assembled.
Chapter 4 examines the conceptual, material and political conditions that make the emergence 
and existence o f ethics governance possible in the United Kingdom. Having demonstrated the 
prevalence and the main characteristics o f bioethical governance in the UK in the last ten 
years, the chapter goes on to argue that the new way o f problematising and administering the 
medical use o f the body that is characteristic of ethics governance is the product o f a will to 
respect and protect human beings from the dangers of modem medicine. This will, it further 
argues, is a style o f thinking that emerged from modem medical ethics (or bioethics) and 
became increasingly influential in the UK from the 1960s onwards. After providing an 
overview o f the emergence and rise o f bioethics to pre-eminence between 1960 and 1990, the 
chapter describes each of the five main elements of this style of thinking: (1) the belief that 
modern medicine was dangerous; (2) the desire to protect and respect human beings; (3) the 
bioethical committee; (4) ethical codes; and (5) ethical technologies. The chapter then 
demonstrates how it was this style o f thinking that made it possible to identify the medical use 
o f the human body and parts thereof as an ethical issue requiring an ethical framework.
Chapter 5 examines the conceptual, material and political conditions that make the importation 
and adoption o f ethics governance possible in Singapore. Having demonstrated the prevalence 
o f bioethical governance in Singapore today, the chapter goes on to argue that despite the 
striking similarities between the British and Singaporean versions o f bioethical governance, 
their conditions o f possibility are thoroughly different. Indeed, the will to respect and protect 
human beings against the dangers o f modem medicine that made the emergence o f ethics 
governance possible in the UK did not play any significant role in Singapore until the turn of 
the century. Moreover, as the chapter also points out, modem medical ethics was virtually
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unheard o f  in the South-East Asian Republic until well into the 1990s. The chapter argues that, 
in contrast to the UK where ethics governance was the product o f a will to respect human 
beings, the development o f ethics governance in Singapore was the result o f a relentless will to 
modernise the country that has characterised the thinking of the Singaporean leadership ever 
since independence in 1959. To demonstrate this, the chapter first describes the different 
element that make up this style of thinking, notably the economically determined notion of 
modernisation and the concept o f industrial infrastructure. It then shows how this same will to 
modernise has informed Singapore’s attempt to turn the Republic into a world-class hub for 
the biomedical sciences from 1985 onwards. It notably shows how the biomedical sciences 
have become conceptualised as an engine of economic growth and how the meaning of 
infrastructure was transformed to support a knowledge-based economy rather than an 
industrialised one. Finally, the chapter explains how ethics governance was developed as part 
o f Singapore’s ‘soft infrastructure’ that would ensure that Singapore’s biomedical research base 
had a ‘good reputation’ across the globe and in particular among foreign multinational 
pharmaceutical companies.
Chapter 6 explores the ways in which the different rationalities and practices that make up 
ethics governance reconfigure modem subjectivities and forms of citizenship. To do so, the 
chapter focuses on a key element of bioethical governance: the principle o f informed consent 
and the numerous strategies, procedures and ethical technologies devised to operationalise it. It 
argues that informed consent is articulated around a particular figure o f the subject whose 
reality it both presupposes and helps to construct: the human being capable o f reflecting on 
and deciding about his or her own existence and body. To substantiate this argument, the 
chapter examines, first o f all, the way the literature on informed consent portrays the human 
being as ‘a person’ who is ‘able to think, act and communicate.’ It describes how these texts 
conceptualise this person and his or her particular capacity: its different dimensions; its 
development and possible loss; and the methods to assess its presence or absence. Second, this 
chapter examines how these same texts portray informed consent as a mean to transform the 
doctor-patient relationship so as to enable the ‘patient as person’ to think and act about his or 
her health and body. It shows, in particular, how the literature on informed consent seeks to 
eliminate the paternalistic ethos around which this relationship was articulated and which 
negated the patient as person. It also shows how this literature aims to rebuild the rapport 
between doctor and patient as a ‘process of communication’ where the patient is given time, 
space and resources to think and decide. Given that, as demonstrated in chapter 5, the UK and 
Singaporean versions of ethics governance are very similar, this chapter explores the impact of 
informed consent on modes of being in the UK and Singapore at the same time, drawing its
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examples from the two countries. Where there are marked and relevant differences, these 
noted and explained.
Chapter 2
A Genealogy of Bioethical Governance
Approaching the field o f bioethics and the ethical governance o f the life sciences with the view 
o f writing its ‘history of the present’ or ‘genealogy’ has to be distinguished from other 
approaches which are dominant within the sociological and anthropological literature analysing 
this topic. A genealogical approach has, in particular, to be distinguished from approaches 
which either seek to demonstrate the ‘shortcomings’ and ‘alienating nature’ of bioethics or, 
conversely, purport to praise its ‘realisations’ and ‘advantages.’ Instead of taking such 
approaches, this thesis explores the conditions that made it possible, from the late 1980s 
onwards, to think about and organize the scientific and medical use o f the human body 
according to the logic o f ethics governance. In other words, this thesis traces the genealogy of 
the rationalities and practices that allow us to see, today, the use o f human body parts in 
medical research as an ‘ethical problem’ that needs to be assessed and regulated in order to 
protect human beings. Furthermore, this thesis examines how these different rationalities and 
practices reconfigure the way we understand ourselves as subjects and citizens. Put differendy, 
it analyses how the ways of thinking and acting that make up bioethical governance are 
overflowing into and transforming our modes o f being.
To write a genealogy o f the way we think about and regulate the medical use o f the human 
body today is of course to build on an important literature which has sought, following 
Foucault, to analyse how particular issues like crime, prostitution, families, illness, cities, 
development, citizenship, or the self have been comprehended, problematised and governed 
(e.g. Foucault 1973; Foucault 1977a; Collini 1979; Donzelot 1980; Rabinow 1989; Corbin 1990; 
Escobar 1994; Rose 1999b; Isin 2002). This is an approach which, through the use of analytical 
concepts like ‘problematisation,’ ‘forms o f rationalities,’ ‘technologies o f government’ and 
‘modes o f subj edification,’ attempts to show the singularity and contingency of the present in 
order to lay open both its limitations and possibilities (cf. Dean 1994; Rabinow 1996; Dean 
1999; Rose 1999a; Hacking 2002; Lemke 2002; Rabinow and Rose 2003; Miller and Rose 
2008). This chapter discusses some of these analytical concepts developed by this literature and 
explains how I have used them to examine both: the transformations in how the circulation of 
the human body for medical research is understood and organised; and, the ways in which 
these transformations have reconfigured contemporary notions o f subjects and citizenship.
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This chapter also situates this thesis’ particular approach to the field o f ethics governance in 
relation to both the sociological and anthropological literature on the ethical governance of the 
life sciences (e.g. DeVries and Subedi 1998; Elliott 1999; Jasanoff 2005; Salter and Salter 2005; 
Petryna 2006; Waldby and Mitchell 2006; Sunder Raj an 2007) and the literature on 
‘governmentality’ (e.g. Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991; Barry, Osborne et al. 1996; Dean 1999; 
Rose 1999a; Foucault 2004a; Foucault 2004b; Miller and Rose 2008). In relation to the first 
body of work, this thesis offers a fresh perspective on the development, globalisation and 
functioning o f the rationalities and practices that make up ethics governance. It does so by 
emphasising contingency in the emergence and dissemination o f bioethics and by stressing 
bioethics’ productive force in shaping subjectivities and citizenship. Beyond its original 
contribution to the sociological study o f bioethics, the thesis also deploys the analytics 
developed by the literature on governmentality in a new field o f research. Indeed, instead of 
contributing to the genealogy of liberalism written by governmentality studies, this thesis 
participates in the burgeoning analysis of how contemporary ethical discourses, from the ethics 
o f war to corporate and environmental ethics, have reconfigured the administration of 
economic, social and personal life across the globe (e.g. Osborne 2003; Barry 2004; Guilhot 
2005; Power 2007). In that respect, a genealogy o f bioethical governance is an attempt to 
increase our understanding of these new ‘languages of virtue’ that are articulated around the 
figure o f the human being.
Finally, this chapter sets out the methodology that has enabled me to access and reconstruct 
the ways of thinking and acting that make up bioethical governance and their development in 
both the United Kingdom and Singapore. Firstly, this chapter explains how, following Bruno 
Latour’s (1988:9-12) ‘Method for Composing Our World,’ I accessed and mapped the dispositif 
of ethics governance through, notably, a systematic content analysis of four of the field’s key 
journals from 1960 to the present and over twenty in-depth interviews with key experts in 
bioethics (lawyers, bio-ethicists, doctors, etc.). Secondly, the chapter also clarifies the reasons 
for choosing to compare and contrast the United Kingdom and Singapore.
Genealogies of Governmental Logics: Problems, Rationalities and Technologies
As stated, this thesis is a genealogy of the rationalities and practices that make up ethics 
governance. As such, it explores the transformations in the ways we think about, problematise 
and govern the scientific and medical use o f the human body which have taken place over the
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last 20 years and charts the conceptual, material and political conditions that have made such 
transformations possible. It seeks, in other words, to locate the rationalities and practices that 
make it possible to identify the medical use of the human body as a ‘problem of ethics’ 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:v) that has to be examined and regulated. It also attempts 
to trace how these rationalities and practices were progressively developed as well as the ways 
in which they were assembled in a complex bioethical assemblage and disseminated in different 
locations. As already explained, to approach the field of bioethical governance of the life 
sciences in these terms is to build on the research ethos and analytics developed by Foucault 
and others when analysing how particular forms o f rationalities (e.g.: criminology; psychiatry; 
sociology; neo-liberal theories; development studies) make it possible to think, problematise 
and govern particular issues (e.g.: crime; the self; families; government; the third world) in 
particular ways at a given time and place (e.g.: Foucault 1972; Foucault 1973; Foucault 1977a; 
Foucault 1977b; Donzelot 1980; Rabinow 1989; Corbin 1990; Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991; 
Foucault 1991a; Escobar 1994; Barry, Osborne et al. 1996; Rose 1999b; Isin 2002;Joyce 2003; 
Lamer and Walters 2004; Foucault 2004a; Foucault 2004b; Miller and Rose 2008).
By focusing on the ‘process of problematisation’ at the heart of ethics governance — namely its 
identification of the use of the human body in medical research as a ‘problem of ethics’ that 
needs to be reviewed and regulated in order to protect human beings — this thesis draws on the 
notion o f ‘problematisation’ developed by Foucault and others (cf. Dean 1999; Rose 1999a; 
Rabinow and Rose 2003; Miller and Rose 2008). The notion of ‘problematisation’ was put 
forward by Foucault as part of his project to historicise reason and examine ‘how men govern 
themselves and others by the production of truth’ (Foucault 1991a:79). For Foucault, one 
needed particular forms o f rationalities and regimes of practices to make it possible to think 
and act in a certain way at a given date and place — ‘one cannot speak of any thing at any time’ 
(Foucault 1972:44). And, for him, the task was to explore ‘the ensemble of discursive and non- 
discursive practices that make something enter into the play o f true and false and constitute it 
as an object o f thought, [problematisation and intervention] (whether in the form of moral 
reflection, scientific reflection [or] political analysis)’ (Foucault cited in Rabinow and Rose 
2003:12-13). Understood within this wider perspective, the concept of ‘problematisation’ 
draws attention to the different forms o f rationalities and regimes o f practices that make it 
possible for something to be identified as a ‘problem’ and invites us to study how these ways 
of thinking and acting were progressively developed and assembled over time:
‘I f  the conduct o f  individuals or collectivities appeared to require conducting, this was because 
something in it appeared problematic to someone. Thus, it makes sense to start by asking how this 
rendering o f  things problematic occurred. The term “problematising” was a useful way o f designating
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this as a process, for it removed the self-evidence o f  the term “problems.” It suggested that 
“problems” are not pre-given, lying there waiting to be revealed. They have to be constructed and 
made visible, and this construction o f  a field o f  problems is a complex and often slow process. Issues 
and concerns have to be made to appear problematic, often in different ways, in different sites, and 
by different agents’ (Miller and Rose 2008:14).
It is this notion of ‘problematisation’ that determines the way I have approached the field of 
bioethical governance o f the life sciences in this thesis. Indeed, unlike much of the 
anthropological and sociological literature on bioethics that approaches the way the use of the 
human body in medical research is regulated today with the will to describe either its 
‘shortcomings’ or its ‘advantages,’ I do not assume that the medical use o f human tissue is an 
‘ethical problem’ which needs to be reviewed and regulated. Instead, I look backwards and ask 
how the use o f human tissue became a problem in the first place. In other words, I explore the 
history o f the different forms of rationalities and practices in our present that makes it possible 
to identify the medical use o f the human body as a ‘problem of ethics.’ I analyse the ‘complex 
and often slow process’ during which these rationalities and practices were progressively 
developed and brought together in a complex assemblage that makes the use o f human tissue 
in research ‘appear problematic’ today.
In order to analyse the different forms o f rationalities and practices that make up ethics 
governance, this thesis draws on another concept developed by Foucault and others, namely 
the notion of ‘govem-mentality’ (cf. Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991; Barry, Osborne et al. 1996; 
Hindess 1997; Dean 1999; Rose 1999a; Lemke 2002; Joyce 2003; Foucault 2004a; Foucault 
2004b; Ong 2006; Miller and Rose 2008). This concept was first coined and discussed by 
Foucault in a series of lectures at the College de France in 1978 and 1979 (Lemke 2001; 
Senellart 2004; O'Malley, Valverde et al. 2006; Valverde 2007; Donzelot 2008; Tierney 2008). 
In these lectures, which continued the genealogy of modem states’ knowledges and powers 
that he begun in 1976, Foucault argued that an important transformation o f the ways in which 
the government of human beings was conceived had taken place in late 18th century Europe. 
He showed how, due to the emergence of liberal theories of government found in the writings 
o f the French Physiocrats and, more significantly, o f political economists like Adam Smith, 
one had shifted from a formula o f rule articulated around theories on reason o f state (Raison 
d ’Rtat), mercantilist economic models, the science o f police (Poli^eiwissenschaji) and a 
diplomatic-military apparatus to a model based on political economy, notions o f the market 
and liberty and apparatuses of security. It was to denote this new way o f conceiving 
government which had emerged in the late 18th century under the influence o f classical 
liberalism that Foucault first coined the term govern-mentality:
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W hat I would like to undertake is something which I would term a history o f  “governmentality.” By 
this word I mean three things. First, the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses 
and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise o f  this very specific albeit complex 
form o f  power, which has as its target population, at its principal form o f  knowledge political 
economy, and at its essential means apparatuses o f  security. Second, the tendency which, over a long 
period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence . . .  o f  this type o f  power 
which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation o f a whole series o f  
specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development o f  a whole series o f  expert 
bodies o f  knowledge (savoirs). Third, the process, or rather the result o f  the process, through which 
the state o f  justice o f  the Middle Ages, transformed in into the administrative state during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes “govemmentalised”’ (Foucault 1991b:102-103; 
cf. also Foucault 2004a:lll-112).
Thus, for Foucault, ‘govem-mentality’ was, first o f all, yet another one of those historically 
delineated ‘discursive formations’ or ‘regimes of practice’ made o f an assemblage of 
knowledges, institutions, procedures and tactics which reconfigured the ways we think about, 
problematise and act upon a particular set of issues, like nineteenth century pathological 
anatomy in relation to notions of illness or penology in relation to concepts of punishment (cf. 
Foucault 1972; Foucault 1973; Foucault 1977a; Foucault 1991a).
‘Can we talk about something like a “govem-mentality” which would stand in relation to the state as 
techniques o f  segregation stand to psychiatry, as techniques o f  discipline stand to the penal system or 
as biopolitics stand to medical institutions?’ (Foucault 2004a:124; my translation).
From this historically delimited understanding, Foucault would, during the course o f his 
lectures, soon generalise the meaning o f govern-mentality to denote an analytical device 
applicable to any particular mentality, logic or style of reasoning concerned with the direction 
of human conduct:
‘. .. what I have suggested to term governmentality ...  is nothing else than a grid to analyse the way 
one conducts the conduct o f  men ... (The aim o f  these lectures was] to see how this grid — which is 
also valid to examine the way one conducts the conduct o f  the mad, the sick, criminals, children, etc. 
— could be useful to analyse phenomenon at a larger scale, as with, for example, a political economy, 
the management o f  a social body, etc.’ (Foucault 2004b:192; my translation).
It was this more general meaning o f governmentality that was adopted by the Anglo-Saxon 
scholars who continued the analysis o f the impact o f liberalism on formulas of rule started by 
Foucault in his 1978 and 1979 series o f lectures (cf. Dean 1999; O'Malley, Valverde etal. 2006; 
Donzelot and Gordon 2008). So, for Mitchell Dean (1999:2) for example, ‘govern-mentality’ 
or, rather, ‘govem-mentalities’ were ‘the mentalities, arts and regimes’ concerned with ‘the 
conduct of conduct,’ while for Nikolas Rose (1999b:xxi) they were ‘mentalities and practices 
... for acting on upon the action o f others towards certain ends’ (1999b:xxi). From a term 
denoting a particular transformation in the knowledges and powers o f the modem state in the 
18th century, the notion o f govem-mentality became an analytical device with which to analyse
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the government o f any aspect of political, economical, social and personal life, be it the 
workplace, childhood, crime, marriage, insurance, colonies shopping malls, refugees, poverty, 
cities or hospitals (O'Malley, Valverde et al. 2006; Miller and Rose 2008:Chapter 1).
Such mentalities or styles of government were, according to these scholars, made up of 
particular grids of intelligibility, series of technologies and types of authorities brought together 
in a complex strategic assemblage which Foucault termed a ‘dispositif or ‘apparatus’: a 
‘resolutely heterogeneous grouping composing discourses, institutions, architectural 
environments, policy decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said’ (cited in 
Rabinow and Rose 2003:10-11. Cf. also: Dean 1999; Rose 1999a; Miller and Rose 2008. Cf. 
Hacking 1992 on the related notion of 'style o f reasoning'). By ‘grids o f intelligibility,’ these 
authors meant ‘rational schemas’ (Foucault 1991a:80) which allow one to perceive, represent, 
analyse and evaluate a particular reality and which include: a particular language, idioms and 
argumentative style; key categories and concepts; typical explanations about how best to 
govern; ideals or moral principles; distinctive problems that can be addressed; and a specific 
understandings of both the objects and subjects o f government, such as a particular figure of 
the citizen. Unsurprisingly given the increasing role played by formalized kinds o f knowledge 
(savoirs) in the government of conduct (cf. Gordon 1991; Foucault 2004a), these ways of 
thinking, representing and evaluating stem from expert bodies of knowledge, such as theories 
o f management, medicine, criminology, economics, political science or, in the case of ethics 
governance, a mixture o f law, moral philosophy and medical sociology. By ‘technologies,’ 
Foucault and others referred to ways of intervening upon and changing the reality that the 
grids o f intelligibility allow to perceive and represent. They are mechanisms for the 
operationalisation and realisation of thought; they include written instructions, ad hoc 
procedures for evaluating a problem, architectural complexes, methods’ manuals, timetables 
and systems o f supervision and control. Finally, by ‘types of authorities’ these authors referred 
to the institutional forms and the kind of expertise which are deemed competent and legitimate 
to enunciate, deploy and transform the grids o f intelligibility and technologies that compose 
particular forms o f rationalities and practices.
The assemblage of forms of rationalities and practices which constitute, in both the UK and 
Singapore, the logic o f ethics governance include: categories such as human tissue; the 
concepts o f ‘respect for life’ and ‘ethical issue;’ reports on the use of human tissue; guidelines 
relative to the collection and use o f human tissue in research; human tissue banks; instruction 
manuals and tests to determine whether an individual has the capacity to grasp information
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and take decisions; translators and professional intermediaries who guarantee that research 
subjects are free to decide whether or not to give parts of their bodies; suggestions to take time 
to reflect; invitations to ask questions and lists of potential themes to be discussed; articles in 
bioethics journals on the human capacity to reflect and decide; patient information sheets and 
consent forms; systems through which the interactions between researchers and research 
subjects are documented; national ethics commissions like Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory 
Committee; medical law textbooks on the procedure of informed consent; professional 
degrees in medical law and ethics; research centres on bioethics; and regulatory agencies like 
the British Human Tissue Authority. This thesis traces a genealogy o f this particular bioethical 
dispositif, o f this assemblage o f grids o f intelligibility, technologies and forms of authorities that 
allows us to think o f the medical use of human tissue as a problem and regulate it.
The aim o f such a genealogy is, first o f all, to offer an understanding of how the medical use of 
human tissue is construed, problematised and regulated today. It should ‘show how to 
understand, act out, and resolve present problems’ (Hacking 2002:24). But, beyond providing 
such an understanding, an analysis o f the process through which the medical use o f the human 
body was problematised should, by ‘emphasis [ing] the contingency of the events that led to the 
predicaments we find pressing or inescapable’ (ibid.), point out the singularity, possibilities and 
limits of how we think about, discuss and organise the medical use of human tissue today (c.f. 
Foucault 1977b; Gordon 1986; Foucault 1991a; Hacking 1992; Dean 1994; Rabinow 1996; 
Hacking 2002; Rabinow and Rose 2003). As Foucault argued, ‘it is a matter o f shaking this 
false self-evidence, o f demonstrating its precariousness, of making visible not its arbitrariness, 
but its complex interconnections with a multiplicity o f historical processes, many o f them of 
recent date,’ it is a matter o f ‘wearing away certain self-evidences and commonplaces’ that 
allows us ‘to show that things “weren’t as necessary as all that’” (Foucault 1991a:75, 76 & 83).
Modes of Subjectification, Technologies of the Self and Citizenship Projects
This thesis does not only explore the recent transformations in the ways we think about, 
problematise and govern the medical use o f the human body and attempt to locate the 
rationalities and practices that make ethics governance possible. It also examines how these 
different rationalities and practices reconfigure the ways we understand ourselves and others as 
subjects and citizens. In other words, it analyses how the different grids of intelligibility, 
technologies and authorities that make up the bioethical dispositif ovtiR ovj into and transform 
our modes o f being. To ask such questions is to build, once more, on the analytics developed
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by Foucault and others in their studies o f how particular rationalities and technologies have 
constituted modern subjectivities and current conceptions of the citizen (e.g. Foucault 1973; 
Foucault 1977a; Foucault 1988b; Foucault 1991a; Rose 1999a; Rose 1999b; Hacking 2002; Isin 
2002; Lemke 2002; Isin 2004; Rose 2007).
For Foucault and others, there is no universal, fixed object — a figure o f the subject or the 
citizen -  in relation to which one could proceed to govern. Instead, for them, notions of 
subjectivity and citizenship that exist at a given time and place have been progressively 
‘constituted through’ what they term ‘practices or modes o f subjectification.’ As Paul Rabinow 
and Nikolas Rose (2003:15) argue in their discussion of Foucault’s notion of subjectification, 
‘the human being, from [his] perspective, is not so much an entity ... than the site of a 
multiplicity o f practices and labours.’ This refusal to accept a universal, pre-established figure 
o f the subject or citizen was o f course a key part o f Foucault’s genealogical project to ‘wear 
away the self-evidences and commonplaces’ of our present by pointing out to their 
contingency and, thereby, opening up possibilities. As Foucault reminded his interlocutors in 
an interview shortly before his death, ‘all my analyses are against the idea o f universal 
necessities in human existence’ (Foucault and Martin 1988:11). In other words, his project was 
not to write a universal theory of the subject or to critique existing rationalities of government 
by comparing them with a universally valid figure of the citizen. Rather, he and others were 
concerned with analysing the different ‘modes of subjectification’ through which subjects were 
constituted over time in a specific location and time. As Foucault argued, ‘we should try to 
discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted 
through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, thoughts, etc’ (cited in Hacking 
2002:104).
At the heart o f the processes o f subjectification are what Foucault (1988b: 18) termed 
‘technologies o f the self — a series o f practices which ‘permit individuals to effect by their own 
means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and 
souls, thoughts, conduct, and way o f being, so as to transform themselves.’ Thus, for Foucault 
and others, human beings constituted themselves through the use of these series of intellectual 
and practical techniques such as categories, concepts, languages, explanations, moral principles, 
methods, procedures and spaces. There is, furthermore, a close relationship between these 
technologies of the self and the logics o f government: the ‘practices of subjectification ... are 
inextricably linked to government and knowledge’ (Rose 1999a:43). Indeed, logics of 
government and the particular expert bodies of knowledge around which they are articulated —
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insurance and social security, medicine, pedagogical theories, advertising and psychology — 
provide human beings with the means to be, talk and do particular things:
The ‘human being is constituted through devices, gazes, techniques which extend beyond the limits 
o f  the flesh ... [which] are assembled together in [dispositifs] such as those o f  social security with its 
offices, procedures, forms, requirements o f  compliance; o f  health with its surgeries and consulting 
rooms, its doctor-patient relations; o f  schooling with its classrooms, desks, partitioning o f  days and 
hours, regimes o f  assessment and examination, spaces for work and sport; o f  advertising and 
consumption with their habitat o f images o f  personhood and pedagogies o f  conduct and 
comportment which provide the means for understanding and acting on the se lf  (Rose 1999b:xx).
Ian Hacking (2002) has showed this close relationship between techniques o f subjectification, 
government and knowledge in his piece ‘Making Up People’ on how particular descriptions of 
human beings or human action such as ‘perverts,’ ‘homosexuality’ or ‘suicide’ bring into being 
new types o f persons and new possibilities for human action:
‘Numerous kinds o f  human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention 
o f  the ways to name them ... Our spheres o f  possibility, and hence our selves, are to some extent 
made up by our naming and what that entails’ (Hacking 2002:113).
He describes, for example, how the idea o f ‘suicide’ was invented by the medical profession in 
France in the early years of the nineteenth century in France, and how their description of 
what counted as suicide, right down to the notion of the suicide note, made it possible for 
coroners to identify suicides, for statisticians to count them, for Durkheim to discuss the 
causes o f suicide and for people, in general, to think about it and, unfortunately, sometimes 
commit it. Similarly, in his genealogy of modern subjectivity, Nikolas Rose (1996c; 1999b) 
shows how the ‘languages, techniques, authorities, judgments’ o f the ‘psy-sciences’ 
(psychology, psychiatry, etc.) have come to ‘shape the texture o f our intimate dealings with 
ourselves and with our closest companions’ by reconfiguring our ‘practical ways of 
formulating, understanding and responding to temptations and aspirations, to happiness and 
sorrow, to achievements and frustrations’ (Rose 1999b:xx).
To convey this central role played by rationalities and practices of government in the 
constitution of subjects as citizens in particular, Nikolas Rose (2007:4-5) has formulated the 
concept o f ‘citizenship projects:’
T y^ citizenship projects, I mean the ways that authorities thought about (some) individuals as 
potential citizens, and the ways they tried to act upon them in the name o f  citizenship. For example: 
defining those w ho were entitled to participate in the political affairs o f  a city ...; imposing a single 
legal system across a national territory; obliging citizens to speak a single national language; 
establishing ...  universal .. .  education; designing building in the hope that they would encourage 
certain ways o f  thinking, feeling and acting; creating prisons, asylums, workhouses and reformatories
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to reshape lapsed citizens, developing social insurance systems to bind national subjects together in 
the sharing o f  risks; exhorting women, as wives and mothers, to produce and rear ...  future citizens 
inaugurating universal health inspection o f  schoolchildren to detect and rectify threats to the 
vitality o f  the future citizen;... [and establishing] a national radio corporation [to] link all inhabitants 
o f  a territory into a single collectivity.’
As Rose shows, these projects of citizenship were, for a long time and as the examples listed 
above demonstrate, national; they were exercises in the building of the nation. But, in the 
West, from the late 1970s onwards, this started to change. Projects o f citizenship were no 
longer articulated around the notions o f the nation-state and society; instead they were now 
built around the idea o f an active and responsible consumer-citizen who was to be shaped and 
governed through techniques such as advertising, public dialogues or the psy-sciences (cf. Rose 
1996b; Rose 2007; Miller and Rose 2008).
My use o f the notions o f ‘subjectification,’ ‘technologies of the self and ‘citizenship projects’ 
very much shapes the way I have approached the field of bioethical governance o f the life 
sciences in this thesis. Unlike most o f the anthropological and sociological literature in the 
field, I do not assume the pre-existence of a particular type of subject or citizen against which I 
judge the success or failure of bioethical governance. Instead, this thesis forms an attempt to 
analyse the figure o f the subject or citizen that is both presupposed and constituted through 
different categories, rhetoric, institutions, procedures, spaces and other moral principles that 
make up the bioethical dispositif. In order to do so, this thesis focuses on the procedure of 
informed consent, a legal mechanism that has become central to the way the medical use of 
human tissue is thought about, problematised and regulated. It examines the particular figure 
of the subject which the bioethical literature on informed consent presupposes and, at the 
same time, helps to constitute through its rhetoric and the series o f technologies it has devised 
to operationalise the notion of informed consent.
Furthermore, and similarly to the work of Nikolas Rose (1996c; 1999b) on the impact o f the 
psy-sciences in the shaping of the self, this thesis’ focus on bioethical governance’s different 
technologies o f the self enables me to highlight the key role played by bioethics in constituting 
modem subjectivities since its emergence in the 1960s in the United States o f America and the 
United Kingdom. Understood loosely as the ‘meeting ground for a number o f ... discourses 
[like medical law, the sociology of medicine or moral philosophy] ... concerned with ethical, 
legal and social questions [related to] medicine, science and biotechnology’ (O'Neill 2002:1), 
bioethics has developed a series of categories, languages, ideals, mechanisms and authorities in 
order to, in the words o f British bioethics pioneer Alastair Campbell (1975 [1972]:7-8), analyse, 
represent and intervene upon individuals’ ‘beliefs, attitudes and codes o f rules’ and their
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capacity for ‘moral judgement.’ As this thesis suggests through an analysis of the mechanism of 
informed consent, these grids of intelligibility and technologies developed by bio-ethicists have 
reconfigured modem subjectivities by allowing individuals to think o f themselves as ‘human 
beings’ graced with a ‘capacity to reflect and decide’ about their own lives and bodies and to 
act as such. Conceptualised in this way, bioethical governance illustrates, alongside other 
contemporary moral discourses such as corporate ethics, the ethics o f war or environmental 
ethics, a new type o f citizenship project articulated around another figure of the citizen -  a 
human being graced with the capacity to reflect and decide.
Sociologies of Bioethics
Given the key role currendy played by bioethics in the governance o f the life sciences and in 
the ways we think, discuss and organise the medical use o f human tissue today, it is 
unsurprising to see that there is an increasing number o f social scientists who are studying this 
issue. O f course, the growing literature on the topic shows a great diversity in the ways these 
scholars have approached the field and in the type o f questions they have found interesting to 
ask. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that most approaches have been rather critical o f bioethical 
governance, highlighting its ‘failures’ and passing judgments on its assumptions. In order to 
locate this thesis in relation to this sociological literature on ethics governance and to spell out 
the distinctiveness o f its approach, it is helpful to chart this literature in terms o f its analytical 
concepts and its questions. One can, in that respect, identify three predominant approaches to 
the study o f bioethics and the ethical governance of the life sciences — the sociology of 
(scientific) governance; the sociology of the (biomedical) economy and the sociology of 
biomedicine. This tripartite division is best understood not as a historical or sociological 
classification but as an heuristic device that enables to differentiate my own concerns and 
analytics from those informing these other three approaches.
Sociology of (Scientific) Governance
Drawing on concepts from liberal political philosophy like ‘democracy,’ ‘the state’ or 
‘legitimation,’ many scholars working on the governance of science in general and medicine in 
particular have addressed the role that bioethics have come to play within this regulatory 
project (e.g. Elliott 1999; Stevens 2000; Wynne 2001; Galloux, Mortensen et al. 2002; O'Neill 
2002; Jasanoff 2005; Salter and Jones 2005; Bogner and Menz 2006; Sperling 2006; Salter and 
Salter 2007; Holden and Demeritt 2008). Their analyses describe in particular what they refer
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to as the ‘professionalisation,’ ‘institutionalisation’ and ‘bureaucratisation’ of bioethics from its 
inception in the 1960s. Thus, these scholars show how bioethics became dominated by a new 
class o f ‘professional experts’ comprising philosophers, lawyers, scientists and sociologists 
which sought to transform their moral expertise into a recognised, financially viable trade 
(Stevens 2000:Chapter 2; Jasanoff 2005:Chapter 7; Salter and Jones 2005). They also show 
how, through the creation of national ethics commissions and international bodies like the 
International Conference on Harmonisation, bioethics was ‘institutionalised’ by ‘the state’ 
which identified it as a ‘mechanism for legitimating biomedical research’ (Galloux, Mortensen 
et al. 2002; Jasanoff 2005:Chapter 7; Salter and Jones 2005; Salter and Salter 2007). They argue 
furthermore that this professionalisation and institutionalisation o f bioethics brought about a 
‘bureaucratisation’ of bioethics which became articulated around ‘standardised moral 
principles’ and ‘formal criteria,’ ‘forms, applications and written records,’ ‘official committees,’ 
as well as ‘administrative procedures’ and ‘routini2ed practices’ (Elliott 1999:Chapter 1; O'Neill 
2002:Chapter 1; Jasanoff 2005:Chapter 7; Sperling 2006; Salter and Salter 2007; Holden and 
Demeritt 2008).
The problem, for some o f these scholars, is that these developments have led to the betrayal of 
the original ideals o f bioethics. These scholars generally share and celebrate many of these 
ideals. In particular, they believe that people should be treated as human beings graced with a 
capacity to reflect, discuss and hold opinions about biomedical science; and they consider, 
together with bio-ethicists, that the role o f bioethics is, or should be, to protect and encourage 
humans’ capacity to reflect on and listen to their opinions. This can be illustrated with 
Jasanoffs (2005:Chapters 7 & 10) concept o f ‘civic epistemology,’ according to which 
bioethics should ideally be a neutral ‘language o f deliberation’ or a ‘new deliberative space’ in 
which ‘human beings’ are recognised and respected as ‘proactive, dynamic’ and ‘knowledgeable 
agents’ who can ‘shape, craft, reflect on, write about, experiment and play with, test and resist 
[medical] science and technology.’ Similarly, in their analysis o f the development o f bioethical 
governance in Singapore, Holden and Demeritt (2008:82-84) lament the ‘dystopian’ and 
‘darker possibilities’ o f a future without the liberal and democratic ‘individuated subjects [of 
bioethics] who ... know exactly ... their rights,... can withdraw, complain and appeal... [and] 
can refuse treatment or form patient activist groups to lobby government or influence the 
design of research.’ For these scholars, the professionalisation, institutionalisation and 
bureaucratisation of bioethics — best symbolised by the procedure o f informed consent — is 
tantamount to a betrayal o f these original ideals, most notably the will to respect and protect 
human beings’ capacity to reflect, discuss and take decisions. Indeed, this triple transformation 
of bioethics converts ‘hot affect ... into cold rationality’ (Sperling 2006), turns ‘personal
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relationships’ into ‘protocols’ and ‘impersonal administration’ (Holden and Demeritt 2008:82- 
83) and ‘appropriate^] ... a person’s sovereignty over herself by taking away a ‘proportion of 
the persons’ moral agency’ (Elliott 1999:14).
A good illustration of the approach taken by this literature is the work of Stefan Sperling 
(2006) on the ethical regulation of stem cell research in Germany. Sperling shows how the 
adoption o f the Stem Cell Law by the German Parliament in 2002 all but silenced the lively 
debates in which almost all sections of the population had taken part. He argues that, by 
appointing a Central Ethics Commission composed o f five physicians and four philosophers 
to judge the merit of individual applications to use stem cells on the basis o f three ‘formal 
criteria’ (the use is important for basic research; there has been prior animal studies; and the 
question can only be answered by using stem cells), the legal text ‘convert[s] ethics into reason,’ 
‘neutraliz [ing] the affective charge’ and wiping out a ‘site o f ongoing reflection on ... ethical 
concerns’ (ibid. p .l, 3). Another relevant example is the recent work o f Kerry Holden and 
David Demeritt (2008) on Singapore’s adoption, in 1998, o f an ethical framework for clinical 
trials based on the regulatory standards o f the International Conference on Harmonisation. 
They argue that these standards were imported by the state in order to promote its biomedical 
industry internationally rather than spread bioethics’ ‘liberal, individualist values’ (ibid. p.71) 
among its population. This, they also argue, was made possible by the way the Singaporean 
state conceived o f ethics: as a series of centralised ‘administrative processes,’ ‘international 
ethical standards’ and ‘forms and documents’ which were completely detached from any 
‘consideration for the ethical concerns that the Singaporean people may have’ (ibid. p.79-80). 
Holden and Demeritt explain that:
In Singapore, [ethical] guidelines do very much what they say on the tin, but the individual subject 
being protected is deafeningly silent .. .  The mapping o f  ICH guidelines onto Singaporean society 
defies the very logic o f  those guidelines. We do not think that [members o f  the national ethics 
committee] have given much thought to the question o f  individual autonomy or what it entails, and 
we doubt that the Singaporean state has either. Bioethics is simply paperwork. As long as the consent 
forms are signed and the paper trail is clear, there should be no qualms about what it means’ (ibid.
p. 81-82).
Sociology of the biomedical Sciences
The sociology of the biomedical sciences has been similarly critical o f bioethics but from an 
altogether different perspective. This vast literature studies the ‘gap’ between the ideals of the 
discourse o f bioethics and the ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ reality o f the field revealed ‘empirically’ 
through the ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) o f the ethnographer (e.g. Fox and Swazey 1984; 
Hoffmaster 1992; Kleinman 1995; DeVries and Subedi 1998; Kleinman 1999; Kleinman, Fox
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et al. 1999; Bosk 2001; Hoffmaster 2001a; Lock 2001b; Corrigan 2003; Dyer 2004; Hedgecoe 
2004; Tutton and Corrigan 2004; Geissler 2005; Parry 2005; Franklin 2006; Parry and Gere 
2006; De Vries, Turner et al. 2007). A key assumption o f this approach is its understanding of 
bioethical governance as part of a sphere described variously as ‘imaginary,’ ‘ideal,’ ‘abstract,’ 
‘utopian’ or ‘theoretical.’ This sphere, and thus bioethics, has to be distinguished from and 
opposed to another, second sphere termed the ‘social context,’ ‘cultural milieu’ or ‘the 
everyday lived experience.’ For the sociology of biomedicine, this second sphere is reality itself 
with its ‘contradictions,’ ‘practices,’ ‘relationships,’ ‘particularisms’ and ‘struggles’ that come 
and ‘muddle’ the ideals o f bioethics. O f course, this dichotomy between the ideal/bioethics 
and the real/social context is at its apex when bioethical governance is exported to places 
outside the Western world which have a different ‘culture’ to the one in which bioethics 
originated. Indeed, bioethics having been developed in the West is ‘ethnocentric’ — it has a 
‘Eurocentric orientation and [a] grudgingly limited engagement with non-Westem and ethnic 
value orientation’ (Kleinman 1999:69; cf. also Kleinman 1995) — and thus even further 
removed from the everyday life experiences o f people from other cultures. Faced with this 
dichotomous world, the role o f the social scientist is to concentrate on reality itself (the socio­
cultural context) and explore it ‘in detail’ through ‘qualitative approaches’ and, in particular, 
ethnography — ‘a method of knowledge production by which the ethnographer enters into the 
ordinary, everyday space of moral processes in a local world’ (Kleinman 1999:77). The 
ambition of this exploration o f everyday lived experience is to not only to increase knowledge 
but also to improve bioethical governance by correcting it where it fails: ‘bioethical analysis [and 
governance] can be made sharper if more attention is paid to the context o f medical decision 
making, and ethnography is the ideal method for accomplishing this’ (Bosk 2001:199; cf. also: 
Hoffmaster 1992; Kleinman 1999; Hedgecoe 2004).
This research ethos is well captured by Sarah Franklin (2004) in her preface to an edited 
collection o f ethnographies o f the interactions and practices which take place when people give 
parts o f their bodies for medical research:
W hat is .. .  important is the level o f  empirical detail provided by the contributors, for these 
perspectives will tell us what happens “when the rubber meets the road,” which may be a far cry 
from what was promised, intended, or imagined. For example, while it is widely acknowledged that 
the principle o f  informed consent is problematic in the context o f  genetic donation, we will need to 
know much more about why and how this is so before we will be able to propose practical ethical 
alternatives. Without the kind o f  detailed studies o f  the actual relations and practices that shape the 
conditions o f  genetic donation, we will not have enough information to produce an informed critical 
account o f  them’ (ibid. p.viii).
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Another telling quote is that o f Barry Hoffmaster (2001b) in his Introduction to an anthology 
aptly entided ‘Bioethics in Social Context:’
‘Bioethics, in this view, is situated in rationality and generality. It prescinds the messy details and 
attachments that give our lives meaning and vigour, the nagging contradictions that make us squirm 
and struggle ...  Because they are yoked to the abstractions o f  reason and theory, judgements about 
matters o f  bioethics frequently outstrip the contexts that generate and shape those matters and ignore 
the agonizing experiences o f  the people which grapple with them .. .  Putting bioethics in personal, 
social and cultural contexts opens the way for modes o f  moral deliberation that are not general, 
rational, and impartial but embrace the distinctive histories, relationships, and milieus o f  people and 
engage their emotions as much as their reasons ...  This is a bioethics situated in lived human 
experience. The qualitative research approaches o f  the social sciences, ethnography in particular, can 
be used to explore ...  that experience ...  The ultimate goal o f  this endeavour is a bioethics that is 
more attuned to the particular and more sensitive to the personal — a bioethics that is more humane 
and more helpful’ (ibid. p. 1-2).
As with the sociology o f scientific governance albeit for different reasons, the procedure of 
informed consent has come to symbolise all that the sociology o f biomedicine has found 
problematic with bioethical governance and has thus attracted the brunt o f the critique (e.g. 
Wolpe 1998; Corrigan 2003; Busby 2004; Corrigan 2004; Haimes and Whong-Barr 2004; 
Hoeyer 2004; Kaye 2004; Geissler 2005; Molyneux, Peshu et al. 2005; Molyneux, Wassenaar et 
al. 2005; Busby 2007; Hoeyer 2007). For this literature, the problem is the notion o f ‘the fully 
informed individual who is free to choose’ around which the mechanism o f informed consent 
is articulated. Such a concept of the human being is a ‘reductionist abstraction’ (Corrigan 
2003:787), a product of Western liberal political theory (D'Agostino 1998), which bears no 
relation to a ‘real person’ whose very constitution is radically informed by the socio-cultural 
context in which he or she lives. The task o f the sociologist or anthropologist is to conduct an 
ethnography in order to ‘flesh out the social process involved when ... research subjects 
consent’ and understand the ‘pre-existing norms and values ... that shape [these subjects’] 
expectations and direct their behaviour’ (ibid. p.768, 780). Helen Busby’s (2004) study o f the 
donation of tissue to both the UK National Blood Service and the UK Biobank is a good 
illustration of such ‘thick descriptions’ of the everyday lived experience. Based on interviews 
with over hundred donors, Busby argues that it is the different level o f trust that donors place 
on the institutions collecting and using the samples (NHS, universities, pharmaceutical 
companies) rather than (as bio-ethicists would have it) the level o f information about what is 
done with the samples that leads donors to consent to give their tissues. Another interesting 
example o f such rich description is Wenzel Geissler’s (2005) ethnography o f the collection of 
blood samples in rural Luoland in Western Kenya by Western medical researchers. He shows 
how, when asked to consent to the collection o f blood, the local population, rather than using
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bioethics’ notions o f information and consent, articulates its concerns around a local Swahili 
idiom about blood-stealing strangers -  kachinja.
Sociology of the (Biomedical) Economy
For the third and last approach, the sociology o f the (biomedical) economy (e.g. Andrews and 
Nelkin 1998; Cooter 2000a; Andrews and Nelkin 2001; Lock 2001a; Scheper-Hughes 2001b; 
Hodges 2004; Petryna 2005a; Petryna 2005b; Cooper 2006; Petryna 2006; Sunder Rajan 2006; 
Waldby and Mitchell 2006; Petryna 2007; Sunder Rajan 2007; Elliott 2008), bioethics and the 
ethical governance o f the life sciences can only be understood in relation to the way the 
management and financing of science in general and the life sciences in particular was radically 
reconfigured between the late 1960s and the early 1990s. The old model, codified in V. Bush’s 
(1945) report Science—the Endless Frontier and articulated around a national, centralised science 
policy, state funding, the notion o f ‘pure science’ and peer-reviewed publications, began to be 
challenged in the late 1960s. By the late 1980s, early 1990s, it had been displaced by a new 
model o f management and financing influenced by neo-liberal theories o f government: ‘the 
global biomedical economy’ (Sunder Rajan 2007:80). In this global biomedical economy, the 
management o f the life sciences was organised around the notion o f the market and 
constituted by a remodelled system o f intellectual property rights and patents, partnerships 
between universities and the pharmaceutical industry, scientists as entrepreneurs, venture 
capitalism, science parks and concepts like ‘productive science,’ ‘innovation’ and ‘technological 
transfer.’ For the sociology of the (biomedical) economy, the consequence of this 
reorganisation o f the management and financing of the life sciences was to heighten 
‘inequalities’ and favour the ‘exploitation o f the underprivileged,’ not the least because of the. 
importance given to ‘ownership’ and the ‘pursuit of profit’ in the new model o f management.
These concerns were often rendered through the narrative of the ‘commodification of the 
human body’ (cf. Andrews and Nelkin 1998; Andrews and Nelkin 2001; Scheper-Hughes 
2001b; Hodges 2004; Cooper 2006; Waldby and Mitchell 2006). According to this narrative, 
the reconfiguration of the management and financing of the life sciences dramatically affected 
the way human tissues used in medical research were collected and exchanged. Instead of 
having citizens ‘giving’ parts of their bodies to their fellow nationals via the redistributive 
mechanism o f the social state as Richard Titmuss had argued in The Gift Relationship, human 
tissues were now to be exchanged according to the laws of the market: human body parts were 
‘owned’ and could be ‘sold for profit.’ This ‘reduction’ o f the body to ‘an object’ that could be 
owned and sold opened the door, it was argued, to the exploitation of the most
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underprivileged, who would be forced to sell their bodies for financial reasons. The 
‘commercialisation o f science’ (Kenney 1986) had brought about the ‘commercialisation of 
body tissues’ (Andrews and Nelkin 1998) and the ‘commodification of life’ (Cooper 2006:16):
‘The medical industry . . .  view[s] the human body as a rich source o f  marketable commodities to be 
used for research and industry. In other words, the medical profession has commodified the human 
body’ (Hodges 2004:2-3).
The aim o f this literature is to provide both a theoretical and an empirical critique of this new 
biomedical economy by charting how it promotes injustice and exploitation (Petryna 2006:55; 
Sunder Rajan 2007:80; Elliott 2008). Given this aim, to analyse bioethics and the bioethical 
governance of the life sciences in relation to the notion o f a global biomedical economy is, for 
this literature, to explore whether ethics governance mitigated or facilitated the injustice and 
exploitation produced by this reconfiguration o f the way the life sciences were managed and 
financed. The answer the exponents of this literature provide is overwhelmingly negative. As 
Sunder Rajan (2007:83) argues in his analysis of the globalisation of research ethics for clinical 
trials: ‘far from mitigating the structural violence from capital, [bioethical governance] serves 
instead to facilitate it.’ Bioethics’ ways o f facilitating the ‘structural violence from capital’ are 
manifold. Some authors have showed how, by accepting to work for the pharmaceutical 
industry and for profit, bio-ethicists have shed any approach which is too critical or 
‘muckraking’ (Lemmens and Freedman 2000; Elliott 2008). Others have argued that the 
language and mechanisms that make up bioethical governance are blind to, and thus unable to 
address, the inequalities and exploitation created by ‘market driven human research’ (Scheper- 
Hughes 2001b; Petryna 2005a; Petryna 2005b; Petryna 2006; Sunder Rajan 2006; Petryna
2007). So, for example, Petryna’s (2006:51, 54) ethnographic analysis shows how the in-built 
variability in the international bioethical regulation for clinical trials makes it impossible for this 
regulatory system ‘to capture’ and address the ‘exploitativeness’ caused by ‘the pharmaceutical 
industry’s pursuit of [research subjects]’ across the developing world.
‘[Bioethics’] procedural issues [which] researchers rely on in realizing human subjects protection are 
insulating researchers from the contexts o f  inequality in which they work ... [The] exclusive focus on 
informed consent narrows [their] vision o f  the broad array o f  factors that are overwhelmingly ethics’ 
(ibid. p.55).
Similarly, Sunder Rajan (2006) and Scheper Hughes (2001b) argue that bioethical governance’s 
inability to address ownership rights coupled with its overemphasis on a notion of informed 
consent which is almost synonymous with the neo-liberal notion o f ‘choice’ makes bioethics a 
very ineffectual critique o f the biomedical economy. Worse still, through its dominance o f the 
governance o f the life sciences, it eliminates ‘dissident voices’ and ‘alternative ethical positions’
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based on notions o f ‘social justice’ which could address the inequalities created by an industry- 
driven research market (ibid. p.31, 32). Finally, some authors have shown how different 
elements that make up bioethical governance assist in the functioning o f the global biomedical 
economy (Waldby and Mitchell 2006; Sunder Rajan 2007). So, for example, looking at the 
ethical regulation o f human tissue research in the United Kingdom, Waldby and Mitchell 
(2006:Chapter 2) argue that the procedure of informed consent makes it possible to transfer 
ownership rights from the research subject giving parts of his or her body to the medical 
researchers.
‘Informed consent is the mechanism that transforms a gift into property ...  [Its] function, allied to 
the commercial aspects o f  tissue research [is] to regulate and formalise the transfer o f  possession  
from donor to recipient .. .  [It enables] the transfer o f  legal claim to the tissue’ (ibid. p.71-72)
Locating the Thesis in Relation to this Literature
What this thesis shares with the three predominant approaches to the ethical governance of 
the life sciences discussed above is a preoccupation with the increasingly important role that 
bioethics has come to play in the regulation of medicine and the life sciences and in the way we 
think, discuss and organise the scientific and medical use of human tissue today. However, 
unlike these three approaches, this thesis does not analyse bioethical governance with a view to 
highlight its ‘failures’ such as its ‘bureaucratisation,’ its incapacity to account for the ‘socio­
cultural context’ or its complicity with the ‘medico-industrial complex’ in ‘exploiting the 
underprivileged.’ Indeed, in contrast to these three approaches, this thesis does not assume 
that the medical use of human tissue is a problem that needs regulation and does not see its 
task to be one of reviewing the regulation put in place by bioethics in order to correct and 
improve it by ‘de-bureaucratising’ it, making it more ‘socially and culturally aware’ or rendering 
it less exploitative. Instead, this thesis asks how the scientific and medical use of human tissue 
became an ‘ethical problem’ in the first place; it asks what are the conceptual, material and 
political conditions that make it possible to identify the medical use o f the human body as a 
‘problem of ethics.’ To do so, it does not draw on concepts such as ‘the state’ and ‘professional 
expertise,’ ‘the everyday lived experience’ of ‘ordinary people’ or the ‘medical industry’ and 
‘ownership rights.’ Rather, it uses notions like ‘mentalities of government,’ ‘apparatuses,’ ‘grids 
o f intelligibility’ and ‘technologies’ to analyse the ‘complex and often slow process’ during 
which the different rationalities and practices that make it possible to perceive the medical use 
of the human body as problematic today were assembled.
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Furthermore, this thesis does not, like the three approaches charted above, assume the pre­
existence of a particular type of subject or citizen against which to judge the success or failure 
o f bioethical governance and which, in the case o f bioethics’ failure, it tries to re-establish. 
Thus, unlike the sociology of (scientific) governance, this thesis does not assume that all 
human beings have a capacity to reflect that should be protected and does not see its role to be 
the defence o f this particular capacity against the encroachments o f professional expertise, 
institutionalisation or bureaucracy. Nor does this thesis consider its task, as does the sociology 
o f biomedicine, to be the rescue o f the true everyday lived experience o f real people in a fight 
against the abstract, Western notion of the free reflexive and decisive individual championed 
by bioethics. N or does this thesis see its role, as does the sociology o f the biomedical 
economy, to be the recovery of Titmuss’ citizen who gives his or her body to his or her fellow 
citizens in need against the onslaught of the neo-liberal market. Instead, drawing on notions 
like ‘subjedification,’ ‘technologies of the self and ‘citizenship projects,’ the thesis forms an 
attempt to analyse the figure o f the subject or citizen that is constituted through different 
categories, rhetoric, institutions, procedures, spaces and other moral principles that make up 
the bioethical dispositif. Within such an approach, the procedure of informed consent is not a 
bureaucratic procedure which stifles the true human capacity to freely reflect and decide; a 
mechanism which fails to understand the real person embedded in his or her socio-economic 
context; or a mechanism which displaces Titmuss’ real volunteer in order to exploit the 
underprivileged. Rather, the procedure o f informed consent — together with all the languages, 
categories, ideals, experts, forms, techniques and systems of accountability that constitute it — 
is a means to create and operationalise a particular type o f subject and citizen.
Contemporary Ethical Logics of Government and their Globalisation
It is important to locate this thesis not only in relation to the sociological and anthropological 
literature on bioethics but also in relation to the literature on govemmentality (e.g. Burchell, 
Gordon et al. 1991; Barry, Osborne et al. 1996; Hindess 1997; Dean 1999; Rose 1999a; 
Hindess 2002; Lemke 2002; Joyce 2003; Foucault 2004a; Foucault 2004b; Ong 2006; Miller 
and Rose 2008). The relationship between the latter body o f work and this thesis is 
multifaceted. In terms of their analytical framework, there is an intimate connection between 
the two. Indeed, as already clarified before, this thesis borrows a series o f theoretical concepts 
developed by the literature on govemmentality in order to explore transformations in the ways 
we think about, problematise and govern the scientific and medical use o f the human body 
that have taken place over the last 20 years. Conversely, in terms o f their thematic interest,
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there are some significant differences between the two. Most importandy, perhaps, is the fact 
that govemmentality studies have been principally interested in how liberalism and neo­
liberalism have reconfigured mentalities o f rules whereas this thesis is concerned with how 
contemporary ethical discourses have transformed logics o f government. This difference of 
focus separates this thesis from the genealogy of liberalism attempted by govemmentality 
scholars, although, o f course, there are some links between the two projects.
The conceptual link between govemmentality and liberalism has existed from the very start 
(O'Malley, Valverde et al. 2006; Valverde 2007; Donzelot 2008; Donzelot and Gordon 2008; 
Tierney 2008). When Foucault coined the term in his 1978 and 1979 series of lectures, he used 
it to examine how liberal theories o f government (such as Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations) 
brought about transformations in mentalities o f rule in the late eighteenth century and how 
two neo-liberal schools of thoughts (the German Ordoliberalen and the Chicago School 
economists) rethought modem logics of government in the twentieth century (Foucault 2004a; 
Foucault 2004b). It was this very focus on liberalism that attracted numerous scholars from the 
USA, the UK and Australia to the notion o f govemmentality. Indeed, it provided them with an 
analytical tool to examine the various impacts o f liberal theories on formulas o f rule at a time 
when the neo-liberal revolution was unfolding in their midst. Their detailed empirical studies 
on the effects of liberal and neo-liberal doctrines on the ways to conceive and administer 
economic, political and social life identified three successive families of liberal rule each 
characterised by particular concepts, institutions, technologies, procedures and types of 
subjects (Gordon 1991; Dean 1994; Rose 1996b; Dean 1999).
The first family o f liberal rule was classical liberal govemmentality, promoted most significantly 
by political economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, which became dominant from 
the early nineteenth century onwards. It was characterised by the idea that the realities to be 
governed such as the economy and the population are autonomous entities functioning in 
accordance with their own natural laws and that the aim of government is to steer clear o f 
disturbing these natural laws while at the same time ensuring that they could function (Gordon 
1991; Osborne 1996; Rose 1996b; Dean 1999); an idea which, according to these same authors, 
was itself based upon liberal understandings o f agency, the economic subject o f interest 
exemplified by Adam Smith’s self-loving agent (Walter 2008). Much o f the govemmentality 
literature forms an attempt to show how this idea permeated and transformed the way o f 
thinking, discussing and governing various aspects o f the economic, political and social life in 
nineteenth century Europe. One relevant example is Thomas O sborne’s (1996) analysis of 
British Victorian public health and sanitary discourses, where he shows how the sanitary
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reforms conducted by people like Southwood Smith and Edwin Chadwick were shaped by this 
will to govern so as to ‘assure the integrity of the natural phenomena, economic processes of 
population’ (ibid. p. 102).
From the late nineteenth century onwards, a second sort o f liberal rule — social liberal — 
emerged, displacing classical liberal govemmentality. This transformation in the mentalities of 
rule had much to do with the writing and activities of social liberal thinkers such as L.T. 
Hobhouse, William Beveridge and John M. Keynes in the UK and Emile Durkheim and Leon 
Duguit in France who, judging economic liberalism to have failed in eradicating the hardships 
of the industrial revolution, argued that the administration o f economic, political and personal 
life had to be re-organised around notions o f ‘society,’ ‘social solidarity’ and ‘welfare’ (Collini 
1979; Donzelot 1980; Rabinow 1989; Donzelot 1991; Gordon 1991; Rose 1996b). Many 
govemmentality scholars showed how this ‘socialization’ o f both government and citizenship 
was made possible through the development of particular knowledges and technologies like 
sociology or social insurance (Collini 1979; Defert 1991; Donzelot 1991; Ewald 1991). By the 
late 1970s, social liberal govemmentality gradually gave way to advanced liberal or neo-liberal 
ways of thinking and governing. This time the impulse to reconfigure formulas o f rule came 
mainly from a network of neo-liberal scholars like Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, 
even though thinkers from a range o f other philosophical and political persuasions shared 
many of the concerns put forward in neo-liberal doctrines, thus giving increased credence to 
the latter (Gordon 1991; Rose 1996b; Dean 1999; Rose 1999a; Foucault 2004b). Central to this 
latest embodiment o f liberalism is the reactivation of market considerations in decision-making 
and the figure o f the citizen as both an entrepreneur and consumer who shapes his/her life 
through acts o f choice. The literature on govemmentality has unearthed many of the various 
technologies like audit, budget discipline and accountancy which have brought into being this 
third major liberal transformation in government and citizenship (Power 1994; Rose 1996b; 
Rose 1999a; Miller and Rose 2008).
My thesis does not add to this genealogy of liberalism; instead, it contributes to the study of 
how contemporary ethical discourses have developed and transformed mentalities o f rule and 
subjectivities. Scholars using a theoretical approach inspired by the literature on govern- 
mentality have started to recognise the rising significance o f these new languages of virtue 
which seek to infuse various domains of life such as war, trade and science with a renewed 
sense of morality (Rose 1999a:Chapter 5; Strathern 2000b; Osborne 2003; Barry 2004; Guilhot 
2005:Chapter 1; Rabinow and Palsson 2005; Barnet, Clarke et al. 2007; Power 2007; Walters, 
Tietavainen et al. 2008):
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‘The language o f  ethics is proliferating . . .  one hears o f  an ethical foreign policy, ethical banking, 
ethical investment, ethical agriculture, ethical business, ethical politicians, the ethic o f  public service, 
ethical shopping, as well as the increasing salience o f  more traditional ethical disputes in the areas o f  
medicine, genetic technologies and the rights o f  life and death’ (Rose 1999a:191-192).
‘The world ... is marked by a remarkable and growing concern with ethics. This is an era when 
notions o f  corporate social responsibility, ethical audit, ethical consumption and environmental 
sustainability have become commonplace’ (Barry 2004:195)
Many o f these scholars have begun to study how these new languages o f virtue — discourses on 
human rights and democracy, agendas for environmental sustainability, corporate social 
responsibility programmes, bioethics and the like — have developed and are reconfiguring 
modem governance and contemporary notions of citizenship (Strathem 2000b; Osbome 2003; 
Barry 2004; Guilhot 2005:Chapter 1; Barnet, Clarke et al. 2007; Power 2007). Some have 
started to examine the links between these modern ethical forms o f governance with the long­
standing tradition of philanthropy (Guilhot 2005), while others have discussed the shift from 
an opposition to capitalism to an ‘ethicisation’ of capitalism brought about by the end o f the 
Cold War which has allowed these politics of virtue to proliferate (MacDonald 2003; Osbome 
2003; Guilhot 2005). A few have also identified the central role played by a series of new 
‘moral fieldworkers’ (Strathem 2000b:2) and forms of ‘moral entrepreneurship’ (Guilhot 
2005:5), including the figure of the non-governmental organisation or N G O  (Strathem 2000b; 
Barry 2004; Guilhot 2005; Rabinow and Palsson 2005). Furthermore, some scholars have 
started to analyse new technologies o f governance that have started to emerge as a 
consequence o f these politics o f virtue and the ways in which they can be exported around the 
globe (Strathem 2000a; Barry 2004; Power 2007). So, for example, Power (2007:93,94) points 
to instruments like ‘standardised narrative reporting,’ ‘league tables and rankings’ which make 
up the ‘new govemmentality of organisations’ brought about by ‘the increasing centrality of 
values and ethics to corporate governance.’ Finally, some scholars have discussed new forms 
of citizenship such as that of the ‘ethical consumer’ which are brought into being by these new 
languages o f virtue (Barnet, Clarke et al. 2007).
Through its analysis of the conditions o f possibility of one particular contemporary ethical 
discourse — bioethics — and the way it has transformed modern formulas o f rule and 
subjectivities, this thesis is to be understood as a contribution to this burgeoning body of work. 
The focus o f analysis of both this emerging body o f work and my thesis are contemporary 
ethical discourses themselves, not liberalism as with the literature on govemmentality. In 
particular, the aim is not to show how these new languages o f virtue resemble and are 
influenced by neo-liberal discourses and thus participate with them in advanced liberal
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govemmentality as Nikolas Rose (1999a:Chapter 5; 2000b; 2006:22-31; 2007) has done in his 
work on ‘etho-politics.’ Indeed, although there is much merit in such an approach, it presents 
two critical weaknesses. First, in order to associate neo-liberalism and contemporary ethical 
theories within one logic of government (advanced liberal rule), one has to use a criteria of 
association (active citizenship) which is so general and vague that it explains very litde and 
forecloses any detailed empirical accounts o f these new politics o f virtue. Second, as Jacques 
Donzelot (Donzelot and Gordon 2008) has argued, by assuming that both neo-liberalism and 
(through its association with neo-liberalism) the new languages o f virtue are morally invalid, 
such an approach can be deemed to be based on problematic assumptions and to be 
unnecessarily disparaging. Instead, the aim o f both the emerging body of work on languages of 
virtue and my thesis is to take these new ethical discourses seriously and provide a detailed 
picture o f their emergence, development and globalisation as well as their impact on 
mentalities o f rule and contemporary concepts o f the subject and the citizen. In this 
perspective, the relationship between ethical formulas of rule and liberalism is not ignored 
altogether but discussed as one aspect among many others. So, for example, in chapters 3 and 
4 ,1 discuss the interactions between bioethics and both social liberal and neo-liberal ways of 
conceiving, problematising and governing the medical use o f the human body.
Methodological Considerations
In order to contribute to our understanding o f the development and impact o f bioethics in 
particular, and contemporary ethical discourses in general, one needs of course to access and 
map out the assemblage o f rationalities, technologies and authorities which allow one, in both 
the United Kingdom and Singapore, to think of the medical use of the human body as an 
ethical problem and to govern it accordingly. I therefore set out here the methodological 
considerations that have guided my efforts to identify and describe both the assemblage of a 
bioethical dispositifs in the United Kingdom and Singapore and the forms o f subjectivity and 
citizenship these dispositifs have brought into being in both countries. Furthermore, I also 
clarify the reasons for choosing the United Kingdom and Singapore as empirical sites.
Constructing a Relevant Corpus of Materials for Analysis
The first strategic methodological choice in my attempt to access and describe the rationalities 
and technologies that make up bioethical governance has been to adopt the ‘method for 
composing our world’ developed by Bruno Latour (1988:9-12) in his analysis of the
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development and diffusion o f the technique of pasteurisation in late nineteenth century 
France. According to him:
‘The method I use does not require us to decide in advance on a list o f  actors and possible actions. If 
we open the scientific literature o f  the time, we find stories that define for us who are the main 
actors, what happens to them, what trials they undergo. We do not have to decide for ourselves what 
makes up our world [or] who are the agents .. .  N or do we have to know in advance what is 
important and what is negligible and what causes shifts in the batde we observe around us. Semiotic 
studies o f  texts o f  the time will do the job o f  inter-definition for us ...  [The writers o f  the period] 
attribute causes, date events, endow entities with qualities, classify actors. The analyst does not need 
to know more than they; he has only to begin at any point, by recording what each actor says o f  the 
others. He should not .. .  impose some predetermined sociology on the sometimes bizarre inter­
definition offered by the writers studied. The only task o f  the analyst is to follow the ...  translations, 
drifts and diversions as they are made by the writers o f  the period’ (ibid. p.9, 10,11).
In other words, and adapting Latour’s words to address the issue tackled in this thesis, there is 
no need to define in advance what bioethical governance is, who the main actors defining, 
promoting and resisting bioethics are or what the key moments in the development of 
bioethics are. Rather, we need to record what doctors, medical researchers, philosophers, 
lawyers, sociologists and other policy specialists have said and written about bioethical 
governance and its importance, the events that gave rise to it, the key actors in its development 
and the main issues encountered when trying to operationalise it. A patient and meticulous 
recording and analysis of what these different ‘writers’ have published will allow us to 
‘understand at once the content [of bioethical governance in the UK and Singapore] and its 
context’ {ibid. p. 12).
In order to record and analyse the texts o f these ‘writers,’ a corpus o f their writings must be 
gathered, for which I have used a three-pronged approach modelled on Latour’s method (cf. 
ibid. p. 11-12). First, I gathered all the relevant articles from the British MedicalJournal(BMJ) and 
the Singapore Medical Journal (SMJ) between 1960 and 2007, searching a series o f over sixty key 
words in the journals’ indexes, including (bio)ethics, (informed) consent, research/experiment, 
patient, human, different types o f body parts (kidney, embryos, tissue, etc.), pertinent medical 
sub-disciplines (genetics, etc.), key institutions (Nuffield Council, Royal College of Physicians, 
etc.) and the names of key actors in the field. As the official journals o f the British Medical 
Association (BMA) and the Singapore Medical Association (SMA) respectively, the BMJ and 
the SMJ discuss in their columns any events relating to the development and change o f medical 
and bio-ethics, mentioning the key actors and actions.
The decision to collect and analyse data for the year 1960 onwards in the United Kingdom was 
based on the fact that historians have located the emergence o f modern bioethics in both the
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USA and Europe in the 1960s, an interpretation confirmed by my own research (cf. Rothman 
1987; Toulmin 1988; Weisz 1990a; Rothman 1991; Baker 1993; Reich 1994; Reich 1995; 
Bompiani 1996; Malherbe 1996; Reich 1996; Viafora 1996; Jonsen 1998; Pellegrino 1999; 
Stevens 2000; Cooter 2000a; Hazelgrove 2002; S. Lock 2002; Amstrong 2007; Fox and Swazey
2008). It could be argued that the immediate post-WWII period and, especially, the drafting of 
the Nuremberg Code in 1947 would constitute a more relevant starting date for a genealogy of 
modern research ethics. Indeed, many social scientists and bio-ethicists see the Code as the 
origin o f both bioethics and today’s ethical regulatory systems for biomedical research (e.g.: 
Campbell, Gillett et al. 1992:81; Kennedy and Grubb 2000:1667-1678; Corrigan 2003:771-772; 
Jasanoff 2005:174; Holden and Demeritt 2008:81). One of their reasons for doing so is that 
many o f the principles laid out in the Code have been integrated and play a key role in today’s 
ethical frameworks for medical research. But, while the impact of the Nuremberg Code on 
modern bioethics cannot be overemphasised, historians argue that modem bioethics only 
started to develop from the 1960s onwards. Firsdy, they show that the Code failed to get much 
attention in either the USA or Europe up to the 1960s, when it was ‘rediscovered’ by the 
nascent discipline o f bioethics. Secondly, the rationale which informed the Nuremberg Code'was 
very different to the one which informed modern bioethics. The Allies drafted and conceived 
the Code not as an instrument to condemn medical research in general but as the perversion of 
medicine by the Nazis and totalitarian rule more generally. In other words, the Code was a 
‘Code for Barbarians’ that was irrelevant to research undertaken in the USA and Europe. In 
contrast, bioethics in the 1960s centred on a questioning of modem medicine and the practice 
of medical experimentation in general. The decision to collect and research data from 1960 
onwards in Singapore is based on two main reasons. Firsdy, the timeframe guarantees a certain 
symmetry to the comparison between the two countries. Secondly, the year 1960 corresponds 
to Singapore’s independence from the British Empire in 1959, a time which saw the creation 
of a series o f national institutions such as Singapore’s Legislative Assembly and the SMA, with 
the latter publishing the SMJ from 1960 onwards after gaining its independence from the 
BMA. This examination of the SMJ from 1960 onwards shows that in Singapore, in stark 
contrast to the United Kingdom, modern bioethics only developed from the mid-1990s 
onwards.
In addition to my survey of the BMJ and the SMJ and using a similar research technique, I also 
gathered all pertinent articles published in: (1) the Journal of Medical Ethics (JMEf one o f the 
leading international bioethics journal, from its launch by the BMA in 1974 to the present; (2) 
the Singapore Medical Association Newsletter (SMAN), a complement to the SMJ which covers 
political, economic and professional matters relating to the practice of medicine in Singapore,
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from its launch by the SMA in 1966 to the present; and (3) the Straits Tims, Singapore’s main 
daily newspaper and the government’s official outiet, from the moment Singapore introduced 
bioethics (circa 1990) to the present. Finally, on the basis of all the articles already gathered, I 
identified key people and institutions in the field o f bioethical governance in both countries 
and collected the different documents they had produced: legal documents; records of 
parliamentary debates; reports and guidelines from government departments, expert 
commissions, bioethics committees, academic research centres, professional medical 
associations and patients’ groups; books and articles published by doctors, medical researchers, 
philosophers, lawyers, sociologists and other policy specialists; manuals, forms and directives 
issued by hospitals, research institutes, tissue banks and universities; reports and directives 
from European institutions like the European Union or the Council o f Europe which are of 
importance in the United Kingdom; and documents from international organisations like the 
WHO, UNESCO or CIOMS which are used in both countries.
It is the systematic content analysis o f this large and robust archive of documents which has 
allowed me both to identify the rationalities, technologies and authorities that have made it 
possible to conceive of the medical use o f human tissue as an ethical problem necessitating 
regulation and to determine the way these bioethical dispositifs have transformed subjectivities 
and notions of citizenship in both countries. Such a document-based analysis is perhaps 
somewhat in contrast to the ethnographic and narrative-based research promoted by the 
sociological and anthropological literature on the biomedical sciences discussed above. 
However, I have not collected and analysed my corpus of texts in isolation; rather, my reading 
and understanding of these documents has been guided and facilitated by a four-pronged, 
complementary research strategy.
Firsdy, I interviewed over twenty key experts in the field of bioethics, including: Alastair V. 
Campbell, Professor of Medical Ethics at the Centre for Biomedical Ethics, National 
University o f Singapore, and member o f Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee; John 
Elliott, Professor o f Psychology, National University of Singapore and Research Fellow at 
Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee; Sarah Franklin, Professor o f Sociology at the 
London School of Economics and member of the UK Human Stem Cell Coordinators’ 
Organisation; Emily Jackson, Professor of Law at the London School of Economics and 
member o f the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and the Medical Ethics 
Committees of both the BMA and the Royal College of Physicians; Terry Khan, Professor of 
Law, National University of Singapore and member of Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory 
Committee; Bartha M. Knoppers, Professor of Law at the University of Montreal, member of
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UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee and International Advisor to Singapore’s 
Bioethics Advisory Committee; Pin Lim, Professor of Medicine, National University of 
Singapore and Chair of Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee; Darryl Macer, UNESCO’s 
Regional Advisor on Bioethics for Asia and the Pacific and member of UNESCO’s 
International Bioethics Committee; Genevra Richardson, Professor o f Law at the Centre for 
Medical Law and Ethics, Kings College London and member o f both the UK Medical 
Research Council and the UK Stem Cell Bank’s Steering Committee; and Chor Hiang Tan, 
Senior Director of Health Regulations at Singapore’s Ministry o f Health and member of 
Singapore’s National Medical Ethics Committee's Workgroup on Biomedical Research on 
Human Subjects.
Secondly, I visited tissue banking facilities in both Singapore and London, including: the 
Assisted Conception Unit, Guy’s Hospital, London; the Tissue Repository, the National 
Cancer Centre, Singapore’s General Hospital; the Tissue Repository, National University 
Hospital, Singapore; and the Singapore Tissue Network. These visits gave me a useful insight 
into how such facilities were run on a day-to-day basis, from obtaining the patient’s consent to 
the collection and deep-freeze storage o f the tissue, and were an excellent opportunity to talk 
with the people working there, in particular the nurses in charge of getting the patients’ 
approval to collect and use parts o f their bodies.
Thirdly, I attended several conferences on bioethics where I listened to relevant lectures as well 
as met and discussed with many eminent and less eminent bio-ethicists. These conferences 
included: a workshop on the ‘Regulation and Standardisation o f Stem Cell Research in the UK 
and China’ organised by the London School of Economics in June 2006; a one-day ‘Ethics 
Symposium’ organised by the Singapore Stem Cell Consortium in February 2007; and the 
eighth ‘Asian Bioethics Conference’ organised by the Asian Bioethics Association and held in 
Bangkok in March 2007.
Fourthly, I benefit from being what early anthropologists would have called a ‘native,’ having 
been trained in and practiced law and, in particular, medical law. Indeed, I was trained at the 
University o f Neuchatel, Switzerland, where I was taught by one o f the country’s first experts 
in the field, Professor Olivier Guillod, who wrote his PhD thesis on Le consentement eclaire du 
patient (The Informed Consent of the Patient, 1986) and opened one of the most important 
centres for medical law in Switzerland in 1994, the ‘Institut du droit de la sante’ at the 
University o f Neuchatel. Furthermore, I worked as a lawyer for the Swiss Ministry of Public 
Health, dealing among other things with the issue o f Patients’ Rights.
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Finally, besides conducting the empirical research explained above, I have also used historical 
books and articles to further contextualise the development o f bioethical dispositifs in both the 
UK and Singapore. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no work done on the history 
of bioethics in the UK as such, apart from the excellent but very specific work of Whong-Barr 
(2003) on the London Medical Group. But, for historical contextualisation in chapter 4 in 
particular, I refer to the following key studies: the instructive work o f Hazelgrove (2002) on 
the reception (or, rather, non-reception) of the Nuremberg Code in the UK between 1946 and 
1973 which shows the absence of modem bioethics in the UK during that period; and the 
work of Rothman (1987; 1990; 1991), Jonsen (1998) and Stevens (2000) on the development 
of modern bioethics in the USA from the 1960s onwards, a rich source o f information given 
the many exchanges between American and British bio-ethicists. Furthermore, to help me 
track Singapore’s post-independence discourse on modernisation discussed in chapter 5, I 
relied on the work of Margolin (1989), Huff (1995), Perry, Kong and Yeoh (1997), George 
(2000) and Rodan (2006). Finally, chapter 3 of this thesis, which examines how the medical use 
o f the human body was thought o f and governed before the emergence o f bioethics in the 
1960s, is significantly informed by the historical work done by other scholars. Most of my 
discussions on the 1832 English Anatomy A ct are based on the excellent work o f Ruth 
Richardson (1987) and Thomas Tiemey (1998) whilst my treatment o f Richard Titmuss’ The 
Gift Relationship owes much to the exceptional scholarly research done by Philippe Fontaine 
(2002) as well as Douglas Starr’s (1998) detailed history o f blood.
Why Contrast the United Kingdom and Singapore?
Finally, I need to justify my choice to study and compare the United Kingdom and Singapore. 
There are four reasons for choosing these two countries. Firstly, both countries are currently at 
the forefront of development in both biomedical research and research ethics (Ong 2005; 
Franklin 2006; Holden and Demeritt 2008). While the UK has a long tradition in both these 
domains, Singapore has made an extraordinary effort to level up in the last ten to twenty years. 
This offers a very different dynamic to studies (e.g.: Geissler 2005; Petryna 2005a; Petryna 
2005b; Petryna 2006; Petryna 2007; Sunder Rajan 2007) which contrast a First World and a 
Third World country in which researchers from the former travel to ‘use’ the population for 
research and where there is an unequal relationship which translates into a particular type of 
ethics for developing countries (e.g. Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2002). Indeed, Singapore is 
now considered as a competitor and partner of the United Kingdom (e.g. Department o f 
Trade and Industry 2004) and, unlike Third World countries which might feel obliged to adopt
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ethical norms developed in the West, Singapore willingly chose to import Western modern 
bioethics.
Secondly, the two countries have had close links since the colonisation of Singapore by and its 
subsequent integration into the British Empire in 1819. The almost 150 years spent as a part of 
the British Empire has made Singapore’s political, economic and social organization often 
strikingly similar to that o f the United Kingdom (cf. Turnbull 1989; Chew and Lee 1991; Perry, 
Kong et al. 1997). The organisation o f the medical sciences is certainly no exception, with the 
British having opened up the first hospitals, set up the medical education system articulated 
around the King Edward VII College o f Medicine opened in 1905 and structured the medical 
profession by establishing the Malaya Branch o f the British Medical Association, which later 
became the Singapore Medical Association (Lee 1978; Tan 1991; Cheah 2003). Although the 
British influence diminished significantly after 1959, with the newly independent Republic 
opening up to other influences, most notably North America, ties with the United Kingdom 
have stayed strong and exchanges have remained important. This is particularly striking when 
examining the import o f ethics governance to Singapore in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Indeed, not only was the city state’s ethical framework for human tissue research explicidy 
modelled on the British system, British bioethics experts, such as Alastair Campbell or Martin 
Bobrow, were also hired to help set up and run Singapore’s ethical framework as well as to 
teach bioethics to local students. This direct influence has furthermore been reinforced by the 
large number of both British life scientists and multinational companies active in the 
biomedical sciences that started arriving from the mid-1980s onwards as part o f Singapore’s 
drive to build up its capacity in medical research. With these emigres and companies came the 
influence o f their compulsory training in medical ethics and awareness o f bioethical issues. 
These numerous similarities have an important impact on the sort o f comparison undertaken 
here. Indeed, instead o f imposing an ‘etic’ analytical grid in order to compare what is 
considered to be, for an external observer, the relevant moral norms in both countries, this 
thesis follows empirically the language, concepts and procedures that make up bioethical 
governance as they are transported from the UK to Singapore by experts in bioethics and 
within bio-ethical reports and guidelines.
The third reason for contrasting the UK and Singapore is that the two countries also present 
some key differences which stand in a productive tension with the similarities discussed above. 
To start with, there are differences in the way that bioethical governance was developed in 
each country. In the United Kingdom, it was developed from the late 1980s onwards by a 
network o f British lawyers, doctors and philosophers working in research centres,
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governmental commissions and professional associations that had been put into place between 
the early 1960s and the late 1980s. In contrast, in Singapore ethics governance was imported 
from the West in the 1990s and parachuted, ready-made, into a country which had little or no 
expertise in bioethics. Furthermore, the recent history of the two countries presents some 
notable contrasts in the last forty years or so. At the time when bioethics was first developed, 
the United Kingdom was contending with the collapse of the Empire, de-industrialisation and 
the emergence o f neo-liberalism and post-1960s radical discourses. In contrast, during that 
same period, Singapore underwent intense post-independence nation-building programmes as 
well as near-obsessive efforts to develop and modernise the country, first through intense 
industrialisation and, more recendy, through the development of the biomedical sciences. 
These differences make the comparison between the two countries productive as it allows us 
to explore both the different rationales for the development of bioethics in both countries and 
how the bioethical principles, categories and techniques developed in the UK are transformed 
and adapted to Singapore’s different political, economical and social context.
The fourth and final reason for comparing the UK and Singapore is the fact that for most of 
the 1980s and the 1990s, the Singaporean government argued, in its bid to deflect human 
rights-based criticisms against the Republic’s ‘illiberal’ policies, that the Island’s population is, 
in terms o f its culture, radically different from the West (George 2000). Based on the concept 
o f ‘cultural relativism,’ which many American anthropologists used to oppose the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the government developed the idea that people in 
Singapore held what it termed ‘Asian values.’ These values, the government further argued, 
were incompatible with the Western individualistic morality embodied in modem human 
rights, including modern bioethics (e.g. Kuhse and Singer 1999; Sakamoto 1999; Doering 2002; 
Yu 2002). By doing so, Singapore was using a rather successful critique of a universally valid 
morality that led some philosophers, political theorists and bio-ethicists to reframe modern 
human rights and bioethics so as to acknowledge and incorporate the notion o f ‘cultural 
difference’ (e.g. Campbell, Gillett et al. 2001 :Chapter 3). By following the diffusion of bioethics 
from a Western country (the UK) to an Asian one (Singapore), this thesis can examine the role 
that the notions o f ‘culture’ and ‘cultural differences’ played in the eyes of those who 
attempted to import bioethics in Singapore.
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Conclusion
This chapter describes both the analytical approach as well as the method used in this thesis to 
explore the field o f the ethical governance o f the life sciences. The approach adopted in the 
thesis is a genealogical one. The chapter explains the research ethos and the analytical concepts 
(problematisation, govem-mentalities, rationalities, technologies of government, forms of 
authorities, modes o f subjedification) that characterise this approach which was developed by 
Foucault and others (e.g.: Donzelot 1980; Rabinow 1989; Burchell, Gordon et al. 1991; Barry, 
Osbom e et al. 1996; Isin 2002; Foucault 2004a; Foucault 2004b). It shows, in particular, how 
the genealogical approach allows one to explore the progressive and contingent development 
of the rationalities and technologies that make it possible to identify something as a problem in 
the present. In our case, it allows us to explore the history o f the different forms of 
rationalities and practices that make it possible to identify the medical use o f the human body 
as a ‘problem of ethics’ today in both the UK and Singapore. The chapter also shows how the 
genealogical approach allows one to analyse the way in which a given set of rationalities and 
practices constitutes a particular figure of the subject and citizen. In our case, it allows us to 
examine how the linguistic categories, institutions and procedures that make up a key element 
of bioethical governance — the mechanism o f informed consent — have reconfigured 
subjectivities by allowing individuals to think of themselves as ‘human beings’ graced with a 
‘capacity to reflect and decide’ on their own lives and bodies.
The method employed in this thesis to access and map out the rationalities and technologies 
that make it possible to identify the medical use o f the human body as a problem of ethics is 
Latour’s (1988:9-12) ‘method for composing our world.’ The key methodological rule posited 
by Latour is that the identification of a governmental logic’s key moments, actors, ideas and 
issues is best left to those who developed the logic themselves. In our case, Latour’s approach 
means that we have to analyse what doctors, philosophers, lawyers and other bioethical experts 
have written and said about bioethical governance. The chapter explains how a corpus of 
writings from these moral experts was gathered by examining four key journals in the field o f 
bioethical governance from 1960 to 2007. It also describes how this corpus was extended to 
include other documents (reports, guidelines, etc.) produced by the people and institutions 
identified as key in the field on the basis o f the analysis of four journals. Furthermore, it 
explains how this document-based analysis was complemented by a series of interviews with 
key experts, attendance o f several bioethics conferences and my ‘native’ insights. Finally, the 
chapter also justifies the choice to contrast the UK and Singapore by highlighting the
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productive mixture of similarities and differences between the two countries as well as to their 
rich and eventful relationship.
Aside from outlining the analytical approach and the method used in this thesis, this chapter 
also outlines the original contribution made by the thesis to the existing literature and, more 
specifically, to the two following bodies of work: (1) sociological and anthropological studies 
of bioethics and (2) govemmentality studies. As this chapter explains, what makes the thesis an 
original contribution to the first body of literature is the different analytical perspective it 
adopts when examining the field of ethics governance. To start with, unlike this body o f work, 
it does not assume that the medical use of human tissue is indeed an ethical issue and attempt 
to uncover bioethics’ shortcomings when addressing this issue (bureaucratisation; lack of 
socio-cultural awareness; facilitating human exploitation). It purports, instead, to analyse the 
conditions that make it possible to identify the medical use o f human tissue as a problem in the 
first place. Furthermore and also in stark contrast with this first body o f literature, this thesis 
does not view bioethical governance in general and the mechanism o f informed consent in 
particular as negating individuals’ true nature (be it their capacity to reflect and decide, their 
socio-cultural dimensions or their right not to be exploited). O n the contrary, it seeks to 
highlight bioethical governance’s productive force in shaping modem subjectivities. The thesis 
shows, in particular, how the language, procedures and institutions that make up the 
mechanism of informed consent, a key component of bioethical governance, contributes to 
the constitution of modern subjectivities.
As this chapter also explains, what makes this thesis an original contribution to the literature 
on govemmentality is the empirical reality to which it applies the genealogical perspective it 
shares with govemmentality studies. In other words, while this thesis shares a similar 
Foucauldian analytical framework with the literature on govemmentality studies, it applies it to 
another field of research. Following Foucault, the literature on govemmentality has, by and 
large, contributed to a genealogy of liberalism and neoliberalism, mapping out their conditions 
of possibility and modes o f subjectification. Instead, this thesis applies the analytical concepts 
it shares with the literature on govemmentality to what I term ‘contemporary ethical 
discourses.’ By this term I refer to these new languages of virtue that aim to infuse various 
domains o f life such as war, trade and science with a renewed sense of morality, including: 
discourses on human rights and democracy, agendas for environmental sustainability, 
corporate social responsibility programmes and bioethics. A burgeoning field of literature has 
begun to study the development of these contemporary ethical their reconfiguration of 
modem governance and citizenship (e.g.: Rose 1999a:Chapter 5; Strathem 2000b; Osborne
44
2003; Barry 2004; Power 2007). By analysing how one such language of virtue — bioethics -  has 
emerged in the UK and been exported to Singapore and by analysing how bioethics has 
transformed modem subjectivities, this thesis aims to contribute to this nascent body o f work.
45
Chapter 3
Southwood Smith, Bentham and Titmuss: 
Governing the Medical Use of the Human Body 
Before Bioethical Governance
This chapter does not address ethics governance itself. It does not, in particular, examine the 
different concepts, expertise and subjectivities that make up bioethical governance and make it 
possible to think and organise the medical use o f the human body today. N or does it examine 
the ways these concepts, expertise and subjectivities were progressively assembled. Instead, this 
chapter describes and analyses the languages, institutional forms and subjectivities that allowed 
people to problemadse and administer the circulation of the human body for medical research 
before bioethical governance became the prevalent governmental logic in the 1990s. More 
specifically, the chapter explores the logics that have dominated the way o f governing the 
circulation o f the body from the start o f the modem era, in the early nineteenth century, to the 
late twentieth century. Furthermore, the chapter focuses primarily on the United Kingdom 
rather than Singapore, both because the most influential logics governing the circulation of the 
body were developed in the UK (rather than in Singapore) and because of the paucity of 
historical scholarship on this issue in Singapore. Nevertheless, a short and necessarily 
superficial account is given of how some of logics o f government that dominated in the UK 
were exported to Singapore. The aim of describing and analysing the often very different ways 
o f problematising and governing the circulation of the human body that prevailed before the 
rise o f bioethical governance is two-fold. First, it offers an interesting contrast to the bioethical 
logic that is prevalent today in both the UK and Singapore. Second, it provides us with an 
overview o f the context in which the different elements that make up ethics governance were 
progressively assembled from the 1960s onwards.
As explained, the bulk of the chapter examines the styles of government which have 
dominated the way o f conceiving and governing the circulation of the human body for medical 
research in the United Kingdom between the early nineteenth century and the late twentieth 
century. It argues that, during that period, there have been two principal logics o f rule that 
have, in succession, dominated the way to think, problematise and govern the medical use of 
the human body (Reubi 2009). The first of these two styles — which I term ‘modem anatomical
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governance’ -  became prevalent with the adoption of the Anatomy A ct in 1832. Drafted by 
physician and health reformer Thomas Southwood Smith and philosopher Jeremy Bentham, 
the A c t set in place a comprehensive scheme to govern the collection and dissection of human 
corpses by anatomical schools and hospitals for research and educational purposes in the UK 
(cf. Richardson 1987; Tierney 1998; Sappol 2002). A typical illustration o f anatomical rule, the 
A ct was also, as Tierney (1998) has argued, the first modem system to govern the circulation of 
the human body. Indeed, by subordinating for the first time the circulation of the human body 
and its governance to the needs o f medical education and research, it marked what Foucault 
described as the passage from a traditional mode of power where the sovereign holds the 
prerogative of life and death to a new type of power which he called ‘bio-power,’ defined as 
the administration o f life so as to optimise and multiply it (cf. Foucault 1978:135-159; Tiemey 
1998; Dean 1999:98-102; Rose 2006:52-54).
Focusing mainly on the A ct itself, the chapter analyses the way in which modem anatomical 
rule has problematised and organised the circulation of the human body. This, I argue, is very 
different from the way bioethical governance thinks and governs the circulation o f the body 
today. For bioethical governance, the problem with the collection and medical use of the body 
is the danger it represents for human beings, a danger it seeks to tame through mechanisms 
like informed consent. In contrast, for anatomical rule, the problem is the insufficient supply 
of human corpses that hinders the development of medicine and, thereby, the happiness o f the 
living. It attempts to solve this problem by establishing an Inspectorate o f Anatomy which is 
responsible for retrieving, in secret, the corpses of paupers who die in workhouses and 
redistributing them to anatomy schools in the UK. This would be the dominant way to 
conceive and organise the circulation of the human body for medical research in the UK for 
over a century until it was progressively displaced by another logic o f governance which I term 
‘haemato-social governance.’
Richard Titmuss’ book The Gift 'Relationship: From Blood to Social Policy, which he published in 
1970 when Professor o f Social Administration at the London School o f Economics, is 
certainly one of the best and most illustrious examples o f haemato-social rule to this day. But, 
unlike the 1832 Anatomy A ct which marked the rise o f anatomical rule, Titmuss’ book signalled 
the twilight of haemato-social governance. Indeed, the book, which compared the American 
market-based and British donor-based systems for the collection and distribution o f human 
blood for transfusion, was intended as a defence of haemato-social governance which, by then, 
had started to be contested by both neo-liberal theorists and thinkers from the nascent field of 
bioethics (cf. Oakley and Ashton 1997; Starr 1998:Chapter 12; Rabinow 1999:Chapter 4;
47
Fontaine 2002; Waldby and Mitchell 2006:Introduction). As this chapter shows, haemato- 
social governance itself had began to emerge almost fifty years earlier, in the mid 1920s, 
together with what the literature on govemmentality has termed welfarist models o f rule based 
on ‘social solidarity’ and ‘society’ (e.g. Gordon 1991; Dean 1999; Miller and Rose 2008). 
Initially developed in relation to blood used in transfusions, it would, from the 1950s onwards, 
become the dominant way of conceiving the circulation for most human body parts, from 
skin, bones and kidneys used in transplantation to human tissues used in medical research.
Concentrating mainly on Titmuss’ book as well as on the organisation o f the collection of 
blood for transfusion, this chapter examines the way haemato-social governance conceived and 
governed the collection and medical use of the human body. I argue that the way Titmuss 
problematised the circulation of the body was very similar to that of Southwood Smith and 
Bentham. Indeed, as with the latter, the issue for Titmuss was the chronic shortages o f blood 
for transfusion which imperilled the functioning o f medicine and, thus, social progress. But, 
while they agreed on the definition o f the problem, Titmuss’ solution could not be more 
different. Instead o f secretly collecting the bodies o f the poor that had died in the workhouses, 
he defended a system articulated around the National Blood Transfusion Service which was 
responsible, first o f all, for persuading people through propaganda to donate blood and, then, 
for collecting and redistributing it to hospitals. This would be the prevailing way to 
problematise and organise the circulation of the human body up to the early 1990s when it was 
definitively dislodged from its dominant position by bioethical governance.
Before concluding, the chapter offers a short, complementary and necessarily superficial 
account o f how these two logics of government that dominated in the UK were exported to 
Singapore after the island’s integration into the British Empire in 1819. Focusing first on 
anatomical rule, the chapter argues that, while the practice o f dissection, strategies o f secrecy 
and the category of the poor were taken up in Singapore, modern anatomical logic never really 
imposed itself in the island. In contrast, the chapter shows how haemato-social logic was 
readily taken up in Singapore and became the dominant way to understand, problematise and 
organise the circulation o f the human body on the island until the arrival of bioethical 
governance in the late 1990s. But, as the chapter also shows, haemato-social rule was not an 
exact replica o f the logic in place in the UK. Indeed, instead o f using haemato-social 
governance to build a welfare state articulated around notions o f social solidarity and progress, 
Singapore’s leadership used it to develop and modernise the newly independent Republic,
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Modem Anatomical Rule
The adoption o f the Anatomy A ct by the British Parliament in 1832 marked the rise to 
dominance o f modern anatomical rule in the United Kingdom. Building on proposals put 
forward by Thomas Southwood Smith, a Unitarian minister trained in medicine and a key 
figure in the British sanitary movement, and, later, by philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the A ct 
sought to address the inadequate provision o f human corpses for dissection used in medical 
education and research in the United Kingdom. To that end, it established an ‘Inspectorate of 
Anatomy’ which would be responsible for secredy collecting the corpses of paupers who had 
died in workhouses and redistributing them equitably among the country’s hospitals and 
anatomy schools (Richardson 1987; Tierney 1998; Sappol 2002; Crimmins 2002b; MacDonald 
2005). As already alluded to, by subordinating the movement of corpses to the needs of 
medicine, the A ct was the first modern system to govern the circulation of the human body, 
marking the passage from a traditional mode o f power to what Foucault termed ‘bio-power’ 
(Foucault 1978:135-159; Tierney 1998; Dean 1999:98-102; Rose 2006:52-54). In any case, the 
system set in place by the A ct was to last over a century in the United Kingdom. One would 
have to wait until the 1920s to start witnessing its progressive erosion by the emergence of 
haemato-social governance (cf. Richardson 1987:258-260; Cooter 2000b:475).
An important trigger to the adoption of the A ct was a transformation in the practice of 
dissection that occurred during the eighteenth century. The dissection of human bodies was 
nothing new in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Great Britain. Ever since its 
emergence in Italian city-states in the twelfth century, dissection had been conceived across 
most o f Europe as a key mode o f knowing about the human body most notably for medicine 
(Park 1995; Siraisi 1995; Porter 1999:176-186). Such an understanding of the practice of 
dissection was still very much the norm in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Great Britain, 
as illustrated by the following quote from Robert Knox, an important Edinburgh anatomist of 
that period:
‘[Dissection is] a means towards an end. It is pursued by the physician and surgeon for the detection 
o f  disease and the performance o f  operations; by both to discover the functions o f the organs; and 
by the philosopher with the hope o f  detecting the laws o f  organic life, the origin o f  living beings, and 
the transcendental laws regulating the living world in time and space’ (cited in MacDonald 2005:99).
It was the same conception of dissection that also informed Jeremy Bentham’s desire to have 
his body dissected after his death, a rather unusual wish for that period and one which he first 
formulated at the age o f twenty-one, in 1769:
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‘It is my Will and special request to my Executor that if  I should chance to die o f  any such disease as 
that in the judgement o f  my said Executor the art o f  Surgery or science o f  Physic should be likely to 
be any wise advanced by observations to be made on the opening o f  my body, that he my said 
Executor do cause my said body as soon after my decease as may be delivered unto George Fordyce 
now  o f  Henrietta Street Covent Garden Dr. o f  Physic ... so to be dealt with’ (cited in Crimmins 
2002b: 9-10).
But, while dissection was nothing new in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Great Britain, it 
was undergoing important transformations, most o f which originated in Paris, which was the 
world’s leading centre for medicine at the time (Gelfand 1972; Porter 1999:306-315). One of 
these changes was the development o f pathological anatomy in late eighteenth century France 
described by Foucault (1973) in The Birth of the Clinic. As Foucault showed, pathological 
anatomy was to radically restructure medical perception, with the likes of Xavier Bichat 
arguing that the description and classification o f diseases had to change and be based on a real 
and objective foundation: their progression in the different tissues o f the human body which 
should be studied by ‘open[ing] up a few corpses’ (Bichat cited in Sappol 2002:77). This 
restructuring of medical perception was also to change the role of dissection from a method to 
map the structure o f the body with its systems and organs to a method to track the 
development o f disease in bodily tissues (Tierney 1998:Paragraph 11). But, while pathological 
anatomy was to progressively transform the way physicians would use dissection in Great 
Britain, it was the emergence of a new model for the practice o f dissection — the ‘Paris manner 
of dissection’ (Gelfand 1972) — which would critically impact on the way the circulation of the 
body was problematised in the early nineteenth century, as Tiemey (1998) has argued.
This new model for the practice of dissection was developed in the French capital from the 
1800s onwards and introduced in London by William Hunter in 1746 (cf. Gelfand 1972; 
Tiemey 1998). Until then, dissections were, throughout Europe, highly ritualized and elaborate 
spectacles performed by renowned anatomists in front o f large audiences composed not only 
of medical students but of representatives of the authorities, members of the educated elite, 
wealthy merchants and other interested spectators. These spectacles, conducted in specially 
built, large and very ornate ‘anatomy theatres’ like the Barber-Surgeons Company’s Hall in 
London, were bestowed with multiple meanings. Besides their role in medical education and 
their entertainment value (some dissections were done with music throughout while others 
concluded with sumptuous feasts), they also marked the status and prestige o f the city in which 
the theatre was located, conveyed lessons in human mortality for the audience and constituted 
a post-mortem punishment for the dissected, the majority of whom were convicts (Sawday 
1995; Tierney 1998).
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In contrast, the Taris manner o f dissection,’ which progressively replaced the ‘dissection-as- 
spectacle’ model during the eighteenth century, was based on privately run anatomy courses 
taught by young surgeons, often in their home or a rented room, to supplement their income. 
Typically three months long, these courses were designed for medical students, to whom they 
gave the opportunity to personally perform dissections on up to six corpses (Gelfand 1972; 
Tierney 1998). The dissemination o f the Paris manner of dissection transformed the 
understanding o f dissection within medicine: not only was dissection a technique to acquire 
knowledge about the body, it was now also something physicians and surgeons had to have 
carried out themselves during their medical education before being allowed to practice their 
profession. Put differently, personal experience o f dissection by medical students was now 
seen as a necessary condition for the development of a rational medicine and safe surgery. This 
new understanding of the dissection is well conveyed in this quote from Southwood Smith:
‘There can be no rational medicine and no safe surgery without a thorough knowledge o f  anatomy... 
It is by dissecting alone, that young men studying medicine and surgery can make themselves 
acquainted with the principles o f  their a rt... Without [dissecting] they cannot,. . .  without the highest 
temerity, perform a single operation ...  [because], unless important and difficult operations are 
performed . . .  with the utm ost skill, life is inevitably lost .. .  [In other words,] operations must be 
performed, medical men must be educated, anatomy must be studied [and] dissections must go on ’ 
(ibid. p.5, 41 & 43).
O f course, by requesting up to six corpses per medical student, the new ‘Paris manner of 
dissection’ substantially increased the demand for dead bodies in the United Kingdom. For 
reasons which we discuss below, this was an increase in demand that the two principal existing 
sources o f supply o f human corpses for dissection which existed in early nineteenth century 
Great Britain would be unable to satisfy. The first o f these two sources o f supply was the 
procedure by which the King gave the bodies of criminals executed at the gallows to 
physicians and surgeons for them to dissect as part o f these criminals post-mortem 
punishment. This procedure was first established by King Henry VIII who, in 1540, had 
granted the newly-formed ‘Barber-Surgeons Company’ the annual right to the bodies o f four 
hanged felons. The procedure was opened to further associations (like the Royal College of 
Physicians) by the 1752 Murder A c t which declared dissection a statutory penalty available to 
judges for the avowed purpose o f ‘better Preventing the horrid Crime o f Murder’ (cited in 
Richardson 1987:35; cf. also: Tierney 1998:Paragraphs 32-37; Sappol 2002:100-101). As 
Tierney (1998:Paragraph 36) has argued, this procedure is an example of Foucault’s traditional 
mode o f power where the sovereign holds the prerogative of life and death (cf. also: Foucault 
1978:135-159; Dean 1999:98-102; Rose 2006:52-54). Indeed, dissection was understood as a
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punishment through which ‘further Terror and peculiar Mark of Infamy might be added to the 
Punishment of Death’ (cited in Richardson 1987:35).
The second of the two sources of supply of human bodies for dissection was the covert 
exhumation of recendy-buried corpses, an activity which went by a variety o f names like grave 
robbing, body snatching and resurrection (cf. Richardson 1987:Chapter 3; Tierney 
1998:Paragraphs 38-40). The clandestine exhumation of dead bodies was an activity which had 
been practiced since as least the seventeenth century. For a long time, physicians, anatomists 
and medical students had exhumed and stolen the corpses they needed for education and 
research themselves. But, by the late eighteenth century, they had delegated this job and left 
the control o f the market in exhumed corpses to ‘professional gangs’ o f ‘body-snatchers’ or 
‘resurrectionists’ (Richardson 1987:57); this shift might have been caused by the recognition, in 
1788, of grave robbing as an offence punishable by fines and /or imprisonment under British 
common law (Tiemey 1998:Paragraph 40). Both anatomists and resurrectionists had generally 
exhumed the bodies of those at the margins o f society such as criminals, prostitutes and 
paupers. It was only with the rise in demand for corpses due to the introduction o f the Paris 
manner o f dissection from the late eighteenth century onwards that body-snatchers started to 
target all segments o f society.
It was the incapacity of these two sources o f supply to provide enough bodies to satisfy the 
increase in demand due to the emergence o f the Paris manner o f dissection which brought 
anatomists and physicians to increasingly agitate in favour of a solution to the problem. An 
influential intervention in this respect was a short article published in the Westminster Review in 
1824 entitled: ‘Use of the Dead to the Living.’ Written by Thomas Southwood Smith, the 
article lamented the insufficient number of corpses available for medical education and 
research and called, in the name o f ‘the happiness of the living,’ for the adoption of an ‘Act of 
Parliament’ that would provide an ‘abundant, regular and cheap’ supply of bodies to 
anatomical schools and hospitals (1832:31,43 & 45). It was this article which prompted Jeremy 
Bentham, who held similar views to those o f Southwood Smith, to address the legal situation 
concerning the failing provision of bodies to hospitals and anatomy schools. By 1826, 
Bentham had started lobbying Parliamentarians to that effect and had written a first draft o f 
the future Anatomy A ct which he aptly entitled the ‘Body Providing Bill.’ Two years later, 
members o f Parliament favourable to his project, like the declared ‘Benthamite’ Henry 
Warburton, had secured the creation of a ‘Select Committee on Anatomy’ which, in a report 
dated 1828, recommended the adoption of a law to ensure a sufficient supply o f corpses for 
medical education and research. After a first failure to adopt the law in 1828, a slightly
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modified version o f the text was finally passed in 1832 under the official tide Actfor Regulating 
Schools of Anatomy (or Anatomy Act).
The adoption o f the A ct in 1832 was very much part of the ‘revolution in government’ that 
took place in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century and which saw government 
increasingly problematising and intervening in economic, political and social life (MacDonagh 
1977; Richardson 1987:Chapter 5). These interventions included, besides the 1832 Anatomy 
A c t  the regulation o f factories and coal mines in a bid to improve the safety o f workers; the 
adoption in 1834 o f the new Poor Lam, which sought to induce paupers to join the free labour 
market by making poor relief available only to those willing to accept the harsh conditions of 
the workhouse; Brougham’s attempts to rationalise the English legal system; Robert Peel’s 
modernisation of the police; and the comprehensive sanitary reforms to improve the vitality of 
the population conducted by Edwin Chadwick and for which public health reformers like 
Southwood Smith had long campaigned.
As MacDonagh (1977:Chapter 1) has argued, these interventions arose from a series of 
different factors. These included the economic and social upheavals resulting from 
industrialisation and technological innovations in agriculture, manufacturing and transport: 
demographic explosion, mass migration to cities, poverty, wage labour, pollution and dire 
sanitation standards. It also included a plethora of movements calling for change and reform. 
An important group, in that respect, was the constellation of people like Chadwick, 
Southwood Smith and Warburton who gravitated around Jeremy Bentham and shared many of 
his ideas and values. Bentham was ‘a true child of the Enlightenment,’ sharing its faith in 
reason and progress (Porter 2000:417). While Bentham applied rational thinking to a series of 
problems, he devoted most of his time to the reform o f law and government in the United 
Kingdom, devising administrative schemes aimed at bringing happiness to the greatest 
number. Many o f his schemes were to play a key role in the nineteenth century British 
revolution in government as they were adopted, developed and put into operation by his 
friends and followers. One illustration, o f course, is the 1832 Anatomy Act, another one is the 
1834 revision o f the Poor Law which, under the direction o f the his friend and secretary Edwin 
Chadwick, incorporated many o f the propositions put forward by Bentham in his writings on 
the subject.
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‘Scanty' Supplies &  the ‘Happiness of the Uving'
For people like Southwood Smith, Bentham or Warburton, the problem with the collection 
and medical use o f the human body was not one o f ‘ethics’ which necessitated the 
development of ‘ethical guidelines’ to protect human beings against the dangers o f science, as 
bioethics would have it today. Rather, the issue, for them, was the deficient supply of corpses 
for dissection for medical education and research. Their will to remedy the situation and 
ensure an ‘abundant, regular and cheap’ supply o f bodies to anatomical schools and hospitals 
was informed by a desire to promote ‘the happiness of the living’ (Smith 1832:31 & 43). This 
was based on two assumptions. First, that the practice of dissection was the basis o f ‘a rational 
medicine and safe surgery’ (ibid. p.5). Second, that a rational and scientific medicine was the 
way to bring about progress, prosperity and happiness. The latter was an idea that had been 
put forward by the philosophers of the Enlightenment: rational and scientific medicine (and 
reason and science more generally) are, by ‘enhancing man’s control over nature,’ the path to 
‘progress, prosperity and the conquest of disease’ (Porter 1999:245; cf. also Canguilhem 1998).
The heart o f the problem, for Southwood Smith and his allies, was that the two existing 
sources o f human corpses — post-mortem punishment and body-snatching — were inadequate 
to satisfy the marked increased in the demand for bodies due to the adoption o f the Paris 
manner o f dissection in the late eighteenth century. To start with, the procedure by which the 
King gave the corpses o f criminals to physicians and surgeons for dissection as part o f a post­
mortem punishment only yielded a very small number o f bodies, even after the passage of the 
Murder A ct in 1752 (Richardson 1987:Chapter 2; MacDonald 2005:Chapter 1). Furthermore, 
although there was talk o f developing this source of supply by extending punitive dissection to 
crimes other than murder, Bentham and others were keen to avoid altogether a source of 
supply o f corpses that was associated with public executions; indeed, they thought that such an 
association would be a hindrance to the development of anatomical science as it sat uneasily 
with the notion that anatomy was the path to progress, prosperity and happiness (Richardson 
1987:Chapter 5; Tierney 1998:Paragraph 42). The clandestine exhumation of bodies, which 
provided most o f the bodies used for dissection in the early 1800s in Great Britain, was also 
deemed inadequate by Southwood Smith, Bentham and others as it still fell short of 
anatomists’ demands for bodies. Furthermore, supplies were often disrupted and the price of 
corpses tended to be high.
13y the method o f  exhumation, the supply after all is scanty; it is never adequate to the wants o f  the 
schools; it is o f  necessity precarious, and it sometimes fails altogether for several months. But it is the 
utmost importance that it should be abundant, regular and cheap’ (Smith 1832:43).
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These shortcoming were the result, for the most part, o f the stark opposition to the practices 
of both exhumation and dissection on the part o f the vast majority o f the population, 
anatomists included (Richardson 1987:Chapter 4;Tiemey 1998:Paragraph40;Porter 1999:316- 
318). This opposition translated into two different types of action. First, many started investing 
in mechanisms — watch houses and guards; protective coffins — to prevent their dead relatives’ 
bodies from being disinterred and stolen from cemeteries. Second, upon the discovery o f a 
case of body snatching, spontaneous crowds would often form and assault the resurrectionists 
and anatomists involved, often ransacking their homes and schools. All this made the practice 
of grave robbing much more difficult and dangerous, leading to an increase in the price of 
bodies as well as to lower and irregular supplies.
Historians offer different explanations for this popular resistance to body snatching and 
dissection. For some (e.g. Richardson 1987; cf. also: Bynum 1991; Park 1995; Siraisi 1995), it 
was fuelled by the belief that there was a strong link between body and soul beyond death, an 
understanding found in animist ideas about the vitality of the corpse as well as in Christian 
notions of resurrection. Animism attributed an ambiguous spiritual power to the corpse which 
could be beneficial to or dangerous for the mourners. These beliefs often mixed with the early 
Christian very material understanding of resurrection which had survived up to the nineteenth 
century, whereby the dead slept in the ground until G od returned to reign over an earthly 
Kingdom, at which point the dead would rise again with their bodies similar in structure and 
matter to those laid down in the grave (Bynum 1991). These beliefs encouraged people to care 
for and respect the dead bodies of their relatives, a care and respect which often translated into 
a strict adherence to the different stages o f funeral rites (the washing, watching, viewing and 
burying of the corpse) and which body snatching and dissection obviously jeopardised.
For other historians (e.g. Laqueur 1983; Sappol 2002), popular opposition to resurrection and 
dissection were related to ideas about social exclusion and respectability in a nascent culture of 
consumption. The latter was replacing the natural order and fixed hierarchy of the pre-modem 
world. In this culture, where ‘money made the men’ (Laqueur 1983:114) and where status was 
acquired, fluctuating and fragile, ‘death became the occasion for a final accounting, a 
stocktaking o f worldly success’ (ibid.). In a world were there was a profound anxiety about 
earthly standing, funerals were the last and final moment to assert oneself, success and capital. 
The more lavish the display, the better. The undertaker rose as servant o f this new order. He 
was the proponent o f a new aesthetic of death: ‘beautiful death’ (Sappol 2002:29). He offered 
an increasing number o f ‘death goods.’ New architectural spaces appeared — mausoleums,
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monuments, pastoral death parks. Allegories about the future o f the soul were replaced by 
narratives about the history of the deceased and his or her worldly success. ‘The funeral 
became a consumption good whose cost was clearly evident and could be matched with 
exquisite precision to the class and degree o f “respectability,” to use the nineteenth-century 
term, o f the deceased’ (Laqueur 1983:114). Within such a system, being disinterred and 
dissected, a fate understood to be reserved to those at the very margins, was considered as ‘the 
final stamp o f failure’ (ibid. p. 120) and a mark o f social exclusion.
This popular opposition to exhumation and dissection was well known to Southwood Smith, 
Bentham and their allies (Richardson 1987; Tiemey 1998; MacDonald 2005). But, compared 
with the promotion of the happiness of the living, people’s reverence for the dead did not 
weigh much, they argued.
‘Veneration for the dead is connected with the noblest and sweetest sympathies o f  our nature; but
the promotion o f  the happiness o f  the living is a duty from which we can never be exonerated’
(Smith 1832:30-31).
The promotion of the happiness the living was not Southwood Smith’s only argument in 
favour o f by-passing popular opposition to dissection and ensuring a adequate supply of 
corpses for dissection. He also argued, for example, that an insufficient supply of corpses 
would bring the ‘ruin o f the Medical Schools’ (ibid. p.40) and make Great Britain ‘become 
entirely dependent on France’ for its anatomical knowledge (ibid. p.49). But the promotion of 
the happiness of the living was by far his chief argument. It was an argument that 
encompassed two separate assumptions. First, the idea that there can be ‘no rational medicine 
and safe surgery’ (ibid. p.5) without dissection, an idea which, as discussed above, had gained 
hold with the introduction o f the ‘Paris manner o f dissection.’ Second, the idea that a ‘rational 
medicine and safe surgery,’ by securing people’s ‘life and health,’ played a key role in 
promoting the ‘happiness of the living’ (ibid. p.3, 5 & 31).
This second assumption was an idea which had first been put forward by the philosophers of 
the Enlightenment whose thought had powerfully influenced all of eighteenth century Europe 
and America (Canguilhem 1998; Porter 2000; Porter 2001). For thepbilosophes, mankind had a 
‘capacity for Progress’ which, if well harnessed, would bring about ‘a better future:’ the 
elimination o f ‘injustices’ and ‘inefficiencies;’ the establishment o f ‘milder government,’ ‘expert 
administration’ and ‘fairer laws;’ the realisation o f ‘religious tolerance,’ ‘intellectual freedom’ 
and ‘heightened self-awareness;’ and the creation o f ‘greater prosperity’ and ‘happiness’ for all
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(Porter 2001:5,16& 17).To illustrate both this perfectibility and better future, the proponents 
o f the Enlightenment often wrote progressive histories of mankind tracing the emergence of 
‘Man’ from ‘savagery’ to ‘civilisation’ (cf. ibid. p.16-18). An example of such texts was the 1794 
Esquisse d ’un tableau historique des progres de I'esprit humain [Sketchfora Historical Picture of The Progress 
of the Human Mlnd\ in which its author, the Marquis of Condorcet, a leading figure of the 
Enlightenment, charted the past, present and future stages o f progress of the human mind. 
The way to bring about such progress, the philosophes argued, was to apply to humans and their 
environment the scientific reason and methodologies, most notably systematic doubt, 
observation and experimentation, which natural scientists had pioneered so successfully in the 
fields o f astronomy and physics (Brockliss 1995:80; Porter 2001:15). ‘Reason and science, they 
held, would make people more humane and happy’ (Porter 2001:7).
A ‘rational and scientific medicine’ had an important role to play in this vision of reform and 
progress for mankind (Brockliss 1995; Porter 1999:Chapter 10; Porter 2000:Chapter 6; Porter 
2001:60-61). For the proponents o f the Enlightenment, physicians could, through the use of 
scientific reason and methods, understand and remedy the causes o f diseases and, thus, 
participate in the creation of greater prosperity and happiness for everyone by securing good 
health and long lives. Such an understanding was not only held by philosophes, but was also 
embraced by doctors who sought to improve or otherwise legitimate their profession. A good 
illustration of this way o f thinking can, once more, be found in Condorcet’s 1794 Esquisse, in 
which he argued that humankind would, through the progress of science and medicine, soon 
overcome diseases and even death itself:
‘The improvement o f  medical practice, which will become more important with the progress of  
reason and o f  the social order, will mean the end o f  infectious and hereditary diseases and illnesses 
brought on by climate, food, or working conditions. It is reasonable to hope that all other diseases 
may likewise disappear as their distant causes are discovered’ (cited in Porter 1999:245-246).
There is little doubt that Bentham, Southwood Smith and their allies shared these ideas put 
forward by the proponents of the Enlightenment. Jeremy Bentham, for example, was one of 
‘the most systematically radical o f the late Enlightenment reformers’ (Porter 2000:415), 
relendessly applying the ‘hands o f reasons’ so as ‘to rear the fabric o f felicity’ (Bentham cited in 
ibid. p.416). Concerned principally with the reform of both law and government, he spent 
most o f his life devising administrative schemes (like poor relief systems and model prisons) 
which would satisfy what was in his opinion the only scientific measure of right and wrong: the 
‘Principle o f Utility’ or the happiness for the greatest number. Medicine, and more particularly 
anatomy, also held his attention. As both his wish to have his body dissected after his death
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and his text Auto-Icon; Or, Farther Uses of the Dead to the Living attest, he saw the dissection of 
bodies as essential in furthering the development of medicine and, thus, the health and 
happiness o f the living (cf. Richardson 1987; Crimmins 2002; Crimmins 2002b). His efforts to 
reform the supply of corpses for dissection certainly participated in the same spirit: by 
guaranteeing a sufficient supply of bodies for dissection, one promoted the development of a 
rational and scientific medicine which, in turn, would improve the health and happiness of all 
(Tierney 1998:Paragraphs 41 & 45).
Southwood Smith developed similar views in the 1824 article in which he argued, in the name 
o f ‘the happiness o f the living,’ in favour of the adoption of an ‘Act o f Parliament’ that would 
guarantee an ‘abundant, regular and cheap’ supply o f bodies (Smith 1832:31, 41 & 43). After 
having argued that dissection was necessary to the existence o f a ‘rational medicine and safe 
surgery’ (ibid. p.5), he went on to explain that both were key in ensuring the happiness of the 
living. This was so, he clarified, because there could be no happiness if there is not, first o f all, 
life and health. Put differendy, a life free from pain and disease was a necessary precondition to 
any feeling of happiness.
‘Everyone knows that, as far as his own individual good is concerned, protracted life and a frame o f  
body sound and strong, free from the thousand pains which flesh is heir to are unspeakably more 
important than all other objects, because life and health must be secured before any possible result o f  
any possible circumstances can be o f  consequence to him’ (Smith 1832:3).
O f Inspection, Secrecy <& the Poor — Bentham’s Body Providing Bid’
Having defined the problem with the collection and dissection o f corpses as a deficiency in the 
number o f corpses supplied to anatomists which, by hampering the progress of medicine, 
jeopardized the health and happiness o f the living, Southwood Smith and his allies sought to 
remedy it by adopting a ‘plan’ to provide anatomy schools with an ‘abundant, regular and 
cheap’ supply o f corpses for dissection (Smith 1832:43 & 47). A t the heart o f the plan was the 
‘Inspectorate o f Anatomy,’ United Kingdom’s first centrally financed and administered 
inspectorate (Richardson 1987:108), which was responsible for collecting corpses for 
dissection and redistributing them to anatomy schools and hospitals across the country. The 
corpses which the Inspectorate was instructed to collect and redistribute were those o f paupers 
who had died in workhouses within the United Kingdom. This system to organise the 
circulation o f the human body is of course in stark contrast with the way bioethical governance 
seeks to regulate the medical use of human tissue today. Instead of monitoring and protecting 
the ‘capacity to reflect and decide’ of all ‘human beings’ through mechanisms like informed
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consent, the Anatomy A ct targeted ‘the bodies’ of ‘the poor’ through a combination of 
techniques o f inspection, strategies of secrecy and workhouses.
The concepts o f an inspectorate and techniques of inspection were not novel in Bentham’s 
thought. He had developed and described them in some of his previous writings, most notably 
his 1791 Panopticon; or, the Inspection House (Bentham 1791; cf. also Foucault 1975) and his 1796 
Essays on the Subject of the Poor Lam  (cf. Quinn 2001). They were characterised by ceaseless 
observation by inspectors, surveillance at every point, permanent registration and reporting so 
as to render the object of governance visible and, thus, subject to intervention. This comes out 
clearly in Bentham’s discussion of the ‘Inspection Principle’ informing his ‘Panopticon’ or 
‘Inspection House:’
Tersons are meant to be kept under inspection ... The more constantly the persons to be inspected 
are under the eyes o f  the persons w ho should inspect them, the more perfectly the purpose o f  the 
establishment have been attained. Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each 
person should actually be in that predicament, during every instant o f  time’ (Bentham 179l:Letter I).
What was particular to the Inspectorate of Anatomy was that its objects of governance were 
human corpses rather than ‘persons’ in ‘prisons, work-houses, manufactories, mad-houses, 
hospitals or schools’ as in the case o f the Panopticon (ibid.). The Inspectorate was responsible, 
first o f all, for having a precise knowledge o f the quantity, location and movement of corpses 
across Great Britain. It had to be able, at any given time, to account for the numbers and 
whereabouts o f the human bodies destined for dissection. As Richardson (1987:Chapter 10) 
shows, the first Inspector of Anatomy, Dr James Sommerville, attempted to achieve this by 
devising a range of instruments including: a system of certificates, warrants and receipts to 
register every stage in the corpse’s journey between death and burial; inspectors to oversee the 
functioning of the system; the writing of reports to document problems; and a system of 
registration for the hospitals, workhouses and anatomy schools participating in the scheme. 
Furthermore, the Inspectorate was also accountable for the fair redistribution of bodies 
between the different schools and hospitals. Unsurprisingly, this was fraught with difficulty 
and different schools and hospitals often levelled accusations of favouritism against the 
inspectors. To avoid this, various solutions were devised, including distributing corpses 
amongst schools in proportion to their number of students. To Sommerville’s great dismay, 
this system soon collapsed after inspectors discovered that some schools were reporting higher 
intakes of students than there were in reality so as to receive more corpses (cf. ibid.).
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The difficulty for Southwood Smith, Bentham and their allies, given the strong opposition to 
dissection among the population, was how to acquire corpses in the first place. As Richardson 
(1987:Chapter 7; cf. also Crimmins 2002b) has showed, different alternatives were discussed by 
those in power. Some, like Warburton, proposed financial inducements to encourage the 
donation o f corpses. Others discussed the possibility of educating people to abandon their 
prejudice against dissection and bring them to voluntarily donate their bodies to medicine. 
Schemes were examined which involved changing people’s minds by having illustrious men 
setting the example by publicly giving their bodies away for dissection. Bentham, for example, 
certainly saw the public dissection o f his corpse by his friend Southwood Smith as well as the 
subsequent display o f his body in a glass cabinet accessible to all as a way to challenge people’s 
objections against dissection, as he made clear in his posthumous text Auto Icon; or, the Further 
Uses of the Dead to the Living (cf. Crimmins 2002). But, instead o f adopting one of these 
alternatives, Southwood Smith and others decided to target and collect in secrecy the corpses 
o f the poor who had died in workhouses and prisons (cf. Foucault 1973; Laqueur 1983; 
Richardson 1987; Sappol 2002; MacDonald 2005).
‘N o  one can object to such a disposal o f  the bodies o f  those who die in prisons; no one can
reasonably object to such a disposal o f  the bodies o f  those who die in poor-houses’ (Smith 1832:47).
‘[It is] the bodies o f  those who during life have been maintained at the public charge [that] should ...
be given up to the Anatomist” (The Select Committee on Anatomy's 1828 Report cited in
Richardson 1987:121).
‘The poor’ was an im portant category in early nineteenth century Great Britain (cf. 
MacDonagh 1977:Chapter 6; Laqueur 1983; Porter 2000:Chapter 16; Quinn 
2001 introduction). The economic and social upheavals brought about by industrialisation and 
innovations in agricultural practice had increased the levels of poverty across the country. This 
increase had, from the 1790s onwards, put the system for the relief o f the poor in place since 
the early seventeenth century under severe strain, prompting a protracted debate about what 
was to be done about poverty which was often linked to the perceived danger of 
overpopulation associated with thinkers like Malthus. The debate was finally settled in 1834, 
two years after the adoption o f tho. Anatomy Act, with the passage o f the Poor Law Amendment 
Act. The latter was the brain child of Edwin Chadwick, Jeremy Bentham’s literary secretary and 
a friend o f both the philosopher and Southwood Smith. Influenced by Bentham’s writings, the 
1834 Poor Law  sought to  induce paupers to join the free labour market by making poor relief 
only available to those willing to accept the difficult conditions o f the workhouses — hard 
work; meagre rations o f  food; and overcrowded dormitories.
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The reason for targeting the bodies o f the poor who had died while in the workhouse was, for 
Southwood Smith, Bentham and others, that these were people who had failed, often by lack 
o f moral discipline or industry, to join the free labour market and had, thus, lived their lives at 
society’s expense. It was therefore only fair, they argued, that these paupers would pay back 
the part o f the public support they had received during their lives by giving their bodies which 
would help produce a knowledge vital to all (Foucault 1973; Laqueur 1983). Southwood Smith 
made that point very clearly in his 1824 article:
‘Those w ho die in poor-houses . . .  are pensioners upon the public bounty: they owe the public a 
debt: they have been supported by the public during life; if, therefore, after death they can be made 
useful to the public, it is a prejudice, not a reason, -  it is an act o f  injustice, not the observance o f  a 
duty, which would prevent them from becoming so . . .  Some concession and co-operation on the 
part o f  the public, for this great public object [the development o f  a rational and safe medicine], is 
indispensable, without which nothing can be done: but if any concession be made, it can be made 
with respect to this class o f  persons better than any other, because it can be made with less violation 
o f  public feeling’ (Smith 1832:47).
The retrieval of the bodies of those who died in poor-houses was, furthermore, to be done in 
the greatest secrecy so as to avoid scandal, public hostility and disorder. As Richardson 
(1987:Chapter 10; cf. also Cooter 2000b) has showed, James Sommerville was gripped by a 
permanent fear of public exposure. He constantly recommended the ‘greatest discretion’ to 
poorhouses participating in the trade, suggesting, for example, that they target the dead 
without friends and family, and encouraging them to remove corpses ‘by undertakers in 
Coffins as if for the purpose o f interment’ (cited in Richardson 1987:244). It is interesting to 
note here that, at a moment when liberal thought was at its height, there was no willingness on 
the part o f these thinkers to target the agency of the poor by informing them and seeking their 
consent about giving their body for dissection (cf. Valverde 2007, especially p. 171 & 173). It is 
true that the 1832 Anatomy A c t did have a clause according to which the body o f a person 
could not undergo dissection after death i f ‘such Person shall have expressed his Desire, either 
in Writing ... or verbally ... that his Body after D eath might not undergo such Examination’ 
(cited in Richardson 1987:205). But, as Richardson (1987:Chapter 10) has argued, this clause 
was not meant to be applied; rather, it was just lip service paid to the liberal notion of freedom.
To recapitulate, this section showed that, from the adoption o f Southwood Smith and 
Bentham’s 1832 Anatomy A ct until the late 1920s, a logic of rule referred to as modern 
anatomical governance was the dominant way of governing the circulation o f the human body 
for medical purposes in the UK. For this style of government, which was principally 
concerned with the collection and use o f human corpses for dissection, the problem was the 
inadequate number of bodies supplied to anatomical schools and hospitals in the UK. As
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showed in the chapter, this was a problem because an insufficient supply o f corpses was 
deemed to hinder the development o f medicine and, thereby, as the philosophers o f the 
Enlightenment had argued, the prosperity and happiness o f the living. As the chapter also 
showed, the solution, for modern anatomical rule, was to create an Inspectorate of Anatomy 
which, using both strategies of secrecy and Bentham’s techniques o f inspection, would collect 
the corpses o f the poor who had died in workhouses and redistribute them to anatomists and 
doctors around the country.
Haemato-Social Rule
Richard Titmuss’ The Gift Relationship: From Blood to Social Polity, which he published in 1970 
while he was professor o f social administration at the London School o f Economics, is 
probably the most famous plea in favour o f haemato-social rule to this day (cf. Oakley and 
Ashton 1997; Starr 1998:Chapter 12; Rabinow 1999:Chapter 4; Fontaine 2002; Waldby and 
Mitchell 2006:10-21). In his book, Titmuss compared the ways o f collecting, storing and 
redistributing blood for transfusion in both the United Kingdom and the United States. On 
the basis o f this comparison, he sought to demonstrate how the British donor-based system 
articulated around ‘gifts’ from ‘voluntary community donors’ generated more and better blood 
supplies than the American market-based system in which blood was bought from ‘the poor, 
the unskilled, the unemployed, Negroes and other low income groups’ (Titmuss 1997 
[1970]:140 & 172). But, while his book is, perhaps, the most famous discussion o f haemato- 
social rule, it was certainly not its first instantiation. Indeed, this new governmental logic had 
started to gradually emerge and displace modem anatomical rule from the 1920s onwards.
One site which played an important role in the initial development o f haemato-social 
governance was the collection, storage and transfusion o f human blood (cf. Starr 1998; 
Rabinow 1999:Chapter 4; Waldby and Mitchell 2006:Introduction). While experimental 
transfusions had taken place as long ago as the seventeenth century, it was only from the early 
1920s that, thanks to developments in immunology and, in particular, the identification of 
blood types by Karl Landsteiner, it became possible to safely transfuse blood from one patient 
to another. In order to supply the blood for these transfusions, panels o f pre-screened 
volunteers who could be called to give their blood when necessary were constituted, of which 
D r Percy L. Oliver’s 1925 Greater London Red Cross Transfusion Service was the first one 
(Starr 1998:Chapter 4). At the eve of World War Two, further developments in techniques of 
blood storage such as the making of anti-coagulants had made it possible to collect and store
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blood for later transfusions. One of the first scheme to do so was set up in 1939 by Janet 
Vaughan, a pathologist at the British Postgraduate Medical School in London. Using a theatre 
impresario to recruit volunteers among the population, she and her colleagues collected and 
stored blood at four depots in the outskirts o f London (ibid., chapters 5 & 6). Six years later, a 
national system to collect, store and redistribute blood for transfusion was established on the 
basis o f the schemes which had been developed during the war (cf. Webster 1988:319-321; 
Mardew 1997:45; Starr 1998:158). Organised around the National Blood Transfusion Service’s 
(NBTS) fourteen transfusion centres in England and Wales which collected the blood donated 
by volunteers and redistributed it to hospitals across the country, this was the system that 
Titmuss would discuss some twenty-four years later in The Gift Relationship.
While blood for transfusion has become the typical illustration of haemato-social rule, this 
governmental logic has not been limited to the collection and use o f blood. On the contrary, it 
also came to inform the governance o f the collection and use o f other parts of the human 
body (in both therapy and research) as well as, more generally, of the use o f human volunteers 
in scientific research. From the 1930s onwards, corpses for dissection were increasingly 
supplied through voluntary bequests rather than through the secret retrieval of paupers’ 
corpses in workhouses (cf. Richardson 1987:258-260; Cooter 2000b:475). From the late 1940s, 
developments in surgical methods had allowed for the mass transplantation Of corneas, 
resulting in the adoption of the 1952 Comeal Grafting A ct and the creation o f regional eye banks 
operated by the National Health Service in keeping with haemato-social logic. In the 1950s, 
further advances in medicine saw the adoption of the 1961 Human Tissue A ct which marked the 
extension of haemato-social governance to the circulation o f skin, bones, arteries and any 
other human tissue used in either therapy or research. Finally, from the 1960s onwards, 
haemato-social governance was applied to the collection and medical use of whole organs like 
kidneys and hearts (that could now be transplanted thanks to advances in immunology), 
resulting in the adoption o f the Human Organs Transplant A ct in 1989 (cf. Hogle 1999; Cohen 
2001; M. Lock 2002). The importance o f haemato-social rule beyond blood was fully 
acknowledged by Titmuss who argued, in The Gift Relationships that the transfusion of blood 
‘was but one illustration o f a number of social policy areas in which gift transactions take place 
and which might have been developed at length’ (1997 [1970]:282). Other such areas included 
the transplantation of corneas as well as, more generally, the use o f human volunteers in 
scientific research:
W e could, for example, have taken for study the giving role o f  the patient as “teaching material,” and
as research material for experimentation and the testing o f  new drugs and other diagnostic and
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therapeutic measures . . .  Or, to take another example, we might have explored the gift transactions o f  
Regional Eye Banks under the National Health Service’ (Titmuss 1997 [1970]:2{80& 283).
Haemato-social logic, which by the 1940s had become the dominant way of governing the 
collection and medical use of human body parts, is very much a particular manifestation of 
what the literature on governmentality has termed ‘social liberal rule’ and whi<chwas prominent 
in the UK between the 1910s and the 1970s (Gordon 1991; Dean 1999; Rose: 1999a; Miller and 
Rose 2008; cf. also Clarke 1996). Based on the writings o f thinkers like L.T. Hobhouse, John 
M. Keynes and William Beveridge, as well as on such knowledges, technologies and 
institutions as sociology, social insurance and the National Health Service, social liberal rule 
was a way to conceive and govern economic, political and personal life articulated around 
notions like ‘welfare,’ ‘social solidarity’ and ‘society,’ which sought to eradicate poverty and 
want (cf. Collini 1979; Donzelot 1980; Rabinow 1989; Defert 1991; Donz«elot 1991; Ewald 
1991; Rose 1996b; Clarke 1996). William Beveridge’s report, Social Insurance ani Allied Services, 
presented to the British Parliament in 1942 and rapidly a bestseller with over 600,000 copies 
sold, offers probably the best insight in this particular mentality of rule.. The report was 
described by Beveridge as ‘one part only o f a comprehensive policy o f social progress’ to ‘be 
achieved by co-operation between the State and the individual’ and aimed at the abolition of 
the ‘five giants on the road o f reconstruction,’ namely ‘Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and 
Idleness’ (1966 [1942]:6 & 9). It was soon to became Britain’s blueprint for post-war welfare 
policy with the government putting in place the main elements of Beveridge's ‘Plan for Social 
Security’ which included, most notably, a unified system o f social insurance as well as ‘a 
National Health Service’ which was responsible for providing ‘all citizens’ with ‘medical 
treatment covering all requirements’ (ibid. p.9-11; cf. also Clarke 1996).
Titmuss’ career as well as his best-loved book The Gift Relationship are illustrative of how 
haemato-social governance was very much a particular manifestation o f social liberal rule (cf. 
Oakley and Ashton 1997; Rabinow 1999:Chapter 4; Fontaine 2002; Waldby and Mitchell 
2006:Introduction). Titmuss incarnated the social liberal mentality, constantly attempting to 
alleviate poverty and create a society characterised by solidarity and equality. These concerns 
constantly informed his work from his early research on the relation between poverty and the 
failing birth rate conducted for the Eugenics Education Society to his establishment of social 
medicine as a discipline in the UK in the 1940s and, thereafter, his defence and development 
o f social policy as both professor o f social administration at the London School o f Economics 
and policy advisor to the Labour party. The Gift Relationship is informed by very similar set of 
concerns. Indeed, by showing that a system built around gifts of blood and a central, state-run 
agency such as the NSTB (which, by 1948, had been integrated within the NHS) provided
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more and better quality blood than a system based on market principles, Titmuss claimed to 
demonstrate the vital role played by social solidarity and altruism in building a society which 
could secure everyone’s needs.
By the 1970s, haemato-social governance, as well as social liberal rule more generally, started to 
be increasingly questioned and progressively displaced. A very important source of criticism of 
any manifestation o f social liberal govern-mentality was neo-liberal scholars like Friedrich 
Hayek. These scholars, whose theories were to inspire a series of British neo-liberal think-tanks 
as well as Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party, advocated the reconfiguration of 
government around the notion of the market, technologies like audit and budgetary discipline, 
forms o f expertise like accountancy as well as a figure o f the citizen as an entrepreneur and 
consumer shaping his or her life through acts o f choice (cf. Cockett 1994; Power 1994; Clarke 
1996; Rose 1996b; Fontaine 2002; Foucault 2004b). One o f these think-tanks, the London- 
based Institute o f Economic Affairs (IEA), was to question haemato-social rule in particular, 
arguing in favour of organising the circulation o f blood for transfusion on the basis of market 
principles rather than around the idea o f gifts and a central, state-run authority like the NSTB 
(cf. Oakley and Ashton 1997; Fontaine 2002). Founded in 1955 by an independent 
entrepreneur named Anthony Fisher, the IEA pursued the expansion o f market analysis in the 
practice of government, which included, most notably, campaigning against the NHS system in 
the relation to the government of health in general and against the collection and redistribution 
o f blood for transfusion through the NSTB in particular. In relation to the latter, two IEA 
publications were especially important, both of which sought to apply market rationalities and 
techniques such as the price mechanism to the circulation o f blood: Michael Cooper and 
Anthony Culyer’s (1968) The Price of Blood: an Economic Study of the Charitable and Commercial 
Principle and Armen Alchian’s (1973) The Economics of Charity: Essay on the Competitive Economics 
and Ethics of Giving and Selling, with Application to Blood.
Another source o f criticism addressed to haemato-social logic in particular came, as discussed 
in more details in chapter 4, from the nascent discipline of bioethics. An important moment, in 
that respect, was the outcry about medical experimentation on humans which took place in the 
early 1960s and which marked the gradual disappearance, in the British media, of the figure of 
the public-spirited citizen volunteering to take part in experiments (cf. Bolton 2008). A key text 
in these 1960s debates about experimentation was Maurice Pappworth’s (1969 [1967]) Human 
Guinea Pigs: Experimentation on Man, which argued that the problem with haemato-social rule 
was not its non-recognition o f market principles but the way it mistakenly assumed that
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patients had an obligation, for the good of society, to offer themselves as research materials to 
doctors.
‘Any classification “for the good o f  society” is to be viewed with distaste, even alarm. Undoubtedly, 
all sound work has this as its ultimate aim, but such high-flown expressions are not necessary, and 
have been used within living memory as cover for outrageous ends’ (Pappworth 1969 [1967]:44).
Titmuss’ discussion o f haemato-social rule in The Gift Relationship was very much conceived as a 
reply to such criticisms. His plea in favour o f the British donor-based system for the collection 
and use of blood as opposed to the American market-based one was, first and foremost, a 
rejoinder to criticisms put forward by the IEA. Indeed, as Fontaine (2002; cf. also Oakley and 
Ashton 1997) has showed, The Gift Relationship was part of a much longer debate between 
Titmuss and the IEA which had started in the early 1960s and which would only stop with 
Titmuss’ death of cancer in 1973. But The Gift Relationship also addressed, most notably in its 
chapters 8 and 16, some of the criticisms put forward by the literature on human 
experimentation like Pappworth’s Human Guinea Pigs, which it listed in its bibliography. In any 
case, Titmuss’ defence of haemato-social rule had mixed results. In relation to both blood for 
transfusion and organs for transplantations, haemato-social has remained the dominant logic 
up to this day, withstanding both the AIDS crisis in the 1980s and the endless propositions to 
organise the circulation o f these body parts according to market-based rationalities (cf. 
Berridge 1997; Mardew 1997; Joralemon 2000; Joralemon 2001). In relation to other areas, 
most notably the collection and use of human tissues for medical research, Titmuss’ 
intervention could not prevent the displacement of haemato-social logic by new forms o f rule 
like bioethical governance. But, even in these areas, not all the principles, devices, forms of 
expertise and subjectivities that make up haemato-social rule have disappeared. Indeed, some 
o f its components like the notion o f ‘the gift’ have survived and, having been detached from 
their original matrix, have been recast within the new formulas o f rule that are now governing 
these areas (cf. Tutton 2004).
O f Shortages and Social Progress
The intensity o f the debate about the compared benefits and drawbacks of welfarist and 
market-based policies mask the fact that, for both Titmuss and the IEA, the problem with the 
collection and medical use of blood or other parts o f the human body was, at root, ‘a problem 
of generating the required supplies’ for medical therapy and research (Cooper and Culyer 
1968:5). Indeed, both were committed to finding ‘possible solutions ... to the problem’ (ibid.). 
This desire to generate a sufficient supply was, in Titmuss’ case at least, informed by a will to
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ensure ‘the advancement of medical science’ and, thereby, ‘the good of all patients’ (Titmuss 
1997 [1970]:281). In other words, aside from the state-versus-market debate which was more 
about how to generate the required supplies, the way Titmuss and his colleagues problematised 
the collection and medical use o f the human body was very similar to the way Southwood 
Smith, Bentham and others had conceived the collection o f corpses for dissection in the early 
nineteenth century: as a problem of ensuring an ‘abundant, regular and cheap’ supplies of 
corpses to guarantee a ‘rational medicine’ and, thus, ‘the happiness of the living’ (Smith 
1832:31 & 43).
The ‘required supplies’ were not just human blood which, thanks to Landsteiner’s 
identification of blood types and the development of anticoagulants and other storage 
techniques, could be routinely collected, stored and transfused for therapeutic purposes from 
the 1940s onwards (cf. Starr 1998; Rabinow 1999:Chapter 4; Waldby and Mitchell 
2006:Introduction). They also encompassed an ever-increasing variety o f body parts which, 
thanks to advances in medicine like the life-saving technologies o f the intensive care units, 
tissue typing procedures and cyclosporine, could be collected, sometimes stored and 
transplanted for therapeutic purposes as well. These other body parts included, from the 
immediate post-war period onwards, corneas, skin, bones and arteries as well as, from the late 
1960s onwards, whole organs such as kidneys and hearts (cf. Hogle 1999; Porter 1999; Le Fanu 
2000; Cohen 2001; M. Lock 2002). Furthermore, the ‘required supplies’ did not only 
encompass body parts for therapeutic purposes; on the contrary, they also included whole 
corpses and ‘any part o f the body ... for the purposes of medical education or research’ 
(Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1232).
Unlike the situation in the early nineteenth century when Southwood Smith, Bentham and 
others had faced a stark popular opposition to the collection and use o f corpses for dissection, 
by this time there was very little resistance to their collection and use for therapy or research. 
O n the contrary, people were, for the most part, eager to give parts o f their bodies. This 
eagerness was a particular manifestation o f the public’s general enthusiasm towards modern 
medicine between the 1920s and the 1970s (Porter 1999:Chapters 20 & 21; Le Fanu 2000). The 
parliamentary debates on the 1961 Human Tissue Act, which legalised the collection and medical 
use of any part o f the human body in the United Kingdom, are an excellent illustration o f this 
mood. Indeed, MPs welcomed an Act which, they argued, stood for ‘the benefit of the living’ 
and ‘the improvement of treatment, education and research’ (Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 
1961:1234-1235), as the following passage conveys well:
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‘I also welcom e the Bill [Human Tissue Act] .. .  I think that the title is a little unfortunate . . .  I would 
like to suggest [instead] something like the “Human Aid to Medical Science Bill.” .. .  When I made 
my will in 19571 definitely willed my eyes under the [1952 Comeal Grafting] A ct to an eye bank, and 
when this Bill becomes an Act I shall add a codicil to my will so that my body may becom e useful 
after death ...  I welcom e the idea that one might carry on som e use for one’s body after one is dead, 
and particularly welcome the Bill for that. I think it will be helpful to medical students . . .  The Bill 
can aid the advance o f  medical education ... I think that we shall leam by the Bill a great deal which 
will be o f  help curing various diseases about which we know very little at present... [as] various parts 
o f  the body can [not only] be used for curing people who are ill but that they can [also] be used for 
research work’ (Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1238-1239)
In other words, the problem for Titmuss and others was not popular resistance in giving one’s 
body to science; rather the problem was that supplies never appeared to be sufficient as 
demand relendessly increased, seemingly without limit. N ot only did medicine request an ever- 
increasing variety o f body parts, the demand for each of these varieties constandy augmented 
as their transfusion or transplantation became routine and their uses in medicine multiplied. 
This is well conveyed in the following passage from the parliamentary debate on the 1961 
Human Tissue A ct in which the then Ministry o f Health Enoch Powell recognised, in response 
to a question about the ‘serious shortage o f corneas for grafts,’ that:
‘[With regard to] the supply o f  corneas, .. .  I must say that I cannot foresee the happy time when it 
will be necessary to cry, “Hold, [we have] enough [corneas].” On the contrary, the present situation 
cannot be regarded as fully satisfactory .. .  The solution to this matter lies in wider public 
understanding o f  what is involved ...  and in close [working] relationships between the corneal 
grafting centres and the hospitals to which persons . . .  made dispositions o f their eyes’ 
(Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1253).
Similarly, Titmuss argued in The Gift Relationship that the increasing roles that blood played in 
modem medicine was constandy increasing the demand for the substance and, thus, creating 
shortages across the Western world:
‘The demand for blood and blood derivatives is increasing all over the world. In high income 
countries, in particular, the rate o f  growth in demand has been rising so rapidly that shortages have 
begun to appear in a number o f  countries’ (Titmuss 1997 [1970]:79).
‘It is clear that the need for blood donations will continue to mount at a rapid rate. In the foreseeable 
future, there appears to be no predictable limit to demand in countries like the United States and 
Britain, more especially if  account is taken o f  unmet needs for surgical and medical treatment and the 
great potentialities o f  demand in many areas o f  preventive medicine ...  Tw o conclusions follow. One 
is that the m ost effective and efficient use should be made o f  existing supplies. The other is the need 
for more donors; in other words, for programmes to increase the proportion o f  the adult population 
who donates’ (Titmuss 1997 [1970]:87).
Titmuss and others’ desire to generate more supplies so as to meet the demand in body parts 
was informed by a will to bring about what Beveridge had termed ‘social progress’ (1966 
[1942]:6), a notion which was similar to the Enlightenment idea o f progress that had informed
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Southwood Smith and others in the way it related improvements in medicine to increases in 
human happiness. Social progress, for Beveridge and other social liberal reformers, was not 
only about the elimination o f want, squalor and ignorance but also about the eradication of 
disease (Beveridge 1966 [1942]:6; Clarke 1996:302; Porter 1999:652). The path to combat 
disease and thus bring about social progress was the development o f modem medicine (cf. 
Porter 1999:Chapter 20). While in the nineteenth century, modern medicine meant, for people 
like Bentham and Southwood Smith, a ‘rational medicine and a safe surgery’ based on 
dissection, for Beveridge and the like it meant, for the most part, what became know as 
‘scientific medicine’ or ‘clinical science.’
Terms such as ‘scientific medicine’ and ‘clinical science’ refers to a style of reasoning that was 
prevalent in twentieth-century Western medicine, a style that seeks to incorporate knowledge 
and practices from the basic sciences (molecular biology, chemistry, physics) and puts a strong 
emphasis on experimentation in both the laboratory and the ward (cf. Platt 1967; Booth 1993; 
Porter 1999:Chapters 17 & 18; Le Fanu 2000:196-205). In the United Kingdom, scientific 
medicine became increasingly prevalent from the early twentieth century onwards with the 
introduction o f a new medical curriculum, the creation o f chairs in medicine, the setting up of 
laboratories in hospitals, the establishment o f medical research centres and the foundation of 
funding bodies like the Medical Research Council (MRC). The British Postgraduate Medical 
School, opened at London’s Hammersmith Hospital in 1935, very much embodied this new 
style of reasoning in modern medicine (cf. Booth 1993; Porter 1999:532-534 & 643; Le Fanu 
2000:196-205). The system for the collection, storage and redistribution of blood for 
transfusion articulated around the NSBT that Titmuss defends in The Gift Relationship was a 
product o f this British scientific medicine. Indeed, it was while enrolled as a pathologist at the 
Postgraduate Medical School and financed with a grant from the MRC that Janet Vaughan 
developed the UK’s first scheme for the mass collection and storage o f blood for transfusion 
in 1939 (cf. Starr 1998:Chapters 5 & 6).
These beliefs in modem scientific medicine and progress were not only held by social liberal 
reformists such as Beveridge, but were pervasive in both Europe and the United States of 
America from the 1920s to the 1970s, reaching their peak in the post-WWII period (cf. Porter 
1999:Chapter 20 & 21; Le Fanu 2000). The pervasiveness o f these beliefs had been buttressed 
by a long series o f success stories that gave credence to the idea that death and disease could 
be conquered: the eradication of tuberculosis and poliomyelitis; the improvements in 
immunology that enabled transfusions and transplantations; the creation o f new drugs from 
cortisone and penicillin to chlorpromazine; and the development of new medical devices from
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the life-saving technologies of the intensive care unit to electrocardiograms and operating 
microscopes. Vannevar Bush, who was to play a significant role in the strengthening and re­
organisation of scientific research in the United States o f America during and after WWII, 
provides a good illustration of these beliefs in modern scientific medicine and progress. In his 
blueprint for the reform o f the way science was to be managed and financed in the post-war 
period, the 1945 report Science: the Endless Frontier, he argued, using the example of penicillin, 
that scientific medicine was essential to the health and prosperity o f the nation.
‘Scientific progress is essential. Progress in the War against Disease [in particular] depends 
upon a flow o f new scientific knowledge ... Without scientific progress, no amount of 
achievement in other directions can ensure our health, prosperity, and security as a nation in 
the modem world’ (Bush 1945:5)
There is litde doubt that those involved in developing and defending haemato-social rule also 
shared these beliefs in modem scientific medicine and social progress. For example, Janet 
Vaughan, an active member of the Physicians’ Republican Committee that supported the 
republicans in the Spanish Civil War, thought, as did most social liberal reformists, that 
‘medicine [was a way] to ameliorate poverty and social injustice’ (Starr 1998:85). Similarly, 
Titmuss also saw his life-long fight for the abolition of poverty and the creation of a better 
society as having a strong ‘medical’ or ‘biological’ dimension. For him, ‘capitalism [was] a 
biological failure’ (cited in Oakley 1991:171) which he sought to correct through a mixture of 
social and medical interventions including: his research for the Eugenics Education Society on 
the effects of poverty on fertility; his establishment, together with John Ryle, of British ‘social 
medicine’ which sought to alleviate the social injustices that caused ill health (Porter 1999:643- 
644); and his development and defence of the NHS (including the NSTB) which he saw as a 
way to create a society characterised by social solidarity and equality (cf. Oakley and Ashton 
1997; Fontaine 2002). Thus, for Titmuss, to give one’s blood or, more generally, to give 
oneself as ‘research material for experimentation and the testing o f new drugs and other 
diagnostic and therapeutic measures’ was to participate, through the advancement o f medical 
science, in the creation o f a society that ensured and improved the wellbeing of all (Titmuss 
1997 [1970] :280-281).
‘[Patients7] willingness to be “taught on7’ and to give o f  themselves ...  is taken for granted in the 
name o f  research, the advancement o f  medical science, society’s need for doctors, the better training 
and more rapid progression o f  doctors . . .  and ultimately for the good o f  all patients irrespective o f  
race, religion, colour and territory ... The benefits o f  teaching, experimentation and research ... 
mostly accrue in the long ...  and further the well-being o f  some future collectivity o f  patients’ 
(Titmuss 1997 [1970]:281).
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Gifts, Community Donors <& Propaganda
For Titmuss, Vaughan and others, the best solution to the problem of how to generate a 
supply of blood (or other body parts) that was sufficient to guarantee the functioning and 
advancement of medicine and, thereby, the well-being o f all patients, was to collect the body 
parts o f ‘community donors’ by using both the technique o f ‘the gift’ as well as ‘propaganda.’ It 
was a solution to the organisation of the supply of blood (and other body parts) that was very 
much in keeping with the social liberal logics of rule that were dominant at the time and which 
advocated the governance of political, economical and personal life around the concepts of 
‘social solidarity’ and ‘society.’ As such, it stood in stark contrast with the solution put forward 
by the economists o f the IEA, who advocated a scheme based on a ‘market in blood’ and ‘paid 
donors,’ as well as with the solution proposed by Bentham, Southwood Smith and their 
contemporaries, who had suggested a system articulated around techniques of inspection, the 
poor and strategies o f secrecy. Titmuss, Vaughan and their contemporaries’ approach to the 
collection and medical use o f the human body was also very different to that of bioethical 
governance. Indeed, the latter problematised the circulation o f the body as an ethical issue (as 
opposed to a question o f shortage) and sought to protect human beings’ capacity to reflect and 
decide through the mechanism o f informed consent (rather than creating sufficient supplies 
through propaganda and gifts).
At the heart o f the solution put forward by Titmuss and Vaughan was the concept o f ‘the gift,’ 
which Titmuss derived from the French anthropological and sociological literature (cf. Titmuss 
1997 [1970]:Chapter 8). The gift, for Titmuss, was an act whereby a member of a community 
or society gives his or her blood (or other body parts) to the community or society and, in 
return, can expect the community or society to provide him or her with blood (or other body 
parts) when he or she needs it. The donor, who Titmuss called the ‘voluntary community 
donor,’ gives without any ‘tangible, immediate rewards’ and without any fear o f ‘penalties’ for 
not giving; his or her gift is, in other words, ‘characterised by complete, disinterested, 
spontaneous altruism’ although there is ‘some expectation and assurance that a return gift may 
be needed be needed and received [from the community or society] at some future time (as 
with Mauss’ examples of gift-exchange in other societies)’ (ibid. p .140). The gift, furthermore, 
is ‘impersonal:’ ‘the recipient is in almost all cases not personally known to the donor [and] 
there can, therefore, be no personal expressions o f gratitude or o f other sentiments’ (ibid. 
p. 127). This meant that the gift is not given to a ‘fellow-member of the community’ or society 
in particular, but to the community as a whole understood as ‘unnamed strangers without 
distinction o f age, sex, medical condition, income, class, religion or ethnic group’ (ibid. p. 140).
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In return, the ‘caring community’ (ibid. p.280) will provide the donor — because he or she is 
member o f that same community — with blood or other body parts when he or she needs 
them.
T eople are expected to contribute -  to give — to serve the interests o f  other people. There is in all 
these transactions an unspoken assumption o f  some form o f  gift-reciprocity; that those who give as 
members o f  a society to strangers will themselves (or their families) eventually benefit as members o f  
that society ...  There is . . .  a vague and general presumption o f  a return gift at some future date’ 
(ibid. p.283).
The gift, as understood by Titmuss, is what can be termed a technique o f social solidarity (cf. 
Donzelot 1991). Developed in the writings of Emile Durkheim (e.g. 2007 [1893]) and Leon 
Bourgeois (e.g. 1912 [1896]) and characteristic o f social liberal governance, techniques of social 
solidarity are articulated around the notion of an integrative and cohesive relationship between 
the individual members o f society and society as a whole, with the former expected to 
contribute to the latter and the latter expected, in return, to guarantee the former’s welfare and 
security (Donzelot 1991; cf. also: Rabinow 1989; Gordon 1991; Dean 1999; Miller and Rose 
2008). There can be litde doubt that Titmuss’ thinking was influenced by such notions. Indeed, 
not only did he directly refer to this French intellectual tradition by using most notably the 
work of Marcel Mauss in The Gift Relationship, he was also conversant, as a professor o f social 
administration at the London School of Economics, with related ideas about both solidarity 
and the social developed in the UK by thinkers like L.T. Hobhouse, J.M. Keynes and W. 
Beveridge. It is thus unsurprising that Titmuss described the gift in particular and social policy 
in general as:
‘[a series of] processes, institutions and structures which encourage ...  the intensity or extensiveness 
o f  anonymous helpfulness in society ... [as] institutions that create integration and discourage 
alienation .. .  [as institutions that] enable the greatest possible number o f individuals to act 
reciprocally, giving and receiving services for the well-being o f  the whole community’ (1997 
[1970] :279-280);
‘integrative systems [whose] processes, transactions and institutions... promote an individual’s sense 
o f  identity, participation and community’ (ibid. p.290).
For Titmuss, both the NBTS and the NHS were the way to operationalise the notion of 
community to which community donors gave their blood and which provided all members of 
the community with the necessary blood when needed. They were the ones to which members 
o f the community gave blood and which ensured that it was then redistributed among all 
members o f the community which needed it ‘without distinction of age, sex, medical 
condition, income, class, religion or ethnic group’ (ibid. p. 140). Indeed, not only did single 
donors lack the means to do so in a community of nearly sixty million members, they would
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also sometimes be prevented from doing so by their own prejudices: ‘givers and recipients 
might, if they were known to each other, refuse to participate in the process on religious, 
ethnic, political or other grounds’ (ibid. p.127). It was the role o f both the NBTS and the NHS 
to create this community of altruistic givers and nameless, sexless and classless recipients:
‘The National Blood Transfusion Service ... [and the National] Health Service ...  have allowed and
encouraged sentiments o f  altruism, reciprocity and social duty to express themselves’ (ibid. p.292);
‘Fellowship relationships [are] institutionally based in Britain in the National Health Service and the
National B lood Transfusion Service’ (ibid. p.311).
This use o f centralised, state-run institutions to represent and operationalise the community or 
society is characteristic o f techniques o f social solidarity. Keynes (1926:40-41), for example, 
called for the creation of such ‘forms o f Government’ which he described as ‘semi- 
autonomous State-bodies whose criterion o f action ... [is] the public good’ and which 
Hobhouse (1922:144) had described a few years earlier as ‘the community’s very imperfect 
organs.’ Similarly, Beveridge (1966 [1942]:6 & 11) conceived his social security system as a ‘co­
operation between the State and the individual’ whereby ‘the State should offer security for 
service and contribution’ and which would be operationalised through a new ‘Ministry of 
Social Security.’
Aside from establishing institutions to operationalise the community, it was also necessary to 
create the ‘community donors’ who would give their blood in an act of ‘complete, 
disinterested, spontaneous altruism’ to the community. In other words, community donors did 
not exist as such; one needed mechanisms which would help shape people’s will in order to 
bring them to donate their blood. These mechanisms included, in particular, national publicity 
programmes conducted on television, in newspapers and in schools. It also included what 
Joralemon (2000:224) termed a ‘new science o f donation’ which determined and analysed the 
psychosocial and socio-economic factors influencing donation in order to better intervene 
upon them. This point was made, for example, by Titmuss (1997 [1970]:59 & 306), who 
acknowledged that one had ‘to actualise the social and moral potentialities o f ... citizens’ and, 
more specifically, one needed to ‘encourage’ and ‘foster altruism and regard for the needs of 
others’ through ‘instruments of public policy.’ The same point was made by the Minister of 
Health Enoch Powell while discussing the shortage o f corneas for transplant in the House of 
Commons in 1960; for him, one needed ‘propaganda’ to bring citizens to understand the 
‘benefits o f donation.’
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‘The solution to [the shortage o f  corneas for transplant] lies in wider public understanding o f  what is 
involved .. .  Propaganda is undoubtedly o f  importance in this matter, and the House may be 
interested to know that the Royal National Institute for the Blind is planning a publicity drive . . .  to 
bring to the attention o f  the public the opportunities and the benefits which donation, o f  eyes in 
particular, can give’ (Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1253).
It is interesting to note here that, unlike anatomical rule which did not acknowledge or attempt 
to intervene upon the agency of the poor, haemato-social governance does recognise, through 
its use o f the technique o f the gift, that individuals have a certain agency. This was an agency 
which had to be intervened upon and shaped through propaganda so as to have people give 
their bodies altruistically to the community. It was not ‘the human capacity to reflect and 
decide’ which sits at the heart o f bioethical governance and which the latter seeks to enable 
and account for, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. This difference is well illustrated by the 
limited significance that Titmuss attaches to one o f the key mechanisms of bioethics, the 
procedure o f informed consent, in The Gift Relationship. Titmuss was clearly aware of the notion 
o f informed consent, which had first come to the fore during the bitter 1960s debate on 
human experimentation to which he refers twice in his book (cf. 1997 [1970]: 136-139 & 284- 
288). But, for him, consent only made sense in relation to what he called the ‘captive voluntary 
donors’ (ibid. p. 136), a type of donor whom he saw as lying outside the normal functioning of 
haemato-social governance and whom he described as:
TDonors in positions o f restraint and subordinate authority who are called upon, required or expected 
to donate ...  [such as people] in prison or similar institutions . . .  [or] primitive people in Africa’ (ibid. 
p. 136-137 & 284).
In contrast, informed consent made no sense in relation to the pillar o f haemato-social 
governance: the ‘voluntary community donor’ (ibid. p. 140). Indeed, Titmuss could not 
conceive that there was anything wrong with the sense of obligation to give for the good o f all 
which, he assumed, drove these ideal donors. There was, in particular, ‘no situation o f power, 
domination, constraint or compulsion, no sense o f shame or guilt, [and] no gratitude 
imperative’ (ibid.) in these areas o f gift relationships. There was, thus, for Titmuss, no necessity 
for informed consent where haemato-social governance was at work, such as with blood 
donation or ‘the giving role of the patient as “teaching material,” and as research material for 
experimentation’ (ibid. p.280) as then practiced in the British National Health Service:
‘patients ... are ... expected to behave as givers on the unspoken assumption that they may benefit; sometimes 
their consent is sought; sometimes they are simply informed; often nothing is said. Their willingness to be 
“taught on” and to give o f themselves, physically and psychologically, is presumed. It is taken for granted in the 
name o f research, the advancement o f medical science, society’s need for doctors, the better training and more 
rapid progression o f doctors professionally and financially and, ultimately, for the good o f  all patients 
irrespective o f  race, religion, colour or territory’ (ibid. p.281).
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To sum up, this section has showed that, from the 1920s to the late 1980s, a logic o f  rule, 
which it terms haemato-social governance and which is well illustrated by Richard Titmuss’ The 
Gift Relationship, dominated the way o f governing the circulation o f the body for medical 
purposes in the UK. Concerned with the collection and use o f most parts o f the body for 
either transplantation or research, the way this mentality o f rule problematised the circulation 
o f the body was very similar to the way anatomical governance did so. Indeed, as with the 
latter, the issue was the chronic shortages o f blood and other body parts which imperilled the 
functioning o f medicine and, thus, hindered social progress. But, while the two styles of 
government had a similar understanding o f the problem, they did not develop the same 
solution. Shaped by the welfarist models o f rule that dominated from the 1920s onwards, 
haemato-social governance was articulated around the notion o f the gift whereby voluntary 
donors generated through propaganda gave parts of their bodies to the community 
operationalised by central, state-run authorities which redistributed them to hospitals across 
the country.
Singapore
Singapore was integrated into the British Empire in 1819, thirteen years before the adoption of 
the 1832 Anatomy Act, when an expeditionary force of the British East India Company 
established a permanent settlement on the island to secure the control o f important trading 
routes to the Far East. The purpose-built warehouses, wharfs, government buildings, squares, 
churches and residential areas soon became an important entrepot and port within Great 
Britain’s mercantile empire, attracting traders and labourers from Europe, China, India and 
South-East Asia (cf. Turnbull 1989; Chew and Lee 1991; Perry, Kong et al. 1997). As with 
many colonial societies, life in Singapore was shaped by knowledges, languages, forms and 
institutions brought from the metropole that combined, sometimes uneasily, with local 
practices and cultures from other parts o f the Empire. The way the circulation of the human 
body was understood, discussed and organised was not exempt from these different 
influences.
This section offers a short and necessarily superficial account o f how the two logics of 
government that dominated in the UK during most of the 19th and 20th centuries were 
exported to Singapore after the island’s integration to the British Empire. It shows, first o f all, 
that anatomical governance never really imposed itself in Singapore. Indeed, although elements 
o f modern anatomical rule like the practice of dissection, strategies o f secrecy and the category
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of the poor were adopted in Singapore, the collection o f corpses for dissection was never 
problematised and regulated in the British colony. Secondly, the section argues that, in 
contrast, a modified version o f haemato-social logic was readily taken up in Singapore. It 
shows that while the concepts, expertise and practices that make up haemato-social rule were 
brought to the South-East Asian colony by the British in the 1940-50s, they were re-aligned to 
serve Singapore’s will to modernise, develop its economy and build the newly independent 
nation after breaking away from the British Empire in 1959. This transformed version of 
haemato-social logic would be the dominant way to problematise and organise the circulation 
o f the human body until the arrival of bioethical governance in the late 1990s.
The Absence of Modem Anatomical Governance
Western medical practices were brought to Singapore by British physicians and surgeons who 
had come with the administrators, soldiers and merchants who established themselves in the 
colony from 1819 onwards (cf. Lee 1978; Tan 1991; Cheah 2003). One important site for the 
introduction o f these practices were hospitals. The British built four o f them, including a 
hospital for paupers and a lunatic asylum, during the nineteenth century. While these were long 
regarded as ‘death houses rather than institutions for ... the alleviation of sickness and 
suffering’ (Tan 1991:342), progress was made from the late nineteenth century onwards. At the 
turn o f the century, for example, the colony’s two major establishments, the General Hospital 
and the Tan Tock Seng Hospital, were improved and transformed into teaching institutions, 
with departments of Clinical Surgery, Medicine and Pathology. Another important site for the 
introduction o f Western medical practices was the colony’s first and only medical school, the 
King Edward VII College o f Medicine. Opened in 1905, it offered a Ucentiate of Medicine and 
Surgery that allowed its holders to practice medicine within any of the British colonies. There is 
litde doubt that dissection was one o f the numerous medical practices which was introduced 
by British surgeons at both the hospitals and the medical school. Indeed, as MacDonald (2005) 
has argued, colonial hospitals were understood to be advantageous places in which to practice 
dissection. First, many o f those people that died there did so far from their families who could 
otherwise remove them from the surgeons’ hands for burial. Second, colonies presented the 
surgeons with the opportunity to dissect racially different bodies that were of great interest to 
Europe’s comparative anatomists. Singapore’s immigration-based and racially diverse 
population matched both criteria. Furthermore, it is clear that students at Singapore’s medical 
school were expected to practice dissections as part o f their curriculum.
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The demand for corpses for dissection was probably satisfied by surgeons who discreetly 
collected the bodies o f those who died in one of Singapore’s hospitals and which were not 
claimed for burial by family or friends (cf. Muir 1964; Government of Singapore 1965:875- 
877). It is likely that, as in the United Kingdom, the corpses that were collected were those of 
people at the margins, like paupers and convicts. It is also probable that, similarly to what 
happened in other colonies, the corpses o f immigrants were especially targeted as they were 
deemed to have no family or friends (cf. Sappol 2002; MacDonald 2005). What was perhaps 
specific to the way corpses were collected in Singapore was the role played by the racial 
classifications that had been introduced by the British. As with other colonial societies, race 
played an important role in colonial Singapore and categories like ‘Chinese,’ ‘Malay’ or ‘Indian’ 
(together with the stereotypes attached to each o f them) were used by the British to govern the 
island, allowing them, for example, to allocate specific neighbourhoods to specific races or to 
limit the access to certain professions to certain races (cf. Perry, Kong et al. 1997; Purushotam 
1998; Lian and Rajah 2002; Lian 2006). The same categories also informed, to some extent, the 
collection o f corpses for dissection. So, for example, ‘Malays’ were deemed to find dissection 
abhorrent and were, whenever possible, spared the practice. In contrast, it was thought that, in 
accordance with Buddhist traditions, Chinese parents would often refuse to claim the bodies of 
their dead children for burial, making them an easy target for dissection (cf. Muir 1964; 
Government o f Singapore 1972:1344-1345). Interestingly, this mode of supply seems to have 
satisfied the, probably low, demand for corpses as the circulation of corpses never really 
became an issue in Singapore in the way it did in the United Kingdom in the 1820s. This 
meant, in particular, that the colonial authorities never set up an institution on the lines of the 
British Inspectorate o f Anatomy with the mandate to organise the circulation of corpses for 
dissection on the island.
Haemato-Social Governance &  Modernisation
In contrast to modern anatomical rule, which never imposed itself in Singapore, haemato- 
social governance was readily adopted on the South-East Asian island after it had been 
imported by the British in the 1940-50s. It rapidly became the dominant mode of 
conceptualising and organising the circulation of the human body for medical purposes in 
Singapore and remained so until the emergence o f bioethical governance in the late 1990s. But, 
while in the United Kingdom haemato-social rule was articulated around notions of the 
welfare state, social progress and solidarity, in Singapore it was, following the country’s 
political independence in 1959, re-configured around notions of modernisation, economic 
development and the building o f the new nation.
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Many of the problems, institutions, strategies and forms of citizenship that are characteristic of 
haemato-social governance were introduced in Singapore in the late 1940s when the British set 
up a system for the collection, storage and redistribution o f human blood for transfusion 
modelled on the scheme in place in the UK (Colony of Singapore Medical Services 1948:92- 
97). This system, the running of which was taken over by the Ministry of Health o f the new 
Republic o f Singapore after the island gained its political independence in 1959, combined 
many elements that are typical o f haemato-social rule. First, it was built around a centralised, 
state-run institution modelled on the British National Blood Transfusion Service (NBTS) and 
responsible for the collection and redistribution o f blood for transfusion: the Singaporean 
Blood Transfusion Service (SBTS) (Colony o f Singapore Medical Services 1953:179-184; 
Ministry o f Health 1959:188-191). Second, it was based on citizens coming forward to give 
their blood voluntarily and without being paid by the SBTS (Ministry of Health 1959:188). 
Third, it relied on strategies of ‘Propaganda and Publicity’ like advertising in the press and on 
the radio, the distribution of leaflets and the screening o f information movies to transform 
Singaporeans into citizens who voluntarily gave their blood to the SBTS (ibid. p. 190). Fourth, 
it was a system that sought to solve the problem of chronic shortage o f blood for transfusion 
due to the rising therapeutic usages o f blood in medicine (Ministry of Health 1959:188; 
Ministry of Health 1965:229). Interestingly, most of these elements that were characteristic of 
haemato-social rule and made up Singapore’s system for collecting and redistributing human 
blood for transfusion were also, from the 1970s onwards, employed to organise the circulation 
o f corneas, kidneys and other human tissues for transplantation (Government o f Singapore 
1972:1339-1346; Teo 1991; Kaur 1998)
In the United Kingdom, these problems, institutions, strategies and forms of citizenship 
characteristic of haemato-social governance participated in the construction o f the welfare 
state, the development o f social solidarity and the realisation o f social progress. In Singapore, 
after the country gained its political independence in 1959, these same elements were re­
aligned to serve the consolidation, development and modernisation of the Republic instead. As 
scholars have shown and as discussed in great detail in chapter 5, the construction of the 
Republic o f Singapore by Lee Kuan Yew and his People’s Action Party (PAP) from 1959 
onwards has been characterised by a implacable will to modernise and develop the country 
economically (Margolin 1989; Chua 1995; Huff 1995; Perry, Kong et al. 1997; George 2000; 
Rodan 2006). Modernising, for Lee and his allies, meant above all improving the population’s 
material conditions. To do so, they adopted an export-based model of industrialisation 
whereby Singapore would seek to attract large foreign multinational companies to open
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factories on the island where they would manufacture products for worldwide export. As 
elsewhere in Asia, at the heart of this process of modernisation and industrialisation was ‘the 
developmental state:’ a strong central government that planned and directed the country’s 
development (Margolin 1989; Castells 1992; Thompson 1996; Perry, Kong et al. 1997; Rodan 
2006). In Singapore, the developmental state was articulated around: the PAP (which has been 
in power since 1959); the Cabinet (which Lee Kuan Yew headed until 1990); the various 
ministries and state administrations; a series of specialised governmental agencies like the 
Economic Development Board or the Housing and Development Board regularly advised by 
selected international experts; the National Trade Union Confederation (Singapore’s official 
and only trade union); and a multiplicity o f parapolitical and intermediary structures such as 
Community Centres, Citizens’ Consultation Committees and Neighbourhood Watch Groups.
The government used a series of strategies to attract multinational companies to open factories 
in Singapore and thus modernise and develop the country. These strategies included the 
provision o f financial and technical advice to the companies settling in Singapore as well as the 
creation o f a first-class industrial infrastructure comprising: public utilities like electricity, gas 
and water; a transport and telecommunication system with an airport, roads, post offices and a 
phone network; and key-in-hand industrial estates (e.g. Ministry of Finance 1961; cf. also: 
Margolin 1989; Perry, Kong et al. 1997). They also included a series of measures to develop the 
population understood as a human resource that was key to the modernisation and 
industrialisation o f the country. These measures comprised: the provision o f health care so as 
to have a healthy and productive population; the construction o f social housing and 
organisation o f social amenities and activities for the workers and their families to create strong 
communities; the development of education to have a qualified and disciplined workforce; 
nation-building programmes to build a ‘common oudook and spirit o f common loyalty’ that 
included the creation of a national language, a national flag and anthem, a national museum 
and library and a set of national values (Economic Planning Unit 1964:33; cf. also: Margolin 
1989; Chew 1991; Chua 1995; Hill and Lian 1995; Perry, Kong et al. 1997; Lee 2005).
For the Republic o f Singapore’s governing elite, the SBTS in particular and haemato-social 
governance more generally had to be understood as part of this particular project of 
developing and modernising the South-East Asian island rather than as a mechanism to build 
the welfare state as in the UK. First of all, the SBTS and haemato-social governance were not 
about the realisation o f social progress as Beveridge, Titmuss and Vaughan would have it but 
about ensuring that the population, understood as a key resource in the development and 
modernisation o f Singapore was kept in a healthy and productive state. This understanding
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comes out clearly in the following extract o f the Republic’s first development plan which 
describes the rationale behind maintaining good health care system, that included of course the 
SBTS run by the Ministry o f Health, throughout the island:
‘Health. The need for maintaining a high standard o f  health services is not purely based on a humane 
and civilized recognition o f  the value o f  human life. N or is it purely a desire to alleviate human 
suffering. It is also based on econom ic considerations. A very considerable part o f the community’s 
resources has already been invested in its population ... In order to reap the benefits o f  these 
investments it is necessary that facilities are provided to protect the population from the avoidable 
hazards o f  living. Death or incapacitation o f  persons capable o f  adding to the national income ... 
would be a waste o f  the capital invested. Consequently it is o f  some importance ...  to continue 
investments for maintaining the health o f  the population’ (Ministry o f  Finance 1961:7).
Furthermore, the act o f giving blood, for the Singaporean leadership, was not a mechanism of 
social solidarity whereby the donor gave altruistically for the good of all patients irrespective of 
race, religion, colour or territory as for Titmuss and his allies; instead, it was a mechanism to 
make the newly independent Republic o f Singapore stronger and to participate in the 
maintaining and improvement o f Singapore’s standards o f living. This comes across quite 
clearly in a speech given by Lee Kuan Yew himself at an Annual Medal Presentation for Blood 
Donors in April 1966:
‘The trouble with us is that for decades we have only looked after ourselves in a very small way. We 
never looked after ourselves in a big way. It was only our own family ...  we cared for. But that is not 
good enough ... If we want to survive in Southeast Asia today, we will have to look after ourselves in 
a big way .. .  It has to be not only my family but my fellow citizens, my country ... We must slowly 
change our attitudes... We must daily consolidate our society. All the racial groups must unite and 
make this a strong country ... There are few countries in Southeast Asia with our standard o f  life. 
And we must be prepared to organise and keep and improve on this. And it can be done slowly as 
each and everybody understands that he must contribute; that he must not only take but give. It is as 
in the case o f  the blood donor. We should not only receive blood. We should give as much as we 
take out o f  this society’ (Lee 1966).
The key difference between the two countries’ understanding of this mentality o f rule was that 
Singapore’s leadership reconfigured and articulated haemato-social governance around the 
development and modernisation of the newly-independent country, instead o f around the 
construction o f the welfare state as in the United Kingdom. There were o f course, besides that 
key difference, a series o f smaller variations. One o f these is worth highlighting: the 
importance accorded to race in the way Singapore organised the collection o f blood for 
transfusion. The emphasis on race is, for example, visible in the SBTS’ periodical analyses of 
the ‘number of donations received by racial groups’ (Ministry of Health 1965:230) as well as its 
campaigns to increase the number of donations of those groups which, according to the 
analyses, do not give enough, like ‘the Chinese’ during the 1960s (ibid. p.230-231). This 
importance o f race is a direct consequence o f the key role that ‘multiracialism’ has played in
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the government of Singapore since 1959. Multiracialism is a notion that was developed by Lee 
Kuan Yew and his allies in the late 1950s in order to help them build and govern the new 
Singaporean nation-state (cf. Benjamin 1976; Clammer 1982; Chua 1995; Hill and Lian 1995; 
Purushotam 1998; Lian and Rajah 2002; Lian 2006). Assuming that the population that lived in 
the city-state was composed of four different racial groups — ‘Chinese,’ ‘Malay,’ ‘Indian’ and 
‘O ther’ -  which each its own culture, language and religion, Lee and his allies argued that the 
construction of a strong and stable nation-state required the existence o f peaceful and 
harmonious relationships between these four racial groups. As the collection of blood 
illustrates, this notably meant that one had to ensure that the four groups contributed in equal 
measure to the efforts to develop Singapore and, in return, benefited evenly from the 
prosperity thus engendered.
Conclusion
The bulk o f this chapter explored the concepts, institutions and subjectivities that allowed 
people to think and govern the circulation o f the human body for medical purposes in the 
United Kingdom before the emergence of bioethical logic in the 1990s. More specifically, it 
analysed the logics which have dominated the way o f governing the medical use of the body 
from the early nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. O n the basis of this analysis, it 
argued that two different logics o f rule had been prevalent during that period. The first one, 
modem anatomical rule, became the dominant mode o f governing the circulation of the 
human body after the adoption o f Southwood Smith and Bentham’s 1832 Anatomy A ct and 
remained so until the late 1920s. For this style of government, which was principally concerned 
with the collection and use of human corpses for dissection, the problem was the inadequate 
number o f bodies supplied to anatomical schools and hospitals in the UK. As the chapter 
showed, this was a problem because an insufficient supply o f corpses was deemed to hinder 
the development o f medicine and, thereby, as the philosophers o f the Enlightenment had 
argued, the prosperity and happiness o f the living. As the chapter also showed, the solution, 
for modem anatomical rule, was to create an Inspectorate o f Anatomy which, using both 
strategies o f secrecy and Bentham’s techniques of inspection, would collect the corpses of the 
poor who had died in workhouses and redistribute them to anatomists and doctors around the 
country.
The second style o f government to dominate the ways in which the circulation o f the body was 
problematised and organised in the UK was, the chapter argued, haemato-social rule, which
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Richard Titmuss famously defended in The Gift Relationship. Before being finally displaced by 
bioethical governance in the early 1990s, this logic o f rule was concerned not only with the 
circulation of blood for transfusion but also with the circulation o f body parts for 
transplantation and human tissues for medical research. As demonstrated in the chapter, the 
way haemato-social governance problematised the circulation o f the body was very similar to 
the way modem anatomical rule did so. Indeed, as with the latter, the issue was the chronic 
shortages o f blood and other body parts which imperilled the functioning of medicine and, 
thus, hindered social progress. But, as argued in the chapter, while the two styles of 
government had a similar understanding of the problem, they did not develop the same 
solution. Shaped by the welfarist models of rule that dominated from the 1920s onwards, 
haemato-social governance was articulated around the notion o f the gift whereby voluntary 
donors generated through propaganda gave parts o f their bodies to the community 
operationalised by central, state-run authorities which redistributed them to hospitals across 
the country.
Because the most influential logics governing the circulation o f the body were developed in the 
UK (rather than in Singapore) and because o f the paucity o f historical scholarship on this issue 
in Singapore, the chapter focused primarily on the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it also 
offered a short and necessarily superficial account o f how both anatomical and haemato-social 
governance were exported to Singapore after the island was integrated to the British Empire in 
1819. O n the basis o f this brief description, it was argued that, while modern anatomical rule 
never really imposed itself in Singapore, haemato-social rule was readily taken up in the 
Southeast Asian island after WWII. Indeed, this style o f governance became the dominant way 
o f understanding, problematising and organising the circulation o f the human body on the 
island until the arrival o f bioethical governance in the late 1990s. But, as was also argued, 
Singapore’s version o f haemato-social logic was not an exact replica o f the one found in the 
United Kingdom. Indeed, instead of using haemato-social governance to construct a welfare 
state articulated around ideas o f social progress and solidarity, Singapore’s governing elite used 
it to develop and modernise the newly independent Republic.
By describing how the circulation o f the human body was problematised and administered in 
both the UK and Singapore before the 1990s, these different analyses provide us with, first of 
all, an understanding of the context in which bioethics would emerge from the 1960s onwards. 
They give us a comprehension of and allow us to situate some o f the discourses, like the 
welfarist and neo-liberal philosophies o f government in the UK or the modernisation and 
nation-building theories in Singapore, which bioethics would later attempt to combine with or,
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on the contrary, seek to challenge and displace as it became prevalent in both countries. An 
understanding o f such discourses will be valuable when discussing the emergence of bioethical 
governance in the following two chapters. Furthermore, these analyses o f ways of 
problematising and governing the circulation of the human body that dominated before the 
emergence o f bioethics offer an interesting contrast to the manner in which bioethical 
governance has attempted to conceive and administer the collection and medical use of the 
human tissue. Two differences in particular are striking and worth reiterating here.
The first one is the difference in the way of problematising the circulation o f the human body 
for medicine. This difference is especially visible in the case of the United Kingdom where, for 
both anatomical and haemato-social rule, the problem with the collection and medical use of 
the human body was the deficient supply of human bodies. For Southwood Smith and 
Bentham, the issue was the insufficient number of corpses for dissection due to the strong 
popular resistance to anatomy, while, for Titmuss, the problem was the chronic shortage of 
blood due to its ever increasing use in medicine. For all three o f them, this deficiency in supply 
was an issue because it was an obstacle to the advancement o f medicine and, thus, to the 
realisation o f progress, prosperity and human happiness. This way o f problematising the 
circulation o f the human body was in stark contrast to the way in which bioethical governance 
conceived the movement o f the body. For bioethical rule, as we will discuss in chapter 4, the 
issue with the collection and medical use of the human body was one of ethics, not o f supply. 
For bioethics, the problem was the danger that scientific and medical research represented for 
human beings when it used their bodies, not the danger that the lack of bodies represented for 
science. This first difference in how the movement of the body is problematised is not as 
marked in the case o f Singapore. Indeed, while the issue as understood by the SBTS 
(insufficient supply o f blood) is different to the problem as understood by, say, Singapore’s 
Bioethics Advisory Committee (the ethical dimension of human tissue research), both 
participate in the city-state’s will to constantly modernise and develop itself, as we will discuss 
in chapter 5.
The second difference, visible in the case o f both Singapore and the UK, relates to the way the 
circulation o f the human body for medicine is organised. For bioethical governance, as we will 
discuss in detail in chapters 6 and 7, human agency plays a critical role. Indeed, for bioethics, 
the key mechanism to protect human beings against the dangers o f science and medicine is the 
procedure o f informed consent. This procedure assumes that every human being has a capacity 
to reflect and decide about what happens to his or her body and seeks to bring this capacity 
into being and shield it against unwanted interferences. This importance accorded to human
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agency in the way bioethics governs the circulation of the human body is in stark contrast to 
the minor role it plays in both anatomical rule and haemato-social rule. This is particularly 
evident in the case o f anatomical governance which, by stealing the corpses of paupers in the 
greatest secrecy, shows very litde willingness to recognise and target the agency o f the poor. 
The difference is also apparent, although more subdy, in the case of haemato-social 
governance. The latter does recognise, through its notions of the gift and voluntary donors, 
that individuals have a certain agency. But, it was a very much passive agency which had to be 
intervened upon and shaped through propaganda rather than the more active agency 
recognised by bioethics where individuals are required to reflect and decide for themselves.
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Chapter 4
‘A Problem of Ethics’ — the Dangers of Modem  
Medicine and the Will to Protect Human Beings
The previous chapter was an analysis o f the mentalities o f rule that dominated the ways to 
conceptualise and organise the circulation of the human body for medical research before 
bioethical governance become prevalent from the 1990s onwards. In contrast, the present 
chapter turns its attention to ethics governance and the different principles, forms of expertise, 
devices and subjectivities that compose this governmental logic. More specifically, this chapter 
examines some o f the conceptual, material and political conditions that make the ways o f 
thinking and acting characteristic o f ethics governance possible today. This chapter focuses on 
the case o f the United Kingdom; the next chapter will ask the same question in relation to 
Singapore.
Before examining the conditions of possibility of ethics governance, the present chapter shows 
how influential this new mentality o f rule has become in the United Kingdom and examines 
some o f its key concepts, forms o f expertise, procedures, institutions and types of 
subjectivities. It is notably argued that, instead o f viewing the circulation of the body as an 
‘issue o f supply’ as haemato-social logic would have it, bioethical governance conceptualised it 
as a ‘problem of ethics’ because of the potential dangers that the collection and medical use of 
human tissue were perceived to entail. The key question was not how to increase the supply of 
body parts but how to protect human beings from these dangers. Such an issue, it is further 
argued, was thought to be the remit o f a particular type o f institution: the bioethics committee. 
Instead o f using devices like the gift or propaganda as the National Blood Transfusion Service 
would do to increase the supply of blood, these bioethics committees advocated a series of 
ethical technologies such as ‘codes o f ethics’ or ‘research ethics committees’ to protect human 
beings from the risks o f human tissue research.
Having showed the predominance o f ethics governance in the United Kingdom today and 
examined some o f its main characteristics, the chapter analyses some of the conceptual, 
material and political conditions that make it possible for human tissue research to be 
described, today, as ‘a problem of ethics’ necessitating codes of ethics and other ethical
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technologies. It argues that this new way to problemadse and govern the medical use of human 
tissue is the product of a will to respect human beings and protect them from modem 
medicine understood as potentially dangerous for humankind; a will that, as the chapter further 
shows, became increasingly prevalent in the United Kingdom with the development of 
bioethics from the 1960s onwards. After providing an overview o f the emergence and rise to 
pre-eminence o f British bioethics between 1960 and 1990, the chapter details some of the key 
aspects that characterised this will to respect and protect human beings. It argues that one of 
these defining aspects was the belief that modern science and medicine was dangerous for 
humankind. Other crucial characteristics o f the will to protect human beings, the chapter 
further argues, were the central role played by expert committees on bioethics, moral 
guidelines and a series of ethical technologies. The chapter then shows how this particular will 
to protect human beings was instrumental in identifying the use o f human tissue in medical 
research as a ‘problem of ethics’ that necessitated the setting up o f an ‘ethical framework’ from 
the 1990s onwards.
Bioethical Governance in the United Kingdom Today
During the 1990s, a new way to think and administer the collection and medical use o f the 
human body progressively displaced the old haemato-social governance. As already explained, 
it is this new way of conceiving and administering the circulation o f the human body, with all 
its rationalities, forms of expertise, problems, institutions, principles and procedures, that I 
term bioethical or ethics governance. This section examines the growing influence o f this new 
logic o f rule in the UK and explores its main characteristics by contrasting it to haemato-social 
governance.
A clear sign o f the growing influence of this new logic o f rule in the UK is the increasing 
number o f texts relating to bioethical governance that have been published there during the 
last fifteen years or so. To start with, there has been a rising number of textbooks and 
scholarly articles authored by lawyers, philosophers or doctors that discuss the ethics o f human 
tissue research. There are many examples, including: the chapter entitled ‘The Human Body 
and its Parts’ in Medicine, Patients and the Haw, a textbook from Margaret Brazier (2007:Chapter 
19), a medical lawyer and founder o f the Centre for Social Ethics and Policy at the University 
o f Manchester; the chapter on ‘The Human Body’ in Medical Ethics, a book authored by 
Alastair V. Campbell (2001 :Chapter 4), a philosopher and one-time editor o f the Journal of 
Medical Ethics (2001:Chapter 4); and Medical and Scientific Uses of Human Tissue, an article
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published in the Journal ofMedical Ethics by Onora O ’Neill (1996), a philosopher and founding 
member of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. There has also been a growing number of 
reports published by independent organisations, governmental bodies or relevant European 
institutions that examine the ethics o f using some parts o f the human body in medical research 
and that suggest possible ethical frameworks. Illustrations are multiple and comprise: Donated 
Ovarian Tissue in Embryo Research, a report from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (1994); Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues, a report from the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics (1995), the UK’s leading institution in the fields of bioethics; Ethical Issues of Human 
Tissue Ranking a report from the European Group on Ethics (1998), an advisory body to the 
European Commission; Human Bodies, Human Choices, a report from the Department of Health 
(2002); and Stem Cell Research, a report from the House o f Lords (2002).
Besides reports, textbooks and scholarly articles, there has, furthermore, been a multiplication 
o f documents which set out ethical guidelines for the medical use o f human tissue or provide 
guidance on how to implement such guidelines. These documents have been published by a 
range o f actors, including government, regulatory agencies, funding bodies, professional 
organisations, research institutions, charities and relevant European institutions. This is but a 
short selection of such documents: the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (1997); the Medical Research Council’s (2001a) Human Tissue and Biological 
Samplesfor Use in Research: Operational and Ethical Guidelines', the Royal College o f Pathologists’ 
(2001) Transitional Guidelines for Handling Surplus' and Archival Material for Human Biological 
Samples', the General Medical Council’s (2002) Good Practice in Research', the Department of 
Health’s (2003) The Use of Human Organs and Tissue; the Consumers for Ethics in Research’s 
(2003b) Genetic Research — GivingSamplesfor Large Studies', the British Parliament’s (2004) Human 
Tissue Act; the European Parliament’s (2004) Directive 2 0 0 4 /2 3 /E C  on Human Tissues and Cells; 
the Human Tissue Authority’s (2006b) Code of Practice on the Removal, Storage and Disposal of 
Human Organs and Tissue; the UK Stem Cell Bank’s (2006) Code of Practice for the Use of Human 
Stem CellUnes', the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s (2007) Code of Practice; and 
the Royal College o f Physicians’ (2007) Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical 
Research with Human Participation.
For the authors of these different texts, the collection and medical use of human tissue was not 
a ‘problem o f supply’ as haemato-social logic would have it, but a ‘problem of ethics’ (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 1995:ii). This way of framing the problem can be found in most of the 
texts listed above. For example, in its report on Donated Ovarian Tissue in Embryo Research, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) described its task as assessing the
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‘clinical, scientific, ethical and social implications o f using ovarian tissue’ (1994). Similarly, in its 
1995 report quoted above, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics explained that its brief was to 
‘deal with the ethical and associated legal questions raised by the medical and scientific uses of 
human tissue’ (1995:ii). The European Group on Ethics used a very similar wording in its 1998 
Opinion on the Ethical Aspects of Human Tissue Ranking, arguing that its role was to assess the 
‘main ethical issues’ arising from ‘the collection and use o f  [human] tissues’ for ‘diagnostic,’ 
‘therapeutic,’ or ‘research purposes’ (1998:3). Likewise, in its 2002 Report on Stem Cell Research, 
the House of Lords understood its task to be a close examination of the ‘scientific and ethical 
issues arising from stem cell research’ (2002:Paragraph 6.1).
By positing the problem as one o f ethics rather than one o f supply, the authors of these texts 
had a very different conception of the task at hand than the one held by proponents of 
haemato-social governance. For Titmuss, Vaughan and others, the ‘problem of supply’ was 
about how to generate the necessary amounts o f body parts to ensure the functioning and 
progress o f medical science and, thereby, the health and happiness of all. In stark contrast, for 
the authors o f the texts listed above, the ‘problem of ethics’ was about how to protect human 
beings from the potential dangers that could arise from the scientific and medical use o f 
human body parts. The dangers imagined by these authors were varied. One risk which they 
often mentioned was that the scientific and medical use of foetal and reproductive tissues 
could lead scientists to put undue pressures on women to abort and give their eggs respectively 
(e.g.: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 1994; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
1995:Chapter 2; European Group on Ethics 2000; Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority 2006). Another set of risks which they regularly brought up were the dangers arising 
from the ‘commercialisation of the human body’ and, most notably, the danger that vulnerable 
people could be tempted to give their body parts for financial rewards (e.g.: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics 1995:Chapter 2; European Group on Ethics 1998; House o f Lords 2002). For 
these authors, it was essential that human beings be protected from such dangers; this, 
according to them, was demanded by the fundamental principle of ‘respect for human beings 
and their lives’ (e.g.: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 1994; Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics 1995:Chapter 6; European Group on Ethics 1998:4-5; Medical Research Council 
2001a:3-6; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2007:Paragraph 1.2).
These texts do not only posit the problem in a different way than would proponents of 
haemato-social governance; they also recommend different experts and methods to address it. 
In terms of expertise, the ‘problem of supply’ had been posited, examined and resolved by 
specialists in social policy such as Richard Titmuss, then a professor o f social administration at
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the London School o f Economics, or socially-minded doctors such as Janet Vaughan. This is 
in strong contrast with bioethical logic where the ‘problem of ethics’ is supposed to be 
identified, assessed and solved by specialists in philosophy, law and medicine generally working 
together in ad hoc committees. Margaret Brazier, Alastair Campbell and Onora O ’Neill, all 
mentioned above, are characteristic examples o f this new breed of specialists; and the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics is typical o f such ad hoc committees that bring together physicians, 
philosophers and lawyers to ‘identify, [examine and report on] ethical questions raised by 
recent advances in biological and medical research’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:i).
In terms o f methods, Titmuss, Vaughan and others had resorted to the technique o f the gift, 
mechanisms o f propaganda and the concept of the real community donor to solve the 
‘problem of supply.’ In contrast, the authors o f the above mentioned texts sought to solve the 
ethical issues that arose from the collection and medical use o f human tissue by using ethical 
principles and technologies articulated around the figure o f the human being. The principles 
laid out in the guidelines listed above determine what type of human tissue can be used, what 
sort o f research it can be used for as well as how it should be collected, stored and disposed of. 
Examples o f these rules include: the prohibition of the use o f tissues collected from embryos 
that are fourteen days or older (cf. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990; Kennedy 
and Grubb 2000:1888-1904; Jackson 2006:Chapter 13; Brazier 2007:Chapters 14, 18 & 19; 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2007); the obligation to obtain a donor’s 
informed consent before collecting his or her body parts and using them for research (cf. 
Medical Research Council 2001a:15-16; Human Tissue Authority 2006a; Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority 2007:Section S.8); and the obligation to dispose o f human tissue 
after research with ‘delicacy and sensitivity’ (cf. Human Tissue Authority 2006b; Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2007:Paragraph G.9.10). The texts listed above also lay 
out a series of institutional forms, procedures and other ethical technologies that aim to 
operationalise the ethical principles. One example is the Human Tissue Authority, a regulatory 
agency which ensures through a complex system of licensing, compulsory record-keeping and 
inspections that anyone collecting, using and storing human tissue for medical research abides 
by the principles discussed above (Human Tissue Act 2004; Human Tissue Authority 2006b).
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The Dangers of Modem Medicine, the Will to Protect Humans & the ‘New* Medical 
Ethics
This section and the next examine the complex and slow process during which the different 
rationalities, institutional forms and practices that make up ethics governance were assembled 
and discuss some o f the conceptual, material and political conditions that made it possible for 
the medical use o f human tissue to be described as ‘a problem of ethics.’ They argue that this 
new way to problematise and govern the medical use of human tissue is the product o f a will 
to respect human beings and protect them from the dangers o f modem medicine which grew 
out of modem medical ethics and which became increasingly influential in the United 
Kingdom after the 1960s.
The present section opens with an account o f bioethics and its development in the United 
Kingdom from the early 1960s onwards. This account notably shows how, by the early 1990s, 
bioethics had become a well-established and influential discourse in the United Kingdom, 
having been adopted not only by professional medical associations and funding agencies but 
also by government, the pharmaceutical industry and the wider public. The section then takes a 
closer look at the will to respect and protect human beings. As this section argues, the will to 
respect and protect human beings is a style o f thinking which grew out o f and became 
influential together with modern medical ethics and which is composed of five key elements: 
(1) the belief that modern medicine in general and medical research in particular were or could 
be dangerous for humankind; (2) the desire to respect human beings; (3) expert committees on 
bioethics that identify and assess ethical issues; (4) moral codes with principles like that of 
informed consent; (5) and ethical technologies that guide, assist and monitor the 
operationalisation o f these principles. The section examines the different elements in turn.
Before discussing the development o f British bioethics and the will to respect human beings, 
however, I need to explain why I have chosen the emergence o f bioethics in the 1960s over 
the redaction o f the Nuremberg Code in the 1940s as the starting point of my story. Some social 
scientists (e.g.: Corrigan 2003:771-772; Jasanoff 2005:174; Holden and Demeritt 2008:81) do 
see the 1947 Code as the origin of both bioethics and today’s ethical regulatory systems for 
biomedical research. So do most bio-ethicists (e.g.: Campbell, Gillett et al. 1992:81; Kennedy 
and Grubb 2000:1667-1678). One important reason for doing so is that many of the principles 
that were laid out in the Code such as that o f informed consent can be found in today’s ethical 
frameworks for biomedical research where they play a key role.
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Despite these similarities, historians have shown that it is problematic to see modem research 
ethics as a direct continuation of the Nuremberg Code (cf. Rothman 1987; Katz 1992; Jonsen 
1998; Cooter 2000a; Edelson 2002; Hazelgrove 2002; S. Lock 2002; Weindling 2006:Chapter 
17). First of all, to do so would ignore the fact that the Code remained largely ignored by 
Western medical scientists and was never deemed to be applicable to medical research in the 
West until the 1960s. It was only then that the Code was put forward by bio-ethicists who, 
interpreting the atrocities committed by the Nazi doctors as a symbol o f the dangers of 
modem medicine, actively used the Code as a model for their own moral guidelines. Before the 
1960s, there seemed to be no raison d ’etre for the Nuremberg Code or indeed any other ethical 
regulation for normal medical research. In the United Kingdom, the post-war period was one 
o f fervent enthusiasm for a modem medicine based on science and research — often referred 
to as ‘scientific medicine’ or ‘clinical science’ — which would bring health and happiness to 
mankind (Booth 1993; Porter 1999:Chapters 17 & 18; Le Fanu 2000). Continuing a trend 
started in the first part of the twentieth century, this post-war enthusiasm for modem medicine 
had led to the creation of new research centres and the multiplication of funding opportunities 
(Booth 1993; Porter 1999:Chapters 21; Le Fanu 2000). In tune with this enthusiasm for 
scientific medicine and in the name of ‘scientific freedom,’ medical researchers were left to 
decide which experiments were desirable; it was thought that, because of their ‘good character,’ 
‘integrity’ and expertise they could be ‘trusted’ to take the right decisions (Hazelgrove 2002; 
Weindling 2006:Chapter 17).
Another reason why it would be problematic to understand modem research ethics as a direct 
continuation o f the Nuremberg Code is that it would conceal the fact that modem research ethics 
and the Code participated in two very different projects. Written by the Allies at the end of 
World War Two, the Code was understood as an instrument to judge and condemn the 
atrocities committed by German researchers under the Nazi regime, not as a series of rules to 
govern research in the free world. It was a ‘code for barbarians’ (Katz 1992:228), not a code 
for ordinary physician-scientists in the West. In other words, for those that devised the Code, 
the problem was not medical research itself. For them,2 the gruesome abuses committed by 
German researchers were not interpreted as a sign that all medical research was inherently 
dangerous, regardless of who conducted it (as bio-ethicists did in the 1960s). For those who
2 There were, o f  course, some people who took part in the trials that thought otherwise. One example is 
Alexander Mitscherlich, a psychiatrist who headed a delegation o f  German medical observers at the trial and 
published parts o f  the trial evidence in Das D iktat der Menschenverachtung (The Order to Despise Humanity], later 
published in English as Doctors of Infamy: the Story of the N a if  Medical Crimes (New York, Henry Shuman: 1949; cf. 
Weindling 2006:Chapter 11). Ostracised by the German medical establishment for his stance against German 
medicine at the Nuremberg trial, Mitscherlich was brought to Frankfurt, at the faculty o f social sciences, by 
Horkheimer and Adorno. There, he continued his critical work on medicine, developing notably the field o f  
psychosomatics, and was promoted to a chair in psychology in 1966 (Weindling 2006:332-336).
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devised the Code, the problem was Nazism and, more generally, ‘totalitarian rule’ and the way it 
had brought about ‘the destructive perversion of medicine’ and caused doctors to commit 
atrocities (Alexander 1949:xxxiv; L. Alexander quoted in Weindling 2001:61). In contrast, for 
modern research ethics the problem was, as is argued below, modem  medicine and medical 
research themselves which were believed to be potentially dangerous for humankind and 
against which human beings had to be protected.
The ‘N ew’Medical Ethics
Medical ethics has existed for over two hundred years in countries like the United Kingdom 
and the United States o f America. Until the 1960s, it was primarily understood as an 
instrument for building a strong medical profession in the hands of professional organisations 
o f physicians like the British or American Medical Associations (cf. Litde 1932:287-295; 
Berlant 1975; Waddington 1975; Baker 1993; Cooter 1995; Cooter 2000a; Amstrong 2007). 
This understanding o f medical ethics, which today is often referred to as ‘traditional’ medical 
ethics, is articulated around professional codes o f conduct which are implemented by 
disciplinary bodies internal to the profession and which cover different aspects of a physician’s 
professional activity, including: setting up a practice; determining fees; disclosing information 
about patients; writing medical certificates; referring patients to colleagues; advertising; or 
holding public office.
From the 1960s onwards, in the USA, the UK and other European countries, this traditional 
understanding of medical ethics was progressively displaced by what would soon become 
know as ‘bioethics’ or ‘modern medical ethics’ (cf. Culliton and Waterfall 1978; Rothman 1987; 
Toulmin 1988; Weisz 1990a; Rothman 1991; Reich 1994; Reich 1995; Viafora and Dell'Oro 
1996; Jonsen 1998; Pellegrino 1999; Stevens 2000; Cooter 2000a; Cooter 2004; Amstrong 
2007). Although traditional medical ethics and bioethics do have some similarities, they also 
present significant differences. The most important of these differences, from my perspective, 
is that bioethics is not concerned with strengthening the profession (the concern of traditional 
medical ethics) but with protecting patients and other people against the dangers which, it 
believes, are inherent to modem medicine (Amstrong 2007). There were many different 
aspects o f modem medicine, from genetics to life prolongation techniques, that bioethics 
deemed to be problematic. Among these, medical research, especially when involving human 
beings, embryos or foetuses, was thought to be particularly problematic, not least because of 
research’s experimental and often non-therapeutic nature (cf. Campbell 1975 [1972]:Chapter 6; 
Jonsen 1998:Part II). Another important difference between traditional medical ethics and
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bioethics is that while the former was a matter solely for physicians, the latter was a ‘meeting 
ground’ for experts interested in the problems raised by modem medicine who came from ‘a 
number o f disciplines’ ranging from philosophy and theology to law, social science and 
medicine (O'Neill 2002:1). And, while traditional medical ethics was mostly considered within 
professional organisations, bioethics was discussed in academic research centres and 
specialised scholarly journals, in government expert commissions and charities as well as at 
conferences organised by international organisations.
The understanding that bioethics was something different from traditional medical ethics 
which concerned itself with the dangers that modem medicine held for humankind and which 
involved experts from a range o f different disciplines is not just one made possible by posteriori 
historical analysis. It was also one that was held and voiced from early on by both the medical 
establishment and the ‘new’ experts on bio-ethicists. In a series of articles on the New Horizons 
in Medical Hthics published in the British Medical Journal in 1973 for example, the editor o f the 
journal had argued that ‘the so-called traditional [medical] ethics’ were ‘not ethics in a true 
sense’ but only ‘professional rules’ (British Medical Journal 1973c:346). Instead, ‘ethics in a true 
sense’ were about ‘the wider realms o f what might be called the collective ethics o f medicine -  
realms where the interests o f medicine, the patient and society mingle and sometimes seem to 
conflict’ (British Medical Journal 1973f:680). Likewise, in an article published four years later in 
the same journal, Alastair V. Campbell, the author o f one the first textbook in bioethics in the 
UK, Moral Dilemmas in Medicine (1975 [1972]), argued that:
‘Medical ethics might be said to have recendy “com e o f  age” — or at least to be passing through the 
phase o f  adolescence, in which a new identity is being sou gh t.. .  Until recendy, the term has mainly 
been understood as a name for an implicit code o f  good conduct among the members o f  the medical 
profession ...  All this is now changing. There is a new m ood for self-criticism in the medical 
profession ... the rapid social changes o f  our times and the increasing complexity o f  medical 
techniques have led the profession to look outside its own ranks for guidance about moral behaviour 
. . .  [turning, in particular, to] philosophy, theology and the social sciences . . .  The discussion [that this 
enables] is bound to take on som e exciting features. In his celebrated attack on the “medicalisation o f  
life” Ivan Illich has suggested that [modern medicine] causes more damage to health than it brings 
benefit to mankind ...  The focus o f  his attack seems to me entirely correct. It is now essential that 
we ask some basic question about the task and place o f  medical care within society as a w hole’ 
(Campbell 1977:818).
In the United Kingdom, the development o f modern medical ethics started in the early 1960s. 
There were two defining moments in the early development of British Bioethics, one being the 
creation o f the London Medical Group (LMG) in 1963 (cf. Whong-Barr 2003). Stemming 
from the British ecumenical movement, the LMG was an independent student body that 
sought to enable medical students to engage with medical humanities and the wider society by
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organising twice-weekly symposia held in teaching hospitals throughout London (London 
Medical Group 1970; Whong-Barr 2003). Free and open to the public, the talks featured 
speakers from both medicine and other disciplines like law, theology and the social sciences 
and covered topics as varied as end of life issues, truth telling, genetics, bisexuality, poverty, 
cannabis use, marriage guidance and nuclear weapons. The scheme was extraordinarily 
successful, with an average attendance o f a hundred persons per session, and was soon 
extended to another seventeen locations outside London. In 1975, the LMG was re-organised 
as the Institute of Medical Ethics, an independent association for the promotion o f the study 
of medical ethics, which continued to run the symposia and started to publish the Journal of 
Medical Ethics with A.V. Campbell as editor. Through its various activities, the LM G /IM E 
would influence a whole generation of physicians, many of whom would go on to hold 
im portant positions within the British medical establishment, like Douglas Black, one-time 
president o f the Royal College of Physicians and Chief Medical Officer (CMO), or Liam 
Donaldson, the UK’s current CMO.
The second defining moment was the numerous publications on human experimentation of 
British doctor Maurice H. Pappworth, most notably his 1967 book Human Guinea Pigs: 
Experimentation on Man (e.g.: Pappworth 1962; Pappworth 1967; Pappworth 1969 [1967]; 
Pappworth 1971; cf. also: Edelson 2002; Hazelgrove 2002; S. Lock 2002; Elliott 2008). 
Pappworth’s publications were part o f a wider literature that contributed to the turning of 
human experimentation into a key issue for bioethics during the 1960-70s and that also 
included the writings of Harvard Professor Henri Beecher (1959; 1966) as well as the World 
Medical Association’s (1964) Declaration of Helsinki. This literature aimed, through a rigorous 
documentation of the harm inflicted on patients and volunteers taking part in medical 
experiments, to force the introduction o f strict ethical frameworks to curb the numerous 
abuses which were then taking place in the West. Pappworth’s and others’ publications set in 
motion a heated public debate on human experimentation in the UK that lasted well into the 
1970s (cf. British Medical Journal 1962a; British Medical Journal 1962b; British Medical 
Journal 1963a; British Medical Journal 1964; British Medical Journal 1967a; British Medical 
Journal 1967c; British Broadcasting Corporation 1970; British Medical Journal 1973g; British 
Medical Journal 1974a; British Medical Journal 1977; Pappworth 1990). The public outcry 
generated by Pappworth’s publications forced the rather reluctant medical establishment to 
address the issue, with the Medical Research Council (1963) issuing a Statement on Responsibility 
in Investigations on Human Subjects and the Royal College of Physicians suggesting that research 
ethics committees should be introduced to supervise medical research (1967; 1973; cf. also: 
Hazelgrove 2002).
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The influence o f bioethics in the United Kingdom increased markedly during the 1980s, with 
an increasing number of actors -  professional medical organisations; the government; funding 
agencies; the pharmaceutical industry — adopting its rationalities and practices. The signs of 
bioethics’ increasing importance were numerous. One such indication was the establishment of 
academic training and research centres in bioethics like the Centre of Medical Law and Ethics 
opened by G.R. Dunstan, Ian Kennedy and others at King’s College, London, in 1983 or the 
Centre for Social Ethics and Policy opened by John Harris and Margaret Brazier at the 
University o f Manchester in 1987. Another sign was the introduction of bioethics teaching in 
British medical schools in the late 1980s (Whong-Barr 2003). A further mark of bioethics’ 
increasing influence was the growing number o f publications on the topic, from articles to 
monographs and edited collections. Examples included Ian Kennedy’s (1981) The Unmaskingof 
Medicine, John Harris’ (1985) The Value ofUfe, Carolyn Faulder’s (1985) Whose Body Is It Anyway?, 
Raanan Gillon’s (1986 [1985]) Philosophical Medical Ethics and Margaret Brazier’s (1987) Medicine, 
Patients and the Law. Yet another proof of bioethics’ consolidation was the creation of 
independent charities that sought to increase the public’s awareness o f modem medical ethics 
such as Consumers for Ethics in Research established in 1989.
There were further and, perhaps, even more telling signs o f bioethics’ growing importance. 
One was the growing numbers of expert committees in bioethics which were established by 
government, professional organisations or funding agencies and which were mandated to 
assess and report on specific ethical issues ranging from IVF treatment to clinical trials on 
healthy volunteers. Examples of such committees included, among others: the Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology created by the Department of Health and 
Social Security in 1982 and chaired by Mary Wamock; the Royal College of Physicians’ 
Committee on Ethical Issues in Medicine established in 1986 under the impulsion of Douglas 
Black; and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics created by the Nuffield Foundation together with 
the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust in 1991. Another important indication 
o f bioethics’ growing influence was the mounting number of ethical frameworks set up to 
regulate medical practice. Such frameworks included, among many others, the regulatory and 
monitoring system for embryo research established by the 1990 Human Fertilisation and 
Hmbiyology A.ct as well as extensive guidelines relating to the organisation and running of 
research ethics committees issued by both the Royal College of Physicians and the Department 
o f Health and Social Security (e.g.: Royal College o f Physicians 1984; Royal College of 
Physicians 1990a; Department o f Health and Social Security 1991; cf. also: Royal College of 
Physicians 1996; Royal College o f Physicians 2007).
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A  Critique of Modernity — Science <& Medicine as Dangers
It is this new medical ethics, which had become ever more influential since its emergence in 
the 1960s, that was the matrix within which the will to protect human beings against the 
perceived dangers o f modem science took shape. Below, this section explores the five 
elements that made up this style o f thinking which grew to pre-eminence together with 
bioethics from the 1960s onwards. To discuss and illustrate these five different components of 
this thought style, the section will use texts published by bio-ethicists from the emergence of 
bioethics in the early 1960s until bioethics had become a well-established and influential 
discourse in the UK in the early 1990s. Having been published over a period of thirty years, 
these texts do, o f course, offer some different views. But, beyond these differences, they are all 
manifestations of this style of thinking which I have termed the will to protect human beings.
Among the different elements that made up the will to protect human beings was the belief 
that modern medicine in general and medical research in particular were dangerous for 
humankind. As already alluded to, such a belief was characteristic o f bioethics. For the new 
medical ethics, modem medicine was not, or not necessarily, a force for good. It was not 
necessarily, as had been commonly believed until the 1970s (Porter 1999:Chapter 21; Le Fanu 
2000), a vector o f health, progress and prosperity. Quite the contrary. Modern scientific 
medicine, for bioethics, had a strong potential to be detrimental to humankind. It represented 
a danger for people’s health and happiness. This was a problem that needed to be analysed, 
discussed and resolved. This point of view could be found in many texts written by 
proponents of the new British medical ethics. Ian Kennedy, for example, made such an 
argument in his 1980 Reith Lectures entided The Unmasking of Medicine. Clearly influenced by 
Ivan Ulich’s (1977 [1976]) Umits to Medicine, he explained that modem or scientific medicine 
had become deleterious to the health and happiness o f the population:
‘My view can be stated briefly. M odem  medicine has taken the wrong path. An inappropriate form o f  
medicine has been created, in large part by doctors and medical scientists ... I will go further. The 
nature o f  m odem  medicine makes it positively deleterious to the health and well-being o f  the 
population ... [We] have hitched our wagon to the wrong star, scientific medicine . . .  [We need to] 
consider how the emphasis should be shifted’ (Kennedy 1981:26 & 50).
Eight years later, a comparable argument was made by Mary Wamock in an article calling for 
the creation o f a ‘National Ethics Committee:’
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After the last war there was a cliche to the effect that man’s scientific knowledge had outstripped his 
moral sense. At that time it was uttered in the context o f  the physical sciences. The bomb had, 
righdy, frightened us all. N ow  that same cliche is more and more to be heard in the context o f  the 
biological sciences. We must take it seriously (Wamock 1988:1627).
The idea that modem or scientific medicine was not a vector of progress but a danger to 
humankind was not specific to British bio-ethics. O n the contrary, it informed a series of 
discourses which flourished between the 1950s and 1970s and which influenced British 
bioethics. One o f these discourse was the post-atomic narrative to which Wamock alludes and 
which held that, in the light o f the destruction and death generated by the products of nuclear 
science in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was necessary to urgently establish regulatory 
frameworks that would ensure more responsible research (Stevens 2000:Chapter 1). Another 
o f these discourses was Christian ethics which had led to the creation o f the LMG in 1963 and 
to which many bio-ethicists explicitly referred (e.g.: Pappworth 1969 [1967]; Campbell 1975 
[1972]). This tradition held that ‘science’ could not be ‘the highest value’ to which ‘all other 
orders o f value should be subordinated’ as this would necessarily lead to the injury of others, as 
Pius XII (1952) explained in The Moral Limits of Medical Kesearch and Treatment. Yet another of 
these discourses was the ‘medicalisation’ narrative best exemplified by Illich’s (1977 [1976]) 
Limits to Medicine. For Illich, modem medicine had, because o f its useless and dangerous 
treatments, its bureaucratic organisation and its ideology that made us too sensitive to pain, 
‘become a major threat to [human] health’ (ibid. p.l). Illich’s and other similar narratives did 
not only have a great influence on large sections o f the British population (cf. Porter 1999:686- 
709) but also on many bio-ethicists (e.g.: Campbell 1977; Kennedy 1981).
For bio-ethicists, the aspects of modem medicine that were potentially dangerous and thus 
problematic were multiple. They included, among others: the field o f genetics, transplantation 
medicine, life-support and resuscitation technologies, and particular psychiatric treatments 
such as ECT (e.g.: W oodruff 1964; British Medical journal 1975; Campbell 1975 
[1972]:Chapter 6; Harris 1985; British Medical Journal 1990; cf. also: Jonsen 1998:Part II; 
Whong-Barr 2003:74). More importantly for us, they also included medical research, whose 
potential dangers were further compounded by its increasing role in m odem medicine and its 
growing volume (Platt 1963:Chapter 8; Beecher 1966; Platt 1967; Pappworth 1969 
[1967]:Preface; cf. also: Rothman 1987; Booth 1993; Hazelgrove 2002). Three types o f research 
in particular were deemed dangerous and thus problematic by bio-ethicists. The first was 
‘human experimentation’ which had become one o f bioethics’ key issues since it was first 
brought up by Pappworth and others in the 1960s (e.g.: Pappworth 1962; Platt 1963:Chapter 8; 
British Medical Journal 1963a; Pappworth 1969 [1967]; cf. also: Pappworth 1990; Edelson
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2002; Hazelgrove 2002; S. Lock 2002; Elliott 2008). The second was research on human 
embryos which had become another critical problem during the protracted confrontations on 
the topic between scientists and pro-life interest groups in the 1980s (e.g.: Harris 1983; 
W amock 1983; Wamock 1985 [1984]; Campbell, Gillett et al. 1992:chapter 4; cf. also: Mulkay 
1997). The third was research on human foetuses which became a problem in the late 1980s 
(e.g.: Committee on the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material 1989; Campbell, Gillett et 
al. 1992:Chapter 4).3
The dangers of medical research identified by bio-ethicists were numerous and, most o f the 
time, potential or future. In the case o f human experimentation, they argued that the danger 
was the possibility o f inflicting physical harm and/or emotional distress on the research 
subject. So, for example, Julia Neuberger, a member o f the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority and research fellow at King’s Centre of Medical Law and Ethics, 
explained that it is important to ‘protect patients from unnecessary research’ given that such 
‘research can be invasive physically, posing questions about pain,’ and that ‘it can also be 
emotionally threatening’ (1992:9; my emphasis). In the case o f embryo research, one danger 
identified by bio-ethicists was the possibility of devious researchers using embryos to develop 
immoral technologies (Mulkay 1997:Chapter 4). Mary Warnock, for example, warned about 
‘the possibility o f unscrupulous scientists meddling with the process of reproduction in order 
to create hybrids or to indulge theories of selective breeding or eugenic selection’ (1985 
[1984]:62; cf. also: Mulkay 1997:21). Some o f the dangers identified in the case o f research on 
foetuses were o f a similar type. So, for example, the Committee on the Research Use of 
Fetuses and Fetal Material argued that, ‘when transplantation o f [large sections of] brain tissue 
is involved,’ one could not exclude, ‘in the light o f current knowledge,’ a risk o f ‘personality 
transfer’ (1989:7). In consequence, the Committee ‘recommended a cautious approach’ 
whereby ‘only isolated neurones or [small] fragments o f tissue [are] used for transplantation’ 
(ibid.). Another sort o f danger identified in relation to foetus research was that women could 
feel forced to become pregnant and abort in order to make foetuses available for research:
‘It has been argued ...  that som eone could become pregnant in order to make a fetus available for 
medical use ... [This] would be ethically unacceptable ...  T o limit the degree to which [such] morally 
dubious wishes can be implemented ... we recommend ... the separation o f  the decisions relation to 
abortion and the subsequent use o f  fetal tissue’ (Committee on the Research Use o f  Fetuses and 
Fetal Material 1989:9).
3 The British spelling ‘foetus’ is used throughout the thesis apart when the text quoted uses the American spelling 
‘fetus,’ in which case the original spelling is conserved.
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For some bio-ethicists, one of the main causes of these potential dangers o f medical research 
was researchers’ scientific ‘mentality’ itself (Kennedy 1981:29); a mentality characterised by 
reason, implacable logic, objectivity, technique and experimentation (e.g.: Pappworth 1969 
[1967]:24-25; Kennedy 1981:27-30; Faulder 1985:62). For them, this spirit carried with it many 
negative traits: a lack of sensitivity, impersonality and an obsession with the pursuit of truth. 
Pappworth, for example, described medical researchers as ‘cold-blooded,’ ‘damned egoists who 
seek their own satisfaction’ in the pursuit of scientific knowledge (1962:72-73); they were 
driven by a ‘zeal to extend the frontiers of medical knowledge’ and tended to ‘depersonalise’ 
and ‘disregard’ their research subjects (1969 [1967]:11 & 24). Similarly, Nicholson argued that 
medical researchers had ‘dedicated [themselves] to the increase o f knowledge’ and ‘to the duty 
o f pursuing the truth even at considerable cost’ to themselves or others (1986:64). It was this 
scientific mentality which, many bio-ethicists argued, made medical research dangerous. 
Pappworth, for example, lamented that modern ‘medicine is rapidly becoming dehumanized 
because o f its emphasis on laboratory procedures and the domination of most medical schools 
by research workers’ (1971:668). Similarly, Kennedy argued that the predominance o f ‘science 
and reason’ within modem medicine has had the ‘unhappy consequence’ that ‘medicine is 
[now] perceived and pursued in ways which do not best serve the needs o f society’ (1981:26). 
Even Mary Wamock, who refused to condone the public’s increasing ‘hostility to science,’ 
argued that ‘man’s scientific knowledge,’ most notably ‘in the context o f the biological 
sciences,’ had started to ‘outstrip his moral sense’ and was now threatening to go beyond what 
was ‘widely seen to be secure and sensible’ for humanity (1985 [1984]:1626-1627).
Interestingly, bio-ethicists, who had rediscovered the long ignored Nuremberg Code and other 
accounts o f Nazi medical experimentation in the 1960s, often expressed the idea that modern 
medicine and research was dangerous by associating it with the atrocities committed by 
German doctors during World War Two. Sometimes, they explicidy equated British 
researchers to Nazi experimenters. Pappworth, for example, argued that while ‘analogy with 
the infamous Nazis doctors may sound gross exaggeration,’ it is ‘unfortunately justified’ (1969 
[1967]:269; c.f. also: Pappworth 1962:73-74; Hodgson 1963). Indeed, for him, British 
researchers and Nazi doctors shared the same ‘zeal’ for knowledge and the same willingness to 
‘ignore the suffering they cause’ (1969 [1967]: 11 & 226-227). But, more often, bio-ethicists 
simply referred to the Nazi atrocities when discussing medical research in the United 
Kingdom. The effect of this textual juxtaposition could not, of course, fail to imply a certain 
level of analogy between the Nazi atrocities and British medical research, thus making it clear 
that modern medicine carried within itself a potential to be dangerous for humankind (e.g.: 
Campbell 1975 [1972]:173; Harris 1985:36-37; Dunstan 1986:v; Nicholson 1986:73; Brazier
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1987:4-5; Kennedy and Grubb 1989:1667-1678; Campbell, Gillett et al. 1992:81; Neulberger 
1992:9). This rhetorical use of the German atrocities and the frequent references to texts like 
the Nuremberg Code (1947) or Mitscherlich’s Doctors of Infamy (1949) participated in a  very 
different spirit than the one which had informed the 1946-47 Nuremberg Medical Trial. As 
alluded to previously, for those that ran the trial and drafted the Code, the problem was not 
medical research itself but Nazism and, more generally, ‘totalitarian rule’ which had perverted 
medicine. For bio-ethicists, in contrast, the problem was modem medicine itself. Medicine was 
not dangerous because it was perverted by an outside force but because it was inherently 
dangerous.
The Will to Protect Human Beings
If  the belief that modern medicine represented a danger for human beings identified the 
problem for bio-ethicists, the will to protect human beings embodied the desire and the drive 
to solve it. Like the belief in the dangers o f modem science, the will to shield human beings 
from these dangers grew out of the matrix of modem medical ethics. It is therefore 
unsurprising that many texts written by proponents o f the new medical ethics express this 
desire to protect human beings which they sometimes refer to as ‘respect for persons’ (e.g. 
Campbell 1975 [1972]:Chapter 5; Faulder 1985:Part I; Harris 1985:Chapter 10-11; Gillon 
1985a). Pappworth, for example, explained that ‘every human being’ should ‘be treated with a 
certain decency’ or ‘considerateness’ (1969 [1967]:43 & 47). Likewise, John Harris exhorted 
people to ‘respect persons’ by showing ‘concern for their welfare’ and ‘respect for their wishes’ 
(1985:193). Warnock made a comparable point when she argued that ‘we must aim* at an
increased ‘sensitivity’ in our ‘treatment o f human beings’ (1983:248).
Very often one will find in bioethical texts the will to respect and protect fellow human beings 
expressed as a Kantian interdiction on the treatment of other human beings as a *mean to an 
end,’ ‘things’ or ‘objects.’ Faulder offers a good illustration when she claims that fwe [should] 
regard [human beings] as persons rather than objects or things’ (1985:23). Similarly, Ian 
Kennedy stated that:
‘Many would see [it as] a fundamental principle [that] we may not use humans as means to an end,
but must respect them as ends in themselves’ (Kennedy 1984:6).
Another, maybe more colourful illustration is offered by Pappworth who, citing Mitscherlich’s 
Doctors of Infamy, argued that it would be wrong to ‘put human beings on the level o f  a molecule 
or a frog or a guinea pig’ (1969 [1967]:227). Indeed, this would ‘not [be] much different’ from
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the way Nazi doctors had conceived o f human beings ‘as a case or a number tattooed on the 
arm;’ they were simply ‘two aspects of the faceless approach of an age without mercy;’ they 
were two manifestations o f ‘the modern age [and its] transmogrification of subject into object, 
o f man into thing’ (ibid.).
For bio-ethicists, the will to respect and protect human beings was a project to re-moralise 
medicine, to make medical research ethical again. Indeed, for them, the desire to shield human 
beings embodied one of the most important moral or ethical values: human beings and their 
lives. Harris, for example, argued that the wish to respect persons has its basis in the fact ‘that 
we value human life supremely’ (1985:7). Likewise, Gillon explained that our desire to protect 
human beings stems from the ‘absolute moral value’ that they possess ‘in contrast to inanimate 
objects and “beasts’” (1985c: 1332). As a key moral value, the will to protect human beings 
played, according to bio-ethicists, a crucial role in limiting and guiding modern medicine and 
medical research. As Wamock explained, moral values offered the necessary ‘barriers that are 
not to be crossed’ and the ‘limits beyond which [researchers] are not to be allowed to go’ 
(quoted in Faulder 1985:59). It was, furthermore, because the will to protect persons was a 
project to re-moralise medicine that bio-ethicists conceptualised the dangers o f modem 
medicine not just as ‘problems’ but as ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ problems. Campbell, for example, 
used the terms ‘moral dilemmas’ and ‘ethical issues’ to refer to the multiple dangers o f modem 
medicine (1975 [1972], especially chapter 6). Similarly, Warnock used the expression ‘ethical 
problems’ to designate the potential dangers ‘arising in both medical practice and research’ 
(1988:1626).
Interestingly, bio-ethicists argued about the characteristics that an entity had to possess in 
order to be categorised as human and, thereby, qualify for the respect and protection that all 
human beings are entitled to. For thinkers like Harris and Gillon, those that deserved 
protection were human beings capable o f reasoning, valuing and willing, which they termed 
‘persons’ (cf. Harris 1983; Harris 1985; Gillon 1985a; Gillon 1985g). So, for Harris (1985:18), 
only a ‘being capable of valuing its own existence’ or ‘person’ is deemed worthy of protection. 
While, for Gillon (1985a: 1735) ‘rational willing agency’ is ‘the moral criterion for distinguishing 
entities [to which we] owed moral obligations’ from those to which we don’t. Such a criterion 
excludes from any sort o f protection not only human embryos and foetuses but also adults 
with mental deficiencies and young children which all lack such a capacity to reason, value and 
will (cf. Harris 1985:Chapter 6; Walsh 1995). For other thinkers such as Mary Wamock or Ian 
Kennedy, the criterion that makes one a human being and worthy of protection is biological: 
‘membership o f the species homo sapiens confers a unique moral importance” (Gillon
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1985g:1646; cf. Warnock 1983; Kennedy 1984; Wamock 1985 [1984]). As Wamock explained, 
‘homo sapiens" is ‘a biological term and simply distinguishes humans from other animals’ 
(1983:241). This criterion extended the respect and protection due to all human beings to 
human embryos and foetuses as well as to children and adults that lack, temporarily or 
permanendy, the capacity to reason (cf. Wamock 1983; Kennedy 1984; Warnock 1985 [1984]; 
Committee on the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material 1989; Walsh 1995). The 
following extracts from Warnock’s writings offer a fine illustration of such a position:
‘However far removed from full humanity [an embryo or] a foetus may be, we would do well to 
remember that it is a human [embryo or] foetus’ (Warnock 1983:242);
‘[Human] society feels ... that its members, especially the most helpless, such as children and the very 
old, must be protected against the possible exploitation by enthusiastic scientists; and embryos [and 
foetuses] are brought into the category o f  those deserving protection ...  the embryo [and the foetus 
are] entided to some added measure o f  respect beyond that accorded to other animal subjects... the 
embryo [and the foetus] o f  the human species ought to have a special status ...  and should be 
afforded some protection’ (Warnock 1985 [1984]:xiv, 62 & 63).
Another good example o f such a position is the report o f the Committee on the Research Use 
o f Fetuses, whose membership notably included Ian Kennedy, published in 1989:
‘Central to our understanding is the acceptance o f  a special status for the living human fetus at every 
stage o f  its development which we wish to characterise as a profound respect based upon its 
potential development into a fully-formed human being. The living fetus is not to be treated 
instrumentally as a mere object available for investigation or use’ (Committee on the Research Use o f  
Fetuses and Fetal Material 1989:4).
With the adoption o f most of Wamock’s suggestions in the 1990 Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology A ct and the adoption of the Committee on the Research Use o f Fetuses’ 
recommendation as official guidelines throughout the NHS, the biological criterion became 
predominant. But, Harris and Gillon’s criterion did not disappear outright. It became, instead, 
a factor to differentiate between human beings with personhood and those without. As such, it 
was one among other similar criteria to distinguish between the different types o f human 
beings that existed. Indeed, the category o f human being was, according to bio-ethicists, far 
from being unitary, being divided into a series o f different sub-categories. These sub-categories 
included, among others: ‘human embryos;’ ‘human foetuses;’ ‘children;’ ‘the mentally 
incapacitated;’ ‘women;’ ‘pregnant women;’ ‘the elderly;’ ‘prisoners;’ ‘patients;’ ‘healthy 
volunteers;’ and ‘junior colleagues and students’ (cf. Pappworth 1969 [1967]:Part 1; Royal 
College ofPhysicians 1984:9-15; Harris 1985:Chapter 11; Royal College ofPhysicians 1986:6-8; 
Royal College ofPhysicians 1990a: Chapters 12-14; Department o f Health 1991:Chapter 4).
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Each o f these sub-categories was provided with a particular level and type of respect and 
protection against the dangers and detriments of modern medicine and research.
The level and type of protection for each of these categories varied according to three different 
criteria: the level of biological development; the magnitude of vulnerability or helplessness; and 
what I call in chapter 6 ‘the capacity to reflect and decide.’ ‘Embryos’ and ‘foetuses,’ for 
example, were given a level of protection in accordance with both their incomplete level of 
biological development and their extreme vulnerability (cf. Wamock 1983; Kennedy 1984; 
Wamock 1985 [1984]; Committee on the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material 1989; 
Royal College ofPhysicians 1990a:Chapter 14). As Warnock argued, being ‘so far from full 
development, so nearly just collections of cells,’ embryos and foetuses do ‘not require full 
human treatment’ (1983:241). They can, in particular and ‘unlike a full human being,’ ‘be used 
as a means to an end that [is] good for other human beings’ (Wamock 1985 [1984]:xv). But, 
their ‘limited form of humanness’ (Kennedy 1984:6) and their ‘helplessness’ akin to that of 
‘children and the very old’ (Wamock 1985 [1984]:xiv) make them nevertheless eligible for 
‘profound respect’ and adequate protection (Committee on the Research Use of Fetuses and 
Fetal Material 1989:4). ‘Children’ and ‘the mentally incapacitated’ offer a different example 
where the level and type o f protection provided depends on both the vulnerability and the 
capacity to reflect and decide of these particular categories o f human beings (cf. Pappworth 
1969 [1967]:47-61 & 72-89; British Medical Journal 1978; Harris 1985:214-218; Nicholson 
1986; Royal College of Physicians 1990a:Chapters 13; Medical Research Council 1991a; 
Medical Research Council 1991b; Campbell, Gillett et al. 1992:Chapter 5). ‘Children,’ for 
example, were deemed to deserve ‘special considerations’ for two reasons (Pappworth 1969 
[1967]:47; cf. also Dunstan 1986:v). Firstly, because they were ‘particularly vulnerable and 
helpless’ (ibid). Secondly, because they were considered to be too ‘young and immature’ 
(Harris 1985:215) to have a fully developed capacity to reflect and decide.
Ethical Expertise — the bioethics Committee
From the early 1980s, the desire to protect human beings from the dangers o f medical research 
became indissociable from a particular form o f ethical expertise: the committee of experts on 
bioethical issues. There are many examples o f such committees. One o f the earliest was 
probably the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology lead by Mary 
Wamock and set up by the Department of Health and Social Security in 1982. Others soon 
followed, established and funded by a variety of organisations, ranging from government 
departments and funding agencies to professional associations and independent charities. They
103
included: the Working Group on the Ethics o f Clinical Research Investigations on Children, 
created by the Institute o f Medical Ethics in 1983; the Working Parties on Research on 
Healthy Volunteers and on Research Involving Patients established by the Royal College of 
Physicians in 1984 and 1987 respectively; the Working Parties on Research on Children and 
Research on the Mentally Incapacitated, both set up by the Medical Research Council in 1988; 
and the Committee on the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material established by the 
Department of Health and Social Services also set up in 1988. While all these committees were 
temporary structures, some more permanent ones were also set up. One illustration is the 
Royal College o f Physicians’ Committee on Ethical Issues in Medicine created in 1985 under 
the impulsion of a former member of the London Medical Group and the then president of 
the RCP, Sir Douglas Black (Saunders 2008). Another typical illustration is the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, established by pre-eminent bio-ethicists like Margaret Brazier, Ian 
Kennedy, Onora O ’Neill, Anne McLaren and Margaret Tumer-Warwick together with the 
Nuffield Foundation, the Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust in 1991 (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2000a).
What makes these different committees manifestations of one and the same form o f ethical 
expertise is that, beyond all their differences in terms o f the ways they are established and 
funded, these committees all share two characteristic features: (1) their members come from a 
range o f disciplinary backgrounds; and (2) their mandate to identify, examine and report on an 
ethical issue. The first of these two characteristics is a reflection of the interdisciplinary nature 
of bioethics, which is the matrix from which bioethics committees developed. As already 
alluded to, modern medical ethics was ‘not a discipline’ but a ‘meeting ground for a number of 
disciplines’ that were concerned with ethical questions raised by medical science (O'Neill 
2002:1). These different disciplines included medicine o f course but also philosophy, theology, 
law and the social sciences. This multiplicity o f perspectives and interdisciplinary expertise had 
characterised bioethics since its emergence in the 1960s. The very successful symposia of the 
LMG, for example, brought together participants with a training in a range o f disciplines from 
medicine to humanities. Similarly, Pappworth, himself a doctor by training, used the work of 
lawyers, sociologists and theologians to argue his case for the regulation of human 
experimentation (e.g.: 1962; 1969 [1967]). Kennedy made the same point in his 1980 Reith 
Lectures when he argued that ‘room must be found for other disciplines, particularly the 
humanities,’ in order to avoid the ‘intellectual strait-jacket’ character of modern medicine 
(1981:27).
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This multiplicity of perspectives and interdisciplinary expertise was carried over when bioethics 
committees started to be set up from the early 1980s onwards. Indeed, this was explicitly 
demanded by many bio-ethicists. Wamock, for example, explained, in an article where she 
pleaded for the creation o f a ‘National Ethics Committee,’ that such a body would have to be 
‘carefully selected to consist of people — some but not all would have a medical or biomedical 
background — who could understand the issues both of fact and value’ (1988:1626). She also 
argued that its ‘chairman would [have to] be a “lay” person, perhaps a lawyer or a member of 
one o f the numerous university departments of medical ethics’ (ibid.). As a result, committees 
o f experts in bioethics in the United Kingdom all had a proportion of non-medical members. 
The 1983 Working Group on the Ethics o f Clinical Research Investigations on Children, for 
example, had nineteen members of which seven were doctors (e.g. Philip Graham), four were 
professors of moral philosophy or theologians (e.g. G.R. Dunstan), two were medical lawyers 
(I. Kennedy; Gerald Dworkin), one was a professor of sociology (David Hall) and two were 
trained in both medicine and philosophy (R. Gillon; R. Nicholson). Likewise, the Polkinghome 
Committee was composed of one professor of medicine (Raymond Hoffenberg), one 
theologian (J. Polkinghome), one medical lawyer (I. Kennedy) and one professor of sociology 
(Sally MacIntyre). The Nuffield Council on Bioethics offered a similar picture with its fourteen 
members drawn from the medical sciences (e.g.: A. McLaren; M. Turner-Warwick), law (e.g.: 
M. Brazier; I. Kennedy) and philosophy (e.g. O. O ’Neill).
Interestingly, even though Warnock (1988:1626) had asserted that ‘there was no such thing as 
an ethical expert,’ most o f those that sat in these committees were part, in one way or another, 
o f the emerging world of British bioethics. So, for example, many o f the committee members 
were members o f associations like the Institute of Medical Ethics or research centres like 
King’s Centre for Medical Ethics and Law. The chairman of the 1983 Working Group, G.R. 
Dunstan, was a founder of King’s Centre for Medical Ethics and also sat in the MRC’s 
Working Party on Research on Children. Another member o f the 1983 Working Group, Ian 
Kennedy, was also a founder of King’s Centre for Medical Ethics and would, later on, also be 
a member of both the Polkinghome Committee and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 
Likewise, Raanan Gillon, another member of the 1983 Working Group, was editor of the 
Journal of Medical Ethics and a member of the Royal College o f Physician’s 1984 Working Party 
on Research on Healthy Volunteers. Similarly, Anne McLaren, a member of the Warnock 
committee became a founding and very active member of the Nuffield Council and, later on, 
of the European Group on Ethics.
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The second characteristic feature of any bioethics committee is its particular mandate or terms 
of reference, which consists of assessing a particular moral problem and recommending the 
adoption o f ethical frameworks to solve the issue. The mandate o f G.R. Dunstan’s Working 
Group on the Ethics of Clinical Research Investigations on Children, for example, was:
‘To analyse the complex moral question raised by clinical research involving children in particular; to 
review the moral basis o f  existing guidelines for the conduct o f  clinical research on children; ...  to 
identify broadly acceptable moral criteria ...  for the conduct o f  such research; [and] to produce a 
study document, containing ethical guidelines for the conduct o f  clinical research involving children’ 
(Nicholson 1986:17).
In the case o f more permanent committees, mandates also generally included the responsibility 
to anticipate and identify new potential issues. Thus, the mandate of the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics included the obligation to ‘identify and define ethical questions raised by recent 
advances in biological and medical research in order to respond to, and to anticipate, public 
concern’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2000a:5). Importantly for us, by establishing these 
committees as the authorities responsible for identifying, examining and reporting on particular 
ethical issues that arise from modem medicine, these terms of reference make these 
committees a crucial element of the will to protect human beings.
Ethical Codes*
For bio-ethicists, the way to re-moralise modern medicine and protect human beings from the 
dangers o f medical research was to establish an ethical or moral framework to govern the 
conduct o f doctors and biomedical researchers. As Warnock explained, ‘only within an ethical 
framework widely seen to be secure and sensible can we continue ... to push back the 
frontiers o f science’ (1988:1627). Such a framework or structure had to be understood, 
according to bio-ethicists, as composed of: (1) ethical codes, i.e. a series of moral principles to 
regulate medical research; and, (2) ethical technologies, i.e. institutional forms, procedures and 
other devices aimed at operationalising and realising these principles. Pappworth was one of 
the first to suggest the introduction o f such a moral framework for medical research in the 
United Kingdom. In Human Guinea Pigs, he argued that one needed to introduce a ‘totally 
different system’ for medical research composed o f both an ‘ethical code’ and an arrangement 
o f ‘research committees’ responsible ‘for the implementation o f the provisions’ o f the code 
(Pappworth 1969 [1967]:225, 252, 259 & 268). This demand was repeated many times in the 
years that followed the publication o f Pappworth’s book. The following extracts from writings 
by Mary Warnock offer a good illustration:
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‘What is needed [are] principles and an institution o f  legal restraints and surveillance which will 
enable research to proceed ...  but constantly watched’ (Wamock 1983:249);
W e believe that [medical research] requires active regulation and monitoring ...  Doctors and 
scientists [should] work within the moral and legal framework determined by society’ (Wamock 1985 
[1984]:75).
The first component o f such ethical frameworks were ‘moral rules that purport to govern the 
conduct o f medical practice’ (Gillon 1985b: 1195) and variously designated as hills o f rights,’ 
‘codes,’ ‘declarations,’ ‘guidelines,’ ‘oaths,’ or ‘principles.’ There are many examples of such 
rules o f ethical conduct in the British bioethical literature. One early illustration are 
Pappworth’s ‘ethical principles’ which he listed and explained in Human Guinea Pigs (1969 
[1967]:225-241) and subsequendy integrated in his ‘Modern Hippocratic O ath’ (1971). Many 
other texts listed similar ethical principals, including: the Medical Research Council’s (1963; 
1992) statements on Responsibility in Investigations on Human Subjects’, the Royal College of 
Physicians’ (1984; 1990a) successive Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical 
Research, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry’s (1988) Guidelines for Medical 
Experiments in Non-Patient Human Volunteers’, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology A ct (1990); 
the Department o f Health’s (1991) Local Research Ethics Committees', and the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority’s (1991) Code of Practice. Another source for such ethical rules was 
the numerous reports published by expert committees on bioethical issues (e.g.: Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 1984; Nicholson 1986; Royal College of 
Physicians 1986; Committee on the Research Use o f Fetuses and Fetal Material 1989; Royal 
College o f Physicians 1990b; Medical Research Council 1991a; Medical Research Council 
1991b).
While many biomedical researchers resisted the idea o f an ethical code to govern the conduct 
of medical research (Mulkay 1997:Chapter 2; Hazelgrove 2002; Weindling 2006:Chapter 17), 
there was no such doubt about the necessity for such moral rules for bio-ethicists. As Hugh 
Clegg argued in relation to human experimentation in one o f his editorials in the British Medical 
journal, ‘guidance in the form o f a code o f ethics’ has not only ‘become desirable but 
imperative’ (British Medical Journal 1963a:2). Full scientific freedom was simply unacceptable 
for bio-ethicists. ‘The majority view is that research needs to be regulated,’ asserted Warnock 
(1985:188); ‘a scientist who argued that he must be free to carry out whatever research he liked, 
by whatever methods, would not get much public support, if this involved the use of human 
beings’ (Warnock 1985 [1984]:xiv). Bio-ethicists also rejected the belief, held by many in the 
British medical establishment until the 1970s, that the researcher’s good character or integrity 
would be sufficient to protect human beings (cf. Hazelgrove 2002). As Gillon (1985e:1497)
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argued, reference to physicians’ ‘good conscience, integrity and good character [is] not enough’ 
to ensure the protection of human beings from the dangers of modem medicine.
The ethical rules suggested by bio-ethicists for the practice o f medical research using any 
category o f human being are o f three types: (1) rules relative to the research itself and, in 
particular, to its risks and its scientific value; (2) rules relative to the researchers; and (3) rules 
relative to the relation between researchers and research subjects. While the rules are generally 
similar for all categories o f human beings and all types o f research, there is o f course some 
variation depending on the human being who is investigated and the nature of the experiment. 
This variation is most marked with the first type of rules: those relative to the research itself. 
These rules address both the risks and the scientific value o f the research. In relation to risks, 
they state that there can be no research that carries more than ‘minimal risk’ for the human 
beings under investigation (Royal College o f Physicians 1990a:21; cf. also: Nicholson 
1986:Chapter 10; Medical Research Council 1991a; Medical Research Council 1991b). There 
are of course many variations. Some variations allow for increased levels of risk. This 
encompasses, among others, experiments on human embryos of less than fourteen days for a 
strictly limited series of purposes (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
1991:Paragraphs 9.2-9.4; cf. also Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) and 
experiments on fully consenting adults (Royal College o f Physicians 1990b:ll). Other 
variations allow for lower levels o f or no risk. This notably includes: human embryos 14 days 
or older, on which no experiment can be conducted (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990); and children, on which only research that is o f direct benefit and that cannot be done 
on others can be conducted (Nicholson 1986:Chapter 10; Department of Health and Social 
Security 1991:16; Medical Research Council 1991a:20).
In relation to the scientific value of research, the first type o f rule states that all experiments 
must be ‘of potential scientific value’ and ‘feasible’ (Medical Research Council 1992:7; cf. also: 
Nicholson 1986:Chapter 10; Department of Health and Social Security 1991:11; Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 1991 Paragraphs 9.6-9.7). The rationale o f this rule is 
that ‘badly planned, poorly designed research that causes inconveniences to subjects and may 
carry risk, without producing useful or valid results is unethical’ (Royal College of Physicians 
1990a:3). It means, among others things, that: the research must be ‘directed towards a 
justifiable advancement in biomedical knowledge;’ there must be ‘a reasonable chance of 
answering the question under examination;’ there has been ‘adequate preliminary literature 
research;’ and ‘pre-clinical laboratory studies’ (cf. Royal College ofPhysicians 1986; Royal 
College ofPhysicians 1990a; Royal College ofPhysicians 1990b).
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The second type o f rule relates to researchers themselves. They state that ‘all research should 
be conducted or supervised where necessary by a qualified medical person with the training 
and experience appropriate to the particular study’ (Royal College of Physicians 1986:9; 
Department o f Health and Social Security 1991:11). The rationale here is that qualified and 
seasoned researchers represent a more secure option for research subjects and are thus 
preferable for the conduct of experiments on human beings. Interestingly, the request for 
professional qualifications extends to the premises and materials used for the research project. 
For example, the Royal College ofPhysicians requires that ‘the premises where research takes 
place should be appropriate to the type o f study and to the risk involved’ (1986:13). In 
particular, it requested that, ‘where there is a serious risk o f adverse reactions, there should be 
facilities and appropriately trained staff for full resuscitation. For some types of study, further 
medical help and intensive care facilities should be available within a few minutes’ (ibid.).
The third and last type of rule relates to the relationship between the researcher and the 
research subject. Generally subsumed under the notion of informed consent, these rules state 
that research ‘subjects should know that they are involved in research’ and that they ‘should 
give [their] consent to all but the most trivial procedures, such as measurement of height and 
weight’ (Royal College ofPhysicians 1990a:20; cf. also: Medical Research Council 1992:8). For 
bio-ethicists, as discussed further in chapter 6, informed consent is a critical part o f the 
obligation to respect human beings understood as persons with a capacity to think and decide 
for themselves; for them, to inform a person about the reasons, procedure and effects o f an 
experiment and to obtain his or her consent is a way to respect that person and his or her 
ability to reason and choose. As examined in more detail in chapter 7, particular rules and 
procedures exist for those human beings that do not have, either temporarily or permanently, 
such a capacity to think and decide for themselves, like human embryos and foetuses, children 
or the mentally incapacitated. With children unable to chose participation in research, for 
example, the ‘consent o f a parent or other legal guardian’ will be sought instead (Royal College 
ofPhysicians 1990a:27; cf. also: Nicholson 1986; Medical Research Council 1991a).
Ethical Technologies
For bio-ethicists, drafting and promulgating ethical codes to govern the conduct o f medical 
research was only the first step towards the re-moralisation o f modem medicine and the 
protection o f human beings. It was a necessary first step to make medical research ethical 
again, but not sufficient in itself. To operationalise and realise the rules o f conduct contained
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in the codes and the aims they embodied, one also needed a series of institutional forms, 
procedures and other devices which I term ‘ethical technologies.’ Bio-ethicists did recognise 
the need for this further, second step and sought to create mechanisms to ensure that the 
ethical codes they had drafted were being implemented. Pappworth, for example, argued that 
‘no code will curb the unscrupulous’ on its own; one also needed a ‘machinery’ like ‘research 
committees’ to ensure that human beings were effectively protected (Pappworth 1969 
[1967]:242 & 252). Similarly, Mary Warnock explained that principles alone were not sufficient 
to guarantee that research was conducted morally; the principles had to be secured through 
mechanisms such as ‘statutory bodies’ that would be responsible for ‘the licensing and 
monitoring o f research’ (1985:79). ‘Until such bodies [are] set up,’ she warned, ‘none o f our 
[principles] can have any practical impact’ (ibid.).
Three major types o f ethical technology were devised by bio-ethicists. The first type was 
guidance mechanisms: detailed directives and other practical guidance addressed to doctors 
and medical researchers to help them transform the codes of ethics into everyday practice. An 
interesting example are the Medical Research Council’s ‘tool kits’ that purport to ‘provide 
guidance to help scientists implement [the different] ethical requirements’ and that comprise 
‘colour-coded route maps,’ ‘useful practical guidance’ and ‘sample scenarios’ (2007a). Another 
good example is the British Medical Association’s guide to assessing someone’s capacity to 
consent which claims to offer practical ‘help’ to ‘conduct [such] an assessment,’ including 
‘appendices covering [a series of] case studies’ (2004:6-7 & 136). The second major type of 
ethical technology was assistance mechanisms: devices that enabled doctors and medical 
researchers to realise particular requirements contained in the ethical codes. An excellent 
example is the ‘patient information sheet:’ a leaflet given to potential research participants that 
describes the purposes, procedures, risks and benefits o f the medical experiment in which they 
are asked to take part (e.g. Nicholson 1986:218-223; Royal College ofPhysicians 1990a:21). 
For bio-ethicists, the information sheet is a device that assists the researcher to fulfil the 
informed consent requirements by conveying the necessary information that potential 
participants need to decide whether they want to take part in the research. As Nicholson 
explained, ‘the use of written information helps [its] communication’ (1986:218 & 221).
The third and last major type of ethical technology developed by bio-ethicists was monitoring 
mechanisms: devices which purport to ensure that medical researchers are effectively fulfilling 
the requirements set out in the different ethical codes. A typical example are research ethics 
committees: a ‘mechanism for examining ... [and] deciding whether [research] conforms to the 
[ethical] standards laid down and enforcing compliance’ (Committee on the Research Use of
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Fetuses and Fetal Material 1989:16; cf. also: Pappworth 1969 [1967]:251 -256; Royal College of 
Physicians 1990a; Department of Health and Social Security 1991; Neuberger 1992). Suggested 
by Maurice Pappworth in the late 1960s, research ethics committees have been introduced 
from the 1970s onwards, although it was only from the mid-1980s onwards that they have 
became standardised and rendered compulsory. The principle is that no research can be carried 
out before a research proposal is submitted for ethical approval and is approved by a 
committee (Royal College of Physicians 1990a:6 & 31; Department of Health and Social 
Security 1991:Chapter 1; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 1991:Chapter 9). 
There are very clear rules about: the form and content of the research proposal; the criteria for 
approving or rejecting a proposal; the composition of the committee (which has to contain 
both medical and lay members); and the committee’s working methods and decision processes 
(cf. Royal College ofPhysicians 1990a; Department of Health and Social Security 1991).
Another example o f a monitoring mechanism introduced by bio-ethicists is the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), first suggested by Warnock’s Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology in 1984. Established by the Medical 
Research Council in 1985 and made statutory in 1990, the HFEA is responsible, together with 
research ethics committees, for ensuring through a system of licensing, inspection and record­
keeping that every research project using human embryos fulfils the necessary ethical 
requirements. The principle is that no research on embryos can be carried out before a 
‘research licence’ has been applied for and has been granted by the HFEA (cf. Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 1984:Chapter 13; Warnock 1985; Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
1991 :Chapter 9). As with research ethics committees, there are strict rules about the form and 
content of the research proposal; the criteria for approving or rejecting a licence; as well as the 
composition and functioning of the HFEA. In contrast to the research ethics committees, the 
HFEA also has the power to carry out inspections in research centres to whom it has granted 
licences and can threaten them with criminal prosecution.
The ‘Scientific and Medical Use of Human Tissue* as a ‘Problem of Ethics*
The present section argues that the existence o f this style o f thinking which grew out of 
bioethics from the 1960s and which I have termed the will to protect human beings is a 
necessary condition to the identification o f the collection and medical use of human tissue as a 
‘problem of ethics.’ Put differendy, the section argues that it is the beliefs, values, forms of
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expertise, institutions, principles and ethical technologies that compose this thought style that 
made it possible for the use of human tissue in medical research to be considered an ethical 
issue that had to be examined and regulated. The section starts by mapping out how human 
tissue became progressively understood to be an ethical issue from the 1990s onwards. It then 
describes how the different elements that make up the will to respect human beings were key 
in rendering this possible.
‘Human Tissue ’ as an Tithical Issue ’
In the early 1960s, the collection of human tissues for scientific or medical purposes was not 
understood as an ‘ethical issue.’ Instead, following the then dominant haemato-social logic, it 
was deemed to be an issue of supply. The problem was not how to protect human beings from 
potential dangers arising from the medical use of human tissue. The problem was how to 
ensure that scientists received a sufficient amount o f human tissues to carry out their research 
and advance medical knowledge. The assumption was that medical progress would bring about 
health and happiness to everyone. The short parliamentary debates that led to the adoption o f 
the United Kingdom’s first Human Tissue A ct in 1961 provide a good illustration o f this then 
predominant way o f thinking about the medical use of human tissue. Although the expression 
‘human tissue’ was not explicitly defined, the MPs’ interventions during the debates make it 
clear that it referred to any tissue that could be transplanted or used in medical research, from 
‘blood,’ ‘corneas, arteries and bones,’ to ‘kidneys’ and ‘living cells’ (Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard) 1961:1231 & 1245). T h e A cfs  main concern was to remove any legal obstacles to 
the collection of such tissues and their use in medical education, therapy or research so as to 
ensure the advancement o f medicine and the happiness of the living. As the Government’s 
spokesperson argued in her presentation of the Bill to Parliament:
‘The Bill is mainly concerned with the removal o f  doubt [about the legality o f  removing body parts]
...  Without the Bill such removal would be in danger o f  being held to be unlaw ful... [which would] 
act as a deterrent to progress .. .  The Bill therefore authorises the removal o f  any part o f  a body for 
therapeutic, [educational and research] purposes. It is important that .. .  the progress o f  research ... 
be encouraged ... The House [is] being asked ...  to interfere for the benefit o f  the living’ 
(Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1231-1235).
All the parliamentarians present in the House shared the views of the Government’s 
spokesperson, even the representative of the opposition who explicitly welcomed the Act  (cf. 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1235-1236). N o one mentioned the potential dangers 
that research with human tissue entailed and no one argued that it could constitute an ethical 
problem that required the creation o f particular ethical safeguards (Parliamentary Debates
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(Hansard) 1961:819-851; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1231-1258; cf. Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard) 1961:1454). On the contrary, most interveners expressed enthusiasm for 
the ‘wonders o f modem science’ (Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:841) and their 
‘benefit for humanity’ (Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 1961:1240).
Thirty or forty years later, the way of thinking about the medical use of human tissue has 
radically changed. As described at the start of this chapter, the scientific use of human tissue is 
now considered to be an ethical issue and the key question is how to protect human beings 
from the dangers that such uses o f human tissue entails. This identification of the medical use 
o f human tissue as a problem of ethics took place progressively. One o f the early milestones in 
this process was the recognition that ‘foetal tissue’ had become an ethical issue in the early 
1970s. In 1970, a claim that ‘aborted live foetuses had been sold for medical experiments,’ 
which was made by an anti-abortion MP to discredit the 1967 Abortion Act, led to the creation 
of an Advisory Group to look into the ‘ethical, medical, social and legal implications of using 
foetuses for research’ (British Medical Journal 1970:433; Advisory Group on the Use of 
Fetuses and Fetal Material for Research 1972:1; cf. also: British Medical Journal 1972a). 
Although mosdy concerned with whole foetuses, the Group did address the medical use of 
‘fetal tissue,’ defined as ‘a part or organ o f the fetus,’ concluding that that it was ‘permissible’ 
(1972:2 & 12). Seventeen years later, after having been judged to be too liberal by the Wamock 
Committee and not in synch with its own recommendations (Warnock 1985 [1984]:64), the 
medical use of ‘foetal tissue’ was re-examined and the conclusions of the Advisory Group’s 
report were revised by the Polkinghome Committee on the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal 
Material (1989:1-4). This Committee recommended that research on foetal tissue (which 
included the creation of cell lines from a foetal cell; cf. ibid. p. 18-19) could only be done within 
a strict ethical framework, which notably included the obligation to obtain the mother’s 
‘positive explicit consent’ and the necessity to have local ethics research committees ‘examine 
all proposals for work with foetal tissue’ (ibid. p. 13 & 16).
Another noteworthy episode in the process that saw the medical use of human tissue become a 
problem o f ethics was the recognition, in the early 1990s, that the use of ‘ovarian tissue from 
foetuses and cadavers’ in medical research entailed ‘clinical, scientific, ethical and social 
implications’ (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 1994). Fears expressed in the 
media that scientists would ‘create babies from the dead’ led to the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology’s Ethics and Law Advisory Group to examine the situation and recommend some 
way forward in 1994 (cf. Mulkay 1997:139-149). In its report on Donated Ovarian Tissue for 
Embryo Research, the HFEA. authorised the use o f foetal and cadaveric ovarian tissue in medical
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research but subjected it to the process o f ethical control set up in the 1990 Human fertilisation 
and Embryology A ct and which notably included a peer-review process to ensure that the 
research was o f scientific value (cf. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 1994).
While the problematisation of both foetal and ovarian tissue were important milestones, the 
decisive episode in the moral problematisation of human biological materials was the 
recognition, in the early 1990s, that ‘the medical and scientific use’ o f any type o f ‘human 
tissue’ raised a series o f ‘ethical and legal questions’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:ii). 
This recognition took place in most Western advanced liberal democracies and led to the 
publication of a series o f reports, from the American Office for Technology Assessment’s 
(1987) New Developments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissues and Cells to the European 
Group on Ethics’ (1998) Opinion on the Ethical Issues of Human Tissue Banking. In the United 
Kingdom, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics was the first to identify the scientific and medical 
use o f the human body as an ethical issue and conduct a thorough examination o f this issue in 
its 1995 Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues. A constant reference point in these developments 
was a court case which saw John Moore claim part o f the proceeds made by researchers from 
the University of California when they sold to Swiss pharmaceutical company Sandoz the 
patent on a cell line which they had created from lymphocytes removed from Moore’s 
cancerous spleen (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:Chapter 2; O'Neill 1996:5; cf. also: 
Rabinow 1996:Chapter 7; Waldby and Mitchell 2006:88-109). This court case triggered fears 
that the way medical research had been re-articulated during the 1970-1980s around market 
considerations, patenting systems, university-industry partnerships and scientist-entrepreneurs 
would lead to ‘the commercialisation o f the human body’ — an expression that referred to the 
possibility o f ‘own[ing] the body or its parts’ and ‘to mak[ing] money out of the transfer of 
“rights” in the body or its parts’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:7 & 12; cf. also: 
Wilkinson 2005; Seale, Cavers et al. 2006). In its conclusions, the Nuffield Council 
recommended that all medical research using human tissue — understood as ‘organs and parts 
o f organs, cells and tissue, sub-cellular structures and cell products, blood, gametes (sperm and 
ova) [as well as] embryos and fetal tissue’ (ibid. p. 19) — should be done within a strict ethical 
framework that included the obligation to obtain the consent o f potential tissue donors and 
the obligation to receive the clearance o f a research ethics committee.
The understanding that the medical and scientific use of any human tissue was a problem of 
ethics was reinforced in the late 1990s during a series o f different developments. The first of 
these developments was the public outcry generated by the realisation that many hospitals 
across the UK had, over the last forty years or so, collected, stored and used human tissues and
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organs for medical research without ever consulting the persons from whom the body parts 
had been taken or their families. The first and most publicised cases were at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary and the Liverpool Royal Children’s Hospital (at Alder Hey), but there were several 
other cases around the country like at Manchester Children’s University Hospital or the Royal 
Hospital for Sick Children in Glasgow. The public outcry led to the constitution of special 
commissions o f inquiry (e.g.: the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, the Royal Liverpool 
Children’s Inquiry, the Retained Organs Commission and the Independent Review Group on 
Retention of Organs at Post-Mortem), the publication of reports and ethical guidelines (e.g.: 
Chief Medical Officer 2001; Royal College of Pathologists 2001; Medical Research Council 
2001a; Department o f Health and Welsh Assembly Government 2002) and, in 2004, the 
adoption o f an entirely revised Human Tissue A ct which set up an ethical framework for the 
medical use o f human tissue and a regulatory authority to oversee its implementation, the 
Human Tissue Authority.
The perception that the medical and scientific use of human tissue was a problem of ethics was 
further reinforced by the recognition, at the turn of the century, that there were ‘scientific and 
ethical issues arising from stem cell research’ (House of Lords 2002:Paragraph 6.1; cf. also: 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2000b). The dangers associated with the medical use of human 
stem cells — defined as a particular type of cells found ‘in the early embryo, the foetus, the 
placenta, the umbilical cord, and most tissues of the body’ and are a ‘source of new cells for 
the regeneration o f diseased or damaged tissue’ (House of Lords 2002:Paragraphs 2.2-2.3) — 
were similar to those associated with other type of human tissues (immoral uses o f embryonic 
or foetal tissues and the commercialisation of the body) and necessitated a similar ethical 
framework (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2000b; House o f Lords 2002). Another 
development which also reinforced the perception that the medical use of human tissue was an 
ethical issue was the recognition that research on ‘human genetics’ presented a series o f ‘social, 
ethical and legal issues,’ most notably in relation to the creation o f ‘genetic databases’ (House 
of Lords 2001; Human Genetics Commission 2007). Although primarily concerned with the 
use o f ‘genetic information,’ organisations like the House o f Lords or the Human Genetics 
Commission did also examine and suggest ethical frameworks for the collection and use of 
bodily fragments from which such information is derived (cf. Parry and Gere 2006).
The Will to Respect the Human Body
Central to this increasing problematisation of the medical and scientific use of human tissue 
was the style o f thought that grew out o f the new medical ethics from the 1960s onwards and
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that I termed the will to protect human beings. It was the beliefs, values, forms of expertise, 
institutions, principles and ethical technologies that compose this style o f reasoning that made 
it possible to identify the scientific and medical use of human tissue as a problem of ethics and 
set up ethical frameworks within which to conduct such research. This is demonstrated by the 
way that the different elements that make up the will to respect human beings inform and 
support the problematisation of the medical use o f human tissues in the United Kingdom.
To start with, the type o f expertise at the heart o f the problematisation o f the medical use of 
human tissue is very similar to the ethical expertise characteristic o f the will to protect human 
beings. First, the particular institutional form of the ‘bioethics committee’ has played a central 
role in the transformation of the medical use o f human tissue into a moral issue. The role 
played by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in this progressive transformation is an excellent 
example, with the Council being one of the first to both report on the ethical issues arising 
from the increasing use of human tissue in medicine and examine the moral issues related to 
the use o f human stem cells in biomedical research in the 1990s (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
1995; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2000b). There are numerous other examples of bioethics 
committees composed of doctors, philosophers, lawyers and social scientists which have been 
key to the problematisation of human tissue in the UK, including: the HFEA’s Ethics and Law 
Advisory Group, which played a key role in problematising the use of ovarian tissue in embryo 
research (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 1994); the Retained Organs 
Commission, which examined how human tissue was collected in some Manchester Hospitals 
and recommended a set of ethical guidelines for the future (Retained Organs Commission 
2002); the Medical Research Council’s Working Group which drafted the MRC’s (2001a) 
Operational and Ethical Guidelines on Human Tissue for Use in Research', and the UK Biobank Ethics 
and Governance Council, which establishes and oversees the implementation of the ethical 
framework for the bank that notably indicates how human tissue samples are to be collected, 
stored and used (UK Biobank 2006).
Second, many ethical experts that were active in the emergence o f modern medical ethics in 
the United Kingdom have played a central role in the problematisation o f the medical use of 
human tissue during the 1990s. Alastair V. Campbell and Ian Kennedy are probably the best 
examples. The former, who had been the initial editor o f the Journal of Medical Ethics and had 
published the first medical ethics textbook in the UK, drafted the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2000 report on Stem Cell Therapy: the Ethical Issues and was Vice-Chair of the Retained 
Organs Commission and Chairman of the UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council. Ian 
Kennedy, who had authored The Unmasking of Medicine and founded the King’s College Centre
116
for Medical Law and Ethics, was a member o f the Polkinghome Committee, President o f the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics and Chairman of the Bristol Children Infirmary Inquiry. There 
were many other such examples, including: Margaret Brazier (founder o f the University of 
Manchester’s Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, founding member of the Nuffield Council 
and Chairwoman o f the Retained Organs Commission); Andrew Grubb (an early member of 
King’s College Centre for Medical Law and Ethics and member o f the MRC Working Group 
on Human Tissue); Onora O ’Neill (a founding member of the Nuffield Council and one o f the 
key authors of the 1995 report on human tissue); and Anne McLaren (a member o f the 
Wamock Committee and the Nuffield Council and a key author of the 2000 report on stem 
cell therapy).
The influence of the will to respect human beings on the problematisation of human tissue 
was not only visible in terms of expertise; it was equally evident in the way those who 
problemadsed the medical use of human tissue also believed that modem medicine and 
research were not necessarily beneficial but could actually be dangerous for humankind and 
thus constituted a problem that had to be examined and solved. At the start o f the fourth and 
most recent edition of Medicine, Patients and the Law, for example, Margaret Brazier typically 
offers a picture o f medicine as both beneficial and detrimental for humankind or, in her words, 
both ‘angel [and] demon’ (2007:4). As illustrations of the latter she lists, in one breath: the fatal 
heart surgeries at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, the unethical collection and use of human tissue 
at Alder Hey, the crimes of Harold Shipman and the atrocities committed by the Nazi 
experimenter, Joseph Mengele, in Auschwitz (ibid. p.3-5). A similar argument was put forward 
by the Department of Health in its Research Governance Framework where it reminded researchers 
that while ‘research is essential’ to the ‘promotion of [our] health and well-being,’ it does, ‘at 
the same time,’ involve ‘an element o f risk for [our] safety and well-being’ (2005:2). Likewise, 
echoing Mary W amock’s 1988 argument that some parts o f modern science were potentially 
immoral, A. V. Campbell explained, in a recent paper about Public Policy and the Future of Bioethics, 
that:
‘It has becom e a platitude to say that the speed o f  scientific and technological innovation has 
outstripped our shared moral visions, but it is none the less true ...  Many [controversies] exist in 
reality or potential’ (Campbell 2005:86).
As in Brazier’s depiction, these dangers were also often expressed by referring to the atrocities 
committed by the Nazis during World War Two (e.g.: Campbell, Gillett et al. 2001:218-219; 
O'Neill 2002:4-5; cf. also: Brazier 2007:4-5). For example, in a review of the Nuffield Council’s
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report on Human Tissue: Bthical and Legal Issues, Pat Walsh, a lecturer at the Centre for Medical 
Law and Ethics at King’s College London, reminded his readers that:
‘Medical practitioners can -  and have -  carried out abuses o f  human rights within the context o f ... 
medical research ... To take an extreme and well-worn example, the Nazi doctor carrying out genetic 
research on prisoners will be guilty o f  serious abuse and his work will be morally unacceptable’ 
(Walsh 1995:246-247).
As with human experimentation and both embryo and foetus research, the dangers o f human 
tissue research, stem cell research or human genetics were multiple and most often potential. 
Some dangers were similar to those envisaged in the 1970-80s, most notably the hazards that 
‘untrustworthy scientists and biotechnologists’ could represent (O'Neill 2002:3; Brazier 
2007:410). Others were particular to the medical use o f human tissue. One example were 
dangers associated with the ‘commercialisation o f the human body’ such as the creation of a 
‘market for procuring human tissue’ which would lead ‘vulnerable people’ to give their bodies 
for ‘financial rewards’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:12 & 50; cf. also: European Group 
on Ethics 1998; European Group on Ethics 2000; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2000b; 
Medical Research Council 2001a; The House of Lords 2002:Chapter 6; European Group on 
Ethics 2004; Wilkinson 2005). Another example, associated with genetic research, was the risk 
of having researchers providing the donor with information about his or her health that he or 
she did not want to receive. As the MRC advised researchers:
‘Research should only go ahead if the potential benefits outweigh any potential risks to the donors of 
the samples. The physical risks involved in donating samples for research will usually be minimal, but 
the risk that information from laboratory tests on a sample might harm the donor or their interests 
must not be forgotten’ (Medical Research Council 2000a:3; cf. also: House o f Lords 2001).
The importance o f the will to respect human beings in the transformation o f the medical use 
o f human tissue into a problem of ethics was also visible in the way that those who 
participated in that transformation constantly referred to their desire to protect human beings. 
The Nuffield Council, for example, used the notion of ‘respect for human lives and the 
human body’ as its ‘ethical principle’ to organise the medical use o f human tissues (1995:39). 
Likewise, the Medical Research Council (2001 a:3 & 6) argued in its Operational and Bthical 
Guidelines relative to Human Tissue and Biological Samplesfor Use in Research that the ‘key principle’ 
which ‘underlies the use of any human material for research should be respect for the human 
body.’ The Department of Health made a similar argument in its Research Governance Framework, 
explaining that ‘the dignity, rights, safety and wellbeing o f participants must be the primary 
consideration in any research study’ (2005:7). As during the 1970s-80s, this will to respect 
human beings was part o f a project to re-moralise modem medicine, to make it ethical again.
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Campbell made the point in his 2005 paper on Public Policy and the Future of Bioethics. Arguing 
against the ‘inevitablist’ position which held that one ‘cannot stem the flow of scientific 
“progress” with arguments of morality,’ he explained that the successful story of the ethical 
regulation of medical research in the United Kingdom proved that this was not the case and 
that ‘it was certainly possible’ in both medical research as in ‘other areas o f technical 
innovation’ to ‘channel, if not to halt completely, the flow of change’ with ethics (Campbell 
2005:87).
Finally, the influence of the will to respect human beings in the problematisation o f the 
medical use of human tissue is also perceptible in the use o f ‘ethical frameworks’ to resolve the 
moral issues involved and protect human beings. The Nuffield Council, for example, argued 
that in order to ensure a ‘general respect for the human body’ one needs an ‘ethical and legal 
framework within which the clinical and research uses o f human tissue takes place’ (1995:123). 
For similar reasons, the UK Biobank adopted its own ‘ethics and governance framework’ to 
regulate and monitor its different activities (2006). These moral frameworks, which comprised 
both ethical principles and technologies, were very similar to those that regulated human 
experimentation and research on both embryos and foetuses. They contained comparable rules 
about the research itself (minimal risk; scientific value), the researchers (qualifications) and the 
relation between researchers and research subjects (informed consent) with necessary 
alterations and additions where the particular nature of research with human tissue demanded 
them (cf. Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:Chapter 13; Medical Research Council 2001a; 
Human Tissue Act 2004; Human Tissue Authority 2006a; Human Tissue Authority 2006b; 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2007:Paragraphs S.8 & G.5; Royal College of 
Physicians 2007:Chapter 7). An example of such an addition are rules on how to store and 
dispose o f human tissue that will or has been used in medical research. The Human Tissue 
Authority, for example, recommends that all ‘[human] remains be disposed o f with respect’ 
and that, ‘as a minimum, stored human body parts, organs and tissue be disposed of separately 
from other clinical waste’ (2006b: 17; cf. also: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
2007:Paragraph G.9.10). Another example is the requirement to inform research subjects not 
only about the research procedures and both the physical and psychological risks involved but 
also about: the risk o f being provided with unwanted information about one’s health; the 
financial or commercial aspects of the research; how long the tissue will be stored for and for 
what uses; and how the tissue will be disposed o f (Medical Research Council 2001a; Human 
Tissue Authority 2006a; Human Tissue Authority 2006b; Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority 2007Paragraphs S.8 & G.5; Royal College ofPhysicians 2007:Chapter 7).
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The ethical frameworks for human tissue research also contain similar procedures, institutions 
and other ethical technologies to the frameworks for human experimentation and both embryo 
and foetus research. To start with, they also include guidance mechanisms. So, for example, the 
Medical Research Council’s Operational and Hthical Guidelines for human tissue research has, 
among its appendices, a Checklist for Research Based on Samples of Human Material as well as a 
Summary of Issues to Address When Obtaining Consent for the attention of researchers (2001 a:30- 
32). The MRC also provides researchers with a Data and Tissues Tool Kit which includes ‘rout 
maps,’ ‘research scenarios,’ ‘best practice documents’ as well as ‘Questions and Answers’ 
leaflets (2007). The ethical frameworks for human tissue research also include assistance 
mechanisms such as ‘patient information leaflets’ (Medical Research Council 2001 a: 15-16; 
Human Tissue Authority 2006a; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
2007:Paragraph G.5; Royal College ofPhysicians 2007:41-42). Furthermore, these frameworks 
also contain monitoring mechanisms. Besides research ethics committees and the HFEA, both 
o f which monitor research with any human tissue and human reproductive tissue respectively 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:Appendix 6; Medical Research Council 2001 a: 17; UK 
Biobank 2006:17; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2007:Section 1; Royal 
College ofPhysicians 2007), there is now a series o f additional monitoring mechanisms. One 
important example is the newly created Human Tissue Authority, which through a complex 
system o f licensing, compulsory book-keeping, inspections and directives, ensures that 
institutions which collect, use and store human tissue for research abide by the ethical 
principles discussed above (Human Tissue Authority 2006a; Human Tissue Authority 2006b). 
O ther examples are the UK Stem Cell Bank Steering Committee and the UK Biobank Ethics 
and Governance Council (UK Biobank 2006; UK Stem Cell Bank 2006).
Conclusion
This chapter started by showing how influential ethics governance has become in thinking 
about, problematising and administering the medical use o f the human body in the United 
Kingdom today. It did so by giving a description o f the inflationary number o f textbooks, 
scholarly articles, reports and guidelines relating to this new logic of rule that have been 
published in the UK in the last fifteen years. From there, the chapter examined some key 
concepts, forms o f expertise, procedures, institutions and subjectivities that characterise the 
bioethical logic. It did so by contrasting bioethics governance to the mentality o f rule it has 
displaced: haemato-social rule. It argued that instead o f conceptualising the circulation of the 
human body as a ‘problem of supply’ as haemato-social logic would have it, bioethical
120
governance views it as a ‘problem of ethics.’ The chapter also examined and contrasted the 
different understandings of medical science, forms of expertise and methods of intervention 
that relate to each o f these two ways to posit the problem.
This discussion provided the basis to look backwards and explore the conceptual, material and 
political conditions that have made it possible for ethics governance to become predominant 
in the United Kingdom from the 1990s onwards. Put differendy, the chapter went on to 
analyse some of the beliefs, values, forms of expertise, institutions, principles and technologies 
o f government that have made it possible, today, to conceptualise the medical use of human 
tissue as a ‘problem o f ethics’ necessitating an ‘ethical framework.’ It argued that this new way 
to problematise and govern the medical use of human tissue is the product of a reaction to 
modem medicine: a will to respect human beings and protect them from modem medicine 
understood as potentially dangerous for humankind. The chapter also argued that this will is a 
particular thought style that has grown out of modern medical ethics and, together with the 
development o f the latter, has become increasingly prevalent in the United Kingdom from the 
1960s onwards.
The chapter first gave an account of bioethics and its development in the United Kingdom 
from the early 1960s onwards. This account notably showed how, by the early 1990s, bioethics 
became a well-established and influential discourse in the United Kingdom, having been 
adopted not only by professional medical associations and funding agencies but also by 
government, the pharmaceutical industry and the wider public. The chapter then offered an 
analysis o f this will to protect human beings, arguing that it is a style of thinking made o f five 
key elements which it described: (1) the belief that modern medicine in general and medical 
research in particular were dangerous for humankind; (2) the will to respect human beings 
itself; (3) expert committees on bioethics that identify and assess ethical issues; (4) moral 
principles like that o f minimal risk or informed consent; (5) and ethical technologies that guide, 
assist and monitor the operationalisation of these principles.
The chapter then showed how this particular will to protect human beings made it possible to 
identify the use of human tissue in medical research as a ‘problem o f ethics’ that necessitated 
the setting up of an ‘ethical framework’ from the 1990s onwards. To do so, it first mapped out 
how ‘the scientific use of human tissue’ progressively became an ethical issue in the United 
Kingdom from the problematisation o f foetal tissue in the 1970s to the questioning o f stem 
cell research and human genetics at the turn of the century. It then showed how this
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progressive process was made possible by the existence of the five different elements that 
constitute the will to respect human beings.
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Chapter 5
‘A Question of Reputation’ — Ethics Governance 
and the Will to Modernise
The last chapter was an analysis o f the conceptual, material and political conditions that make 
it possible to conceptualise the medical use o f human tissue as a ‘problem of ethics’ in the 
United Kingdom today. The present chapter provides a parallel study of the situation in 
Singapore. It examines the development and assemblage o f the rationalities and practices that 
make it possible to understand, nowadays, the scientific and medical use of the human body as 
an ethical issue that needs to be examined and regulated.
Before exploring the conditions o f possibility of ethics governance in Singapore, the present 
chapter shows how influential this mentality o f rule has recendy become in the South-East 
Asian Republic. It does so by describing the surprisingly large number of texts relating to the 
subject that have been published in Singapore in the last five to ten years. The chapter also 
points out the striking similarity between the Singaporean and British version o f ethics 
governance. It notably shows how, like in the UK, the medical use o f the human is described 
as an ethical issue because o f the potential dangers that such a use is thought to entail. It also 
highlights the existence o f similar types o f institutions such as bioethics committees and look- 
alike ethical frameworks.
The chapter then analyses some of the conceptual, material and political conditions that make 
it possible for the medical use of human tissue to be viewed, today, as creating a series of 
‘ethical, legal and social issues’ best solved through the adoption of ‘ethical principles and 
guidelines’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:10-ll). It argues that although Singapore’s 
version of ethics governance is strikingly similar to the British one, its conditions of possibility 
are thoroughly different. Indeed, as the chapter shows, the will to respect human beings and 
protect them against the dangers of modem medicine that had been increasingly prevalent in 
the United Kingdom from the 1960s did not play any significant role in Singapore until the 
turn of the century. Moreover, as the chapter also points out, modern medical ethics was 
virtually unheard o f in the South-East Asian Republic until well into the 1990s. Instead of 
being the product o f a will to respect human beings like in the UK, the development o f ethics
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governance in Singapore was, it is argued, the result o f a will to relendessly modernise the City- 
State that has characterised the thinking o f the Singaporean leadership ever since the country’s 
independence in 1959.
To demonstrate this argument, the chapter first gives a description o f this will ceaselessly to 
modernise the country when it was first articulated in the ten years that followed independence 
and teases out its key elements. This notably includes, among others, an economically 
determined notion of modernisation, a particular type o f governmental agencies and an 
infrastructure adequate for intensive industrialisation. The chapter then shows how this will to 
modernise has informed and driven Singapore’s attempt to turn the City-State into a world- 
class hub for the life sciences from 1985 onwards. It demonstrates, in particular, how 
biomedical research became conceptualised as an engine o f economic development and the 
way the meaning o f infrastructure was transformed to support a knowledge-based economy 
instead of an industrialised one. Finally, the chapter explains how ethics governance was 
developed as part of Singapore’s ‘soft infrastructure’ that would ensure that Singapore’s 
biomedical research base had a ‘good reputation’ across the globe and in particular among 
foreign multinational pharmaceutical companies and medical researchers.
Bioethical Governance in Singapore Today
From the turn of the century onwards, a new way to think and administer the collection and 
medical use o f the human body imported from the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America became prevalent in Singapore. As already explained, I term this new way of 
conceiving and administrating the circulation of the human body, with all its rationalities, 
forms of expertise, problems, institutions, principles and procedures, ‘bioethical governance’ 
or ‘ethics governance.’ The present section examines the growing influence of this new logic of 
rule in the South-East Asian Republic and also highlights the striking similarity between the 
Singaporean and British version of ethics governance.
There are many signs of the growing influence of bioethical governance in Singapore. First, 
there has been, from 2000 onwards, a steep rise in the number of articles published on the 
topic in The Straits Times, Singapore’s main daily newspaper and the government’s official 
outlet. While less than thirty articles containing the words ‘medical ethics’ or ‘bioethics’ were 
published during the 1990s, there were over one hundred and forty in the first seven years 
following the millennium. Second, there are the many statements from people who explicitly
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acknowledge bioethical governance’s increasing importance in Singapore. For example, in an 
article published in The Straits Times in September 1999 and entitled ‘Bioethics: the Conundrum 
of our Time,’ the author explained that ‘bioethics, the study of moral issues in medical research 
and treatment, has come to the fore here in Singapore sooner than we think’ and argued that 
we would have ‘to pay more attention to [it]’ from now on (The Straits Times 1999). Similarly, 
Barbara Knoppers, a Canadian specialist in medical law and ethics, a member of UNESCO’s 
International Bioethics Committee and one of the four international experts advising 
Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee, argued in an interview in 2007:
‘For long, there was no mention of Singapore in the literature on bioethics. When I worked for
UNESCO [from the mid to late 1990s], Singapore was nowhere to be seen. But now, since a few
years, it is everywhere. They are doing interesting things’ (Knoppers 2007).
Third, as Knoppers alludes to, there is a growing number of scholarly articles authored by 
lawyers, doctors, philosophers and others that discuss the ethics o f human tissue research, 
although the number is still infinitely lower then in the UK. One example is Taw, Medicine and 
Society: Some Bioethical Issues in Singapore, an article authored by T. Iyer (1998), a member of the 
National University of Singapore’s (NUS) Law Faculty, which discusses, among different 
ethical issues, the medical use of foetal tissue. Another illustration is Ethical and Legal Issues in 
Singapore Biomedical Research, a paper written by Taiwo A. Oriola (2002), also from NUS’ Law 
Faculty, that discusses various ‘ethical issues’ from cloning to human tissue research. Other 
examples include the following articles that discuss the use of human stem cells in medical 
research: Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research, authored by the Chairman o f the Singapore Medical 
Association’s recently created Centre for Medical Ethics & Professionalism, Dr. J.J. Chin 
(2003); The Ethical Position of Singapore on Embryonic Stem Cell Research, published by two members 
o f Singapore’s newly established Bioethics Advisory Committee (Lim and Ho 2003); and both 
The Singapore Approach to Human Stem Cell Research and Recent Developments in Ethics and Regulation 
of Cloning and Human Stem Cell Research in Singapore, written by a group of doctors and lawyers 
from NUS (Tay and Tien 2005; Tay, Tien et al. 2005).
Fourth, there is a growing number of reports and guidelines relative to the ethical dimensions 
of the medical use of the human body. Among these documents, the most important are the 
reports o f Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee (BAC) established in December 2000, 
most notably its reports on both the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in Human Stem Cell Research, 
Reproductive and Therapeutic Cloning and Human Tissue Research (2002a; 2002b). Besides the BAC’s 
reports, there are other reports or guidelines directly or indirectly relative to ethics governance 
from other institutions. These include, among others: the National Medical Ethics
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Committee’s 1997 Ethical Guidelines on Research Involving Human Subjects (Ministry o f Health 
1998:Annex IV /D ); the Ministry of Health’s (1999) Guideline for Good Clinical Practice; 
Singapore’s National Cancer Centre’s (2002) StandardOperatingProceduresforthe Tissue Repository, 
and the National University of Singapore’s Institutional Review Board’s numerous Ethical 
Guidelines on the collection, storage and medical use of human tissue (2004; 2005a; 2006).
Interestingly, the version of ethics governance put forward by the authors o f the 
aforementioned mentioned scholarly articles, reports and guidelines is strikingly similar to the 
one outlined in British bioethics texts. To start with, these authors use comparable expressions 
to the ones employed in the United Kingdom to posit that the collection and medical use of 
the human body raises a series of ethical problems. In its report on Human Tissue Research, for 
example, the BAC argues that ‘human tissue banking and human tissue research’ both present 
many different ‘ethical, social and legal issues’ (2002b:i). Likewise, in his article on Ethical Issues 
in Stem Cell Research,}.]. Chin argues that ‘human stem cell research raises a number of difficult 
and important ethical issues and concerns’ (2003:111). Tay and Tien explain using almost the 
same terms that ‘human stem cell research’ presents ‘ethical, legal and social concerns’ (Tay, 
Tien et al. 2005:93).
Furthermore, the authors of the texts listed above assume, as do British bio-ethicists, that the 
medical use o f human tissue entails dangers for human beings and envision similar types o f 
dangers to the ones imagined in the UK. So, for example, one risk often mentioned in 
Singaporean texts in relation to the ‘donation of cadaveric foetal tissue’ is the danger that 
‘inappropriate incentives and coercions’ could be ‘introduced into a woman’s decision to have 
an abortion’ (Chin 2003:113; cf. also: Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002a:22-23). Another 
risk often mentioned are the dangers entailed in the commercialisation of the human body, 
most notably the risk that this may lead to immoral financial incentives to give one’s body (e.g.: 
Oriola 2002:508; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002a:34; Bioethics Advisory Committee 
2002b:24-25 & 36; Chin 2003:113). As in the United Kingdom, the aim o f authors of the texts 
listed in the previous paragraphs is to protect human beings, their lives and bodies against 
these various dangers. For example, the Bioethics Advisory Committee (2004:24) explains that 
the ‘purpose o f ethics governance’ is to ‘promote respect for all human beings and protect 
their health and rights.’ Likewise, Tay and her colleagues argue that the aim o f bioethics is to 
set up ‘safeguards for people and mankind’ against the dangers of human tissue research (Tay, 
Tien et al. 2005:102).
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Another remarkable similarity between the Singaporean and the British versions o f ethics 
governance is the type o f expertise deemed necessary to identify, examine and solve the ethical 
issues arising from the medical use of human tissue. As in the UK, Singapore relies on 
bioethics committees composed of experts from medicine, law, philosophy and the social 
sciences to assess these ethical issues. Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee, which was 
key in identifying human tissue research as an ethical issue in the City-State, is a fine 
illustration. Created in 2000, the BAC is composed o f doctors (e.g. its chairman, NUS 
Professor o f Medicine Lim Pin), lawyers (e.g. NUS Professor of Law Terry Kaan), social 
scientists (e.g. NUS Professor of Psychology John Elliott) and philosophers (e.g. NUS 
Professor of Philosophy David Chan). The similarity to the type of expertise is further 
heightened by the presence o f British bio-ethicists within the BAC: Martin Bobrow, a 
geneticist and member of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, is one o f the four international 
experts; Alastair V. Campbell, one o f Britain’s first bio-ethicist, was hired as Professor of 
Medical Ethics at NUS and became member of BAC in late 2006.
Last but not least, Singapore’s version o f ethics governance is also comparable to the British 
one in terms o f how the ethical issues arising from the medical use of human tissue are 
addressed. Like in the United Kingdom, Singapore has adopted various ethical principles and 
set up a series o f institutions, procedures and ethical technologies. The principles adopted by 
the City-State are very similar to those generally accepted in the UK, like the interdiction to use 
tissue from embryos that are fourteen days or older (e.g.: Bioethics Advisory Committee 
2002a:30; Chin 2003:114; Tay and Tien 2005:293) or the obligation to obtain a donor’s 
informed consent before collecting his or her body parts (e.g.: National Cancer Centre 
2002:Section B.3; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:34-35). Singapore has also set up a 
series of ethical technologies that purport to operationalise its ethical principles. These too are 
very similar to the ones in place in the UK and notably include institutional review boards (e.g.: 
Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D ; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2004).
The Will to Modernise -  Singapore’s Unremitting Desire to Progress
Although Singapore’s version of ethics governance is striking similar to the British one, its 
conditions o f possibility are thoroughly different. Indeed, instead of being the product of a will 
to respect human beings like in the UK, the development of ethics governance in Singapore 
was, I will argue, the result of a will to relentlessly modernise the City-State that has 
characterised the thinking o f the Singaporean leadership ever since independence in 1959. The
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present section gives an outline of this will to ceaselessly modernise the country when it was 
first articulated in the ten years that followed independence.
What I term Singapore’s unrelenting will to modernise, its drive to improve and develop, is a 
particular style o f thinking which has informed the way Singapore’s leadership has thought and 
acted from the 1960s to the present day. This style is composed of a series o f four elements 
which I will examine here: (1) modernisation understood primarily as ‘economic development’ 
creating improved ‘material well-being;’ (2) ‘government as planner and mobiliser;’ (3) 
‘infrastructure;’ and (4) the notion that one has to improve or otherwise perish. To unpack 
these different elements constituting Singapore’s drive for modernisation, it is best to examine 
the period when this will to modernise was first articulated, that is the 10 years or so that 
followed political independence from the British Empire in 1959. This was a difficult period by 
any account: widespread poverty; insalubrious dwellings and rampant tuberculosis; stagnating 
economy with high unemployment rates; demographic explosion; serious political unrest, with 
the rise of Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party and the repression o f the radical left; racial 
tensions and riots; regional insecurities and tensions, most notably Singapore’s expulsion from 
the newly formed Federation o f Malaya in 1965; as well as the withdrawal o f the British 
military and economical presence from the late 1960s onwards.
It is during that period that the various elements making Singapore’s drive for modernisation 
were developed by a small group of individuals comprising members of the governing elite, 
senior civil servants and foreign international development experts. The group notably 
included: Lee Kuan Yew, the ‘father’ of modern Singapore, Prime Minister o f the South-East 
Asian Republic from independence up to 1990 and Minister Mentor advising the Cabinet 
thereafter; Goh Keng Swee, an economist and architect of Singapore’s economic 
modernisation, Minister of Finance up to 1970 and thereafter Minister o f Defence; Hon Sui 
Sen, the first director of Singapore’s Economic Development Board, created in 1961; and Dr. 
Albert Winsemius, a Dutch economist and United Nations’ industrialisation specialist, who 
started advising Singapore in 1960 when he visited City-State as head o f a UN Industrial 
Mission and continued to do so until the 1980s. While this small group o f individuals never 
coherendy outlined in one master document the different elements that make up Singapore’s 
will to modernise, these elements can be found at work in many different texts written by these 
individuals: development plans, essays and conference papers, state institutions’ charters, 
industrial estates projects, all of which I draw upon to sketch Singapore’s unrelenting drive for 
modernisation.
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Modernisation as Economical Development
There are, o f course, very different understandings o f modernity and o f how to achieve it. 
Among the Singaporean leadership of the 1960s, modernity was something principally material. 
In a paper presented at a seminar on Modernisation in Singapore held at the University of 
Singapore in 1972, Goh expressed it thus:
‘As far as Singapore is concerned, we see the modernisation process in terms o f  creating increased 
material well-being for our citizens. This means more jobs, bigger incomes, better career prospects, 
better homes: in short a better life, materially’ (Goh 1977:191).
Modernisation, in other words, was primarily economical; it was to be achieved, mainly, 
through economic development (Margolin 1989; H uff 1995; Perry, Kong et al. 1997; Barr 
2006). Goh Keng Swee, in a 1961 article entided Man and Economic Development and reproduced 
in his 1972 Economics of Modernisation, had no doubt about that:
‘Econom ic development ...  is how to make man better o ff  materially, how  he can have more and 
better food to eat, better homes to live in, better education for his children, better means o f  
transportation, more leisure, in fact, how man can achieve a fuller life’ (Goh 2004 [1972]:45).
The same idea was also explicitiy asserted by the Singapore’s Economic Planning Unit, which 
argued that the Republic’s first economic development plan is ‘a means towards building a 
stable and prosperous society with better living standards and the prospect of a richer and 
fuller life for all’ (1964:39).
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, economic development, according to the dominant theory in 
economics, was necessarily synonymous with ‘industrialisation’ (Margolin 1989; Huff 1995), an 
understanding that Singapore’s leadership, counselled by international experts, also adhered to. 
As Goh Keng Swee put it: ‘It was necessary to seek new sources o f economic growth. The 
manufacturing industry was one obvious option’ (1977:7). Or, in Lee Kwan Yew’s more 
dramatic style: ‘the only way to survive was to industrialise’ (2006:67). At first, Singapore 
followed, for the most part, the import-substitution model o f industrialisation proposed by 
leading Argentinean economist Raul Prebisch in his 1950 report for the United Nations, The 
Economic Development of Eatin America and its Principal Problems (Margolin 1989:58). These 
concepts had been introduced in Singapore by a series o f international expert visits to the 
Island, most notably the United Nations Industrial Mission led by Dutch economist D r Albert 
Winsemius which visited the Island in 1960 and whose report constituted the bulk of 
Singapore’s first Development Plan, the Development Plan, 1961-1964 (Margolin 1989; Perry,
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Kong et al. 1997; Khondker 2002; Lee 2006; Rodan 2006). After Singapore’s expulsion from 
the Federation of Malaya, in 1965, and following further advice from Winsemius, the emphasis 
o f industrialisation was shifted to a more export-based model o f industrialisation (Margolin 
1989; Huff 1995; Perry, Kong et al. 1997; Rodan 2006). Instead o f creating national industries 
(which, with the separation from Malaysia, would have lacked a domestic market large enough 
to thrive), Singapore would now attract large foreign multinational companies to locate 
factories on the Island from where they would manufacture products for worldwide export.
Government as Planner and Mobiliser
For the Singapore leadership, government played a key role in the process o f modernisation 
and industrialisation (Huff 1995; Perry, Kong et al. 1997; Rodan 2006). In the words o f Goh 
Keng Swee, ‘government has to be both the planner and mobiliser o f the economic effort’ 
(1977:191). This was understood to be in stark contrast with the former colonial power’s more 
liberal policies: ‘it is no longer possible to allow the economy to run itself in a completely 
laissez-faire system’ (Ministry of Finance 1961:58). But, in no circumstances did the Singapore 
leadership envisage a government which controlled and ran on its own the entire production 
system. On the contrary: the role of government could only be understood in relation to those 
that Goh Keng Swee termed ‘the entrepreneurs’ (2004 [1972]:66) and defined as ‘the standard 
bearers of economic progress and as introducers of innovation’ (2004 [1972]:61). The role of 
government was not to replace them. Rather, the role of government was to help 
entrepreneurs; its role was to create the conditions in which they could thrive. In Goh’s words, 
‘government policy ... must be directed to the support o f ... business’ (1977:17). This division 
o f roles between government and entrepreneurs was also explicitly acknowledged in the 
Economic Planning Unit’s Review of Progress of the 1961-64 plan:
‘With the econom y a free enterprise in the State, Government acceptjs] that industrialisation [is] for 
private enterprise, local and foreign, and accept[s] as its responsibilities to provide the conditions 
necessary for the growth o f  private investment and to help build the infrastructure for 
industrialisation’ (Economic Planning Unit 1964:9).
This understanding of the role o f government in the modernisation and industrialisation 
process was not particular to Singapore; according to political scientists, who describe this 
understanding as characteristic o f ‘developmental states,’ it is shared by most Asian countries 
attempting to modernise and industrialize (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Castells 
1992; Thompson 1996; Perry, Kong et al. 1997). What was maybe particular to Singapore was 
its understanding o f who should take on the role o f the entrepreneurs. Indeed, given its
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adoption of an export-oriented model o f industrialisation, the Republic tended to identify the 
entrepreneurs with, primarily, foreign multinational companies (Margolin 1989:146-158). 
Therefore, the role o f government in Singapore was to attract these companies by offering them 
the best conditions to manufacture and do business (Margolin 1989; Huff 1995; Perry, Kong et 
al. 1997; Rodan 2006). The government had ‘to make it easy and attractive for manufacturers 
to set up business in Singapore’ (Goh 1977:9). Lee Kwan Yew is very explicit in his recent 
autobiography:
“We had to link up with the developed world -  America, Europe and Japan — and attract their 
manufacturers to produce in Singapore and export their products to the developed countries . . .  If 
multinational companies could give our workers employment and teach them technical and 
engineering skills and management know-how, we should bring in the multinational companies’ (Lee 
2006:75-76).
In order to achieve its role as the planner and mobiliser of the economic effort and thus attract 
multinational companies, the Singapore government used a particular series of strategies: (1) 
planning; (2) the creation of specialised agencies; (3) financial and technical assistance; (4) the 
development o f the population; (5) the creation o f infrastructure. As many o f these strategies, 
the first one -  planning — had probably been recommended by the numerous international 
experts who had visited Singapore after its independence; it would guarantee, they argued, that 
the government’s effort to modernise was systematic, smooth and efficient (Margolin 1989; 
Huff 1995; Perry, Kong et al. 1997). The first plan was the Development Plan, 1961-1964 
published in 1961 and described by Singapore’s Economic Planning Unit as ‘a systematic 
attempt for planned economic development of the State’ (1964:1). It was written by a team 
from the Ministry o f Finance under the leadership of Goh Keng Swee and in close contact 
with the 1960 United Nations Industrial Mission headed by Albert Winsemius (Margolin 
1989:64). The plans starts, in its first two chapters, by outlining the ‘nature o f the problems 
that face Singapore’ (Ministry of Finance 1961:1) as well as examining the Republic’s ‘past 
performance’ (ibid. p.20). Then, chapters 3 to 5 discuss the financing of the plan. And, in the 
six remaining chapters, the plan outlines various strategies to modernise Singapore which it 
groups under the following three headings: ‘economic development,’ ‘social development’ and 
‘public administration.’
One of the main strategies outlined by the Plan and suggested by Winsemius was the creation 
o f a specialised agency, the Economic Development Board, in 1961. While all government 
agencies were to work towards modernizing Singapore, the EDB, staffed ‘top personnel’ 
recruited ‘through the World Bank,’ was to spearhead economic development and 
industrialisation (Ministry of Finance 1961:69). ‘If Industrial Promotion is to be successful, an
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adequate organisation has to be created. The organisation should be more than an industrial 
loan agency. It should have a core of officers who possess industrial and financial experience’ 
(ibid. p.68). The role o f the EDB was to monitor the world market so as to identify industries 
judged to be desirable to Singapore’s long-term development. Furthermore, once such 
industries were identified, the EDB attempted to lure them to Singapore by offering financial 
incentives, technical assistance, first-rate infrastructure and a disciplined and cheap workforce. 
The EDB was ‘to do much more than wait for potential investors seeking loans to embark on 
industrial projects. The organisation would be able to plan industrial projects and attract 
private capital into these projects’ (ibid. p.68). The EDB was ‘responsible for the active 
promotion o f industrial investment, both at home and abroad’ (Economic Planning Unit 
1964:10).
Another important strategy outlined by the Plan was the provision, through the EDB, of 
financial and technical assistance to companies relocating in Singapore. This assistance 
consisted, first, in tax breaks offered to foreign companies relocating in Singapore. The main 
instrument in that respect was the ‘Pioneer Certificate;’ administered by the EDB, it ‘enabled a 
firm to be exempted from Income Tax for five years from the production date’ (Economic 
Planning Unit 1964:10). Assistance further consisted in ‘loans on favourable terms’ (Ministry 
of Finance 1961:69) and ‘participation in the equity capital of new industries (Economic 
Planning Unit 1964:10), which were both also managed by the EDB. Thirdly, assistance 
offered by the EDB was also technical. Most of that was ‘the undertaking of feasibility studies 
for prospective industrialists’ (Economic Planning Unit 1964:10).
Developing the Population
The fourth type of strategy used by Singapore’s government to fulfil its role as the planner and 
mobiliser of the economic effort aimed at improving the population understood as ‘human 
resource.’ Thus, the Development Plan, 1961-64 outlined, under ‘social development,’ a series of 
schemes relating to health, education, social welfare, culture, housing, sewerage, community 
services and fire brigade (Ministry of Finance 1961:Chapters 9-10; Economic Planning Unit 
1964:25-34). All these schemes had as their target the population of Singapore itself; they were 
all attempts to transform and develop this population to make it into one o f the pillars on 
which modernisation would be erected. They understood population as ‘human resource.’ As 
any other resource, the population had first to be protected: new hospital wards had to be 
built; health care had to be improved; housing, in close proximity to the new Industrial Estates, 
had to be constructed; sewerage had to be devised; parks, playgrounds and swimming pools
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had to be erected; basic social welfare had to be offered; and fire brigades had to be put in 
place (cf. Ministry of Finance 1961:Chapters 9-10; Economic Planning Unit 1964:25-34). The 
Development Plan, 1961-1964 was explicit about that:
‘Scarce resources have been invested in the form o f food, clothing, education and the other social 
investm ent... in [the] population. In order to reap the benefits o f  these investments it is necessary 
that facilities are provided that protect the population from the avoidable hazards o f  living... [To do 
otherwise] would be a waste o f  the capital .. .  invested’ (Ministry o f  Finance 1961:7).
Furthermore, the population had to be invested in and improved. In that respect, the 1961- 
1964 plan provided, in its ninth chapter, for the expansion o f post-primary and technical 
education. It notably envisaged the creation o f a Polytechnic comprising four departments: 
Engineering; Architecture and Buildings; Accountancy; and Nautical Department (Ministry of 
Finance 1961:113-116). O f course, ‘the expansion o f both technical secondary education and 
the Polytechnic [were] direcdy related to the overall emphasis on industrial expansion’ (ibid. 
p. 102). Indeed, ‘the extension of education and the raising o f educational standards [were] 
necessary conditions o f economic growth’ in two respects (Goh 1977:115). First, it gave 
people the technical skills necessary to work in factories. Second, it ‘[brought] about a rapid 
transformation of social attitudes to those more consistent with the needs of modernising 
societies’ (Goh 1977:7). Among these social attitudes, Goh listed ‘respect for hard work, 
innovation, a meritocratic system of personnel selection and advancement, continuous striving 
for greater efficiency, in short, achievement orientation’ (1977:10). Another section in the plan 
aiming to change and improve the population, besides education, was ‘culture’ (1961:118-120) 
or, in the words of Goh, ‘nation-building activities’ (1977:64; cf. also: Chua 1995:Chapter 5; 
Hill and Lian 1995; Perry, Kong et al. 1997:Chapter 3). These were schemes — public 
campaigns, radio and TV programmes, national library and museum — ‘designed to help 
develop in the people of the State a common oudook and a spirit o f common loyalty’ 
(Economic Planning Unit 1964:33).
Infrastructure
The last type of strategy deployed by the plan and which are central to the argument presented 
here are those that purport to create an infrastructure for industrialisation. In the 1960s, 
infrastructure was understood as primarily physical (cf. Ministry o f Finance 1961:Chapters 7-8; 
Economic Planning Unit 1964:5-24). There were, first of all, all the facilities to provide ‘public 
utilities like electricity, gas and water’ (Economic Planning Unit 1964:5): power stations, gas 
plants, pumping stations, reservoirs and the like. Then, there was also an entire ‘transport and
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telecommunication’ system (ibid. p.5): new bridges and roads, multi-storey car parks, deeper 
basins and longer wharfs in the harbour, extended runways for the airport, better air traffic 
control equipment, a meteorological service, connection to the round-the-world 
commonwealth submarine telephone cable system and the creation o f supplementary post 
offices. And, last but not least, there were ‘industrial estates’ comprising ‘factory sites and in 
some cases completed buildings, equipped with all necessary services like power, water, light 
and sewerage, for new industries’ (ibid. p. 10). The piece de resistance in that respect was the 3000 
acres of land that made up ‘Jurong Industrial Estate,’ south-east Asia’s largest industrial area at 
the time. Located in the south-west of the Island o f Singapore, the land had first to be drained, 
levelled and partly reclaimed on mangrove swamps and prawn ponds. It was then connected to 
central Singapore by a new road, a railway track and a fast ferry service. Electricity, gas and 
water supplies were set up. A port facility was built. Sewage were constructed. Telephone links 
were established and ready-to-move-into factories were erected.
As with the other strategies, all this physical infrastructure has to be understood in relation to 
the notion o f an export-oriented industrialisation. The ‘provision of infrastructure’ was one of 
the ‘principal measures to encourage new industries [to relocate and invest] in Singapore’ (Goh 
1977:8). The setting up o f infrastructure was understood as a central part of the government’s 
role to modernise by creating a perfect environment in which foreign multinationals would 
want to relocate and invest. Goh is explicit about that:
‘As regards infrastructure, we tried to make it easy and attractive for manufacturers to set up business 
in Singapore [by building] a large industrial estate ...  in Jurong, with its own port to handle bulk 
cargo, equipped with rail and road transportation as well as adequate supplies o f  power and industrial 
water’ (Goh 1977:8).
Similarly, Lee Kwan Yew also recognises this in his memoirs:
‘The government played a key role in attracting foreign investments; we built the infrastructure and 
provided well-planned industrial estates, equity participation in industries, fiscal incentives and export 
promotion. Most important we established good labour relations and sound macro-economic 
policies, the fundamentals that enable private enterprise to operate successfully. Our largest 
infrastructure development was the Jurong industrial estate’ (Lee 2006:79-80).
Survival
While the three elements discussed so far explain what type o f modernisation was pursued and 
outline some of the means that were deployed in order to achieve it, they do not explain why
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one should want to modernise in the first place. Indeed, the will to improve was not a given; it 
had to be cultivated. Singapore’s leadership was well aware o f this:
‘The assumption that man wishes to improve his basic material living conditions does not always 
hold true. There are societies where ...  human beings seek no im provem ent... [One has] to arouse 
such societies from their lethargy ...  The people o f  a country must desire progress’ (Goh 2004 
[1972]:46 & 53).
The mechanism that the Singapore’s leadership used to spark such a desire among its people 
was what scholars have termed ‘the ideology of survival’ (e.g.: Chua 1995:105; Hill and Lian 
1995:19-20 & 189-190; Perry, Kong et al. 1997:7). The logic underlying this mechanism was 
straightforward: when placed in a life threatening situation, you either improved or you 
perished. Following this logic, the Singapore’s leadership ‘cultivated a continual sense o f crisis 
and urgency’ (Perry, Kong et al. 1997:6) so as to bring about in the people a desire to work 
hard and progress. O f course, the desperate situation in which Singapore was in the 1960s -  
economical crisis, internal political unrest and neighbouring countries understood as 
threatening enemies — made it easier to create such a feeling o f imminent danger. Nevertheless, 
this situation was well exploited by government in order to generate a true sense of crisis and 
urgency. A good example is the rhetoric displayed in Lee Kuan Yew’s recent autobiography 
where he explains ‘how difficult it was for a small country ... with no natural resources to 
survive in the midst o f larger, newly independent nations all pursuing nationalistic policies’ 
(2006:11). It was, he continues, ‘a long, hard slog to find ways o f staying independent and 
making a living without Malaysia as our hinterland. We had to work against seemingly 
insuperable odds to make it from poverty to prosperity ... The years after 1965 were hectic 
and filled with anxiety’ (2006:12).
The correct reaction when faced with this permanent sense of insecurity, according to the 
Singaporean leadership, was to improve relendessly. As Lee Kuan Yew explained:
‘Econom ic and social progress are not the natural order o f  things ... they depend on ceaseless effort 
and attention’ (Lee 2006:11).
This notion of a ‘ceaseless effort’ comes well across in the government’s constant review of the 
progress achieved in relation to its existing plans and its will to adapt them if necessary. Thus, 
for example, in its review o f the Development Plan, 1961 -1964, the Economic Planning Unit 
wrote that the 1961-64 plan was ‘only one in the series o f plans required for the development 
of a stable self-generating economy... and [that] Government is now engaged in the 
preparation o f the next plan’ (1964:39). This will to constantly better oneself was often
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translated as the will to excel, the will to be the best. In a speech entitled Why Singapore Succeeds 
given at a London conference in 1972, Goh resumed ‘the basic thinking and philosophy 
underlying [his government’s] policy’ like this: ‘Singapore must excel in ... whatever it attempts 
... Government policy must be directed to the pursuit o f excellence’ (1977:17). Only 
excellence, only being the best would allow one to avoid perishing.
After the 1960s
This particular style of thought, this will to relendessly improve did not disappear after the 
1960s. On the contrary, it has continued to inform the thinking and acting o f the Singaporean 
leadership up to the present day, not the least because o f the People’s Action Party’s 
uninterrupted rule since independence and the way the leaders have constandy and 
meticulously groomed and co-opted their successors (Perry, Kong et al. 1997; George 2000; 
Rodan 2006). The recent call by Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s current Prime Minister, to 
‘improve [the Island] and build on it, [to] make it something better ... [and to] keep on 
pursuing excellence, keep on aiming high, and keep on improving life’ is a good illustration of 
how this way of thinking is still very much alive and kicking today (2004). And, the fact that 
Lee Hsien Loong is Lee Kuan Yew’s oldest son and that his father still occupies an advising 
function in his Ministerial Cabinet (as ‘Minister Mentor’) points out to how the stability among 
Singapore’s leadership has helped this style of thought to endure up to this day. But, as 
discussed below, the perhaps most striking illustration of the persistence up to this day of the 
will to constandy modernise among the Singaporean leadership is the Republic’s twenty years 
o f policies aiming to promote the biomedical sciences on the Island (Rodan 2006).
Before examining these particular policies, it is worth noting that while this will to modernise 
and constandy improve has endured up to this day, some of its elements had, obviously, to be 
adapted to the changing economical and geopolitical realities o f the last twenty-five years. Two 
changes merit attention. First, there was a change in the Republic’s economic policy and, 
therefore, o f how modernisation was understood following Singapore’s two first economical 
crises since independence, in 1974-75 and in 1985-86. These crises made clear that Singapore 
was becoming less attractive for multinational companies to relocate compared to emerging 
economies like Indonesia, other newly industrialised nations like Hong Kong or even 
developed countries. A change of economic policies was thus necessary if economic growth 
was to be sustained.
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This was achieved in 1986 with the publication of a report o f the Economic Committee aptly 
entided The Singapore Economy: New Directions. Chaired by Lee Hsien Loong, then Minister for 
Trade and Industry, the Committee identified the causes of the 1985-6 crisis (loss o f 
competitiveness) and proposed a series o f ‘policies for growth’ to remedy the situation. One 
trend in these policies was the shift from a focus on industry to one on international services, 
notably the financial and banking sectors (Margolin 1989:227-8). As the authors o f the report 
argued:
We must move beyond being a production base, to being an international business centre ...
Singapore should become a major exporter of services’ (Economic Committee 1986:12).
The other trend was a move from low-skilled industries to industries using ‘high technology 
and R&D’ (Economic Committee 1986:Chapter 16; cf. also Margolin 1989:228-9). Thus, as 
scholars have showed, modernisation was still mainly economical and export-oriented; but it 
was now based on services and high-technology rather than low-skilled industries (Margolin 
1989; Perry, Kong et al. 1997; George 2000).
The second change which merits mention relates to Singapore’s economical and political 
situation and, therefore, to ‘the ideology of survival.’ In the 1960s, Singapore was poor and 
underdeveloped, it was rife with internal political discord and it was surrounded by unstable 
and threatening neighbours. From the 1980s onwards, the situation had changed dramatically: 
order had been restored under the strong leadership o f Lee’s People’s Action Party; relations 
with Malaysia and Indonesia had improved; and, most important o f all, Singapore had become 
affluent. Indeed, by the mid 1980s, Singapore’s GNP per capita was similar to those of many 
developed countries and, by 2000, it was among the highest in the world. This, ironically 
enough, was problematic in terms of Singapore’s ideology of survival. Indeed, it meant that 
there was no more ‘sense of crisis and urgency’ which could be used to drive people to 
continuously improve.
To avoid this from happening, the Singaporean leadership was quick to reshape the ideology 
of survival and adapt this mechanism to instil a desire for progress to the new situation. To do 
so, the leaders argued that while Singapore had indeed made tremendous progress, the levels 
of prosperity and comfort that had been reached remained extremely fragile; poverty, civil 
strife and other dangers were not far off. The main reason for this fragility was, they argued, 
the always staffer international competition among nations. And the proof of both this frailty 
and tougher economic race were, the government argued, the economic crises which regularly
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rocked the Island.4 Faced with this situation, it was impossible to ‘complacently settle for 
present levels o f prosperity;’ one needed, instead, to work harder and to understand ‘the 
continual importance o f upgrading the economy’ (Perry, Kong et al. 1997:6).
Singapore’s latest economic development plan -  the 2003 New Challenges, Fresh Goals: Towards a 
Dynamic Global City published by the Economic Review Committee under the chairmanship of 
Lee Hsien Loong — exemplifies well the city-state’s reshaped ‘ideology of survival.’ Drafted in 
reaction to 1997-1999 Asian Financial Crisis, the plan urged Singaporeans to ‘remake and 
upgrade the economy’ (Economic Review Committee 2003:4). It recognised that ‘overall 
[Singapore] had made tremendous progress since the last major recession in 1985,’ but warned 
that ‘the economic race has [since] become tougher’ (ibid. p.3). This meant that, ‘as Singapore 
becomes more developed,’ its citizens ‘will need to work doubly hard to overcome the 
challenges ahead and sustain healthy economic growth’ (ibid. p.29).
Biomedical Research as the Path to Modernity
Before the late 1980s, there was almost no biomedical research carried out in Singapore. In a 
1986 editorial o f the Singapore Medical Journal which discussed the development o f medicine in 
the small Republic, Dr. Feng described this state of affairs in no uncertain terms, arguing that 
‘Singapore is too small and its talent pool too limited to engage in any meaningful basic 
medical research’ (1986:463). Ironically enough, this situation was to change from that time 
onwards with the publication that very same year of the Economic Committee’s already 
mentioned report The Singapore Economy: New Directions. Recognising that ‘Singapore [did] not 
have a research tradition’ (1986:149), it proposed to change this situation by developing a 
‘competence’ in ‘biotechnology’ understood as ‘pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food processing 
[and] agro-technology’ (ibid. p. 147). This was not the first time that the Singaporean leadership 
was interested in the life sciences but it was the first time that it officially stated its interest to 
promote biomedical research.
Since 1986 there has been no looking back and Singapore’s wish to build a limited competence 
in biotechnology has become, over the next twenty years, a will to become a global ‘biomedical 
sciences hub’ with ‘world-class science and technology capabilities’ (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 2006:i and 11). Specialised agencies promoting biomedical research have
4 After the 1974-5 and 1985-6 economical crisis, Singapore was again hit by recession in 1997-9 (Asian Financial 
Crisis) as well as in 2001-02.
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mushroomed: the National Science and Technology Board (now A*Star), created in 1991; the 
National Medical Research Council, founded in 1994; the Biomedical Research Council, 
opened in 2000; and the Research, Innovation and Enterprise Council and the National 
Research Foundation, both formed in 2005. The national budget allocated to promote research 
and development has exploded from $SG 2 billion in 1991 to $SG 13.55 billion in 2006. 
Specialised research centres dedicated to the life sciences have proliferated since Singapore 
opened its first such institution under the aegis of Sydney Brenner in 1987, the Institute of 
Molecular and Cell Biology, now directed by Sir David Lane. Likewise, Singapore’s universities 
have also seen their biomedical divisions expand considerably while prestigious foreign medical 
schools such as Duke University have opened local branches in Singapore. Furthermore, the 
city-state has also made considerable efforts to educate and train Singaporeans as biomedical 
researchers and technicians while, at the same time, attracting foreign talent to come and work 
in the Republic, such as Edison Liu and Neal Copeland -  two o f the United States’ most 
prominent cancer researchers. Finally, under the aegis o f the EDB, Singapore has also 
successfully attracted foreign multinational companies active in the life sciences such as 
Novartis to come and settle part o f their research base in Singapore.
This section argues that these twenty years o f policies to promote biomedical research are very 
much a product of the will to modernise which has informed the Singaporean leadership’s way 
of thinking from the 1960s onwards. It does so by describing how all four of the elements 
characteristic o f the will to modernise have structured the city-state’s efforts to turn the island 
into a global life sciences hub. First, it shows how the biomedical research was identified as an 
engine o f economic development or modernisation. Then it describes how investment in the 
life sciences became to be understood as an improvement o f Singapore’s economy which was 
necessary to the Republic’s survival. From there it explains how Singapore’s government 
became seen as the planner and mobiliser of biomedical research. Finally, it argues that the 
notion o f infrastructure was redefined to include ‘technological infrastructure’ which included, 
most notably, the construction of a ‘Biopolis’ and the realisation of a series o f ‘soft 
infrastructures.’
As alluded to before, one of the reason for the prevalence o f this will to modernise among the 
leaders of the South-East Asian Republic up to this day, be it in the promotion of biomedical 
research or elsewhere, is the stability o f Singapore’s leadership. The activities of both Philip 
Yeo and the Economic Development Board to promote the life sciences in Singapore are a 
good illustration of this style of thought’s continuing influence in the island. Yeo, the main 
architect of the development o f the biomedical research in Singapore, was born on the Island
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in 1947. After an engineering degree at the University of Toronto and a Master in Business at 
Harvard, he joined Singapore’s Ministry o f Defence in 1970 where he was trained by and 
would remain, for the next fifteen years, a close collaborator o f G oh Keng Swee, one of the 
main artisans o f the city-state’s industrialisation after independence. In 1986, Yeo was 
nominated director o f the EDB where he stayed until 2006. During his time as head o f the 
EDB, he was in charge of promoting the life sciences in Singapore, a role which he further 
made his own when he was nominated co-chairman of the National Science and Technology 
Board/A*Star in 1999, a position from which he retired in 2007.
biomedical Research as an Engine of Growth
The strong influence of the will to modernise on the city-state’s promotion of the life sciences 
is discernible, first o f all, in the way the Singaporean leadership understands biomedical 
research as being necessarily related to the concept o f modernisation developed in the 1960s 
and still valid today: biomedical research is a driver o f the country’s (economic) development. 
Singapore’s desire to promote the life sciences can only be understood in relation to this 
particular vision o f modernity. Indeed, for the small Republic, scientific research in general and 
biomedical research in particular are ‘important growth engines’ (Economic Review 
Committee 2003:12), engines ‘to achieve continued economic growth’ (National Science and 
Technology Board 1996:13), engines ‘to achieve ... long-term growth and prosperity’ (Ministry 
o f Trade and Industry 2006:iii). In other words, for Singapore, the promotion o f biomedical 
research is understood as an economic development strategy to achieve progress and 
prosperity. This identification of biomedical research as a driver of economic development and 
progress is not a recent one; it has been developed gradually over the last 30 years or so and 
has its roots in Singapore’s attempts to diversify its economic and industrial policies put in 
place in the 1960s.
As mentioned earlier, the Economic Committee’s 1986 report certainly represents the most 
significant moment in these attempts to diversify, confirming for good the change from low- 
skills industries to services and high-tech industries. But, attempts at diversification were 
already evident before, in the early 1970s. It is then that the Singapore’s governing elite began 
to construct its understanding of biomedical research as a driver o f economic development. 
The first step was the realisation o f the relation between the use o f skills or technology in 
production and increased economical growth. In the early 1970s, the Singaporean government 
had been contemplating, in order to diversify its industries, to promote ‘high-tech industries’ as 
opposed to the more labour-intensive ones upon which Singapore’s industrialisation had been
no
based since the Development Plan, 1961-1964 (Margolin 1989; Khondker 1994; Huff 1995; Perry, 
Kong et al. 1997; Rodan 2006). One proponent of this strategy was the influential Goh Keng 
Swee. In his 1973 Labour in a Technological Society, he argued that:
‘[Singapore] should produce complex products requiring labour skills in great amounts, not merely
cheap labour. In other words, we want to increase the level o f  technology o f  industries in Singapore’
(Goh 1977:199).
He was thus postulating a relation between skills/technology and economic growth — the more 
skills/technology, the more value-added content, the more growth — which he was keen to 
exploit. Indeed, in relation to industries using unskilled labour, Singapore was starting to lose 
out to economies, such as Malaysia or Indonesia, which could offer lower labour costs (Perry, 
Kong et al. 1997:108). By having a more skilled labour force, Singapore would avoid this 
problem altogether. Indeed, it would allow it to target high-tech industries located in 
developed countries, attracting them with its lower labour costs. Furthermore, the skilled 
labour necessary to high-tech industries offered a higher added-value and thus produced more 
growth.
While some initial steps towards the systematic implementation o f G oh’s vision were taken 
with the launch o f Singapore’s ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ in 1979 (Margolin 1989), the real 
breakthrough was the Economic Committee’s 1986 report. To start with, it reasserted the 
relation postulated by Goh while replacing ‘skills/technology’ with ‘science and high- 
technology:’ ‘new high-tech industries’ will offer better perspective for growth than low-skills 
ones because of their ‘higher value-added content’ (1986:Chapter 16). Then, for the first time, 
it both clarified which high-technologies Singapore would pursue and included ‘biotechnology’ 
in this list (ibid. p.147).5 Finally, the report also called for Singapore to put into place ‘an 
effective R&D policy’ so as to develop a ‘competence’ in these technologies (ibid. p. 148). This 
resulted, five years later, in the creation of the National Science and Technology Board and the 
publication o f Singapore’s first 5-years S&T plan, the Window of Opportunities: National Technology 
Plan 1991. Twenty years later, there has been no significant change to the basic policy options 
laid out in the 1986 report. Thus, Singapore’s latest S&T plan, the Science and Technology Plan 
2010: Sustaining Innovation-Driven Growth still purports to ‘anchor’ Singapore ‘into a knowledge- 
and innovation-driven economy’ so as to achieve ‘long term growth and prosperity’ (2006:iii).
5 The list included the following technologies: information technology; biotechnology; micro-electronics; robotics
6  artificial intelligence; lasers/optics; and communications technology (ERC 1986:147-8).
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The reasons why the 1986 report included ‘biotechnology’ among the ‘new high-technologies’ 
in which to invest were numerous. First, it was around that period that the important 
commercial potential o f biotechnology had been recognized and that a new, highly promising 
and profitable industry based on these molecular biological technologies had started to emerge, 
in particular in the United States (American Office o f Technology Assessment 1984; Kenney 
1986; Zucker, Darby et al. 1998; Acharya 1999; Argyres and Liebeskind 2002). The first 
American start-ups founded by scientists with the help o f venture capitalists and 
commercialising products using biotechnology started to appear in the mid 1970s and by 1984 
there were already over one hundred o f them. The ‘biotechnology fever’ did not only grip Wall 
Street; by the late 1970s large multinational pharmaceutical and chemical companies were 
entering the fray and starting to seriously invest in the new technologies. By 1983, American 
private investment in biotechnology had reached over one billion US dollars and, by 1984, 
biotech had been officially recognized as the new big thing by the American Office of 
Technology Assessment in its report Commercial Biotechnology: A n  International Analysis. The 
EDB, whose role was to constantly monitor the world market in search for new industries that 
would be o f benefit to Singapore’s long term growth, could not have missed these 
developments in the United States.
A second reason for the Singapore’s interest in biotechnology was the fact that it seemed to 
match rather well the Republic’s recent attempt to diversify its industries by investing in high- 
technologies. Indeed, biotechnology involved the use o f a specialised technical knowledge 
synonymous with higher added-value and increased potential growth. Third, there was the fact 
that, from the late 1970s onwards, many foreign multinational pharmaceutical and chemical 
multinational companies had started to re-orient their activities around biotechnology 
(American Office o f Technology Assessment 1984; Kenney 1986). Given Singapore’s export- 
oriented economic model and its reliance on foreign, and especially American, multinational 
companies, this must have provided an additional incentive to invest in biotech for the 
Republic’s leaders. Finally, one cannot neglect the influence o f personal contacts, notably the 
relationship between Lee Kuan Yew and future Nobel Prize winner Sydney Brenner. Lee had 
met the South African molecular biologist through a banker friend in the early 1980s. He 
seemed to have been greatly impressed by Brenner, so much so that, in 1985, he made him a 
Kuan Yew Distinguished Guest. This was to be the start o f a long association between Brenner and 
Singapore.
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Hewers of Wood &  Drawers of Water
Another indication of the way that the will to modernise has structured the city-state’s policies 
to promote the life sciences is the manner in which the latter has been related to the ideology 
of survival — the government’s mechanism to instil an aspiration for progress among the 
Singaporean population. As discussed above, this mechanism had been adapted to Singapore’s 
new economical and political situation in the 1980s. Most notably, references to poverty, civil 
strife or regional tensions had been dropped in favour of a fear of falling behind in an 
economic race between nations which was depicted as being as fierce as ever. As the 
Economic Committee’s argued in 1986, economic competition had become ‘stiffer:’
W hen Singapore first began industrializing in the 1960s, our competitors were the other developing 
nations. We had obvious advantages. .. .  N ow  we are competing with the developed nations. ... 
Compared to these countries, our advantages are not so obvious. The competition is now much 
more intense’ (Economic Committee 1986:10).
Twenty years later, the Economic Review Committee’s had the same message, arguing that ‘the 
economic race has become tougher’ (2003:3).
As alluded to before, the only solution, given this situation, was to work harder and to upgrade 
the national economy. For the Singaporean government, one way to achieve the latter was to 
invest in knowledge-based industries and, notably, in the biomedical industry. Put differently, 
investing in new technologies in general and in the life sciences in particular was understood as 
a strategy necessary for the Republic’s very survival. This, at least, was the way the 
Singaporean leadership thought from as far back as the early 1980s. Thus, in 1983, S. 
Dhanabalan, an influential member of Singapore’s government, put it thus:
‘[Singapore can not] ignore the implications o f  the new technology, f6] Unless we acquire new skills, 
identify new opportunities and absorb new ideas, we will be left on the wayside o f  development. We 
need to retrain, upgrade and educate. We must m ove up or remain, as we have been, hewers o f  wood 
and drawers o f  water’ (Dhanabalan 1983:6-7).
Although cast in a more modern idiom, the city-state’s latest S&T plan defends basically the
i
same position when it argues that:
6 S. Dhanabalaris understanding of the new technology encompassed the following fields: ‘robotics and 
computerisation,’ and, ‘farther down the road, advances in such fields of basic science as genetic engineering and 
biotechnology and artificial intelligence research’ (1983:4).
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‘Singapore’s economic strategies must keep up with the changing global economic landscape. 
Singapore must continue its process o f  upgrading and renewal to ensure that we remain competitive 
in a global knowledge economy’ (Ministry o f  Trade and Industry 2006:3-4).
Government as Planner and Mobiliser of Biomedical Research
The clearest evidence of the way the will to modernise has informed and shaped Singapore’s 
promotion o f the life sciences is probably the key role played by the government in turning the 
Island into a global biomedical research centre. Indeed, the government has been ‘the planner 
and mobiliser’ of biomedical sciences as it was of industrialisation in the 1960-70s, a fact 
corroborated by the studies documenting the persistence of what is termed Singapore’s 
‘developmental state’ from the 1960s up to this day (Perry, Kong et al. 1997; George 2000; 
Rodan 2006). In other words, the role o f government in relation to the life sciences has been -  
in conformity with Singapore’s export-oriented economic model in place since the 1960s and 
under the guidance o f foreign experts such as Sydney Brenner7 — to attract the leading foreign 
multinational companies in the field to settle in Singapore by ‘provid[ing] a comprehensive and 
efficient net o f infrastructure’ (Economic Committee 1986:13) while leaving them to undertake 
‘the bulk of R&D activities’ (National Science and Technology Board 1991 :ii).
As with its efforts to industrialise after independence, the government has used the same set of 
strategies to fulfil its role as the planner and mobiliser of biomedical research: (1) plans; (2) the 
creation o f specialised agencies; (3) financial and technical assistance; (4) measures to develop 
the population; and (5) a world-class infrastructure. The first plan articulating policies to 
promote the life sciences was the already mentioned in the 1986 report o f the Economic 
Committee. It laid out the main strategies ‘to develop competence in selected new technologies 
and to move into high technology industries as one area for growth’ (1986:145). It was 
followed by a plethora of other plans which both reiterated and specified the principles 
outlined in the 1986 report: the Economic Development Board’s unpublished 1988 National 
Biotechnology Programme and 1989 National Biotechnology Master Plan', the Economic Planning 
Committee’s 1991 Strategic Economic Plan: Towards a Developed Nation; the 1991 Window of 
Opportunities: National Technology Plan; the 1996 National Science and Technology Plan — Securing Our
7 The use o f experts to know what constituted the appropriate infrastructure for biomedical research is, o f course, 
an another striking similarity to Singapore’s efforts to industrialize in the 1960-70s, when the government had 
enlisted industrialisation specialists such as A. Winsemius. Brenner started advising the Singapore government in 
the early 1980s, after meeting Lee Kuan Yew. He notably partook, together with Philip Yeo, in the foundation o f  
Singapore’s first research centre dedicated to the life sciences, the Institute Molecular and Cell Biology, in 1987. 
And, from 1991 onwards, he was a permanent member o f  the International Advisory Council to the 
NSTB/A*Star together with the then chairman o f GlaxoSmithKline, Sir Richard Sykes.
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Future-, the unpublished 2001 S & T 2005 Plan; the 2003 The Report of the Economic Committee: New 
Challenges, Fresh Goals — Towards a Dynamic City; and the 2006 Science and Technology 2006-2010 
Plan — Sustaining Innovation-Driven Growth, Singapore’s fourth and latest science and technology 
plan.
In a striking parallel to the establishment of the EDB in 1961 by the Development Plan, 1961- 
1964, all the plans enumerated above created a series o f ‘government agencies responsible for 
promoting R&D’ (National Science and Technology Board 1991:21), now regrouped in what is 
called the ‘National R&D framework’ (National Science and Technology Board 1996:44-45; 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006:26-29). Indeed, while during the early years, from 1986 to 
1991, the promotion of biomedical sciences was assumed principally by the EDB, new 
specialised organizations were created from the early 1990s onwards. Thus, in 1991, the 
National Science and Technology Board (now A*Star) was founded ‘to develop Singapore into 
a centre o f excellence in selected fields of science and technology’ (National Science and 
Technology Board 1991:ii). Funding bodies were also set up, such as the National Medical 
Research Council or the Biomedical Research Council. And, by 2005, a Research, Innovation 
and Enterprise Council had been established to oversee and ‘lead the national drive to 
promote research’ (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006:26).
Another series of measures contained in the various plans promoting biomedical sciences, 
were those related to financial and technical assistance for multinational companies — yet 
another symmetry with the 1961 development plan. These measures comprised, first of all, ‘tax 
incentives for R&D’ (Economic Committee 1986:149). One example was the ‘Pioneer Status 
Certificates’ granting ‘complete tax exemption;’ offered by the EDB since 1961 it was extended 
to cover enterprises undertaking R&D (National Science and Technology Board 1991:55-56). 
Second, there was ‘government funding for R&D,’ either as grants and loans or as investment 
in companies’ capital. An example of the former is the Research Incentive Scheme for 
Companies which allocates grants to enterprises to hire and train research scientists. An 
illustration o f the latter is Bio*One Capital, an organization founded in 1990 which can invest 
in foreign biotechnology or pharmaceuticals companies when advantageous for Singapore. 
Finally, there are a whole variety of technical assistance programmes generally run by A*Star 
and which comprise advice on financial assistance, business counselling and guidance on how 
to administer patents.
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Education
For the will to modernise, the population is understood as a key resource for economic 
development whose quality can be improved via different strategies. As Singapore’s Economic 
Planning Committee argued in a 1991 report:
‘The single m ost important factor towards achieving developed country status is enhancing 
Singapore’s m ost important resource, its people’ (Economic Planning Committee 1991:7).
Both this understanding of the population and such enhancement strategies can be found in all 
the plans promoting the life sciences in Singapore — a further indication of how the will to 
modernise is at the heart of the transformation of the city-state into a global biomedical hub. 
While the schemes for social development contained in the 1961 development plan were rather 
varied, the strategies to enhance the quality o f the population found in the plans relating to 
biomedicine focused primarily on education.8 This was a focus which informed all of 
Singapore’s economic diversification strategies from the late 1970s onwards, when the 
government identified the quality of the population in terms o f education, training and skills as 
a ‘fundamental requirement of economic growth’ and modernisation (Economic Committee 
1986:13). As Singapore’s Economic Committee argued in its 1986 report:
‘A country’s development cannot only be measured by its per capita GNP. [Rather,] the driving force 
[of development] lies in factors such as the education level o f  our population’ (Economic Committee 
1986:59).
In relation to the biomedical sciences the strategies to increase the educational profile of 
Singapore’s workforce consisted in four sorts o f measures (cf.: Economic Committee 1986; 
National Science and Technology Board 1991; National Science and Technology Board 1996; 
Ministry o f Trade and Industry 2006). First, it comprised measures to provide people with the 
knowledge and skills required for biomedical research so as to have a ‘critical mass o f R&D 
manpower’ (National Science and Technology Board 1991:35). This meant ‘expanding Masters 
and PhD programmes’ at existing universities, polytechnics and research centres (Economic 
Committee 1986:149), offering ‘scholarships and grants’ as well as ‘career counselling and 
guidance’ (National Science and Technology Board 1991:40-41). It also meant opening new
8 As discussed below, the strategies to improve the population’s educational profile generally consisted in 
improving the possibilities for education and training (more schools, better access, etc.). But, interestingly, from 
1983 to 1987, these measures where complemented with ‘a form o f social eugenics’ (Perry, Kong et al. 1997:85). 
Indeed, based on Lee Kuan Yew’s belief that intelligence was genetically based, measures were taken to encourage 
better-educated Singaporeans to reproduce so as to ensure that the population’s level o f competence would not 
decline. These measures included the promotion o f marriage between graduates as well as the pre-primary and 
primary school registration priority to graduate women with three or more children (cf. Perry, Kong et al. 
1997:88-91).
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specialised research institutes, such as the Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology, providing 
‘resources o f manpower, skills, technology, knowledge, and products and processes directed 
towards helping R&D activities undertaken by companies’ (Economic Planning Committee 
1991:72). Second, it also comprised measures to recruit foreign talents from abroad in order to 
both increase the numbers o f scientists and researchers in the population and to offer the rest 
of the population access to ‘role-models’ as well as to ‘knowledge and skills’ (National Science 
and Technology Board 1991:38).
Third, there were also measures to ‘re-orient’ the ‘education system’ so as to ‘allow for more 
creativity’ (Economic Committee 1986:118). Programmes were designed for students ‘to be 
encouraged from young to be more creative and [to] be given the opportunity to experiment 
and tinker’ (ibid. p. 149). Fourth, there were measures to create a ‘research and development 
culture,’ that is schemes to raise the population’s interest in science and its ‘awareness’ of the 
role o f research ‘for Singapore’s prosperity’ (National Science and Technology Board 1991:39). 
Similar to the nation-building activities o f the 1960s, these measures included: the creation of a 
‘young inventors award which promotes creativity and innovation among students and young 
Singaporeans;’ ‘science and technology quizzes, fora, seminars and workshops to promote an 
interest in science and technology among the young;’ ‘publicity campaigns to promote R&D 
careers ... among the young and the general public;’ the ‘profiling of local inventors and 
scientists on television;’ ‘science and technology films for the general public and students;’ as 
well as ‘the creation o f science and technology role models’ (National Science and Technology 
Board 1996:35).
The Technology Corridor <& Biopolis
The central place given to the notion of infrastructure in the promotion of the biosciences in 
Singapore represents not only another indication o f the way the will to modernise has driven 
and shaped the latter but it is also, as will become clear, fundamental to this chapter’s 
argument. Instead of the ‘industrial infrastructure’ of the 1960-70s, the plans for establishing a 
global life sciences hub in the city-state all contain strategies to build a ‘technological or 
technology infrastructure’ (Economic Planning Committee 1991; National Science and 
Technology Board 1991; National Science and Technology Board 1996). This infrastructure 
can only be understood in relation to the Singapore’s definition o f biomedical research as an 
engine of economic growth. In other words, it is an infrastructure that has to ‘meet the needs 
of an economy characterised by knowledge-intensive activities’ (National Science and 
Technology Board 1991:71); it has to provide a ‘dynamic and vibrant environment for R&D’
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which ‘will make it easy for foreign companies to re-locate R&D operations in Singapore’ 
(Ministry o f Trade and Industry 2006:52).
An important part of this infrastructure is a ‘physical infrastructure’ (Ministry o f Trade and 
Industry 2006:52) known as the ‘Technology Corridor’ (National Science and Technology 
Board 1991:71). Drawing its inspiration from similar ‘sciences cities’ built in Europe and North 
America, this ‘technopolis’ was conceptualised in the early 1990s and has been continually 
developed ever since (National Science and Technology Board 1991:71). Reminiscent of 
Jurong Industrial Estate in both its size and importance, this project aims, as most 
technopoles, to provide both a working and living space for ‘a closely knit community’ of 
‘researchers’ and others who ‘have the ability to exploit the commercial potential o f the 
research’ such as ‘industrialists, financiers and managers’ (National Science and Technology 
Board 1991:71-72). Situated on the South-West coast o f Singapore, the Corridor comprises 
most o f the city-state’s higher education establishments,9 countless research and business 
facilities10 as well as a series o f residential areas complete with retail facilities, schools, hospitals 
and other leisure and cultural amenities.11
Most o f the work space for biomedical research has been recently relocated in a purpose-built 
biomedical research hub named Biopolis (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006:53). Situated in 
the midst o f the Technology Corridor and housing most o f its research centres dedicated to 
the life sciences12 as well as the NSTB/A*Star, Biopolis is a nine-buildings complex which 
offers biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies laboratory and office space as well as all 
the equipment, services, and resources necessary to undertake biomedical research and 
development. These include among others: conference facilities, meeting rooms, operating 
theatres, necropsy rooms, structures for the cryo-preservation o f embryos and sperm, an 
academic library as well as the national tissue and DNA repository and the Singapore Tissue 
Network.
9 These include: the National University o f Singapore, the National University Hospital, Nanyang Technological 
University, Ngee Ann Polytechnic and Singapore Polytechnic. Also in the area is the Asian campus o f the French 
Business School IN SE A D .
10 These include Singapore’s Science Park, Vista XChange, Biopolis and, more recently, Fusionpolis. The latter 
three are facilities offered by One North, a recent 200 hectares development within the Corridor (cf. www.one- 
north.sgV
11 At first, the residential area was limited to Holland Village, an expatriate enclave north o f the Corridor. Lately, 
new residential areas are being built within the One North development project. For more on these residential 
areas, cf. National Science and Technology Board 1991, National Science and Technology Board 1996 and 
www.one-north.sg. Cf. also: Wong, K. W. and T. Bunnell (2006). "'New Economy' Discourse and Spaces in 
Singapore: A Case Study o f One-North." Environment and Planning A 38: 69-83.
12 These include: the Bioinformatics Institute, the Bioprocessing Technology Institute, the Genome Institute o f  
Singapore, the Institute o f Bioengineering & Nanotechnology and the Institute o f Molecular and Cell Biology.
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Soft Infrastructure
Besides this ‘physical’ infrastructure of the Technology Corridor, technological infrastructure — 
and this was a novelty compared to the industrial infrastructure in the 1960-70s — also included 
what was termed ‘soft infrastructure’ (Economic Planning Committee 1991; National Science 
and Technology Board 1991; Ministry of Trade and Industry 2006). This notion first appears 
in the 1991 Strategic Economic Plan of Singapore’s Economic Planning Committee, a plan 
strongly influenced by the thinking o f Harvard Business School Professor Michael E. Porter 
and, most notably, by his opus The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1989).13 The Strategic 
Economic Plan argued, as had the Economic Committee in its 1986 report, that Singapore’s 
development should not only be measured in quantitative terms such as the GNP per capita\ 
one had to complement this with qualitative measures. Put differendy, these plans argued that 
development or progress should not only be quantitative; it also had to be ‘qualitative’ or 
‘sustainable’ (Economic Planning Committee 1991:3). The government’s will to invest in soft 
infrastructure was a response to these demands for qualitative growth. As the Economics 
Planning Committee argued:
‘Singapore has spent the last 25 years investing heavily in physical infrastructure and today is rated 
one o f  the best in the world in this aspect. [In the future,] emphasis needs to be placed on soft 
infrastructure’ (Economic Planning Committee 1991:7).
Lee Kuan Yew makes a similar point in his recently published memoirs:
‘In material terms, we have left behind our Third World problems o f  poverty. However, it will take 
another generation before our arts, culture and social standards can match the First World 
infrastructure we have installed’ (Lee 2006:13).
The Strategic Economic Plan defined ‘soft infrastructure’ as ‘the elements o f a country’s economy 
and society, apart from resources and physical infrastructure, which make it dynamic’ 
(Economic Planning Committee 1991:50). In a language strongly reminiscent of Porter’s,14 
these elements are further described as ‘key competitive advantages’ of a nation which are not 
physical but relate instead ‘to certain social structures and systems’ (Economic Planning 
Committee 1991:54). Up until the late 1990s, the different plans and reports which promoted 
biomedical research in Singapore regularly listed three elements as constituting such non­
physical ‘key competitive advantages.’ These three elements were: (1) schemes relating to
13 The book is an empirical analysis o f the factors that make a nation competitive in the global economy. It was 
based on the study o f ten important trading nations among which figured Singapore
14 Compare this description with Porter’s notion o f ‘competitive advantages’ and his definition o f infrastructure as 
the elements ‘that affect competition, including ... cultural institutions’ (Porter 1989:75). Cf. also: Niskanen, W. 
A. (1991). "The Soft Infrastructure o f  a Market Economy." Cato Journal 11(2): 233-238.
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education aiming to provide human resources o f quality (cf. Economic Planning Committee 
1991:8; National Science and Technology Board 1996:38-41); (2) schemes purporting to 
encourage ‘the commercialisation o f technology, as well as building a culture of innovation and 
technology entrepreneurship’ (cf. National Science and Technology Board 1996:42); and (3) an 
improved, up-to-date intellectual property legal system compatible with international norms 
(Economic Committee 1986:150; National Science and Technology Board 1991:67).
The first two of these soft infrastructures have already been examined above as ‘measures to 
improve the quality o f the population’ and ‘technical assistance programmes,’ respectively. The 
notion that an intellectual property legal system was an important non-physical ‘key 
competitive advantage’ was recognised by the Economic Committee in its 1986 report. ‘The 
government should speedily ... improve the patent system [because] it will be difficult to 
promote R&D if firms face difficulty in patenting their inventions’ (Economic Committee 
1986:150). This advice was rapidly put into practice. In the early 1990s, the legal norms were 
updated and the Singapore Patent Office was reorganised in accordance with a proposal of the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (National Science and Technology Board 1991:67). 
By the end o f the decade, Singapore’s system to protect intellectual property had been aligned 
with other systems around the world, making it less costly and time-consuming then before.
Ethics Governance: a Necessary Component of a Modem Singapore
This section turns to the recent development of bioethical governance in the South-East Asian 
Republic and argues that it was the product o f the will relentlessly to modernise the country 
that has informed the Singaporean leadership since the early 1960s. It does so by showing that, 
for the Singaporean leadership, an ethical framework for biomedical research was equivalent to 
laboratories equipped with the latest equipment or an internationally compatible IP system: it 
was a (soft) infrastructure that was necessary to modernise and transform Singapore into a 
world-class hub for the life sciences. As the section further explains, at the heart of such an 
understanding was the assumption that an ethical framework for biomedical research modelled 
on internationally recognised standards would guarantee the credibility or good reputation of 
Singapore’s biomedical research around the world.
Before developing this argument, the section gives an outline of the development of bioethical 
governance in Singapore, from its emergence around the work of the National Medical Ethics 
Committee in the late 1990s to its consolidation through the activities o f the Bioethics
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Advisory Committee in the first decade o f the twenty-first century. It also shows that, unlike 
the situation in the UK, this development is not the product o f a will to respect human beings 
and protect them against the dangers o f modem medicine; indeed, modern medical ethics 
(from which such a will grew in the UK) was virtually unheard o f in the South-East Asian 
Republic until well into the 1990s.
Developing Ethics Governance in Singapore
The introduction o f the language, principles, institutions and procedures o f ethics governance 
began in 1996 under the auspices of the National Medical Ethics Committee (NMEC). 
Interestingly, the creation o f the NMEC by the Singaporean government in 1994 had nothing 
to do with either the medical use of human tissue or, more generally, biomedical research. 
Indeed, the NMEC was created, first o f all, to deal with passive euthanasia which had become 
an issue in Singapore in relation to the rising costs of medical services due to medicine’s 
increased capacity to prolong the dying process of the aged and the terminally-ill (Iyer 1998:24- 
25; cf. also: Ministry o f Health 1998:1-2 & 4-5). To solve this issue, the NM EC suggested the 
introduction o f a system whereby patients could sign ad hoc forms which directed doctors to 
withhold life-saving measures when they were at a terminal stage of their lives, a suggestion 
which was turned into law in 1997 (National Medical Ethics Committee 1995; cf. also: Ministry 
of Health 1998:4-5). Second, the NMEC was created by the Singaporean government as a 
mechanism to strengthen the discipline among the medical profession and reassert the 
importance o f what was known in the West as ‘traditional’ medical ethics (Ministry of Health 
1998:5-6). As the then Minister of Health George Yeo argued in his speech announcing the 
creation o f the NMEC:
‘The doctor-patient relationship is a special one and should always remain so. It [can be] . . .  likened 
[to the relationship] between parents and children ...  [or] the teacher-pupil relationship ...  To  
preserve the health o f  the doctor-patient relationship, we need clear sanctions by the Ministry o f  
Health and a strong ethical code among members o f the medical profession ...  [To that end,] the 
Ministry o f  Health has ...  established a [National] Medical Ethics Committee to advise us ... The 
Committee will be discussing the need for an explicit code o f  conduct for doctors and how medical 
ethics should be taught to medical students and maintained in the profession’ (Yeo 1994).
But, because o f its relatively open terms o f reference, the NMEC started to address questions 
relative to biomedical research in 1996 and introducing some of the categories, expertise and 
other ethical devices that make up ethics governance (cf. Ministry o f Health 1998:3). It did so 
in a series o f recommendations and guidelines whose ‘objective ... was to ensure that the 
rights and the welfare of [human] research subjects were protected’ (Ministry o f Health 
1998:8). The two most substantial texts were the NM EC’s own Ethical Guidelines on Research
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Involving Human Subjects and Singapore Guideline for Good Clinical Practice, proposed by the Ministry 
o f Health and approved by the NMEC.15 These two documents introduced a basic regulatory 
system protecting human subjects in research. Modelled on the standard ethical frameworks 
existing in developed countries, like the British Royal College of Physicians’ (1990a) Guidelines 
on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical Kesearch Involving Human Subjects, this system 
introduced new expressions, practices and institutions like ‘human being,’ the ‘principle of 
autonomy,’ ‘research ethics committees’ and ‘informed consent procedures,’ all borrowed from 
modem Western bioethics (Ministry of Health 1998:Annex IV /D ; Ministry o f Health 1999).
The NMEC did not only introduce Western-modelled ethical guidelines and their specific 
categories, institutions and other ethical technologies. But it also contributed to create a pool 
of local experts in modern research ethics by employing twelve members to research and 
decide on ethical issues. Some of them, like Professor o f Psychology John Elliott or Professor 
o f Law Terry Kaan, both from the National University o f Singapore, would go on to serve, 
later on, as member o f the Bioethics Advisory Committee. The work of the NMEC 
furthermore participated in giving modem Western bioethics a wider recognition among 
medical doctors and the wider population. Indeed, under the impulsion o f both the NMEC 
and the Ministry of Health, various initiatives were taken to raise the profile of medical ethics 
in Singapore. These included, among others: the introduction of courses in medical ethics at 
the Singapore Medical Association (SMA) and the National University of Singapore for 
practicing doctors and medical students respectively; the obligation for newly qualified doctors 
to take a pledge reminding them of their responsibilities and their duty to their patients, to 
mankind and the profession; the creation of the SMA’s ‘Medical Ethics Award’ for the best 
annual essay in bioethics; and the publication o f articles on medical ethics in The Straits Times.
The NM EC’s initial introduction of the language, principles, institutions and procedures of 
ethics governance was consolidated and systematised by the Bioethics Advisory Committee 
(BAC), which was created in December 2000. As the city-state’s first institution solely 
dedicated to biomedical research ethics, the task of the BAC has been ‘to examine the potential 
ethical, legal and social issues arising from research in the biomedical sciences in Singapore’ 
(Bioethics Advisor)7 Committee 2002b:l). As with the NMEC, the BAC has contributed to the 
production o f local expertise in bioethics and to educate the public about bioethical issues. So, 
for example, the creation o f the BAC in 2000 was followed by: the consolidation o f the local 
pool of experts in bioethics due to the BAC employing twelve experts on the topic; the
15 The other texts were short recommendations, such as the one forbidding experimental foetal tissue 
transplantation (except with a special authorisation) and the one banning the creation o f human babies through 
cloning techniques (cf. Ministry o f  Health 1998:6-12).
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organisation o f numerous public consultations ran by the BAC about a variety of ethical issues 
such as human stem cell research or genetic therapy; the organisation by the BAC of 
Singapore’s first international conferences in bioethics; the opening of the Singapore Medical 
Association’s Centre for Medical Ethics & Professionalism in 2001; the opening of Centre for 
Biomedical Ethics at the National University of Singapore headed by British bio-ethicist 
Alastair V. Campbell; and an ever increasing number o f articles on the subject o f bioethics in 
The Straits Times.
Aside from producing local expertise in bioethics and in educating the public about bioethical 
issues, the BAC’s also consolidated and systematised the basic research ethics framework set 
up by the NMEC through a series of five reports aimed to ‘protect human life and the rights 
and welfare o f the individual’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002a:i): the reports on the 
Ethical, Ijegal and Social Issues in Human Stem Cell Research and Human Tissue Research (2002a; 
2002b); the report on Research Involving Human Subjects (2004); the report on Genetic Testing and 
Genetic Research (2005); and the report on Personal Information in Biomedical Research (2007a). To 
start with, these reports revisit and improve the regulatory system protecting human research 
subjects put in place by the NMEC. So, for example, the BAC’s 2004 report on Research 
Involving Human Subjects, modelled on the latest Western research ethics frameworks, further 
modernises and upgrades the initial work done by the NMEC in its Ethical Guidelines on Research 
Involving Human Subjects. Furthermore, the five reports also go beyond a basic system to protect 
research subjects and also regulate, following current developments in modern Western 
bioethics, other more specific ethical issues. It is in this context that, in 2002, the BAC 
regulated the use o f human tissue and cells in biomedical research by publishing its two 
successive reports on the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in Human Stem Cell Research and on 
Human Tissue Research. This was the first time in post-independence Singapore that the use of 
human tissue in biomedical research was declared an ‘ethical issue’ and that an ad-hoc regulatory 
framework purporting to protect the rights and welfare o f individuals was proposed.
The Absence of Modem Medical Ethics in Singapore until the 1990s
Unlike the situation in the UK, the development o f ethics governance under the successive 
aegis of the NMEC and the BAC from the late 1990s onwards was not the product o f a will to 
respect human beings and protect them against the dangers of modern medicine. Indeed, 
modem medical ethics — the matrix from which such a will grew in the UK -  was virtually 
unheard o f in the South-East Asian Republic until well into the 1990s, as was the case
153
elsewhere in Asia (cf. Macer 1992; Morioka 1995; Sakamoto 1999).16 Modern medical ethics’ 
categories, assumptions, principles, forms o f expertise, institutions and practices were 
conspicuous by their absence (cf. Gwee 1981). There was no reference to ‘the rights of the 
individual’ or ‘the dignity o f the human being.’ There was no belief that modern medicine was 
dangerous or otherwise detrimental to humankind. There was no professional bio-ethicists, 
nor any bioethical committee responsible for identifying, assessing and solving ethical issues in 
relation to modern medicine and research. There were no procedure o f informed consent for 
human subjects undergoing medical experimentation. And ‘research ethics committees’ did not 
exist on the island (The Straits Times 1992; The Straits Times 1993). In an 1981 article 
published in the Singapore Medical Association Newsletter, A.L. Gwee, the Singapore MedicalJoumah 
first editor, summed up the situation by arguing that:
‘There has been great upheavals and controversies in medical ethics all over the world in the last 
twenty years ... [but] Singapore seems to have lived through this period o f  medical strife in a 
becalmed state, for there has been no important debates .. .  in the last twenty years locally within 
the profession .. .  [The] major problems in local medicine have to do with medical behaviour o f  a 
personal nature like advertisement, fees and malpractice. One may say therefore that the major 
medical controversies have passed by Singapore’ (Gwee 1981:1)
The claim that modem medical ethics was conspicuous by its absence in Singapore necessitates 
the following two caveats. First o f all, the concept o f modem research ethics was known to a 
small circle o f medical professionals on the island. Thus, for example, the Singapore Medical 
Journal, regularly contains a few scattered references to the latest developments of research 
ethics in the West (e.g.: Singapore Medical Journal 1960; Singapore Medical Journal 1974). But, 
these developments were never thought as directly relevant to Singapore until the 1990s. 
Second, the city-state has had what is called in the West ‘traditional’ medical ethics since its 
colonisation by the British in 1819. Indeed, traditional medical ethics were brought to 
Singapore by British physicians and surgeons who had come with the administrators, soldiers 
and merchants who established themselves in the colony from the 1820 onwards (cf. Lee 1978; 
Tan 1991). At the heart o f this traditional system o f ethics is the Singapore Medical 
Association’s (which was the Malaya branch of the British Medical Association before 
independence) ‘Ethical Code’ which is enforced by the Singapore Medical Council (cf. 
Singapore Medical Association 1982).
There are certainly many possible reasons for the absence of modem medical ethics in 
Singapore before the 1990s. But, one which has perhaps had a determining effect is the
1(5 Bioethics first emerged in Japan in the late 1980s, early 1990s before spreading progressively to other Asian 
countries, thanks notably to the work o f UNESCO. The creation o f the Asian Bioethics Association in 1995 in 
Japan was a turning point in the development o f bioethics in Asia.
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important role played by the notion of ‘Asian values’ in the thinking of Singapore’s governing 
elite until the late 1990s and the incompatibility of these values with some o f bioethics’ key 
concepts. The notion of ‘Asian values’ is the product o f the Singaporean leadership’s 
determination to actively combat the spread o f ‘unwholesome’ Western values in Singapore, a 
determination which has existed since independence (cf. Hill and Lian 1995:Chapter 8; Perry, 
Kong et al. 1997:Chapter 3; Hill 2000). This determination has to be understood in relation to 
the governing elite’s will to modernise and, more particularly, to its strategies to develop the 
population to ensure it fits Singapore’s modernisation project. In the 1960-70s, as already 
alluded to in this chapter’s second section, the education and nation-building programmes that 
made up these strategies sought to instil the population with values like respect for hard work, 
thrift, punctuality, responsibility and patriotism in order to mould it into a disciplined 
workforce and a strong nation (Chua 1995:Chapter 5; Hill and Lian 1995:Chapter 8; Perry, 
Kong et al. 1997:Chapter 3).
During the 1980s-90s, partaking in a movement that saw many South-East Asian countries 
articulate a national identity around the notion o f ‘Asian values,’ Singapore’s governing elite 
further developed these values and construed them as specifically ‘Asian’ (cf. Chua 
1995:Chapter 7; Hill and Lian 1995:Chapter 8; Perry, Kong et al. 1997:Chapter 3; Birch 1998; 
Hill 2000). Values like hard work, thrift and responsibility were not abandoned but augmented 
by a series of other values like the primacy o f the collective over society or the importance of 
the family which, it was argued, were specifically Asian and came from traditions such as 
Confucian Ethics. As it had been done in the 1960s-70s, these new ‘Asian values’ were 
inculcated into the population through a series of education and nation-building programmes 
which included: the introduction o f compulsory courses in religious studies; the creation of an 
Institute o f East Asian Philosophies to develop these values; and, in 1991, the establishment of 
a ‘national ideology’ composed of a ‘set o f Shared Values’ to which all Singaporeans should 
‘subscribe and live by’ (cf. Government of Singapore 1991).
Aside from instilling a certain set of desirable values, these different education and nation- 
building programmes also sought to halt the spread in the island o f undesirable values which, 
according to the Singapore leadership, had originated in the West and posed a threat to 
Singapore’s modernisation project. In the 1960-70s, these undesirable Western values ranged 
from 1960s student radicalism to anti-establishment attitudes and were symbolised, in the eyes 
of Singapore’s governing elite, by ‘the long-haired hippies with patched-up jeans and patched 
up souls’ (Hill and Lian 1995:188). The following extract from G oh Keng Swee’s 1976 lecture 
on ‘The Pitfalls of Western Intellectual Radicalism’ provides a good illustration:
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‘Our citizens have been assailed by many new and strange ideas and practices. There is the hippie 
cult, the cult o f  permissiveness, student radicalism, ideologies o f  the welfare state and anti­
establishment and anti-multinational company attitudes, to name a few. We have had to combat these 
ideas and practices because we believe that they are irrelevant to our situation and in some cases 
would be harmful to our interests’ (Goh 1977:164)
With the development of its ‘Asian values’ rhetoric during the 1980s-1990s, the Singaporean 
leadership slightly redefined the Western values it judged to be undesirable. It notably re­
focused its attacks on the notion o f individualism which was judged to carry excessive 
importance in the West and concentrated its forces in combating American and European 
concepts o f human rights which it saw as the symbol o f this excess (cf. Perry, Kong et al. 
1997:Chapter 3; George 2000:Chapter 3; Hill 2000; Thompson 2001; Chong 2004). It was only 
after the 1997-1999 Asian Financial Crisis that Singapore (together with many other Asian 
countries) abandoned its ‘Asian values’ rhetoric.
In contrast to its overt and systematic opposition to human rights, the Singapore government 
never explicitly judged modem medical ethics to be incompatible with ‘Asian values’ and 
therefore to constitute a Western value whose diffusion in Singapore was undesirable. 
Nevertheless, there are a couple of reasons to believe that Singapore’s ‘Asian values’ rhetoric 
did present an obstacle to the development o f bioethics in the Republic. First, bioethics’ 
Western origins together close relationship to both 1960s student radicalism (cf. Toulmin 
1988; Rothman 1990) and human rights discourses (e.g. Council o f Europe 1997; UNESCO 
2005) seem amply sufficient to qualify as an undesirable Western value. Second, as some 
scholars have argued, there are major incompatibilities between Asian values and some of 
bioethics’ key concepts which would present an important obstacle to its adoption by a 
country championing Asian values (cf. Sakamoto 1999; Chan and G oh 2000; Hattori 2002; Yu 
2002; Holden and Demeritt 2008). In particular, the primacy of the community and the family 
over the individual which is a cornerstone of Singapore’s Asian values is incompatible with 
bioethics’ emphasis on personal autonomy.
It is also noteworthy that the emergence o f bioethics in Singapore in the late 1990s coincides 
temporally with the country’s abandonment of the Asian values rhetoric. It would be wrong to 
interpret both events as signs o f a will of Singapore’s governing elite to democratise and 
liberalise the country. Indeed, as scholars have demonstrated, Singapore’s abandonment of the 
Asian values rhetoric in the late 1990s did not at all result in the democratisation of Singapore’s 
political structures or its adoption o f human rights (cf. Tan 2001; Lee 2005; Chua 2005a; Chua 
2005b; Rodan 2006). N or did Singapore’s abandonment o f the Asian values rhetoric stop its
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government from continuing to imbue its population with values such as the primacy of 
society over the individual or the importance of the family, as it did, for example, in its latest 
nation-building programme: Singapore 21: Together; We Make the Difference (cf. Government of 
Singapore 1999). But, the abandonment of the Asian values rhetoric certainly removed a series 
o f potentially glaring contradictions that would have existed if the Singapore government had 
promoted bioethics and Asian values at the same time.
Ethics Governance as Soft Infrastructure ’
Given the absence of modern medical ethics in Singapore until the mid-1990s, the 
development o f ethics governance in the Republic could not be the product of a will to protect 
human beings as it was in the UK. Instead, the development of bioethical logic in Singapore 
was the product of the will relendessly to modernise the country that has informed the 
Singaporean leadership since the early 1960s. This is demonstrated by the way the Republic’s 
leaders have consistendy seen ethics governance as a key element of the (soft) infrastructure 
that Singapore needs to build in order become a world-class hub for the life sciences. For 
them, bioethical governance is on a par with the setting up o f an IP system, the creation o f a 
culture of innovation or the construction of laboratories equipped with the latest equipment; 
all these elements of infrastructure are, for them, necessary steps in the constant modernisation 
of Singapore.
A good illustration o f this way of thinking is an article published in the Singapore MedicalJournal 
in 1999 in which the chairman of the governmental committee responsible to oversee clinical 
trials conducted in Singapore explains the aim and importance of the NM EC’s recendy 
adopted Singapore Guidelinefor Good Clinical Practice. For him, the ethical framework put in place 
by the Guideline is necessary ‘to strengthen [Singapore’s] infrastructure and build an [ethical] 
culture for clinical trials’ in order for ‘Singapore to function as a regional hub in Asia’ where 
foreign ‘pharmaceutical companies [are willing to] invest’ (Woo 1999:7). Another example, is 
the ministerial speech announcing the creation o f the BAC in December 2000. N ot 
insignificandy, the speech was given by Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo at a 
ceremony held by Shering-Plough for the launch of its new manufacturing plant for 
blockbuster drug Claritin — itself an important success for the government’s plans to turn the 
Island into a biomedical hub. In this speech, Yeo proceeded, after having duly welcomed 
Shering-Plough’s investments in the island, to remind the audience of the Republic’s aim to 
promote biomedical research and how it intends to do it:
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‘Singapore is committed to the long-term development of the Life Sciences as an important pillar of 
Singapore’s economy in the coming decades ... [and] we are putting in place the major building 
blocks needed for the development of the Life Sciences industry’ (Yeo 2000:2-3).
Many o f these ‘major building blocks’ were well-known and had been developed from 1986 
onwards. Yeo listed them as follows:
‘[1] build [ing] up a technology and research infrastructure;... [2] the availability of venture capital;... 
[3] re-orientate the entire education system [so as to] nurture local talent; ... [and 4] attract large 
numbers of foreign talents’ (Yeo 2000:2-3).
But, for the first time, Yeo added a new element to this list: ‘we must [now also] put in place 
an ethical framework to guide research’ (ibid. p.2). For Yeo, ethics governance had become 
one o f the ‘major building blocks’ whose establishment was necessary to transform Singapore 
into a world-class hub in the life sciences. While this understanding was repeated numerous 
times after that, the most telling confirmation o f this very particular understanding of research 
ethics is to be found in Singapore’s latest science and technology plan. The latter lists the 
Bioethics Advisory Committee and the ethical regulations for research it has put in place as a 
‘soft infrastructure’ or a part Singapore’s ‘world-class research infrastructure’ which should 
transform the island into a world-class hub for the biomedical sciences:
W orld-Class Research Infrastructure. Singapore has made significant progress in creating an 
attractive environment with high quality facilities to support research and technology activities ... 
that will make easy for foreign companies to locate R&D operations in Singapore. With good  
infrastructure support, Singapore hopes to ... position itself as the R&D gateway to Asia, through 
which companies can access the attractive markets in the region. [Singapore’s research infrastructure 
comprises:] A. The physical infrastructure: [1.] Biopolis, the centre o f  biomedical research in 
Singapore ...  with its scientific equipm ent... ; [2.] the Singapore Tissue Network, the national tissue 
and D N A  repository ...  B. The soft infrastructure: [1.] the Bioethics Advisory Committee ...; [2.] the 
National Advisory Committee for Laboratory Animal Research . . . ’ (Ministry o f  Trade and Industry 
2006:52-55).
PLthics Governance as Mechanism to Produce International Credibility
The reason why Singapore’s leaders understood ethics governance as a necessary piece of its 
‘world-class research infrastructure’ is because they identified ethics governance as a 
mechanism to ensure the ‘credibility’ or ‘good reputation’ o f Singapore’s research base (Woo 
1999:7; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2004:3; Elliott 2007; Lim 2007).17 Since it started 
promoting biomedical research in the mid-1980s, Singapore’s aim was to be, in the not too 
distant future, one of the best centres for the life sciences worldwide. This, o f course, meant
17 Power (2007) makes a similar point in relation to corporate ethics, arguing that private corporations have 
embraced voluntary systems o f ethics governance to improve their ‘reputation’ among the public.
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avoiding being labelled as a ‘new wild east’ (Elliott 2007) or a ‘renegade jurisdiction’ (Lim cited 
in Ong 2001) where scientists and companies of little repute and reliability would come and 
undertake unethical research o f substandard quality. Adopting and implementing a modem 
research ethics framework was deemed to be the best remedy against such a label. Professor 
Lim Pin, Chairman of the BAC and former deputy chairman o f the EDB, was explicit about 
that:
‘It became clear [in the late 1990s] that in order to be successful, we needed to have a good  
reputation. We needed credibility and therefore had to have an ethical framework for research. ... 
One fear for young developing countries wanting to succeed [like Singapore] is that in order to 
succeed they will do anything, including research deemed unethical elsewhere, and thus become 
identified as a [second-class] country .. .  We want to avoid that. We want to be internationally 
competitive. We want to be equal and ethics is a critical part in achieving this. It is essential’ (Lim 
2007).
In other words, ethics governance was understood as a mechanism which would guarantee the 
good reputation o f Singapore’s research base and thereby participate in establishing the island 
as a world-class hub for the life sciences. As the BAC declared while articulating its own 
mission:
“We hope that in establishing clear and transparent [ethical] rules, standards and procedures, the 
reputation o f  Singapore as a global centre o f  excellence in biomedical research will be upheld and 
strengthened’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2004:3).
The Ministry for Health and Transport, Dr. Balaji Sadasivan, made a similar point in his 
presentation o f the BAC’s guidelines to the Annual Diner o f the SMA:
‘The [ethical] framework for licensing, controlling and monitoring o f  biomedical research activities 
.. .  would strengthen our international reputation and standing as a research centre’ (Sadasivan 
2003:3).
The aim was not to render Singapore’s biomedical research credible to its own population. 
Indeed, unlike the UK, there had been no scandals or public outcries related to medical 
research like those exposed by Pappworth or those at Bristol or Alder Hey in Singapore (Tan 
2007). There was actually so litde interest in the topic among the population that many of the 
BAC’s scheduled dialogue sessions with the public had to be cancelled (Toh 2007). Rather, the 
aim of ethics governance was, in the eyes of the Singaporean leadership, to give Singapore’s 
biomedical hub a good reputation in relation to an international audience. In conformity with 
the city-state’s export-oriented economic model, this audience was composed by all those that 
were deemed necessary to create a thriving biomedical industry in Singapore. These were, first 
o f all, foreign multinational biotechnological and pharmaceutical companies, for which an
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ethical framework for research was deemed to be an advantage (Pereira 2006; Sunder Rajan 
2007). This was a fact well understood by those in charge in the Singaporean government. 
Thus, for example, while discussing the Singapore Guidelinefor Good Clinical Practice, the chairman 
o f Singapore’s council overseeing clinical trials argued that an ethical framework for research 
conferred the city-state ‘an international reputation’ which would bring about ‘giant 
pharmaceuticals [to] invest in Singapore,’ thereby allowing the latter ‘to capture the global 
market’ (Woo 1999:7). Talented overseas researchers were the other, important part of the 
targeted audience. Indeed, it was assumed by those in charge in the Singaporean government 
that no gifted foreign scientist would want to risk his or her career by being associated with a 
country of low repute (Elliott 2007; cf. also Pereira 2006:112).
Singapore’s fear o f and wish to avoid being labelled a ‘new wild east’ is related to existing 
discourses which have denounced and tried to expose the ‘outsourcing’ o f ethically dubious 
biomedical research from Europe and the USA to countries with more ‘liberal attitudes’ in 
these matters (cf. Petryna 2005a; Petryna 2005b; Petryna 2006). Although Singapore has not 
been the primary target of these discourses, the city-state has also received its share of negative 
publicity. Articles have appeared in major Western media outlets as well as in academic 
journals condemning Singapore as ‘too liberal’ in terms o f research ethics. These included 
among others: ‘Biomedical Science: a Liberal Regime,’ published in the Far Eastern Economic 
Review (2003); ‘Singapore Sweetens the Pills,’ published in The Guardian (2004); ‘A Candy Store 
for Scientists,’ published in the Eos Angeles Times (2004); ‘Asia is Stem Cell Central,’ published 
in Businessweek (2005); and ‘Singapore Acts as Haven for Stem Cell Research,’ published in The 
New York Times (2006). As their titles often give away, the critique in these articles is that the 
city-state lacks adequate modern bioethical regulations or, when the existence o f guidelines is 
acknowledged, that these solely serve as a cover-up and that any type of research is therefore 
possible in Singapore (Pereira 2006:112). The Singaporean leadership has always been keen to 
dismiss this critique, setting up a modem research ethics framework, constantly improving it 
and insisting that it is no smokescreen.
The way Singapore handled the case of Professor Shovron in 2003 is illustrative of these 
efforts. Shovron, a prominent British scientist lured to Singapore in 2000 and installed as 
director of its National Neuroscience, was accused by patients o f wrongdoings in late 2002, 
notably taking blood samples without proper consent. Singapore’s reaction was swift. First of 
all, Shovron was sacked after an investigation conducted by the Singapore Medical Council 
judged him culpable of the wrongdoings he had been accused of. Furthermore, the rules 
relative to research committees were tightened up with the publication o f the BAC’s Research
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Involving Human Subjects — GuidelinesforlRBs in 2004. Finally, government agencies in tandem 
with the state-controlled media issued a series o f statements condemning Shovron as a 
‘cowboy’ and arguing that the fact that the issue had been dealt with ‘swiftly and decisively’ 
illustrated ‘the ability o f the relevant authorities ... to identify shortcomings and further 
strengthen the regulatory process’ (Chang 2003). As Professor Lim Pin argued, Shovron was 
one o f these ‘people trying to do things here [in Singapore] that they know they will not be 
able to do in their own home country’ (cited in Chang 2003). One ‘cannot get away with [such] 
shortcuts in Singapore,’ he continued, ‘[because] we are very protective and jealous about our 
reputation’ (cited in Enserink 2003:233)
Importing bioethical Governance from the West
Given that, for Singapore, the aim of having a bioethical dispositzfsvas to promote its credibility 
and reputation among an international audience, the categories, principles, expertise, 
institutions and procedures that made up this dispositifh^d to conform to globally recognized 
standards as like the rest o f Singapore’s infrastructure from laboratories to airports and IP law 
systems. This was explicidy stated by the Singaporean government. For example, in his speech 
announcing the creation of the BAC, Yeo argued that Singapore ‘must have ethical standards 
for research which stand up to international scrutiny’ (2000). Similarly, the BAC argued in its 
reports that:
‘[We have to] ensure the harmonisation o f  our laws with accepted international best practice ...
[from] the leading jurisdictions around the world’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:2-3);
‘The harmonisation o f  our national ethics governance framework with that o f  leading research
jurisdictions is o f  national strategic importance’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2004:29).
In other words, Singapore had to import a whole system o f ethical values — ethics governance 
and the matrix in which it had developed, modern Western bioethics -  from Europe and 
North America. Indeed, the internationally recognised ethical frameworks that Singapore 
sought to emulate were those that had been developed in ‘scientifically advanced countries’ like 
the USA or the UK (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2007a:9; cf. for example: Ministry of 
Health 1998:Annex IV /D ; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002a: 14-20). O f course, there was 
room, within this process o f import, for minor modifications or refinements. In relation to the 
ethical regulation o f stem cell, for example, the BAC recommended the adoption of the UK 
ethical framework ‘subject to modifications as necessary for Singapore as well as refinements
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found in regulatory systems in other countries’ (2002a:32; cf. also: Elliott 2007; Lim 2007).18 
But, these minor modifications and refinements aside, the task for Singapore was to import a 
whole system of ethical values from the West. This was in stark contrast to Singapore’s 
promotion o f Asian values and its opposition to undesirable Western norms like human rights 
that has informed the country’s policies since independence.
Importing a whole system o f ethical values meant, first o f all, that Singapore had to address all 
the ‘ethical issues’ deemed o f importance to this international audience. To do so, Singapore 
had to monitor existing international recognised ethical dispositifs around the world and make 
sure that its own dispositif was up to date. It is therefore no surprise that the list o f topics 
tackled by both the NMEC and the BAC — research on human beings; clinical trials; cloning; 
genetic testing; etc. — is a carbon copy of the catalogue o f issues addressed by bioethical 
commissions in other developed countries and by international organisations like UNESCO. 
Research using human tissue was one of these issues that Singapore had to address to ensure 
its bioethical dispositif was up-to-date. Indeed, human research tissue, including stem cell 
research, was an important topic debated in many developed countries at the start o f the 
twenty-first millennium and Singapore’s survey o f the development of bioethics worldwide 
could not have failed to register this. It was therefore only a matter of when, not if, the BAC 
would address the medical and scientific use of human tissue. As a matter of fact, it did so 
rather rapidly, addressing the issue in its two first reports (2002a; 2002b).
N ot only did Singapore have to address all problems of ethics deemed to be of importance to 
an international audience o f pharmaceutical companies and medical researchers. It also had to 
do so using the language, principles, forms of expertise, procedures and technologies that were 
used in internationally recognised bioethical dispositifs and with which the international audience 
which Singapore targeted was familiar with. It is therefore unsurprising that the BAC described 
‘human tissue banking and human tissue research’ as well as ‘stem cell research’ as presenting a 
series o f ‘ethical, social and legal issues’ that had to be investigated by experts in bioethics 
organised in a bioethical committee like the BAC (2002a:i; 2002b:i). It is also therefore to be 
expected that human tissue research was described by the BAC as an activity fraught with 
dangers against which ‘all human beings’ had to be protected in the name o f ‘respect for 
human life’ and ‘respect for the human body’ itself (2002a:i; 2002b:35; 2004:24-27). Similarly, it 
is unsurprising that the BAC would suggest, in order to solve these ethical issues, the adoption 
o f ‘an ethical and legal regulation’ that would ‘provide a firm foundation for the proper and
18 To this day, the BAC has never suggested any such ‘modifications’ or ‘refinements.’ But, as discussed in chapter 
6 in relation to informed consent, one can o f course find some minor differences in practice between the 
Singaporean system o f ethics governance and those o f ‘scientifically advanced countries.’
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ethical governance of human tissue research in Singapore’ (2002b:8). Likewise it is to be 
expected that Singapore’s ethical framework would feature the principle o f informed consent 
and institutional review boards (cf. 2002a; 2002b; 2004). In short, given Singapore’s 
understanding of ethics governance as a mechanism to guarantee its good reputation to an 
international audience, it is unsurprising that the Republic’s bioethical dispositif is, as described 
in detail in the first section of this chapter, so strikingly similar to the one in place in the UK.
To import this Western system of ethical values, the Singaporean government did two things. 
First, it surveyed, monitored and adopted the ethical standards put forward by key developed 
countries and recognised international organisations. In the words of George Yeo, Singapore 
has to ‘monitor closely’ and take up ‘the ethical standards adopted by leading Life Sciences 
research centres in the world’ (2000). This pattern o f review and reproduction is discernible in 
both the work o f the NMEC and the BAC. So, for example, the NMEC 1997 'EthicalGuidelines 
on Research Involving Human Subjects followed very closely the corresponding regulation in place 
in Canada and the UK, notably the Royal College o f Physicians’ (1990a) Guidelines on the Practice 
of Ethics Committees in Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (Ministry o f Health 1998; Tan 
2007). Similarly, the BAC modelled itself and its reports on comparable organisations and 
reports published by recognised international organisation (UNESCO; WHO) or key Western 
countries (USA; UK; Australia; Sweden; Japan). Interestingly, the most influential reports 
surveyed by the BAC to set up its bioethical dispositif were the ones from the UK. In relation to 
stem cells, for example, a domain where the BAC (2002a:32) explicitly adopted ‘the UK model’ 
as its ‘basis model,’ the BAC’s recommendations were strongly influenced by the following UK 
reports: the 1984 Report of the Committee of Inquiry in Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
chaired by Mary Warnock; the 1989 report of the Polkinghorne Committee on Research Use 
of Fetuses and Fetal Material; and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 2000 report on Stem Cell 
Therapy: the Ethical Issues (cf. Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002a:Chapter 6). Similarly, in 
relation to other human tissues, the BAC’s recommendations explicitly followed those set out 
by the UK Medical Research Council in its 2001 Operational and Ethical Guidelines on Human 
Tissue and Biological Samples for Use in Research (cf. Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:21-22, 
29 & 33).
Second, as already mentioned, Singapore also hired and consulted numerous international 
experts in bioethics. So, for example, the Bioethics Advisory Council has an ‘International 
Panel o f Experts’ manned with four experts from Canada, the USA and the UK and whose 
function is, among others, to ‘align Singapore with international best practice’ (Bioethics 
Advisory Committee 2007). These four experts are: Professor Martin Bobrow, a British
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geneticist and member of the UK’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics; Professor Barbara 
Knoppers, a Canadian medical law and ethics specialist and member of UNESCO’s 
International Bioethics Committee; Dr. Thomas Murray, President of the New York-based 
Hastings Centre and one of the first bioethics research centres; and Professor Bernard Lo, 
Director o f the Program in Medical Ethics at the University o f California, Los Angeles. A 
further foreign bioethical expert hired by Singapore was British bioethics pioneer A.V. 
Campbell who was became director o f NUS’ Centre for Biomedical Ethics and member of the 
BAC.
Conclusion
This chapter started by showing how influential ethics governance has become in thinking 
about, problematising and administrating the medical use o f the human body in Singapore 
today. It did so by giving an account o f the increasing number from 2000 onwards of: articles 
on the topic in Singapore’s main daily, The Straits Times', statements from government officials 
and international ethics experts on the rise of bioethics in the South-East Asian Republic; 
scholarly articles authored by lawyers, doctors, philosophers and others on the issue; and 
reports and guidelines relative to the ethics of the medical use o f human tissue. From there, 
the chapter went on to examine some key concepts, forms o f expertise, procedures, 
institutions and subjectivities that characterise the Singaporean version of bioethical 
governance. It showed, in particular, how strikingly similar this version is from the one in place 
in the United Kingdom.
This discussion provided the basis to look backwards and explore the conceptual, material and 
political conditions that have made it possible for ethics governance to become predominant 
in Singapore from the 2000s onwards. Put differently, the chapter went on to explore some of 
the beliefs, values, forms o f expertise, institutions, principles and technologies that have made 
it possible, today, to conceptualise the medical use o f human tissue as creating a series of 
‘ethical, legal and social issues’ necessitating ‘ethical and legal guidelines.’ The chapter argued 
that although Singapore’s bioethical dispositif is almost identical to the one in place in the UK, 
their conditions o f possibility are very different. In particular, it showed that the will to respect 
human being and protect them against the dangers o f m odem  medicine that has been 
increasingly prevalent in the UK from the 1960s onwards did not play any significant role in 
Singapore until the turn of the century. Indeed, as the chapter further showed, modem medical 
ethics (the matrix from which this will to respect human beings grew out in the UK) was
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virtually unheard o f in the South East Asian Republic until well into the 1990s. Instead of 
being the product of a will to respect human beings like in the UK, the chapter argued that 
development of ethics governance in Singapore is the result o f a will to relendessly modernise 
the City-State that has characterised the thinking of the Singaporean leadership ever since 
independence in 1959.
To demonstrate this argument, the chapter first described this will to modernise to ceaselessly 
modernise the country when it was first articulated in the ten years or so that followed 
independence. It showed, in particular, that this will to modernise comprised: a notion of 
modernity understood as primarily economic or industrial; an understanding that its was for 
the government to make this modernity happen by attracting foreign multinational industries; 
and the belief that in order to attract these industries, the government had notably to build a 
world-class industrial infrastructure. Then the chapter explained how this will to modernise has 
informed and driven Singapore’s attempt to turn the city-state into a world-class hub for the 
life sciences from 1985 onwards. It notably showed how biomedical research became 
conceptualised as the engine of economic development replacing low-added value industry. It 
also showed how the meaning of infrastructure was transformed from the elements necessary 
to support industrialisation to the physical and intellectual components to enable the 
emergence o f a knowledge-based economy. Finally, the chapter explained how ethics 
governance was developed as one element of this infrastructure, alongside the construction of 
Biopolis and the set up of a modem IP system. It also showed how this understanding of 
ethics as a key element of Singapore’s infrastructure for its biomedical economy rests on the 
assumption that ethics governance is vital in guaranteeing one’s international reputation. This 
link between ethics and reputation elucidate in turn the strange similarity between the British 
and Singaporean bioethical dispositifs. Indeed, to reassure an international audience, Singapore 
had to use the same language, expertise, institutions and procedures that are internationally 
recognised as standard.
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Chapter 6
A Human Being Graced with a Capacity to Reflect 
and Decide — Devising a N ew  Figure of the Citizen
Chapters 4 and 5 analysed the different conceptual, material and political conditions that make 
it possible to conceptualise the medical use o f human tissues as an ethical problem in both the 
United Kingdom and Singapore today. The present chapter builds on these insights and 
explores how the different principles, forms o f expertise, institutions and procedures that 
make up bioethical governance reconfigure the ways in which we understand ourselves and 
others as subjects and citizens. In other words, it examines how the different grids of 
intelligibility, technologies and authorities that comprise the bioethics dispositif tee. overflowing 
and transforming our modes of being. In order to do so, this chapter focuses on a key element 
o f bioethical governance: the principle of informed consent and the numerous strategies, 
procedures and ethical technologies o f government devised to operationalise it.
Before exploring how bioethical governance and, more particularly informed consent, 
reconfigure modern subjectivities and forms o f citizenship, the chapter offers an introductory 
account o f the concept of informed consent. Significandy, it situates this concept within 
bioethical governance, explaining how it is both an ethical principle and a series o f ethical 
technologies that seeks to ensure that human beings are respected and protected from the 
dangers relative to the collection and medical use o f human tissue. It also shows that informed 
consent has become a cornerstone o f ethics governance. One sign of the importance that 
informed consent has gained within bioethical governance today is the ever increasing number 
of texts that recommend its application, explain its importance and functioning and/or discuss 
the ways in which it should be operationalised.
Having given a description of the principle of informed consent and its key role within 
bioethical governance, this chapter analyses the ways in which the principle o f informed 
consent and the ethical technologies through which it is operationalised reconfigure modern 
subjectivities and forms o f citizenship. Taking its cue from Hacking’s (2002) essay ‘Making Up 
People’ and Rose’s (1996c; 1999b) analysis o f the psy-sciences, the chapter argues that 
informed consent is articulated around a particular figure o f the subject whose reality it
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presupposes and which, at the same time, it helps to bring into existence. This figure o f the 
subject is that o f the human being capable of reflecting and deciding on his or her own 
existence and body. On the one hand, this figure o f the human being is, according to the 
literature on informed consent, how people already are in reality. In other words, this particular 
concept o f the subject is, according to this literature, a natural given that has to be protected 
against the dangers o f modern medical science through the principle o f informed consent and 
the different techniques that operationalise it. O n the other hand, the descriptions of this 
figure of a human being able to reflect and decide that one finds in the literature on informed 
consent participate in the construction of this particular subject by creating a sphere of 
possibilities for people to think and interact accordingly. The construction of this subject is 
further reinforced by the ethical technologies through which the bioethical literature 
operationalises the principle of informed consent. Indeed, these technologies expand and 
consolidate the sphere of possibilities to act as a human being capable to reflect and decide by 
ensuring that this concept of the subject can be enacted and is respected in the rapports 
between researchers and research subjects.
To substantiate this argument, this chapter examines, first o f all, the way the literature on 
informed consent portrays the human being as ‘a person’ who is ‘able to think, act and 
communicate.’ More specifically, it describes how these texts conceive this person and his or 
her particular capacity: its different dimensions; its development and possible loss; and the 
methods to assess its presence or absence. Second, this chapter also examines how these same 
texts portray informed consent as a means to transform the relationship between the medical 
researcher and the research subject (‘the doctor-patient relationship’) so as to enable the latter 
to be a person that thinks and acts about his or her life and body. It shows in particular how 
the literature on informed consent seeks to eliminate the paternalistic ethos around which this 
relationship was articulated and which negated the ‘patient as person.’ It also shows how this 
literature aims to rebuild the rapport between doctor and patient as a ‘process of 
communication’ where the patient is given time, space and resources to think and decide.
The argument made in this chapter has to be qualified in two respects. Firsdy, the figure of the 
human being capable to reflect and decide on his or her own existence is not a recent concept, 
nor is it particular to bioethical governance. Indeed, scholars have showed that this 
understanding o f the person has a long genealogy in the West and has been both assumed by 
and brought into existence through a wide set o f practices such as marriage, ownership and 
autobiographical writing (e.g. MacFarlane 1978; Carrithers, Collins et al. 1985; Taylor 1989; 
Mascuch 1997). By being articulated around this same figure of the subject, informed consent
167
and, more generally, bioethical governance partake in and further strengthen these pre-existent 
and widespread cultural assumptions about personhood. Secondly, while the bioethical 
literature on informed consent certainly creates a sphere of possibilities in which people can 
act as human beings able to reflect and decide, this does not mean that people will effectively 
do so in reality. On the contrary and as medical ethnographers have extensively documented 
(e.g.: Corrigan 2003; Busby 2004; Geissler 2005; Hoeyer 2007), people often do not conform 
to the descriptions of human beings and human actions found in the bioethical literature on 
informed consent.
As discussed in chapter 5, the consequence o f Singapore’s understanding of bioethical 
governance as a mechanism to produce international credibility is that the Republic’s system of 
ethics governance is very similar to the one in place to the United Kingdom. This resemblance 
extends to the way the principle of informed consent is defined and operationalised in both 
countries. For a long time, informed consent, because o f its emphasis on the individual or the 
person, was seen as antithetical to Singapore’s authoritarian political culture and to its rhetoric 
on Asian values which held both the community and family over the individual (cf. Yu 2002; 
Holden and Demeritt 2008). But, with the adoption of bioethical governance from the late 
1990s onwards, informed consent has been taken on and implemented by the Singaporean 
government (e.g.: Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5; Bioethics Advisory 
Committee 2002b:23-29; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2004:27; Bioethics Advisory 
Committee 2007a:23-37). This is the case, even though the government has warned, through 
the Bioethics Advisory Committee, that ‘the value o f free choice’ which underpins informed 
consent ‘does not supersede all other values in [Singaporean] society’ (2007a:26). As with most 
of bioethical governance’s other rules, institutions and procedures, the notion of informed 
consent that Singapore has adopted and implemented is very similar to the one existing in the 
UK. Given this similarity, this chapter explores the ways in which informed consent 
reconfigures modem subjectivities and citizenship in the UK and Singapore at the same time, 
drawing its examples from both countries. Where there are marked and relevant differences, 
these are noted and explained.
Informed Consent and its Importance within Bioethical Governance
Informed consent, as it has already been alluded to in chapters 4 and 5, plays an important part 
within bioethical governance in both the United Kingdom and Singapore. To start with, it is 
one of the principles found in the different ethical codes that regulate the use of human tissue
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in medical research in the two countries. For example, Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory 
Committee listed ‘informed consent’ as one o f the ‘governing ethical principles’ guiding the 
conduct o f research with human tissue (2002b:33-34). Likewise, the Royal College of 
Physicians’ Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees identifies ‘consent’ as a ‘fundamental 
principle’ for the ‘storage and use of human bodies, body parts, organs and tissues’ for medical 
research (Royal College of Physicians 2007:52; cf. also chapters 5 & 7). There are coundess 
other similar examples (e.g.: Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1995:Chapter 6; Ministry of Health 
1998:Annex IV /D ; Medical Research Council 2001a:Chapter 6; Human Tissue Authority 
2006a; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2007:Paragraph S.8).
As an ethical principle, informed consent requires scientists wanting to collect and use human 
body parts in medical research to inform the potential donors about why they want to do that 
and how they will proceed. Furthermore, it also requires them, after having adequately 
informed the potential donors, to obtain their permission before collecting and using their 
body parts. For example, Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee lays down that 
researchers working with human tissue ‘have an obligation to ensure that valid and appropriate 
consent to the donation [of the tissue] is obtained’ (2002b:23). A valid and appropriate consent 
means, first o f all, that the consent is ‘informed,’ i.e. that ‘sufficient information on choices and 
potential consequences’ is given to the potential donor (ibid.). Furthermore, it means that 
consent should be ‘free,’ i.e. that it is the product o f the ‘unfettered voluntary exercise of free 
will’ (ibid.). Similarly, the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority sets out that 
all people donating their reproductive tissues for research have to be ‘provided with adequate 
information including details o f all the risks’ by the scientists planning the research (2006:6). 
Furthermore, these people have to ‘be free from coercion, pressure or manipulation’ when 
deciding whether or not to donate their reproductive tissues to research (ibid.).
Informed consent is not just an abstract principle; it is also made up of numerous types of 
ethical technologies that have been set up, in both the UK and Singapore, to realise the 
principle in practice. There are, first o f all, what I have termed guidance mechanisms: detailed 
directives and other practical guidance addressed to either researchers or potential donors to 
help them transform the principle of informed consent into everyday practice. These include 
guides for researchers to assess whether potential donors have the capacity to consent (e.g. 
British Medical Association and The Law Society 2004); directives for researchers about who 
and how one should obtain consent (e.g.: General Medical Council 1998; Ministry of Health 
1998:Annex IV /D ; Royal College o f Pathologists 2001; Medical Research Council 
2001a:Chapter 6; National Cancer Centre 2002:Paragraph B.3; NUS Institutional Review
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Board 2005b; Human Tissue Authority 2006a; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
2007:Paragraph S.8; Medical Research Council 2007; Royal College of Pathologists 
2007:Chapter 5); and directives for potential donors about how one should be treated by 
researchers (e.g.: Department o f Health 2001 d; Consumers for Ethics in Research 2003a; 
Consumers for Ethics in Research 2003b).
Secondly, there are what I have called assistance mechanisms: devices that assist researchers to 
realise a particular action required by the principle o f informed consent. These include patient 
information sheets that help researchers give the necessary information to potential donors 
(e.g.: Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D ; NUS Institutional Review Board 2005b; Human 
Tissue Authority 2006a: 19; Royal College of Pathologists 2007:41-42) and the use o f 
translators when the potential donor does not speak the same language as the researcher (e.g.: 
Medical Research Council 2001 a: 17; Human Tissue Authority 2006a: 17; Royal College o f 
Pathologists 2007:42-43). Thirdly, there are what I have termed monitoring mechanisms: 
devices that control that researchers are effectively abiding by the principle of informed 
consent. These include: institutional forms like research ethics committees or regulatory 
agencies (e.g.: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority; Human Tissue Authority), 
which have to ensure through licensing procedures and inspections that researchers using 
human tissue fulfil consent requirements (cf. Ministry of Health 1998:Annex IV /D ; Bioethics 
Advisory Committee 2004; Human Tissue Authority 2006a; Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority 2007; Royal College of Physicians 2007); and record-keeping systems 
like written consent forms that can document that consent requirements have been fulfilled 
(e.g.: Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D ; NUS Institutional Review Board 2005b; Human 
Tissue Authority 2006a:20-21).
As the other ethical principles and technologies that make up bioethical governance in both 
the UK and Singapore, informed consent is understood as a way to solve some of the ethical 
issues that arise from the collection and medical use o f human tissue. It is, in other words, a 
way to ensure that human beings are respected and protected against the dangers linked to the 
use o f the human body in medical research. For example, Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory 
Committee argued that ‘the fundamental objective of a system o f ethics governance,’ which 
includes ‘free and informed consent’ as one of its ‘core principles,’ is to ‘promote respect for 
all human beings and protect their health and rights’ (2004:24-26). Similarly, the London-based 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics argued that ‘consent of those from whom tissue is taken’ is an 
‘important consideration’ in ensuring ‘respect for the human body and respect for human 
dignity’ (1995:40). More succinctly, the United Kingdom’s Royal College of Physicians
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explained that ‘the principle of consent is based upon a doctrine of respect for persons’ 
(2007:39).
As it has been widely argued, informed consent is a key constituent o f ethics governance, both 
in the United Kingdom and in Singapore, but also elsewhere. First, as alluded to in chapter 2, 
the key role played by informed consent has been widely acknowledged and criticised by social 
scientists working on bioethics and the ethical governance of the life sciences (e.g.: Wolpe 
1998; Scheper-Hughes 2001b; Corrigan 2003; Jasanoff 2005:Chapter 7; Sunder Rajan 2006; 
Salter and Salter 2007). Second, the importance is also explicitly recognised by experts in 
bioethics in both the United Kingdom and Singapore. For example, in his Foreword to a book 
on Informed Consent in Medical Research, Richard Smith, the then editor of the British Medical 
Journal, argued that ‘with every day that goes by the issue of informed consent becomes more 
central’ (2001 :xi). Similarly, the philosophers, lawyers and doctors who compose Singapore’s 
Bioethics Advisory Committee and who drafted its report on Human Tissue Research argued that 
‘free and informed consent is the cornerstone o f the legal and ethical legitimacy and validity of 
a gift o f human tissue intended for research’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:23). 
Likewise, the House o f Lords, in its report on Stem Cell Research argued that ‘informed consent 
is especially important in all research on tissues of human origin’ (2002:Paragraph 8.21). There 
are plenty o f other similar examples (e.g.: Faulder 1985:2; O'Neill 2002:2; O'Neill and Manson 
2007:1-2) and the fact was further confirmed to me in interviews by many experts in the field 
(e.g.: Campbell 2007; Elliott 2007; Knoppers 2007).
The importance o f informed consent within bioethical governance is furthermore underlined 
by the ever increasing number o f texts in both the UK and Singapore that discuss the notion, 
arguing its importance, recommending its application and /or explaining its functioning and 
how it can be operationalised. These texts include, first o f all, reports of bioethics committees 
or other similar bodies that discuss the importance o f informed consent in medical research in 
general or in relation to the collection and medical use o f bodily tissues in particular. Examples 
are numerous: the Mary Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation andEmbryology (1985 [1984]:16 & 
66-67); the Institute of Medical Ethics’ report on Medical Research with Children (Nicholson 
1986:216-223); the Royal College of Surgeons’ reports on Research on Healthy Volunteers 
(1986:11-12) and on Research Involving Patients (1990b: 15-29); the John Polkinghome Report on the 
Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material (1989:Chapter 6); the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ 
reports on Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (1995:Chapter 6) and Stem Cell Therapy: the 
Ethical Issues (2000b:9-10); the National Medical Ethics Committee’s Ethical Guidelines involving 
Human Subjects (Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D ); the report of the Bristol Royal
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Infirmary Inquiry (2001:Chapter 23); the report o f the Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry 
(2001:Chapter 11); the reports o f Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee on the Ethical, 
Social and Legal Issues in Stem Cell Research (2002a:22-23, 30 & 33-34), Human Tissue Research 
(2002b:23-29) and Research Involving Human Subjects (2004:24-27 & 39-40); the United 
Kingdom’s Department o f Health’s report on Human Bodies, Human Choices (2002:Section 6); 
and the House of Lords’ report on Stem Cell Research (2002:Paragraph 8.21).
Aside from these reports there is also a series o f scholarly books and articles on the topic of 
informed consent in relation to either medical research or, more specifically, human tissue 
research written by philosophers, doctors and lawyers. These include, among many others: the 
section on ‘The Principle o f Valid Consent’ in Maurice Pappworth’s (1969 [1967]:231-235) 
Human Guinea Pigs; G.R. Dunstan and Mary J. Seller’s (1983) Consent in Medicine; Carolyn 
Faulder’s (1985) Whose Body is It? The Troubling Issue of Informed Consent, Ranaan Gillon’s (1985j) 
Consent, the chapter on ‘Respect for Persons’ in John Harris’ (1985:Chapter 10) The Value of 
Life; Stella R. Quah’s (1989) The Patient’s Right to Know, Mary Wamock’s (1998) Informed Consent 
— A. Publisher’s Duty; David Chan’s (2000) The Doctor-Patient Relationship; the chapters on 
‘consent’ in Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb’s (2000:Chapters 5 & 6) Medical Law, Myint Soe’s 
(2000) Informed Consent in Medical Cases', the section on ‘Information and Consent’ in Alastair V. 
Campbell’s (2001:222-225) Medical Ethics', Len Doyal and Jeffery Tobias’ (2002) Informed Consent 
in Medical Research; Martin Bobrow’s (2004) The Patient’s Consent, the chapters on ‘consent’ in 
Emily Jackson’s (2006:Chapters 4 & 5) Medical Law, Paul Tan’s (2006) The Doctrine of Informed 
Consent, the chapter on ‘competence, consent and compulsion’ in Margaret Brazier’s 
(2007:Chapter 5) Medicine, Patients and the Law, and Onora O ’Neill’s (2007) Rethinking Informed 
Consent.
A final type o f texts on informed consent is guidelines and other documents offering guidance 
as to when and how to apply the principle of informed consent. These include first o f all laws 
(e.g.: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990; Human Tissue Act 2004; Medicines for 
Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004). It also encompassed guidelines and other 
forms of guidance from: governmental bodies (e.g.: General Medical Council 1998; Ministry of 
Health 1999; Department of Health 2001a; Department o f Health 2001b; Department of 
Health 2001c; Department of Health 2001 d; General Medical Council 2002; General Medical 
Council 2008); regulatory authorities (e.g.: Human Tissue Authority 2006a; Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2007); funding agencies (e.g.: Medical Research 
Council 1992; Medical Research Council 2001a); professional organizations (e.g.: Royal College 
o f Pathologists 2001; British Medical Association and The Law Society 2004; British Medical
172
Association 2006; Royal College of Pathologists 2007; Royal College of Physicians 2007); 
universities and tissue banks (e.g.: National Cancer Centre 2002; NUS Institutional Review 
Board 2005b; UK Biobank 2006; UK Stem Cell Bank 2006); and patients associations (e.g.: 
Consumers for Ethics in Research 2003a; Consumers for Ethics in Research 2003b; The 
Patients Association No Date).
The Human Capacity to Reflect and Decide
Having given a description o f the notion o f informed consent and its key role within bioethical 
governance, I can now examine the ways in which the principle o f informed consent and the 
various ethical technologies that seek to operationalise it reconfigure modem subjectivities and 
citizenship. As explained above, I argue that informed consent is articulated around a 
particular figure o f the subject — the human being able to reflect and decide on his or her own 
existence and body — whose reality it presupposes and which, at the same time, it helps to 
bring into existence (cf. Rose 1996c; Rose 1999b; Hacking 2002). On the one hand, this figure 
o f a human being able to reflect and decide is, according to the literature on informed consent, 
a natural given that has to be protected against the dangers of modem medical science through 
informed consent. On the other hand, the descriptions o f the human being that one finds in 
the literature on informed consent participate in the construction o f this particular figure of 
the subject by creating a sphere o f possibilities to think and act accordingly. The construction 
o f this particular subject is further reinforced by the ethical technologies that operationalise the 
principle o f informed consent. Indeed, these technologies develop and strengthen the sphere 
of possibilities for people to act as human beings capable of reflecting and deciding by 
ensuring that this concept of the person can be enacted and is respected in the rapports 
between researchers and research subjects.
To substantiate this argument, the present section examines the way the literature on informed 
consent portrays the human being as ‘a person’ who is ‘able to think, act and communicate.’ It 
describes in particular how these texts conceive this particular capacity: its different 
dimensions; its development and possible loss; and the methods to assess its presence or 
absence. The next sections examine how these same texts portray informed consent as a 
means to transform the relationship between the researcher and the research subject (‘the 
doctor-patient relationship’) so as to enable the latter to be a person that thinks and acts. They 
show how the literature on informed consent seeks to eliminate the paternalistic ethos around 
which this relationship was articulated and which, according to this literature, negated the
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person in the research subject or patient. They also show how this literature aims to rebuild the 
rapport between the scientist or doctor and the research subject or patient as a ‘process of 
communication’ where the latter is given time and space to think and decide.
A  Being Able to Think, A ct and Communicate ’
As other principles and techniques that make up bioethical governance, informed consent is a 
mean to ensure that human beings are respected and protected against the dangers arising 
from the use of human tissue in biomedical research. For example and as already mentioned 
above, bioethics experts working for Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee conceive ‘free 
and informed consent’ as a mean to ‘promote respect for all human beings and protect their 
health and rights’ (2004:24-26). Likewise, the bioethical experts working for the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics thought that bioethical governance and consent were key to ensure the 
‘respect for the human body and respect for human dignity’ (1995:40). Alastair V. Campbell, 
who, as previously discussed has been prominent both in the UK and Singapore, offers 
another illustration; he argued that ‘respect for persons’ implies that one ‘must be given 
information and be allowed to make up [one’s] own mind’ (2001:10). There are countless other 
examples in the literature on ethics governance that relate informed consent to the notion of 
respect for human beings (e.g.: Campbell 1975 [1972]:Chapter 5; Faulder 1985:Part 1; Harris 
1985:Chapters 10-11; Gillon 1985g; O'Neill 1996; Medical Research Council 2001a:3 & 6; 
Royal College o f Physicians 2007:39).
For the literature on informed consent mentioned at the end o f the previous section, the 
human being is conceived as a ‘person’ or a ‘moral agent’ that is ‘able to think, act and 
communicate.’ For example, Alastair V. Campbell (2001:10) argues in Medical Ethics that, as 
persons, human beings ‘have their own opinions and aims in life, which require them to act 
intelligently in most o f the things they do.’ Similarly, Ranaan Gillon (1985a: 1735) explains in 
Philosophical Medical Ethics that human beings as ‘persons’ are ‘rational willing agents’ with a 
certain ‘self-awareness.’ They have, he further argues, a ‘capacity to think, decide and act on 
the basis o f such thought and decision’ (1985b: 1806). The House of Lords gives a comparable 
definition in its report on Stem Cell Research, explaining human beings as ‘persons’ are ‘beings 
able to think, act and communicate’ with other persons (2002:Paragraph 4.7). Similarly, 
O ’Neill and Manson (2007:51 & 54) explain in their book Bethinking Informed Consent that 
human beings have moral ‘agency’ which they define as involving:
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‘commitments, .. .  the ability to grasp rational relations between propositions and the ability to put 
one’s commitments to act into action ...  [including] communicative action’ (O'Neill and Manson 
2007:54).
While the concepts of personhood or agency put forward in this literature do differ and are 
aspects o f different theories, from Kantian philosophy to feminist and human rights 
discourses, they all assume that a person is an entity with a series o f capacities. These capacities 
include: (1) the ability to hold values or commitments; (2) the ability to communicate and 
exchange information; (3) the ability to reason or reflect; and (4) the ability to decide and act. 
For the sake of simplicity, I subsume this understanding of personhood and this series of four 
different abilities under the generic term o f ‘capacity to reflect and decide.’
The capacity to hold values or commitments is, according to the literature on informed 
consent, an ability to entertain a certain worldview and to hold certain principles and 
preferences. Carolyn Faulder, for instance, argues that ‘people carry with them ... hopes, fears, 
beliefs, experiences, prejudices [and] expectations’ (1985:29). Likewise, the British Medical 
Association explains, in its guide to assess the mental capacity o f patients and research 
subjects, that the latter ‘have their own religious beliefs and value systems’ (2004:4). O ’Neill 
and Manson make a similar point when they argue that persons have the ability to hold to 
types o f commitments: (a) ‘practical commitments that stem from their desires, needs, whims, 
preferences, principles and so on;’ and (b) ‘cognitive commitments’ which cause persons which 
hold them to ‘take certain things (but not others) to be the case; some things to be likely, 
others to be impossible, and so on’ (2007:51-52). These worldviews, principles and preferences 
are, according to the literature on informed consent, particular to each person; they are shaped 
by their experiences as well as their socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. Faulder, for 
example, argues that a human being’s worldview and preferences constitute his or her 
‘personal luggage’ and are shaped by the ‘particular circumstances o f [his or her] individual 
existence’ (1985:29). Similarly, Paul Tan, a lawyer at the National University of Singapore, 
explains that a person has a ‘view of the world’ and particular ‘concerns’ that are informed by 
his or her ‘background’ such as ‘gender, race [and] economic status’ (2006:157). Likewise, the 
British Medical Association argues that ‘aspects o f a person’s thinking may derive from ... a 
particular cultural or ethnic background’ (2004:154).
Besides the capacity to hold values or commitments, a person also has, according to the 
literature on informed consent, an ability to communicate and exchange information with 
other human beings. For instance, the Department of Health’s (2001 b:4) Reference Guide to 
Consent argues that persons have ‘an ability to communicate’ with other agents. Alastair
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Campbell offers another example in his Medical Ethics, arguing that persons have the capacity to 
exchange information with other agents in ‘respectful and broadly rational dialogue [s]’ 
(2001:11). Martin Bobrow, a member of the Nuffield Council and one of the international 
experts advising Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee has a very similar stance, 
explaining that persons have an ability to exchange information with each other as part o f a 
‘process o f communication’ (2004:2). According to the literature on bioethical governance, the 
capacity to communicate and exchange information also allows other agents to influence or 
challenge a person’s values and preferences. For example, O ’Neill and Manson (2007:55) 
suggest that ‘communicative actions have to take account o f the commitments o f others, and 
may aim to alter their commitments.’ In the same way, Paul Tan argues that information 
‘disclosed’ by a person to another will ‘make a difference’ and can even lead to cases of 
‘manipulation’ (2006:165).
Aside from an ability to have preferences and communicate, the literature on informed 
consent also conceives the person as a being graced with what Myint Soe, the Singapore 
Medical Association’s legal advisor, calls a ‘capacity to reason’ (2000:5). The authors that 
elaborate on the particulars o f this capacity to reason argue that it is a faculty to assess and 
make inferences from one’s values and commitments as well as the information received from 
other agents. Tan, for example, describes it as the ability to ‘take into account a variety of 
considerations’ (2006:157). O ’Neill and Manson talk about a capacity to ‘grasp inferential 
relations between [one’s] cognitive commitments and [one’s] practical commitments, including 
the descriptions under which [one] acts’ (O'Neill and Manson 2007:53). Harris (1985:197-198) 
explains that it is an ability to assess the ‘truth or validity’ of specific beliefs, notably the ability 
to probe whether there is ‘a commensurate relationship between the strength of the evidence 
for (particular] facts and the strength o f the beliefs they support;’ it is also the capacity to make 
‘inferences [that are] valid.’
The fourth and last faculty that a person has is, according to the literature on informed 
consent, the capacity to decide and act. It is best understood as an ability to settle on one 
particular a course of action and turn it into reality. The British Medical Association describes 
it as ‘the capacity’ to ‘retain information for long enough’ so as ‘to use it and weigh it in the 
balance in order to arrive at a decision’ (2004:138). Similarly, O ’Neill and Manson (2007:54) 
talk about ‘the ability to put one’s commitments to act into action.’ More simply, John Harris 
(2003:11) suggests that persons have ‘the ability ... to make choices that shape [their] lives.’ 
According to the literature on informed consent, the course o f action on which a person 
settles is necessarily particular to that person as it reflects a mixture between his or her values,
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the information he or she had received and the way he or she had reasoned. Someone else will 
not necessarily settle for the same course o f action, nor find it reasonable. For example, 
Carolyn Faulder (1985:25) explained that a person’s decisions are necessarily ‘subjective 
judgments’ and can, as such, appear ‘unwise or irresponsible’ to others. Similarly, the British 
Department o f Health argues in its Reference Guide on consent that a person will ‘make a 
decision based on their own religious beliefs or value system’ (2001b:4). This decision might be 
‘perceived by others to be irrational’ (ibid.); it might even be viewed as
‘So outrageous in its defiance o f  logic or o f  accepted moral standards that no sensible person who
had applied his or her mind to the question could have arrived at it’ (Department o f Health 2001b:4).
For the literature on informed consent, the human being as person has, as a self-contained 
entity graced with its own capacity to reflect and decide, a certain autonomy or independence 
in relation to other human beings (cf.: Wolpe 1998; O'Neill 2002). Harris, for example, 
suggests that ‘autonomy is part o f our concept o f the person’ (2003:10). Similarly, Gillon 
argues that ‘autonomy’ is a ‘necessary feature’ o f ‘any rational agent’ (1985b: 1807). Autonomy, 
for the literature on informed consent means that persons will, by exercising their capacity to 
reflect and decide, direct their own actions and lives. As Faulder argues, autonomy means ‘to 
control one’s own destiny and to determine one’s own ends’ by using one’s capacity to reflect 
and decide (1985:2). Similarly, Harris suggests that autonomy implies that a person is ‘able to 
control [his or her] own life ... by the exercise of [his or her] own faculties’ (1985:195). So too, 
Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee argues that ‘autonomy’ means that persons will 
‘decide for themselves what is good for them’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2004:25; cf. 
also: Ministry of Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.3.1).
For the literature on informed consent autonomy or independence does not mean that human 
beings as persons are secluded and isolated from each other. On the contrary, human beings as 
persons will, as entities graced with a capacity to communicate, interact and dialogue with each 
other. As the House of Lords explains, the human being as a person is a being that is ‘able to 
... communicate’ with other human beings (2002:Paragraph 4.7). Similarly, Alastair Campbell 
suggests that human beings as persons engage in ‘broadly rational dialogues’ with each other 
(2001:11). For the literature on informed consent, these interactions and process of 
communication allow human beings as persons to receive information to help them think and 
take decisions. As Campbell explains, ‘in order to act intelligently,’ human beings as persons 
‘must ... be given information’ (ibid. p. 10). Furthermore, these interactions and 
communication give human beings as persons the necessary support to think and take a
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decision. For example, the UK General Medical argues that ‘discussions’ with other human 
beings will ‘help [a person] to make decisions’ (2008:14).
‘Adults, Children and the Mentally Incapacitated’
While, in principle, the literature on informed consent considers that human beings have 
personhood or moral agency, this is not necessarily always the case. As Carolyn Faulder has 
argued, ‘there are, o f course, categories [of human beings] who cannot be described as 
“reasonable persons’” (1985:39; cf. also: Quah 1989:187; O'Neill 2002:40).19 Indeed, for this 
literature on informed consent, the ability to reflect and decide is not immutable. On the 
contrary, it is a faculty which develops from birth onwards and only reaches full development 
in adulthood. It is, furthermore, a faculty that, even after attaining maturity, fluctuates with 
time due to illness, physical disabilities or the environment. To capture these developments 
and fluctuations, the literature on informed consent uses a series of categories to classify 
human beings in relation in relation to the development or state o f their capacity to reflect and 
decide. The most important of these categories are those o f ‘children,’ ‘adult’ and ‘the mentally 
incapacitated’ (e.g.: Faulder 1985:39; Quah 1989:187; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
1995:Chapter 6; Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.5; Soe 2000:5; Bobrow 
2004:4; Royal College of Physicians 2007:Chapter 8) This same literature has also devised ‘tests 
o f capacity’ to determine in which o f these categories a particular individual should be 
classified and, thereby, how much moral agency they have (British Medical Association and 
The Law Society 2004:4).
From birth until the start o f the start o f adulthood, an individual will be classified as a ‘child’ 
and deemed, by the literature on informed consent, to lack a fully-fledged capacity to reflect 
and decide. As the Royal College of Physicians explains, ‘children as a group’ have ‘difficulty in 
expressing their needs or defending their interests’ (2007:58). Similarly, O ’Neill argues that 
‘children, or at least younger children’ are not ‘in the maturity of their faculties’ (O'Neill 
2002:40; O'Neill 2003:4). Indeed, for the literature on informed consent, the capacity to reflect 
and decide is not given fully-developed at birth. Rather, informed by psychological theories 
about the development of moral judgment in children, this literature understands the capacity
19 The notions of (mental) capacity and incapacity are of course not exclusive to the bioethical literature on 
informed consent. On the contrary, there is a long history of debates and a vast literature on the topic, most 
notably in relation to the UK’s recent re-organisation of its mental health services and the adoption of the 2005 
Mental Capacity A ct and the 2007 Mental Health A ct (cf. Department o f Health, Review of the Mental Health Act 
1983: Report of the Expert Committee, London, 1999).
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to reflect and decide as slowly acquired with time and the experiences one goes through in life. 
For example, the Medical Research Council explains that:
‘A child's ability to consent develops as he or she learns to make increasingly complex and serious 
decisions, which can be experience and/or age-related’ (Medical Research Council 2004:27).
Another illustration is the report on Medical Research with Children published by the Institute of 
Medical Ethics (Nicholson 1986). Strongly influenced by Piaget’s examination of how children 
develop a respect for moral rules and Kohlberg’s three stages in the development of moral 
judgement — from the ‘pre-conventional’ stage between seven and ten years old, to the 
‘conventional’ stage between ten and fourteen and the ‘post-conventional’ stage after fourteen 
— the authors o f the report understand ‘the progress towards mature judgement as a gradual 
process’ (ibid. p. 130). And, having sampled a series o f empirical psychological studies on how 
children understand health in general but also the risk involved when participating in research 
as well as the process of consenting, the authors further suggest that ‘children ... develop their 
capacities for moral judgement in a relatively uniform manner’ (ibid. p. 141), which they 
describe thus:
‘Before the age o f  7 years (by which is meant the developmental age o f  an average 7-year-old ...)  
attempts to obtain a child’s assent ... are likely to be meaningless ...  The nearer the child is to 14 
years old, the more important does his assent to a research procedure become. Nevertheless, in the 
age range 7 to 14, he will not usually have reached an adult level o f  moral judgem ent... From the age 
o f  14 years upwards, it appears that children ...  are as competent as adults to decide’ (Nicholson  
1986-151).
From the ‘age o f maturity’ onwards, one becomes, according to the literature on informed 
consent, an ‘adult.’ It is presumed, by this same literature, that individuals who have reached 
adulthood have a fully developed capacity to reflect and decide. So, for example, the British 
General Medical Council explains that:
‘[One] must work on the presumption that every adu lt...  has the capacity to make decisions ...  and 
to decide to, or refuse, an examination, investigation or treatment. [One] should only regard [an 
individual] as lacking capacity once it is clear ...  they cannot understand, retain, use or weigh up the 
information needed to make a decision or communicate their wishes’ (General Medical Council 
2008:27)
Similar illustrations can be found in many texts relative to informed consent (e.g.: Department 
of Health 2001 d:3; British Medical Association and The Law Society 2004:5). Adulthood is 
defined in terms of age: all those older than a certain age are deemed to be adults. In the 
United Kingdom, this age varies between 16 and 18 years o f age; in Singapore, it is considered 
to be 21 years o f age (Ministry of Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.5.1; Soe 2000:5;
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Bobrow 2004:4; Medical Research Council 2004; General Medical Council 2008:23). The 
presumption that an adult has the capacity to reflect and decide can only be reversed if there 
are ‘doubts’ about that individual’s ability to think, act and communicate which are then 
corroborated by a test of capacity (Department of Health 2001b:4; British Medical Association 
and The Law Society 2004:17).
Adults who have been determined to lack the ability to think, act or communicate through the 
use of a test of capacity will, according to the literature on informed consent, be classified as 
‘mentally incapacitated’ or otherwise ‘incompetent’ (e.g.: Quah 1989:187; Medical Research 
Council 1991b; Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.5.2; Soe 2000:5; Bobrow 
2004:4; British Medical Association and The Law Society 2004; Royal College o f Physicians 
2007:60-61). The reasons that can affect someone’s ability to reason and choose range from 
temporary physical states (fatigue; drunkenness) to more permanent ones (mental illness; 
disability). The British Medical Association’s guide to assessing people’s capacity to reflect and 
decide offers an good illustration. Among the possible conditions that might cause the loss o f 
one’s capacity, the guide lists: ‘physical conditions, such as severe pain or fatigue;’ ‘poor 
eyesight, deafness and problems with speech and language;’ and ‘mental disabilities’ caused by 
mental illnesses like dementia, depression or schizophrenia (2004:149-150).
Tests of capacity are highly codified procedures which are to be carried out by qualified 
medical doctors (cf. Ministry of Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.5.2; British Medical 
Association and The Law Society 2004; Royal College o f Physicians 2007:43-44; General 
Medical Council 2008:30). The British Medical Association and Law Society’s (2004) widely 
used and cited guide to the Assessment of Mental Capacity is probably one of the best illustration 
o f these tests o f capacity. The aim of these tests is to assess whether someone can reason 
correctly, not whether his or her values or preferences on which his or her choices are based 
are acceptable or reasonable. According to the Assessment of Mental Capacity, the test purports ‘to 
assess what the person is actually capable of deciding... not whether the decision is sensible or 
wise’ (ibid. p.23). For example, a decision based on an ‘unusual value system’ and thus 
seemingly ‘irrational’ is not a sign of a lack of capacity; inversely, a decision based on ‘a 
misperception o f reality’ or a series of erroneous inferences is a sign that someone ‘lacks 
capacity’ (ibid. p.4).
To proceed to such an assessment, the doctor will have to gather background information on 
the individual being assessed as well as interview him or her. In relation to background 
information, the Assessment of Mental Capacity recommends the examination of: ‘past medical
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and psychiatric records;’ ‘systematic assessment of cognitive functioning’ done by ‘clinical 
psychologists;’ ‘reports from social workers, nurses or care workers;’ and ‘information from 
friends and family’ (ibid. p. 154). In relation to the interview, the British Medical Association’s 
guide suggests to pay attention to the following elements: ‘appearance and behaviour;’ ‘speech;’ 
‘mood;’ ‘thought;’ ‘perception;’ ‘cognition;’ ‘orientation;’ ‘memory;’ ‘intelligence;’ and ‘insight’ 
(ibid. p.155-159). The guide also recommends, where necessary, to use more systematic 
evaluations such as ‘medical or psychometric tests’ such as the Mini-Mental State 'Examination 
(ibid. p l5 5 &  157).
‘Doctors Must Abandon Paternalistic Attitudes*
This section and the two that follow examine how the literature on informed consent portrays 
informed consent as a mean to transform the doctor-patient relationship so as to enable the 
‘patient as person’ to think and act about his or her life and body. This should further 
substantiate the argument made in this chapter, namely that informed consent revolves around 
an understanding o f the subject -  the human being capable o f reflecting and deciding on his or 
her own existence and body -  whose existence it both presupposes and helps to construct. 
The present section analyses what, for the literature on informed consent, is the first step in 
the transformation of the rapport between doctor and patient: doing away with the 
paternalistic ethos that, according to this literature, has long informed the doctor-patient 
relationship. It shows that the rationale put forward by the literature on informed consent for 
discarding paternalism is that it negates the person within the patient. The next two sections go 
on to examine what, according to the same literature, is the second step in the transformation 
of the doctor-patient relationship: its re-organisation as a ‘process of communication’ where 
the patient is given time, space and resources to think and decide. They show how, for the 
literature on informed consent, this re-organisation should enable the patient as person to 
unfold and develop.
For the literature on informed consent, informed consent is a way of transforming the 
relationship between doctor and patient or, in the case o f human tissue research, the rapport 
between the researcher and the research subject giving his or her bodily tissues. The 
transformation, according to this literature, should enable the ‘patient as person’ to think and 
act about his or her life, health and body. Ian Kennedy, for example, argued that:
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‘There is little doubt that .. .  the doctrine o f  informed consent promises to transform the doctor- 
patient relationship. It reasserts the notion that the patient is a partner ...  and cannot be a partner if  
he is kept in ignorance’ (Kennedy 1981:130).
Similarly, Carolyn Faulder explained that ‘informed consen t... is crucial to creating an ethical 
and healthy patient-doctor relationship’ (1985:128). Stella Quah, a sociologist at the National 
University o f Singapore (NUS) and one of the first to write on informed consent in the South- 
East Asian Republic, expressed a similar view, explaining the role o f ‘the concept o f informed 
consent’ in transforming ‘the doctor-patient relationship’ and challenging ‘the “traditional” 
values o f professional authority’ (1989:187).
For this literature, the first step in transforming the doctor-patient relationship is to do away 
with paternalism which, it claims, has informed the rapport between the doctor and the patient 
until now. For instance, in its report on the retention o f body parts at the Royal Liverpool 
Children’s Hospital at Alder Hey, the Inquiry called for the medical profession ‘to consign 
paternalism to the annals o f history’ (2001:445). Likewise, Alastair V. Campbell argued that:
D octors . . .  must abandon paternalistic attitudes and include their patients as participants . . .  That is 
what respect for people involves ...  The old paternalistic attitude ...  must be rejected’ (Campbell, 
G illettetal. 2001:11 & 26).
David Chan, a professor o f philosophy at NUS and an early member o f Singapore’s Bioethics 
Advisory Committee, made a similar point in his survey of the attitudes o f Singaporean 
doctors in relation to ‘medical paternalism, consent and patient autonomy’ (2000:58):
D octors cannot avoid taking patient choice ... into account. The age when doctors are respected as 
superiors whose diagnoses and treatment prescriptions are unquestioned is over’ (Chan and Goh  
2000:76).
Paternalism, for the literature on informed consent, is a belief held by doctors and patients 
alike that it is doctors who should decide what patients do about their health and bodies. 
Furthermore, it is the belief that doctors should do so without consulting their patients, for 
only they know what is best. John Harris, for example, gives the following definition:
‘Paternalism is the belief that it can be right to order the lives o f  others for their own good, 
irrespective o f  their wishes or judgments. The characteristic cry o f  the paternalist is “D on ’t do that, it 
isn’t good for you’” (Harris 1985:194).
Similarly, the Inquiry into the retention of body parts at the Royal Liverpool Children’s 
Hospital at Alder Hey argued that:
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‘Patemahsm is . . .  the policy o f  restricting the freedom and responsibilities o f  one’s dependants 
in their supposed best interest’ (The Royal Liverpool Children's Inquiry (Chairman: Michael Redfem  
QC) 2001:369).
The belief that patients should not be involved and consulted in relation to decisions about 
their health and body means, according to the literature on informed consent, that paternalism 
often involves doctors withholding information from or lying to patients. For example, Chan 
explains that the ‘withholding of information on ... risks is a common feature of paternalism’ 
(2000:69). Similarly, O ’Neill argues that ‘the whole tradition o f medical paternalism centres on 
desires to assist patients and research subjects by mild and well-intentioned deception and 
euphemisms’ (2002:119). Likewise, Faulder asserts that ‘the paternalistic doctor’ always 
‘believes he knows what is best’ for his patient; ‘almost invariably this means he is going to He’ 
to him (1985:118).
According to the Hterature on informed consent, there are different reasons as to why 
patemahsm has dominated the relationship between doctor and patient for so long. One 
reason often mentioned in this Hterature is that doctors beHeve that their knowledge of human 
health is infinitely superior to the one of patients. For example, Faulder argues that:
‘Doctors generally ...  say that they must [decide for their patients] because their skills and experience 
give them the advantage o f  superior knowledge .. .  Patients have [to] put themselves into their hands 
precisely because they possess these skills and they [must therefore] rely on their doctors to choose 
the best [solution]’ (Faulder 1985:28).
Similarly, Tan explains that ‘medical patemahsm finds its roots’ in the ‘claim that doctors know 
best’ about human health (2006:150). Another reason for the predominance of patemahsm 
often put forward by the Hterature on informed consent is doctors’ behef that their patients are 
not intelhgent or knowledgeable enough to decide about their own health and bodies. David 
Chan, for instance, explains that:
TDoctors seem to think that either the patients’ knowledge is still inadequate, or their knowledge does 
not translate into rational thinking’ (Chan and Goh 2000:70).
Similarly, Faulder argues that medical patemahsm stems from the ‘contempt with which some 
o f these doctors view their patients and the low opinion they have of their intelhgence’ 
(1985:111). A further reason for the prevalence o f medical paternalism put forward by the 
Hterature on informed consent is that, in the case of medical research in particular, to inform 
and involve patients would represent an obstacle to the progress of science as it would lead to 
them refusing to participate. For example, Faulder argues that:
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‘[Doctors often hold] the belief that it is o f  paramount importance to get the scientific answers, and if  
informing their patients means that they are less likely to be co-operative in that research, then such 
doctors will have no difficuldy in asserting that the individual patient’s interests must take second  
place to the interests o f  science. This is a dangerous road to go down’ (Faulder 1985:111).
Similarly, Stella Quah explained that in ‘a research setting,’ ‘medical researchers may, 
consciously or unconsciously,’ see informing their patients as a hindrance to ‘their goals o f 
experimentation and discovery’ (1989:184). Furthermore, in the case o f Singapore, the 
literature on informed consent often explains the prevalence of medical paternalism because of 
the latter’s similarities with Singapore’s Asian values, most notably the Asian propensity to 
respect and revere authority. So, for example, Chan argues that ‘paternalism’ is compatible with 
‘Confucian ethics’ where the ‘doctor [is said to] have the heart of a father’ and should be 
respected as such (2000:59). Similarly, Teoh, explains that ‘Asians’ are ‘perhaps less likely to ask 
difficult questions or to openly question the doctor’s opinion’ (1996:14). So too, the nurses in 
charge o f obtaining informed consent at the Tissue Repository at Singapore’s National 
University Hospital explain that among the ‘older less educated Asian population’ many 
potential donors are ‘very surprised’ to be asked for consent; for them, doctors are to be 
‘respected and revered’ (Tissue Repository at the National University Hospital 2007).
For the literature on informed consent, the problem with paternalism and the reason why it 
recommends its elimination is that it negates the patient as person and his or her capacity to 
reflect and decide about his or her own health and body. Indeed, the belief that the doctor 
should not consult or take into account the patient’s values and preferences as they are 
irrational and a hindrance to good medical science does certainly fly in the face o f this 
literature’s concept of the person. This incompatibility is expressly recognised as a problem by 
the literature on informed consent. For example, John Harris argues that paternalism ‘involves 
treating the agent as incompetent’ and ‘denies the individual control over her own life and 
moral destiny’ (1985:194). Indeed, ‘where the agent is misinformed, or only told part o f the 
truth, or where he is kept in total ignorance,’ Harris further argues, ‘his capacity to make the 
best choices he can will be undermined’ (ibid. p.198). Similarly, Faulder explicates that a 
paternalistic attitude ‘betrays an insulting contempt for the intelligence and self-awareness of 
the patient’ (1985:5) and transforms him or her into a ‘passive and uncomplaining’ subject 
(ibid. p. 110).
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‘A Process of Communication*
For the literature on bioethical governance, informed consent is not only a way to abolish a 
doctor-patient relationship based on paternalism. It is also a means to re-construct in its place 
a new relationship that would enable the patient as person to unfold and employ his or her 
capacity to reflect and decide about his or her health and body. In Alastair Campbell’s words,
‘A  different m odel o f  the medical relationship is required [in place o f  the old paternalistic model] to 
ensure that patients are treated in a way that respects their individuality and their capacity to make 
judgments for themselves’ (Campbell, Gillett et al. 2001:21).
A new model o f doctor-patient relationship that would allow patients or research subjects to 
reflect and decide about their health and bodies should, for the literature on informed consent, 
be articulated around the notions of ‘communication’ and ‘time and space to think.’ This 
section examines the notion of communication while the next section explores the notion o f 
time and space for reflection.
For bio-ethicists, the doctor-patient relationship has to be re-organised as a ‘process o f 
communication’ (Bobrow 2004:2) or a ‘dialogue’ (Tan 2006:171). The aim o f this dialogue is to 
enable the patient to obtain, from the doctor, all the information that he or she considers 
necessary to decide about what he or she wants do with his or her body and, most notably, to 
decide to give or not parts of it to medical research. In general, the information given will, for 
the most part, be about the research itself and its implications for the patient. Alastair 
Campbell, for instance, argues that:
‘Respect for Persons. .. .  Patients [as persons] have their own opinions and aims in life, which require 
them to act intelligently in m ost o f  the things they do. But in order to act intelligendy, patients must 
.. .  be given information ...  [Respect for persons] implies a respectful and broadly rational dialogue 
between doctor and patient’ (Campbell, Gillett et al. 2001:10-11).
Similarly, the British General Medical Council explains in its guide on good practice that:
‘[There should be] an open and helpful dialogue ... between doctors and research participants. 
Effective communication is the key to enabling participants to make informed decisions’ (General 
Medical Council 2002:Paragraphs 17-18).
Through a series o f rules and ethical technologies o f government, the literature on informed 
consent sets out and manages the content, amount and form o f the information obtained by 
the patient during his or her dialogue with the doctor. These rules and technologies are 
explored below.
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O f Content and Quantity
For the literature on informed consent, the information obtained by the patient during the 
dialogue with the doctor has to have a specific content and quantity. In relation to content, this 
literature dictates that the information should be limited to medical and technical information 
about the research and its implication for the patient or research subject. The doctor or 
researcher, who is deemed to be ‘the expert’ in the field, should provide the patient, who is 
‘usually ignorant about the basic medical facts,’ with the necessary medical knowledge about 
the investigation to which he or she is asked to participate (Faulder 1985:35). Conversely, the 
doctor or researcher should not impose his or her own values or preferences on the patient. 
Indeed, according to the literature on informed consent, the dialogue should bring together the 
medical expertise o f the doctor with the values or preferences of the patient. As Alastair 
Campbell explains, the ‘dialogue between doctor and patient’ should ‘combine the patient’s 
values and the doctor’s expertise to produce benefit’ (2001:11). Similarly, the UK Department 
o f Health explains that:
‘The patient and the health professional need to come to an agreement ...  based on the patient’s
values and preferences and the health professional’s clinical knowledge’ (Department o f  Health
2001a:10).
In relation to quantity, the literature on informed consent dictates that the patient or research 
subject should be at least given minimum information about the proposed investigation, 
whether he or she wants it or not. To do otherwise, the literature argues, would negate the 
concept of the person. In addition, the doctor or researcher should encourage the patient or 
research subject to request any supplementary information he or she think is important and 
should satisfy these requests. To ensure that a minimal amount of information is given to each 
patient or research subject and to guarantee that those who require more information can 
obtain it, the literature on informed consent has set a two-part system. The first part ensures 
the minima by requiring that doctors or researchers give a set amount o f information in 
relation to a series of specific aspects of the research (purpose; risks; etc.). The second part 
ensures that the patient or research subject has the possibility of asking any additional 
information he or she considers as important in order to make his or her decision.
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'There is No Right to Remain in Ignorance ’
The imperative to give at least minimal information about the proposed research to the 
research subject, whether or not the subject has requested such information or expressed any 
interest in having it, is based on the assumption that there is no right to remain in ignorance 
about one’s health or body. Indeed, this would negate the notion o f the person that the 
literature on informed consent seeks to promote. Harris, for instance, explains that:
£It is doubtful whether there could be any right to remain in ignorance ... [On the contrary, doctors 
should] remedy where possible both the defects o f  reasoning and o f  information which militate 
against the individual’s capacity [to reflect and decide] .. .  [even if  this means] contravening the 
wishes o f  the agent [not to know]’ (Harris 1985:208 & 213).
The UK Human Tissue Authority (2006a: 18) makes a similar point, recommending to 
researchers that while ‘some patients may not be interested in knowing about the proposed use 
o f the tissue,’ they ‘should nevertheless have all their options explained to them and be 
provided with an appropriate level o f information.’ Likewise, the British General Medical 
Council recommends to physicians in its guide on Seeking Patients’ Consent that:
‘If patients ask you to withhold information and make decisions on their behalf ... you should 
explain the importance o f  them knowing the options open to them, and what the [investigation] will 
involve. I f  they insist they do not want to know in detail .. .  you should still provide basic 
information’ (General Medical Council 1998:Paragraph 11; cf. also: General Medical Council 
2008:11).
To ensure that this ‘basic information’ is provided, the literature on informed consent requires 
the physician to give some information to the patient or research subject about four different 
aspects o f the proposed research. These four aspects are: (1) the nature and purpose o f the 
proposed research; (2) the procedures undertaken on the patient or research subject; (3) the 
risks for the patient or research subject and the benefits for the research subject or society in 
general; (4) the financial and commercial aspects o f the proposed research. There are 
numerous texts in which these different aspects are listed and discussed (e.g.: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics 1995:Chapter 6; Royal College o f Physicians 1996:32; General Medical Council 
1998:Paragraphs 5 & 35-37; Ministry of Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.1; Campbell, 
Gillett et al. 2001:222-225; Royal College o f Pathologists 2001:8-9; Medical Research Council 
2001a:15; Department of Health 2001b:5-6; General Medical Council 2002-26; Bioethics 
Advisory Committee 2002b:23-29; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
2007:Paragraphs S.8.2-S.8.4). These four aspects are examined in turn below.
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As with any other research, the first aspect of the proposed research about which researchers 
who want to collect and analyse human tissues have to inform potential participants is the 
nature and purpose of the proposed investigation. For example, under the heading ‘what 
information should be given?,’ the UK Human Tissue Authority explains to researchers 
collecting and using human tissue that:
‘Information should include the nature o f  the intended activities and the reasons for them’ (Human
Tissue Authority 2006a: 18).
Similarly, Singapore’s National Medical Ethics Committee argues that, among ‘the items of 
information’ that ‘prospective subjects’ should be given are the research activities and ‘the 
reasons for the research’ (Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.1). In the case 
of human tissue research, this requires, first o f all, to explain to potential research subjects 
which tissues would be collected for research. For example, Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory 
Committee sets out that:
It is necessary to ensure that donors fully understand what is proposed to be taken, particularly if
gross human tissue samples (e.g. entire organs or blocks o f  organs, or o f  limbs, as opposed to tissue
slides or small tissue blocks) are involved’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:27).
Similarly, the British General Medical Council requires that researchers ‘must be satisfied that 
participants understand the amount and nature of tissues, organs or body fluids which will be 
taken’ (2002:Paragraph 24). In accordance with such requirements, Singapore’s National 
Cancer Centre explains in its Patient Information Pamphlet that it will collect the ‘leftovers’ from 
the tissues that are ‘removed from [a patient’s] body [during surgery] to help in the diagnosis 
and/or treatment’ (2005:1). Similarly, the UK Biobank explicates to potential donor in its 
Information Leaflet that they will be requested to ‘give small samples o f blood (about three 
tablespoons) and urine’ (2007a:3).
Explaining the nature and purpose o f the research requires, furthermore, that doctors tell the 
prospective donor how the collected tissue will be used. This will involve giving information 
about the particular research project in which the tissue will be used (this is known as ‘specific 
consent’). For example, the UK Human Embryonic Stem Cell Co-ordinators’ Network 
describes its research to potential donors of fertilised human eggs as a ‘project to generate 
human embryonic stem cell lines that could be useful for research into genetic diseases’ 
(2007a: 1; 2007b: 1). In case the tissue is collected to be stored in a bank and used in future 
research projects (generic/general consent), this has to be made explicit. For example, the UK 
Human Tissue Authority requires that:
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Tatients should be told whether the consent is generic (i.e. for use in any future research project that 
has ethical approval) or specific’ (Human Tissue Authority 2006a:18).
According to the British Medical Research Council, ‘it is not acceptable to seek unconditional 
blanket consen t... using terms such as “all biological and medical research;”’ instead, ‘possible 
future research should be explained in terms of the types o f studies that may be done, the 
types o f disease that could be investigated and the possible impact o f the research on them 
personally’ (Medical Research Council 2001 a: 15). So, for example, the UK Biobank explains in 
its Further Information Leaflet that the samples collected ‘will be kept for several decades’ and 
should allow researchers to understand the ‘impact o f lifestyle, environment and genes’ on the 
‘risk o f developing serious diseases’ like ‘cancer, heart disease, stroke, diabetes [and] dementia’ 
(2007b:3 & 6). In Singapore, the Bioethics Advisory Committee accepts donation of tissues for 
future research but recommends that:
T)onors should be free to decide whether their gift [of tissue] should be a general one (in that the 
[tissue] may be applied towards any research use or purpose), or for a specific (and specified) limited 
research use or purpose only’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:26).
Explaining the nature and purpose of the research will also require researchers to explain what 
happens to the tissues themselves. For example, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority requires researchers to tell potential donors about ‘any tests that may be performed 
on embryos or cells derived from the embryos’ (2007:84). Similarly, the Human Tissue 
Authority requires researchers to explain ‘how the tissue will be used’ (2006a:18). So, for 
instance, in its Further Information Leaflet, the UK Biobank explains to prospective donors ‘what 
happens to the blood and urine samples’ (2007b:5). First o f all, it tells them, they are put ‘into 
several different tubes,’ some of which are ‘spun in the assessment centre to allow immediate 
separation of the blood in its constituent part’ (ibid.). Later, it continues, they are ‘transported 
overnight to the UK Biobank laboratory in Manchester for further processing and storage,’ 
including ‘preserving the white blood cells in such a way that they can be grown and more 
genetic material produced in the future’ (ibid.).
Finally, explaining the nature and purpose o f the research also requires the researchers to 
inform participants about what happens to the tissues collected once they have been used. The 
British Medical Research Council, for instance, requires researchers to explain to potential 
donors ‘how any surplus material will be disposed o f when it is no longer required’ (200la: 16). 
Similarly, the UK Human Tissue Authority recommends that ‘establishments which store or 
use human organs and tissue’ for research ‘develop a clear and sensitive disposal policy,’
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document it and ‘make it available to the public’ (2006b:15). Indeed, ‘relatives [that] donate 
organs, tissue or a whole body ... for ... research ... may wish to know how the material will 
be disposed o f after use’ (ibid.). Likewise, Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee suggests 
that tissue banks have ‘respectful and appropriate methods of disposal for ... human tissue 
samples’ and inform the potential participants about these methods (2002b:27).
The second aspect o f the proposed research about which researchers have to inform potential 
participants are the procedures undertaken on the human subject during the research. In the 
case of human tissue research, it will often suffice to explain ‘the process involved in obtaining 
the sample’ (Medical Research Council 2001 a: 15), a process that can be more or less complex 
depending on what part of the body is needed. A good illustration can be found in the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s (2006:7) leaflet Donating Eggs for Research:
‘1. The donor is given drugs, usually a nasal spray, to stop their normal cycle. Once this has been 
achieved they are given another drug to stimulate super ovulation ... This drug is often injected ...  2. 
The donor is monitored for the number o f follicles that are developing ...  by ultrasound analysis 
and/or blood tests. 3. When eggs are almost ready ...  another drug is injected to prepare for 
collection. 4. During egg collection the donor is usually given a sedative or anaesthetic. 5. The eggs 
are collected, m ost commonly using a thin tube and ultrasound guidance. The tube is inserted 
through the vagina into the follicles containing eggs, and fluid including the eggs is drawn out 
through the tube. 6. Once collected the eggs ...  are placed into culture dishes.’
The description o f the ‘assessment visit’ in the UK Biobank’s (2007a:3) Information Eecflet offers 
another interesting example:
‘The appointment at the assessment centre should take about 90 minutes. During this visit, you 
would: ...  answer questions about your health, lifestyle, memory, work and family history; have non- 
invasive measurements o f  blood pressure, pulse rate, height, weight, body fat, grip strength, bone 
density and lung function; [and] give small samples o f  blood ... and urine for long-term storage and 
analysis (including genetic data).’
The third aspect of the proposed research about which researchers have to inform potential 
participants are the risks and benefits o f the proposed investigation. For example, Singapore’s 
National Medical Ethics Committee requires that doctors explain both ‘the potential risks’ and 
‘the anticipated benefits and consequences o f the study for the subject and society’ (Ministry of 
Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.1). Similarly, the UK Human Tissue Authority 
suggests that ‘patients ... should be told of any “material” or “significant” risks’ (2006a: 18). 
They should notably be informed o f all ‘physical risks’ (Medical Research Council 2001 a: 15) 
‘inherent in the way the sample will be obtained’ (Human Tissue Authority 2006a: 18). The UK 
Biobank (2007a:7), for example, informs potential donors that ‘taking part’ in the project 
should, in principle, ‘not cause [them] any harm’ although they ‘may feel some discomfort
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when [they] have blood taken, although [the bank’s] staff are specially trained to reduce this 
risk.’ Another illustration can be found in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority’s (2006:7) leaflet Donating Eggs for Research which describes ‘the medical risks 
involved in egg donation:’
‘The long term consequences o f  taking the fertility drugs that are used when wom en donate are not 
known and there have been concerns expressed that exposure to these drugs may increase the chance 
o f  certain types o f  cancer ...  although to date there has been no conclusive evidence . . .  In the short 
term, the fertility drugs can cause donors to experience discomfort, m ood swings, infections or 
bleeding as well as the risk o f  developing ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS). Mild OHSS is 
relatively com m on (occurring in between 1-10% o f  treatment) and can be treated and controlled. 
Severe OHSS is rarer (occurring in around 1% o f  cases) and very rarely severe OHSS can be fatal. 
There are also risks associated with the type o f  anaesthetic or sedation that is used when the eggs are 
collected.’
Researchers also have to mention risks of a more psychological nature. In the case of human 
tissue research, these risks are generally related to ‘information, such as genetic information or 
HIV status’ that might result from the tests done on the collected tissue and ‘which may have 
significant implications for [the participant or his or her] family members’ (Human Tissue 
Authority 2006a: 18). For example, the Medical Research Council explains that:
‘Tests done on samples o f  human material in the course o f  research may reveal information that has 
implications for the donor’s future health or healthcare, or otherwise impacts on their interests .. . 
Participants have a right to know information that may affect their interests, b u t ... they might [also] 
choose not to exercise that right... This must be ... explained clearly to research participants before 
they consent to take part in the research’ (Medical Research Council 2001a:18).
Finally, researchers should also mention the possible benefits (or lack thereof) of the proposed 
research, either for the participants direcdy or for society in general. The information provided 
to potential tissue donors by Singapore’s National Cancer Centre provides a good illustration:
‘Human tissues provide the materials for researchers to study different diseases . . .  Some o f  the 
research findings may help doctors and scientists develop new products, such as drugs and diagnostic 
tests leading to better prevention and treatment o f  diseases’ (National Cancer Centre 2005:1)
The fourth and last aspect of the proposed investigation about which researchers have to 
inform potential research subjects are the financial and commercial aspects o f the research 
project. For example, the UK General Medical Council requires that researchers be ‘open and 
honest about any financial transactions associated with the use o f tissues, organs or body 
fluids’ (2002:Paragraph 24). Similarly, Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee recommends 
that:
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‘If it is likely that donated tissue samples will in the future be made available for commercial research 
with consequent financial benefit or gain to third parties, we suggest that this possibility be made 
clear to donors at the very outset’ (Bioethics Advisory Committee 2002b:24).
Another example is offered by the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority which 
requires that researchers ‘ensure that donors are given information about how the research is 
funded, including any direct payments or benefits which would accrue to researchers and/or 
their departments, and any financial interests in the research project or its sponsoring 
organisations’ (2007:85).
Asking Questions, Listening <& Showing Sensitivity
In addition to giving minimal information about the proposed research, researchers should 
also encourage the patient or research subject to request any supplementary information he or 
she think is important. If the patient or research subject asks questions, these should be 
answered satisfactorily by the researcher. The imperative to do so is based on the assumption 
that patients or research subjects, while all in need of some information to reflect and decide 
about what happens to their bodies, will vary in the amount o f information they desire to do 
so. For example, the UK Department of Health in its guide on consent suggests that:
‘Patients will vary in how much information they want: from those who want as much detail as 
possible, including details o f  rare risks, to those who ask health professionals to make decisions for 
them’ (Department o f  Health 2001a:18).
Similarly, the UK Human Tissue Authority reminds researchers that while ‘some patients may 
not be interested in knowing about the proposed use o f the tissue’ that is removed from them, 
others ‘will want [to be provided with] more detail than others’ (2006a: 18). Singapore’s 
Bioethics Advisory Committee makes a comparable point when it argues that ‘it should be self- 
evident’ that ‘the level o f detail offered’ should be tailored ‘at helping the potential research 
participant [to] understand’ (2007a:24).
To guarantee that patients are encouraged to ask for additional information and to ensure that 
doctors do satisfy these requests, the Hterature on informed consent has devised a series of 
ethical technologies of government. These include: (1) invitations to potential research subjects 
to ask additional questions; (2) printed Hsts of possible additional questions that potential 
research subjects might want to ask; (3) injunctions to researchers to Hsten, show sensitivity 
and answer questions asked by potential research subjects; and (4) injunctions to researchers to
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indicate to potential research subjects how they can reach them if they want to resume the 
dialogue. These different ethical mechanisms o f government are explored below.
The first o f these technologies are invitations to potential research subjects to ask any 
additional questions they have about the proposed research. These invitations to ask questions 
have become a standard element of information sheets offered to potential research subjects. 
For example, the Royal College of Physicians’ guidelines on research ethics committees, which 
have influenced practice in both the UK and Singapore, recommend that written information 
sheets given to patients or research subjects should always contain such information (e.g.: 
1984:12; 1990a: 17; 1996:32). Similarly, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(2003:2) requires that patients or research subjects ‘should be informed’ by the investigators 
that they ‘have the opportunity to ask questions and discuss’ before agreeing to give their 
tissues to research. Likewise, the Association o f the British Pharmaceutical Industry advises 
that:
‘The investigator [should always ensure] ... that he has ...  given the volunteer the opportunity to 
question him on any points felt by the volunteer to require qualification’ (Association o f  the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry 1988:8).
One can find many examples o f such invitations to ask questions made to patients or research 
subjects when in patient information sheets or general information leaflets for patients and 
research subjects. The British Department o f Health’s guide on consent for adults, for 
instance, advises the patient or research subject that:
‘You should always ask [the researchers] more questions if  you don’t understand or if  you want more 
information’ (Department o f  Health 2001d:5).
Another example can be found in the Tissue Repository of the National University of 
Singapore’s Information Pamphlet
‘You will have an opportunity to speak with your doctor or nurse before/after your operative 
procedure to make sure that all your questions are answered’ (Tissue Repository at the National 
University Hospital 2006:2)
These invitations to ask questions often come together with recommendations to write down 
points that remain unclear as well as any additional questions that one wants to ask the 
researcher. So, for instance, in its leaflet on You and Your Doctor, the Patients Association 
suggests to patients that:
193
‘I f  you think o f  more questions after leaving the doctor, write them down’ (The Patients Association 
N o  Date:8)
Similarly, the British Department of Health reminds patients that they should ‘always ask 
anything [they] want’ and that, ‘as a reminder/ they ‘can write [their] questions [on the consent 
form] in the space over the page’ (2001 a:47).
The second ethical technology to encourage patients to ask any additional questions they have 
about the proposed investigation are printed lists o f possible questions that the patient or 
research subject might want to ask to researchers. These lists o f questions generally follow the 
themes — nature o f the investigation; benefits and risks; etc. — around which the minimal 
information is articulated. The information leaflets distributed by the London-based charity 
Consumers for Ethics in Research (CERES) provide a good illustration of such lists (2003a; 
2003b; 2003c). So, for example, in its leaflet Medical Research and You: What You Need to Think 
About, CERES suggests:
‘Here are some questions you [as a potential research subject] may want to ask before you sign [a 
consent form]: H ow  was I chosen? What will happen to me? ... H ow  often will this happen, or for 
how  long? Will it hurt? What are the possible side effects o f  the research? H ow  long will the research 
take? Will I have to make extra visits to the hospital, or stay in longer? Will my fares or expenses to 
and from appointments be paid? What kind o f  care will I have if  I do not take part in the research? 
Will the researchers collect information about my genes? If you are pregnant, how might the research 
affect your baby? What is the research for? ...  W ho is sponsoring the research?’ (Consumers for 
Ethics in Research 2003a).
Similarly, in its brochure Genetic Research -  Giving Samples for Large Studies, CERES also advises 
research subjects to ask ‘the following questions:’
‘What does the study involve? Will I find it uncomfortable or painful to give a sample? H ow many 
samples will I have to give and how often? Will the arrangements for taking the sample be 
convenient for me? Will my fares or expenses to and from appointments be paid? D oes the research 
involve interviews or filling in questionnaires about my or my family’s health? What will happen to 
my blood or other sample? ...  Will my samples be kept when the study ends and, if  so, what will 
happen to them? ... Will I be told the research results? D o  you want to know the overall results o f  
the research? When are the research results likely to be available or published in medical journals or 
the national press?’ (Consumers for Ethics in Research 2003b).
The third ethical technology to encourage patients to ask any additional questions they have 
about the proposed investigation are injunctions addressed to researchers to listen to, 
demonstrate sensitivity and answer the queries of patients. These injunctions contain, first of 
all, a call to researchers to listen to research subjects. For example, Peter Byrne, a member of 
the Centre for Medical Law and Ethics at King’s College, argues that:
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‘The patient can expect to be heard ... [and] the doctor can be expected to make a reasonable effort 
to listen and to explain’ (Byrne 1983:30).
In his lecture on informed consent at Singapore’s Clinical Research Centre, Martin Bobrow 
made a similar point, explaining to the researchers listening to him that they should ‘not talk all 
the time’ but that they should ‘listen as well’ (2004:4). Likewise, Campbell argues that ‘for [a 
dialogue] to happen, the patient and the doctor must be prepared to listen to each other’ 
(2001:11). So too, the UK Human Tissue Authority explains that ‘seeking consent is a process 
which involves listening ... so as to arrive at a shared understanding’ (2006a:20).
Another element o f these injunctions to listen, demonstrate sensitivity and answer questions is 
the imperative, for researchers, to show a certain empathy for the potential research subject’s 
perspective. For example, the UK General Medical Council recommends that researchers ‘be 
prepared to respond ... sensitively to any questions which the participants may ask’ 
(2002:Paragraph 24). So too, Martin Bobrow explains to researchers that dialoguing with the 
research subjects ‘requires care, thought, sensitive handling and patience’ (2004:1). Similarly, 
the UK Department of Health explained that researchers should be sensitive to the ‘patient’s 
perspective’ and be aware of what he or she might want to know, in particular: ‘what would 
[the investigation] involve?; will it hurt?; what about the risks?; can I drive/work/look after my 
family afterwards?’ (Department of Health 2001a:32). The UK Human Tissue Authority makes 
a similar point and requires researchers to ‘be sensitive’ to the fact that subjects’ particular 
‘attitudes towards the use of tissue’ and remember that these attitudes ‘can vary widely among 
cultures and religions’ (2006a: 17). Likewise, consent nurses from the Tissue Repository at 
Singapore’s National University Hospital explain that they ‘really try to put [themselves] in the 
patient’s shoes’ when they go and talk to them to obtain their consent to give tissue for 
research (Tissue Repository at the National University Hospital 2007).
Yet another element o f these injunctions to listen, demonstrate sensitivity and answer 
questions is that the imperative, for researchers, to do their utmost to respond to their patients’ 
queries ‘honestly’ and ‘fully.’ For example, the UK Department of Health recommends that:
‘I f the patient asks specific questions about the procedure and associated risks these should be 
answered truthfully’ (Department o f  Health 2001b:6).
The UK General Medical Council makes a comparable suggestion in its guide on consent:
‘[Researchers] must respond honestly to any questions the patient raises and, as far as possible, 
answer as fully as the patient wishes ...  [They] must answer ... questions as fully, accurately and
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objectively as possible’ (General Medical Council 1998:Paragraph 9; cf. also General Medical Council 
2002:Paragraph 14).
In case the researcher is not able to answer a subject’s question, he or she must organise 
someone who can to come and respond to the subject. So, for instance, the UK Department 
o f Health recommends that if the person researcher ‘is not able to answer [the subject’s] 
questions,’ he or she should ‘find out or arrange for someone else to talk to [the subject] about 
[his or her] concerns’ (200Id:5).
The fourth ethical technology to encourage patients to ask any additional questions they have 
about the proposed investigation are injunctions addressed to researchers to indicate to 
patients how they can reach them if they want to resume the dialogue with them. This 
imperative entails informing the patient that he or she can ask additional questions at any time, 
even after that he or she signed the consent form. For example, Carolyn Faulder explains that:
‘The patient has to understand that she can resume the dialogue at any time and feel free to ask more 
questions at they occur to her’ (Faulder 1985:115).
In order to enable patients to resume the dialogue at any time, patient information sheets will 
generally contain an invitation to request further information should the need arise later on 
and these invitations will always come along with the contact details o f the researchers. As the 
Royal College o f Physicians’ guidelines recommend:
‘Information sheets should clearly state the name, address and telephone number o f  the investigator 
and, if  appropriate, o f  the person supervising the research’ (Royal College o f  Physicians 1996:32).
So, for example, the Patient Information Pamphlet given to potential donor by Singapore’s 
National Cancer Centre explains, under the heading ‘Can I contact anyone if I have further 
questions?,’ that:
‘You may call the National Cancer Centre Tissue Repository (6436-8307) and ask for the Repository 
Administrator who will be able to assist you with further questions’ (National Cancer Centre 2005:2)
Similarly, the UK Stem Cell Co-ordinators’ Network’s (2007a; 2007b) Kesearch Information Sheets 
explain, under the heading ‘Who should I contact for further information?,’ that:
‘If you have any questions or concerns and would like to discuss this further, please feel free to 
contact: Glenda Cornwell, Stem Cell Research Coordinator, The Assisted Conception Unit, Guy’s 
Hospital, Tel. 07704 700 782, glenda.comwell@kcl.ac.uk’ (2007a:3; 2007b:3).
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O f Quality
For the literature on informed consent, the information obtained by the patient during the 
dialogue with the doctor does not only have to have a specific content and quantity but also a 
particular quality. Indeed, as Alastair Campbell explains, ‘great attention must be paid to the 
quality o f the communication’ (2001:223). Likewise, O ’Neill and Manson suggest that for 
‘successful communication’ to take place, it is necessary to meet ‘some epistemic standards’ 
(2007:84). A certain level of quality or epistemic standard is vital to ensure that the information 
disclosed by the physician is understood by the patient or research subject. As O ’Neill and 
Manson argue:
‘Successful communication must in the first place use a language that its audiences can follow, and
make what is said intelligible to them’ (O'Neill and Manson 2007:85).
Similarly, the UK Human Tissue Authority explains that a ‘valid consent can only be given if 
proper communication has taken place’ (2006a: 17).
To ensure that the quality of the information obtained by the patient during his or her dialogue 
with the doctor had the necessary quality, the literature on informed consent has devised a 
series o f rules and ethical technologies of government. Some o f these rules and technologies 
refer to the language used by the doctor and the patient; they aim to ensure that this language 
is adequate in relation to the following three dimensions: (1) the national/cultural; (2) the 
socio-economic; and (3) the expert/lay. The other rules and technologies refer to other aspects 
of how one communicates, ranging recommendations relative to when and where to dialogue 
to the speed o f one’s explanations and the use o f visual aids. These different rules and 
technologies are explored below.
The first set of rules and technologies that refer to the quality of communication relate to 
language. For the literature on informed consent, doctor and patient have to speak the same 
language. As O ’Neill and Manson argue, ‘speaker and audience must share a language’ 
(2007:56). Language, for this literature, has at least three dimensions or meanings. The first o f 
these dimensions or meanings is language understood as a national idiom replete with its 
cultural references. In the United Kingdom, researchers have to be certain that the patient or 
research subjects understands and speaks English. If  this is not the case, researchers should use 
translators and information materials written in a language that the research subjects can read. 
So, for example, the UK Human Tissue Authority reminds researchers that:
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Tar ticular consideration should be given to the needs o f  individuals and families whose first language 
is not English. Where consent forms are used, these should be available in ...  the main community 
languages ...  Wherever possible, professional translators ...  should be used’ (Human Tissue 
Authority 2006a: 17).
In the same way, researchers in Singapore have to identify which of the Republic’s four official 
language (Mandarin, Malay, Tamil, English) the research subjects understand and speak and 
address them in that language. However, if they do not share a language, they will have to draft 
in a translator. The consent nurses at the Tissue Repository at Singapore’s National University 
Hospital, for example, will be able to speak English and Mandarin but will have to use 
translators to speak with those speaking Malay, Tamil or another language (Tissue Repository 
at the National University Hospital 2007). Similarly, the consent forms used at Singapore’s 
National Cancer Centre remind the researcher that the patient should have ‘the nature of the 
donation ... explained ... in a language/dialect that pie or she] understands’ (National Cancer 
Centre 2004:1).
The literature on informed consent furthermore reminds researchers that, when translating 
from one language to another, they should pay particular attention to potential cultural and 
religious differences that often came together with different languages. For example, the UK 
Human Tissue Authority explains that:
‘Attitudes towards the use o f  tissue ...  can vary widely among cultures and religions [and that] all 
healthcare professionals must be sensitive to this’ (Human Tissue Authority 2006a:17).
Similarly, consent nurses at the National University Hospital’s Tissue Repository will be aware 
from which o f Singapore’ four ethnic groups (Chinese, Malay, Tamil, European) the patient 
comes as this will indicate different sensitivities in relation to the gift of bodily tissues. For 
instance, Malays will be approached with particular care as they are often thought to be 
opposed to tissue donation (Tissue Repository at the National University Hospital 2007). So 
too, Stella Quah explains researchers should be attentive to ‘cultural or religious differences’ as 
they will affect the ‘meaning’ patients attach to donating parts o f their bodies (1989:185).
The second dimension or meaning of language for the literature on informed consent is 
language understood in socio-economic terms. Researchers should ensure that the patients or 
research subjects’ socio-economic situation does not constitute an obstacle to their 
understanding and /o r faculty to express themselves. In case it is an obstacle, researchers
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should adapt the way they communicate and the information they provide accordingly. 
Carolyn Faulder, for example, explains that:
‘The ugly class divisions in our society also have to be taken into account. Doctors are invariably 
middle-class .. .  whereas a large number o f  their patients will be working class. This puts them at a 
distinct disadvantage when it comes to voicing their preferences or doubts to som eone who speaks 
with a different accent, almost in a different language ...  they feel they cannot express themselves 
“properly” ... [and are] intimidated ... but these obstacles to communication must be overcome’ 
(Faulder 1985:35-36).
Similarly, the UK General Medical Council reminds physicians that they should be attentive to 
‘patients’ occupation’ as it ‘may have a bearing on the information they need in order to reach 
a decision’ (1998:Paragraph 6; cf. also 2002:Paragraph 18). So too, the UK Department of 
Health suggests that ‘there should be support for those ... who have low levels of literacy’ 
(2003:21). Stella Quah makes a comparable point, explaining that ‘social class differences 
between [researcher] and patient with the patient feeling inadequate, ignorant and worried’ will 
have to be overcome to allow good communication (1989:185). The nurses at the National 
University Hospital’s Tissue Repository in Singapore also suggest that the ‘level of education’ 
will have an important bearing on communication and will have to be addressed (Tissue 
Repository at the National University Hospital 2007).
The third dimension or meaning o f language for the literature on informed consent is that of a 
technical or expert language, as opposed to the idea o f a lay or non-expert language. A 
consequence of physicians’ expert medical knowledge is the highly technical and often abstruse 
language that they use. As Faulder explains, ‘expertise generates its own jargon and nowhere 
more so than in medicine’ (1985:35). Such a language is only understood with difficulty by 
non-specialists, creating a ‘communication gap’ between physicians and patients or research 
subjects (ibid. p .112). As Faulder further argues, ‘communicating specialised knowledge to 
someone who is untutored in the subject is a problem in any field’ (ibid. p.35). In consequence, 
the literature on informed consent recommends that doctors simplify their explanations and 
use a ‘non-technical and readily understood language’ (Campbell, Gillett et al. 2001:223) when 
informing their patients or research subjects. For example, the Royal College of Physicians 
recommends that:
‘The scale and type o f  the research activity ...  should be couched in easily comprehensible terms but 
any necessary simplification should not have the effect o f understating any risks or o f  glossing over 
inconvenience or discomfort’ (Royal College o f  Physicians 1990b: 16).
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Similarly, Martin Bobrow, in his exposition o f informed consent suggests that the ‘language’ 
used by researchers should be ‘clear and simple’ (2004:3). So too, the Singapore Guideline for Good 
Clinical Practice requires that:
‘The language used in the oral and written information about [the research] ... should be as non­
technical as practical and should be understandable to the subject’ (Ministry o f  Health 1999:29).
Some texts even suggest that in order to be certain that the language one uses is 
comprehensible, one should use existing tests o f comprehension. So, Nicholson (1986:221), 
for example, argues that to ensure that they speak ‘a language level that is likely to be 
comprehended’ by patients, doctors should use any o f the ‘various tests of readability [that] are 
now available.’ The UK General Medical Council, for instance, does have its information 
leaflets for patients edited in ‘plain English’ — a style of writing that is ‘clear and concise’ and 
which uses ‘short sentences, everyday words and personal words (such as “I,” “we” and 
“you”)’ — by the Word Centre (e.g. General Medical Council 2007; cf. also: The Word Centre 
2008).
Aside from the rules and technologies related to language, the literature on informed consent 
has also set out a series of principles and mechanisms which regulate and manage how, when 
and where one should communicate. First, many texts in this literature will contain injunctions 
to researchers to inform and discuss with patients at a time best suited to them. For example, 
the UK The General Medical Council recommends researchers to ‘discuss [the medical 
research] at a time when the patient is best able to understand and retain information’ 
(1998:Paragraph 13). Similarly, the British Medical Association suggests that researchers 
‘choose the best time of the day’ to discuss with the research subject (2004:18). Consent nurses 
at Singapore’s National University Hospital have similar rules and they will be careful to go 
and talk to a patient when it is best suited for him or her (Tissue Repository at the National 
University Hospital 2007). Likewise, Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee recommends 
that consent ‘has to be taken in a timely ... manner’ (2007a:24).
Secondly, the literature on informed consent will contain injunctions to researchers to ensure 
that the discussion is held at the best possible location for the research subject. The British 
Medical Association for example, suggests that researchers ‘choose the best location’ and 
‘create the right environment’ (2004:17 & 18). It notably recommends that that ‘the 
temperature in the room is comfortable and that the lightening is soft and indirect, but 
sufficiently bright for easy eye contact and interpretation of expression, and to study any 
relevant documentation’ (ibid.). It also recommends that the researcher should ‘try and
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eliminate any background noise or distractions’ and make certain that ‘there are no 
obstructions which could hinder the development of a relationship of equals,’ such as ‘the 
height and positioning of the chairs’ (ibid.).
Thirdly, the literature on informed consent contains advice for researchers about how they 
should communicate with research subjects. Some o f this advice is about the way researchers 
should speak. For example, the UK General Medical Council suggests that, ‘where patients 
have difficulty understanding information or [where] there is a lot o f information to absorb,’ 
the doctor should ‘provide [this information] in manageable amounts’ and do it ‘over a period 
of time’ and maybe ‘repeat it’ (1998:Paragraph 13). Similarly, the British Medical Association 
recommends that researchers should ‘speak at the right volume and speed,’ ‘use short 
sentences with familiar words’ and, ‘if necessary, accompany speech with slightly exaggerated 
gestures or facial expressions’ (2004:18). There is also some advice relative to the use of both 
signers and visual aids to improve communication. For example, the UK General Medical 
Council suggests providing patients or subjects whose disabilities impair their capacity to hear 
or read information with alternative means o f being informed like: the use o f ‘signers;’ the 
‘tape recording o f the [discussion];’ or the use of ‘written material, visual and other aids to 
explain complex aspects of the investigation ... where appropriate and /o r practicable’ 
(1998:Paragraph 13).
Among the ‘written material’ mentioned above, the ‘patient information sheet’ has become 
ubiquitous and is a document often discussed in the literature on informed consent (e.g.: Royal 
College of Physicians 1990b:16-17; General Medical Council 1998:Paragraph 36; Ministry of 
Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.1; Medical Research Council 2001 a: 15; Department 
of Health 2001d:8-9; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2004:22-29; Human Tissue Authority 
2006a: 19). These patient information sheet are generally standardised leaflets describing the 
medical investigation, notably its purpose, procedures, risks and benefits. In conformity with 
the requirements regarding language outlined above, these leaflets will be ‘written in simple, 
easily comprehensible language’ (Royal College of Physicians 1996:32) and ‘be available in a 
number of local languages and in a variety of formats, e.g., Braille, audiovisual, etc.’ (Human 
Tissue Authority 2006a: 19). Such a leaflet is considered as a tool to facilitate the patient or 
research subject’s understanding; a piece of information that he or she can take home to study 
and reflect about or that he or she can show to and discuss with a friend or a relative (Royal 
College o f Physicians 1990a:21). In no circumstances should it be ‘a substitute for talking to 
the patient;’ it should, rather, ‘be used to support the oral description of what is involved’ 
(Royal College o f Physicians 1990b: 16).
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Time & Space to Think
Informed consent, according to the literature on the subject, is a means o f building a new 
doctor-patient relationship around the notions o f ‘communication’ and ‘time and space to 
think’ so as to enable the patient as person to unfold and employ his or her capacity to reflect 
and decide. While the previous section has discussed the notion of ‘communication,’ the 
present section examines the notion o f ‘time and space to think.’
For the literature on informed consent, the doctor-patient relationship has to be re-organised 
so as to offer the patient enough time and space to think. The aim is to encourage and enable 
patients or research subject to reflect and decide whether he or she wants to give bodily tissues 
to medical research by giving him or her the time, space and support to do so. The British 
Medical Association, for example, explains that:
T eople should be enabled and encouraged to take for themselves those decisions which they are able 
to take ...  [and to] regulate their own lives’ (British Medical Association and The Law Society 
2004:3).
Similarly, having posited that patients have ‘their own opinions’ and can ‘act intelligently,’ 
Alastair Campbell argues that for them to express these opinions and act intelligently they 
must ‘be allowed’ to ‘think about what is being said’ and ‘make up their own minds’ (2001:10- 
11).
The literature on informed consent has set out a series of rules and ethical technologies of 
government in order to generate the time, space and support necessary for patients or research 
subjects to think and decide. These rules and technologies include three sets o f injunctions: (1) 
to research subjects to take their time and think carefully before deciding whether or not to 
participate in the research; (2) to research subjects to enlist the support o f family, friends, 
personal GP and patient advocates; and (3) to researchers not to temper with the research 
subjects’ capacity to reflect and decide by using any forms o f coercion. These rules and 
technologies are explored below.
The first rule or technology is the injunction made to research subjects to take the time to 
think carefully before deciding whether they want to give their bodily tissues to medical 
research. These injunctions can be found in patient information sheets as well as in leaflets
202
about medical research addressed to the general public. For example, the leaflets Medical 
Research and You published by Consumers for Ethics in Research (CERES) recommend to 
potential research subjects to ‘think carefully before [they] decide to take part’ (Consumers for 
Ethics in Research 2003b). They also inform potential research subjects that they can and 
should take their time:
T )o I have to decide at once? N o. You can ask for time to think about it’ (Consumers for Ethics in 
Research 2003b).
Patient Information Sheets will generally contain similar injunctions. For example, the UK 
Biobank Information Ijeaflet suggests to those who have been invited to participate that:
‘Before you decide whether to join, it is important for you to understand why U K  Biobank is being 
done and what is involved. Please take the time to read the following information carefully’ (UK  
Biobank 2007a: 1).
Ethical guidelines and research manuals will, similarly, strongly recommend to researchers to 
make sure that research subjects are given enough time to think carefully about their 
participation. Singapore’s National Medical Ethics Committee, for example, advises doctors 
that
‘Sufficient time must be given to the prospective subject for reflection’ (Ministry o f  Health 
1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.2).
Similarly, the UK Human Tissue Authority recommends that researchers ‘seek the person’s 
consent to the proposed procedure well in advance’ so as to give him or her ‘reasonable time 
to reach a decision’ (2006a: 16; 2006c: 14). It suggests, in particular, that ‘it is important that 
[researchers] do not convey to [the person] any sense of being rushed’ (2006c: 18). So too, the 
UK General Medical Council advises researchers to ‘give the patient time to reflect, before and 
after they make a decision, especially if the information is complex or what [they] are 
proposing involves significant risks’ (2008:13). It recommends in particular that researchers 
‘ask if [the potential research subjects] would like more time to think about [their 
participation]’ (ibid. p. 19).
The second rule or technology to encourage and enable the research subject to think and 
decide is the suggestion made to him or her to enlist the support o f others such as family, 
friends, personal GP or patient groups to discuss the issue and help him or her decide. These 
injunctions can be found in both patient information sheets and leaflets on medical research 
for the general public. The CERES’ leaflet on Medical Research and You, for example, informs
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potential research subjects that they ‘may want to talk to family or friends or [their] GP’ about 
whether or not to take part (2003a:2). Similarly, the Research Information Sheet o f the UK Stem 
Cell Co-ordinators’ Network tells those invited to participate to:
Tlease take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if  you wish’ 
(UK Stem Cell Co-ordinators' Network 2007a: 1; UK Stem Cell Co-ordinators' Network 2007b: 1)
Ethical guidelines and research manuals also contain recommendations to researchers to 
encourage research subjects to enlist the support o f their family, friends, personal GP and /or 
patients associations. Nurses at Singapore’s National University Hospital Tissue Repository, 
for example, will make sure the prospective research subject can ‘discuss the issue with both 
his family and his personal G P’ (Tissue Repository at the National University Hospital 2007). 
Similarly, the UK General Medical Council recommends that researchers:
‘Make sure, wherever practical, that arrangements are made to give the patient any necessary support. 
This might include for example, using an advocate or ...  [involving] those close to the patient .. .  
[Furthermore] you should accommodate a patient’s wishes if  [he or she] wants ...  a relative, partner, 
friend, carer or advocate to be involved in discussions or to help [him or her] make decisions’ 
(General Medical Council 2008:13-14).
Likewise, the UK Human Tissue Authority suggests that ‘giving consent’ should ‘be seen as 
part o f a continuing process in which individuals, and their relatives or close friends, can 
discuss the issue fully’ (2006a: 16). So too, the Royal College o f Physicians recommend that 
‘[research] subjects should be given plenty o f time to ... consult their families or their general 
practitioners’ (1990b:21).
Although injunctions to patients to enlist the support o f other people can be found in both the 
UK and Singapore, there are differences between the two countries in relation to who is 
enlisted for support and how they are enlisted. In the UK, patients or research subjects will be 
encouraged to enlist the support not only of their family and personal GP but also o f their 
friends and patients support groups like The Patient Association or Consumers for Ethics in 
Research (CERES). So, for example, the General Medical Council talks about enrolling the 
support of ‘a relative, partner, friend, carer or advocate’ (2008:14). The UK Stem Cell Co­
ordinators’ Network invites potential donors to contact CERES if they want support or more 
information (2007a:3; 2007b:3). In the UK, furthermore, it is understood that while it would 
be beneficial for the research subject to discuss the issue with other people, he or she cannot 
be forced to do so. So, for example, the General Medical Council explains that researchers 
‘should consider involving ... people who are close to the patient’ but only ‘if the patient
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agrees’ (2008:25). Similarly, CERES explains to patients that they should ‘talk to family or 
friends’ but that ‘the decision is [theirs]’ (2003a:2).
In Singapore, research subjects are mosdy encouraged to enlist the support of their family and, 
sometimes, their personal GPs. For example, nurses working at the National Cancer Centre’s 
Tissue Repository at the Singapore General Hospital will make sure the potential donor of the 
tissue discusses the issue with his or her family (Kon 2007). Similarly, nurses working for the 
Tissue Repository at Singapore’s National University Hospital will ensure that prospective 
research subjects ‘discuss the issue with both [their] family and [their] personal G P’ (Tissue 
Repository at the National University Hospital 2007). In contrast, texts on informed consent 
never mention ‘patient advocacy groups.’ This absence is due to the inexistence in Singapore 
o f associations like the London-based Patient Association and CERES. The inexistence of 
such associations in the South-East Asian Republic is unsurprising given Singapore’s 
authoritarian political culture articulated around the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) supremacy 
since independence. Although, there has been a will on behalf of the PAP to develop a 
stronger civil society in order to help the country’s economic development since the late 1990s, 
this has not translated into the liberalisation or democratisation o f the Republic. This will has 
led to the creation o f a few civil society organisations and to their integration into the policy 
process. But, the Republic’s political culture — the general censorship and discouragement, the 
sometimes overt repression and the stringent legal requirements to fulfil in order to create an 
organisation — still leaves little room for civil society organisations and activities (cf.: George 
2000:Chapter 14; Lee 2001; Tan 2005; Chua 2005a; Chua 2005b).
In Singapore, the family of the potential research subject is, in general, automatically integrated 
to the discussion about whether or not the subject should give his or her bodily tissues. Chan’s 
survey of doctors’ attitudes in Singapore, for example, reveals that ‘ninety percent [of doctors] 
consider it appropriate to discuss a patient’s case with immediate family members’ (2000:73). 
Similarly, nurses at both the National Cancer Centre’s and the National University Hospital’s 
Tissue Repositories will, in principle, contact the family of the prospective donor to discuss the 
issue with its members. When prospective research subjects are elderly persons, nurses will 
first contact the family members to ask them whether they can approach the research subjects 
(Kon 2007; Tissue Repository at the National University Hospital 2007). The family’s key role 
in the process of informed consent in Singapore is related to official discourses about the 
family as the basic unit o f Singaporean society and the importance of filial piety.
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These discourses were first developed as part of the rhetoric on Asian values that emerged in 
the 1980s (cf. Hill and Lian 1995:Chapter 6; Tan 2001). One o f the major values identified in 
the 1991 White Paper on Shared Values was the notion o f ‘family as the basic unit of society’ 
(Government o f Singapore 1991:10). This was further elaborated in a 1994 report on 
Singapore's Family Values that identified the Confucian notion of ‘filial piety’ as one of the five 
family values shared by Singaporeans (Hill and Lian 1995:154; cf. also: Ministry o f Community 
Development 1994). Filial piety requires children to show respect and deference towards their 
parents and to care for them when they become old. As elsewhere in Asia, it has often been 
mooted as a specifically Asian value and a bulwark against Western individualism (cf. 
Sakamoto 1999; Hattori 2002; Yu 2002). Even after Singapore abandoned its Asian value 
rhetoric in the late 1990s, the government did not abandon its promotion o f strong families 
and filial responsibility (cf. chapter 5). For example, in one of its latest nation-building projects, 
a report entided Singapore 21: Together; We Can Make the Difference, the government argued that 
‘strong families’ were the country’s ‘foundation and future’ (1999:24). The notion of strong 
families signifies, among other things, that children, ‘when [their] parents reach their twilight 
years,’ should offer them ‘support’ and ‘care’ for them (ibid. p.27). This means that children 
should and will take care of their parents’ health care when they are old, taking with them and 
liaising with doctors (Kon 2007; Tissue Repository at the National University Hospital 2007). 
Thus, the will o f doctors and nurses to integrate the family in discussions about the donation 
o f tissue is, in Singapore, a sign o f sensitivity towards the prospective research subject and his 
or her family.
In many Asian countries, the integration of the family in the process of informed consent is 
interpreted, by bio-ethicists, as evidence that Asians have a different understanding of both the 
doctor-patient relationship and the human being as well as, more generally, different cultural 
values than in the West (e.g. Asai 1996; Fan 1997; Sakamoto 1999; Hattori 2002; Yu 2002; 
Chan 2004; Cong 2004). Given that in Singapore the particular place given to the family within 
the process o f informed consent is a consequence of the country’s Asian values rhetoric, it 
would make sense to interpret this place as proof that Singaporeans have different cultural 
values than in the West (Chan 2000; Yu 2002). But, unlike in other Asian countries, neither of 
Singapore’s two bioethical committees perceives the role given to the family by doctors and 
nurses as evidence that Singaporeans have an understanding o f the doctor-patient relationship 
and the human being that is culturally different than in the West (Elliott 2007). On the 
contrary, they argue that Singaporean and Western understandings are in principle similar (e.g. 
National Medical Ethics Committee 1995; Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D ; Bioethics 
Advisory Committee 2004; Bioethics Advisory Committee 2007a). There are two main reasons
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for the committees’ desire not to emphasise possible cultural differences between Singapore 
and the West. Firstly, the idea that there are cultural values that are specifically Asian and 
superior to Western values lost its attractiveness after the 1997-1999 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Indeed, the crisis has often been perceived in Singapore and other South-East Asian countries 
as a refutation o f this idea, leading these countries to quietly abandon their Asian values 
rhetoric and talk about cultural differences (Thompson 2001; Chong 2004). Secondly, 
Singapore’s desire to be recognised as a world-class player in biomedical research meant that 
the country had to adopt a system o f ethical governance that conformed to (not culturally 
different from) globally recognised moral standards. Only such a system could bring the 
international credibility that Singapore strived for (cf. chapter 5).
The third and last rule or technology to encourage and enable the research subject to think and 
decide is the injunction made to researchers not to temper with the research subjects’ capacity 
to reflect and decide by using any forms of coercion or manipulation. This injunction can be 
found in many texts on informed consent. Carolyn Faulder, for example, argues that:
‘Our bodies belong to us ...  We alone must decide whether we wish to lean our bodies to the cause 
o f  medical research. N o  one has ...  the right to seek to influence, deceive or manipulate us into 
making a decision which is against our own best wishes for ourselves’ (1985:128-129)
Similarly, O ’Neill and Manson argue that researchers have no right to use ‘coercion, duress, 
force or constraint’ or deception, manipulation or fraud’ to try to bring a prospective research 
subject to give his or her bodily tissues to medical research (2007:76 & 92). So too, the 
Singapore Guideline for Good Clinical Practice explains that:
‘Neither the investigator, nor the [research] staff, should coerce or unduly influence a subject to 
participate [in a research project]’ (Ministry o f  Health 1999:28).
There are, according to the literature on informed consent, a number of situations that can 
lead to undue influence or pressure being exercised on prospective research subjects and 
should thus be avoided. One of these situations is when the researcher is the doctor in charge 
o f the prospective research subject’s health. Here, the subject and patient can feel that he or 
she has to give his or her bodily tissues to further benefit from the doctor and researcher’s 
services. Singapore’s National Medical Ethics Committee, for example, argues that ‘patients 
may feel undue pressure if consent is requested by physicians directly responsible for their 
care’ (Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D , Paragraph 2.5.2). Similarly, Martin Bobrow 
explains that:
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‘It is easy to forget how many different people may bring pressure to bear on som eone to participate 
in a medical procedure ...  The m ost likely culprit is the attending medical professional. Often this is a 
person that they see as having some authority, frequendy som eone to whom they entrust their health 
and believe they are indebted for services already rendered Unless this is made explicit to them, they 
may feel that the extent to which they receive proper care depends on them being cooperative in 
agreeing to take part in research’ (Bobrow 2004:2).
To avoid this situation, the literature on informed consent recommends that researchers 
discuss this issue explicitly with the patient and ensure them that their refusal to take part will 
not affect the medical care they will receive. For example, the Patient Information Pamphlet of 
Singapore’s National Cancer Centre Tissue Repository explains to patients that ‘whether [or 
not] you choose to donate, your medical care will not be affected’ (2005:2). Similarly, Martin 
Bobrow recommends that, to avoid that patients feel obliged to participate, the professional 
must go an extra mile to point out that the quality o f care they will deliver is not contingent on 
the patient agreeing to take in a research programme’ (2004:2). Alternatively, some texts on 
informed consent recommend that, instead o f the researcher-physician, a third party with no 
stakes in the issue should discuss with the patient and ask for his or her consent. Singapore’s 
Bioethics Advisory Committee, for example, argues that:
‘In instances where patients may be potential research participants, we reiterate that particular caution 
is necessary when the attending physician is also the researcher, lest patients feel under an obligation 
to their physicians. .. .  Where the risk o f  pressure on a prospective research participant is seen as 
significant, it may require an independent competent third party to take consent’ (Bioethics Advisory 
Committee 2007a:24).
Another situation that can lead to undue influence or pressure being exercised on prospective 
research subjects and that should thus be avoided is when these potential subjects are either 
prisoners or in a dependent relationship with the researcher (e.g. students, junior medical staff, 
nurses, etc.). According to the literature on informed consent, such prospective research 
subjects are not really free to refuse their consent. Singapore’s National Medical Ethics 
Committee, for example, explains that, ‘because of their special status, questions can always be 
raised about [prisoners’] freedom to refuse consent’ (Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D , 
Paragraph 2.5.6.2). Similarly, the Committee also suggests that ‘subjects, who maybe in 
dependent relationships with investigators (e.g. students, junior medical staff, nurses, etc.), may 
not feel “free” to refuse’ (ibid.). In general, texts on informed consent recommend that 
prisoners or people in dependent relationships should not be asked to donate their tissues to 
research. Singapore’s National Medical Ethics Committee, for example, explains that ‘research 
on prisoners should not be undertaken’ (ibid.). Similarly, the Royal College o f Physicians 
explains that:
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TSJo student should undertake experiments for any investigator who acts as a personal tutor to that 
student... Similar considerations apply to others in hierarchical relationships e.g. junior medical or 
nursing sta ff (Royal College o f  Physicians 2007:61).
Yet another situation that can lead to undue influence or pressure being exercised on 
prospective research subjects and that should thus be avoided is when they are paid to give 
their bodily tissues for research. According to the literature on informed consent, monetary 
rewards could persuade people against their better judgement. The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, for example, argues that monetary rewards for giving human tissue ‘may obstruct 
rather than secure genuine consent’ (1995:50). Similarly, Singapore’s National Medical Ethics 
Committee suggests that ‘excessive remuneration or other forms o f benefit’ can ‘persuade 
patients to volunteer against their better judgment’ (Ministry o f Health 1998:Annex IV /D , 
Paragraph 2.5.3). Given the risk of coercion or manipulation that monetary rewards entail, the 
literature on informed consent generally forbids any such remuneration (e.g.: Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics 1995:Chapter 6; Medical Research Council 2001a; Bioethics Advisory Committee 
2002b).
Conclusion
The aim o f this chapter has been to contribute to our understanding of ways in which the 
different principles, expertise, institutions and procedures that make up bioethical governance 
reconfigure m odem subjectivities and citizenship. To do so, it has focused on a key element of 
bioethical governance -  the notion of informed consent. Except when there are marked and 
relevant differences, the chapter has drawn its illustrations without distinction from the United 
Kingdom and Singapore. This has been made possible by the fact that Singapore has adopted 
and implemented a very similar notion of informed consent to the one existing in the UK. 
This, as explained in chapter 5, is a consequence o f Singapore’s understanding of bioethical 
governance as a mechanism to produce international credibility.
Before exploring the way informed consent has sought, through its principles, procedures and 
institutions, to transform modern subjectivities and forms of citizenship, the chapter gave an 
introductory account of the notion o f informed consent. Situating informed consent within 
bioethical governance, it has showed how informed consent is both an ethical principle and a 
series of ethical technologies that seek to ensure that human beings are respected and 
protected from the dangers relative to the collection and medical use of human tissue. It has 
also demonstrated that informed consent has become a cornerstone o f ethics governance in
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both the UK and Singapore. To do so, it has drawn attention to the ever increasing number of 
texts that recommend the application of informed consent, explain its importance and 
functioning and /o r discuss the ways in which it should be operationalised.
Having given a description o f the principle o f informed consent and its key role within 
bioethical governance, the chapter went on to analyse the ways in which the principle of 
informed consent and the ethical technologies that operationalise it reconfigure modem 
subjectivities and forms of citizenship. The chapter argued, in that respect, that informed 
consent is articulated around a particular figure of the subject: the human being capable of 
reflecting and deciding on his or her own existence and body. Taking its cue from Hacking’s 
(2002) essay ‘Making Up People’ and Rose’s (1996c; 1999b) analysis o f the psy-sciences, the 
chapter further argued that this figure of the subject around which the notion o f informed 
consent revolves is both a reality that the bioethical literature on informed consent 
presupposes and one that it helps to create. On the one hand, the figure o f the human being 
capable o f reflecting and deciding is, according to this literature, how people really are. It is this 
already existing human being that this literature aims to protect against the dangers of modem 
medical science through the principle of informed consent and the different techniques that 
operationalise it. On the other hand, the descriptions of this human being that one finds in the 
literature on informed consent participate in the construction o f this particular subject by 
creating a sphere o f possibility for people to think and interact accordingly. This sphere of 
possibility and, thereby the figure of the human being is further reinforced by the ethical 
technologies that the literature on informed consent devises to ensure that this particular 
subject can be enacted and is respected in the rapports between researchers and research 
subjects.
Before substantiating this argument, the chapter made two caveats. Firsdy, it explained that the 
figure o f the human being capable o f reflecting and deciding is not particular to bioethical 
governance. O n the contrary this understanding of the person has a long genealogy in the 
West and has been at the heart of a series of practices. The bioethical literature on informed 
consent partakes in and further strengthens these pre-existent and widespread cultural 
assumptions about personhood. Secondly, the chapter made clear that while the literature on 
informed consent creates a sphere of possibilities in which people can act as human beings 
able to reflect and decide, this does not mean that people will effectively do so in real life. In 
actual fact and as medical ethnographers have extensively documented, people do often not 
conform to the descriptions of human beings and human actions put forward by bio-ethicists.
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In order to substantiate this argument, the chapter examined, first of all, the way the literature 
on informed consent portrays the human being as ‘a person’ who is ‘able to think, act and 
communicate.’ It has described how the person is conceived as a being graced with a series of 
faculties — that of holding particular values, of communicating, of thinking and of deciding — 
which it terms ‘the capacity to reflect and decide.’ It also explained how, according to the 
literature on informed consent, this capacity develops during childhood and how it can be lost 
during adulthood at the inset of a mental illness or disability. As further evidence for its 
argument, the chapter also examined how this same literature portrays informed consent as a 
means o f transforming the doctor-patient relationship. For this literature, such a 
transformation is necessary in order to allow the ‘patient as person’ to unfold and to use his or 
her capacity to think and decide about his or her body and health.
The first step in this transformation is the elimination o f the paternalistic ethos around which, 
it is argued, the doctor-patient relationship has long been articulated. Indeed, as the chapter 
showed, this ethos based on doctors deciding what is best for patients without consulting them 
very much negates the notion of the patient as a person capable of thinking, acting and 
communicating put forward by the literature on informed consent. The second step in the 
transformation o f the doctor-patient relationship is its re-organisation around the concepts of 
‘communication’ and ‘time and space to think.’ The chapter showed how, according to the 
literature on informed consent, this re-organisation should enable potential research subjects to 
think and decide about whether or not they want to donate their bodily tissues to medical 
research. The chapter described in particular the different rules and ethical technologies of 
government devised by this literature to ensure that a dialogue takes place between doctor and 
patient during which the latter receives sufficient information to think and decide what he or 
she wants to do. The chapter also described the series of rules and technologies set out by this 
same literature to ensure that the patient has the necessary time, support and space to think 
and decide what he or she wants to do. It is maybe worth underlining here how astonishing it 
is that the desire to protect subjects from the potential dangers of medical science has been 
translated into such a complex set of ethical technologies for managing the relations between 
doctors and patients.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that, over the last twenty years, a new logic of rule, which I have termed 
‘bioethical governance,’ has reconfigured the way the scientific and medical use o f the human 
body is problematised and administered. As the thesis has showed, bioethical governance is an 
immense apparatus made of a series o f resolutely heterogeneous elements, including: key 
categories such as ‘the human being;’ research centres on bioethics; a particular language and 
argumentative style; instruction manuals and tests to determine whether an individual has the 
capacity to grasp information and take decisions; human tissue banks; official reports on the 
medical use o f human tissue; distinctive ‘problems o f ethics;’ injunctions to patients to take 
their time to reflect on whether they want to give parts o f their body to medical research; 
professional degrees in medical ethics; moral principles such as ‘the respect for life;’ guidelines 
on how to ethically collect human biological samples; systems to document and account for 
the interactions between researchers and research subjects; translators and consent nurses; 
medical law textbooks; invitations to patients to ask questions; national commissions on 
bioethics; patient information sheets and consent forms; articles in bioethical journals; and 
regulatory agencies.
As this thesis has further showed, three o f the numerous elements that compose bioethical 
governance are particularly characteristic of this new mentality of rule. Firstly, a belief that 
medical research with human tissues constitutes an ‘ethical issue’ because of the dangers it 
represents for human beings and a corresponding desire to solve this issue by re-organising 
biomedical science in a way that is protective and respectful of human life and dignity. 
Secondly, the institutional form of the bioethical committee whose members are philosophers, 
theologians, doctors and lawyers and whose mandate is to analyse and offer solutions to the 
ethical issues that the medical use of the human body is supposed to generate. Thirdly, an 
assemblage of codes, practical instructions and guidance, formal procedures and monitoring 
bodies generally referred to as an ‘ethical framework’ and which aims to guarantee that the 
collection and use o f human body parts in medical research is done in a way that respects and 
protects human beings.
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As the thesis has made clear, bioethical governance has become a mentality o f rule that is both 
widespread and exerting a growing influence across the globe. At first the preserve of 
philosophers and lawyers specialising in biomedical ethics and law, it has now been adopted by 
a wide range o f actors, including: international organisations such as UNESCO, the W HO and 
the OECD; national ethics commissions; funding agencies for medical research; life sciences 
laboratories, hospitals; pharmaceutical companies; professional medical associations; and 
patient organisations. Furthermore, while bioethical governance was first developed and 
restricted to countries in the West, most notably the United States o f America and the United 
Kingdom, it has been increasingly exported outside the Western world in the last fifteen years. 
Countries like Brazil, China, Japan and Singapore, for example, have all recendy adopted and 
introduced this new mentality of rule.
This thesis has focused on the development o f bioethical governance in the United Kingdom 
and Singapore. Both at the forefront o f biomedical research and bioethical thinking today, 
these two countries offer an interesting combination o f similarities and differences. There are 
many similarities in the way their medicine is organised as well as in the content and structure 
o f their ethical frameworks, most o f which are due to a shared colonial past and exchanges 
which have remained important even after independence in 1959. These similarities stand in 
productive tension with a series of differences between the two countries. There are, to start 
with, differences in the way bioethical governance was developed in the UK and Singapore. In 
the former, it progressively grew out o f the discourse o f bioethics from the late 1980s onwards 
as in other Western countries such as the USA. By contrast, in Singapore it was imported 
ready-made in a short period around and after the millennium. Furthermore, the two countries’ 
histories post-1960 also present some important differences. The UK had to contend with the 
end of empire, de-industrialisation and the emergence o f neo-liberalism and other radical 
discourses from the 1960s. At the same time, Singapore was concerned with its development 
and modernisation as well as with building a post-colonial national identity centred on 
specifically Asian values.
Based on comprehensive archival research and a series o f complementary interviews and using 
Foucault’s (1991a; 2004a; 2004b) genealogical approach, this thesis has examined three aspects 
o f bioethical governance in the UK and Singapore. Firstly, it has mapped out the ways to think 
about, problematise and administer the medical use o f the human body before the emergence 
o f bioethical governance. The thesis has argued that, from the 1820s to the 1980s, there were 
two principal logics of rule that dominated the way the medical use of the human body was 
thought about and organised. The description o f these two mentalities o f government, which I
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have termed ‘anatomical liberal governance’ and ‘haemato-social governance’ respectively, 
offered an interesting contrast to bioethical governance. Most significantly, this contrast has 
enabled the thesis to highlight some of the distinctive features o f bioethical governance such as 
the typical bioethical knowledge which it incorporates, its belief in the dangers of science and 
its emphasis on informed consent.
Secondly, the thesis has located and traced the development and assemblage o f the 
rationalities, authorities and practices that make the existence o f bioethical governance in the 
UK and Singapore possible today (cf. Donzelot 1980; Barry, Osbom e et al. 1996; Miller and 
Rose 2008). Although the two countries share an identical model o f bioethical governance, the 
thesis has argued that the conditions o f existence of bioethical governance in the UK were 
different from those in Singapore. The thesis has demonstrated that the development of 
bioethical governance in the UK is the product of a ‘will to protect human beings’ from the 
dangers o f modem medicine. This will to protect human beings, the thesis has argued, is a style 
o f thought that grew out of modem bioethics and that is articulated around the following five 
elements: a belief that modem medicine is dangerous, a desire to respect human beings, 
bioethical committees, moral codes and technologies.
In contrast to this, the thesis has argued that the import o f bioethical governance to Singapore 
in the late 1990s was the result not o f the growth of bioethics but of a relentless ‘will to 
modernise’ the country. This will, the thesis has argued, is a style o f thought that has 
characterised the Singaporean leadership ever since independence in 1959 and which is built 
around, in particular, an economically determined notion o f modernisation and the concept of 
infrastructure. The thesis has showed how, after informing the country’s industrialisation in the 
1960-70s, this will led the Singaporean government to transform the island into a world-class 
hub for the biomedical sciences from the mid 1980s onwards. For the Singaporean leadership, 
bioethical governance was a way to ensure the good reputation o f the country’s biomedical 
research and was, as such, one element of the ‘infrastructure’ that the government set out to 
build in order to attract multinational pharmaceutical companies to relocate on the island.
The third aspect of bioethical governance explored by this thesis is the way in which the 
different rationalities, authorities and practices that make up this new logic o f rule are 
articulated around and help reconfigure modern subjectivities and forms o f citizenship (cf. 
Rose 1996c; Rose 1999b; Hacking 2002; Isin 2002). Focusing on a key element of bioethical 
governance — the principle o f informed consent and the different ethical technologies devised 
to operationalise it — the thesis has argued that informed consent is articulated around a
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particular figure o f the subject: the human being capable o f reflecting on and deciding about 
his or her own existence and body. On the one hand, this human being is considered to be a 
natural given by bio-ethicists. Indeed, this figure is at the centre of their efforts to protect 
human beings from the dangers of modern medical science. On the other hand, bio-ethicists, 
by their discussions of this figure o f the subject and their efforts to protect it also participate in 
the constitution o f this particular human being. Indeed, the linguistic categories which they use 
to describe this human being as well as the ethical technologies which they devise to ensure 
that this particular subject is respected in the rapports between researchers and research 
subjects create a sphere o f possibilities for people to think and interact accordingly.
These original insights on bioethics and the ethical governance o f the life sciences provided by 
this thesis stem from its genealogical approach that contrasts with the perspective generally 
adopted in the sociological literature in this field. Two differences in particular are worth 
highlighting. Firsdy, this thesis does not bemoan bioethics’ bureaucratic structure or condemn 
its perceived complicity with the biomedical industry in exploiting research subjects, as do 
most researchers in this field (e.g. Elliott 1999; Jasanoff 2005; Salter and Salter 2005; Waldby 
and Mitchell 2006; Sunder Rajan 2007). Instead it has focused on the rationalities, practices 
and authorities that compose bioethics and the ethical governance of the life sciences. This 
difference o f focus has allowed the thesis to identify and draw attention to the gigantic 
heterogeneous assemblage of linguistic categories, moral principles, expertise, formalised 
procedures, typical problems and institutional forms that make bioethical thought and 
intervention possible in the first place. Secondly, this thesis does not criticise bioethics’ abstract 
and Western notion of the subject and its failure to grasp socio-cultural realities as many 
scholars have done (cf. DeVries and Subedi 1998; Kleinman 1999; Hoffmaster 2001a; Corrigan 
2003). Instead, it has assessed the role played by bioethical governance in the constitution of 
modem subjectivities. This difference o f focus allowed this thesis to emphasise the creative 
power of the knowledges, practices and institutions that make up today’s immense bioethical 
dispositif. More specifically and as alluded to above, this particular focus has allowed this thesis 
to identify and draw our attention to the figure of the human being brought into being by the 
vast bioethical literature on informed consent.
More importandy, this thesis also contributes to the burgeoning study o f what I have termed 
‘contemporary ethical discourses.’ By this term I refer to these new languages o f virtue — 
discourses on human rights and democracy, agendas for environmental sustainability, 
corporate social responsibility programmes, bioethics and the like — that have flourished since 
the end o f the Cold War and which seek to infuse various domains o f life such as war, trade
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and science with a renewed sense of morality. Many scholars have recognised the rising 
significance of these contemporary ethical discourses and started to study their impact on 
modem forms of governance and subjectivity (cf. Rose 1999a:Chapter 5; Strathern 2000b; 
MacDonald 2003; Osborne 2003; Barry 2004; Guilhot 2005:Chapter 1; Rabinow and Palsson 
2005; Barnet, Clarke et al. 2007; Dean 2007:Chapter 3; Power 2007; Weszkalnys 2007; Moon 
2008). Some have identified a shift of mentality from an opposition to capitalism to a will to 
‘ethicise’ it which, they argue, has allowed these politics o f virtue to proliferate after the end of 
the Cold War (MacDonald 2003; Osbom e 2003; Guilhot 2005). Others have explored some of 
the institutional forms such as the non-governmental organisation (or N G O ) that make 
contemporary ethical languages possible (Strathern 2000b; Barry 2004; Guilhot 2005; Rabinow 
and Palsson 2005). Others still have analysed particular technologies of government without 
which some moral discourses could not exist such ‘standardised narrative reporting/ ‘league 
tables and rankings’ for corporate ethics governance (Power 2007:93,94; cf. also: Barry 2004; 
Weszkalnys 2007). Finally, some o f these scholars have discussed new forms o f citizenship that 
these languages o f virtue both assume and help to bring into being, such as the figure o f the 
‘moral fieldworkers’ (Strathern 2000b:2; cf. also Guilhot 2005:5) and that o f the ‘ethical 
consumer’ (Barnet, Clarke et al. 2007).
The genealogy o f bioethical governance put forward in this thesis offers a double contribution 
to the study of this ‘ethical turn’ in governing. Firstly, its in-depth analysis o f one particular 
language o f virtue (bioethics) adds to our understanding of the conditions o f possibility and 
processes o f subjectification associated with these ethical discourses. Secondly, this thesis also 
provides us with a conceptual framework with which to explore the impact o f other languages 
o f virtue on today’s forms o f governance and notions of subjectivity. As explained in the 
thesis, the framework used in this research is built around concepts such as ‘problematisation,’ 
‘rationalities,’ ‘technologies’ and ‘subjectivities.’ These concepts were initially developed by the 
literature on govemmentality to analyse the impact of liberalism and neo-liberalism on 
mentalities o f rule and modes o f being. This thesis suggests that these concepts can and should 
now be applied to the new languages of virtue that have thrived since the fall o f the Berlin 
Wall. Such an approach, it is suggested, should allow us to better understand the way in which 
the ethical turn in governance has transformed our logics o f rule and our notions of 
subjectivity over the last twenty years.
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